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22 MS CARSS-FRISK: Absolutely, with a sort of symmetry between
23 a public international plane remedy and there not being
24 a remedy in the domestic court, yes.
25 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: Yes.

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1 MS CARSS-FRISK: If we then look at the sort of overarching


2 test for working out when a particular act really is to
3 then be seen as an act of a State that introduces State
4 immunity in this sense, the way that Lord Bingham puts
5 it is to refer to whether there is a sufficient degree
6 of connection between the acts in question and the
7 foreign State.
8 You get that from paragraph 11, if I could just ask
9 you to turn it up. He says:
10 "In some borderline cases there could be doubt
11 whether the conduct of an individual although a servant
12 or agent of a State had a sufficient connection with the
13 State to entitle it to claim immunity for his conduct."
14 And, of course, it is possible for a State official
15 to act in a purely private capacity, but in this case,
16 for the reasons I have already mentioned, it is clear
17 that the claim is abuse of power.
18 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: Yes.
19 MS CARSS-FRISK: So in a sense, my Lord, I don't need to go
20 into the intricacies of what is meant by "sufficient
21 connection" or exactly how you find that out, because,
22 as I have said, it is clear on the face of the pleading.
23 But if it is necessary to go into it, we would suggest
24 there are factors that are obviously relevant to that
25 question of sufficient connection such as the identity

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1 of the relevant actors, and here the identity of the


2 relevant actors is that they are all clearly public
3 officials at various levels of seniority with, as I have
4 said, the defendant at the top of the pyramid as
5 Prime Minister/Minister of Foreign Affairs.
6 The other relevant factor, we would suggest, is the
7 nature of the powers being used, the nature of the act
8 involving State power. Does it involve a use of State
9 power?
10 Well, in this case again we are talking about
11 expropriation pursuant to various State powers. We are
12 talking about detention pursuant to various State
13 powers. Again, whether ultimately lawful or not, there
14 is no doubt on the pleaded case that this is what the
15 claim is about, and as it happens on the evidence before
16 you there is no doubt about it either, but, of course,
17 we are focusing on the way that the case is put.
18 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: Yes.
19 MS CARSS-FRISK: It is no doubt also relevant to look at the
20 purposes or purported purposes of the acts in question.
21 Well, again so far as expropriation is concerned,
22 certainly for the purposes or at least purported
23 purposes of public benefit in the shape of the so-called
24 Education City project, your Lordship may remember that
25 was why the land was appropriated from the claimant as

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1 was the land of many others.


2 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: Had this project proceeded there is
3 foreign universities on this land --
4 MS CARSS-FRISK: Absolutely, yes.
5 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: -- so it didn't end up by chance in
6 someone's personal possession.
7 MS CARSS-FRISK: Absolutely not. One can look at all of
8 that on the website. As far as I can see, there is no
9 dispute about that at all.
10 So far as detention is concerned, again as
11 your Lordship knows, certainly that was for a public
12 purpose or at least purportedly so, ie to do with
13 a criminal investigation, and indeed charge.
14 In addition, one may factor in, so far as detention
15 is concerned, that what is being alleged is that the
16 claimant was held at various facilities that were in
17 fact prisons in Qatar, State facilities.
18 So everything has a public flavour consistently with
19 what is said in the letter before claim and what is said
20 in the pleading itself about abuse of public office.
21 So what then is the claimant's response to this. Of
22 course, I will have a right of reply, but very, very
23 briefly --
24 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: We have finished with Jones now, have we?
25 MS CARSS-FRISK: We have finished with Jones now. As

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1 I understand it, it is being said, well, but the


2 defendant and the State of Qatar haven't stated that the
3 claimed actions of the defendant were acts of a State.
4 That is a reference to paragraph 5.1 of the claimant's
5 skeleton.
6 Without taking you to the evidence on this, can
7 I just put down a marker that that is, with respect,
8 just a clear misreading of the defendant's position.
9 One focuses, of course, on what is being alleged.
10 Indeed that is what the claimant invites the court to
11 do. So there is absolutely no inconsistency between it
12 being said on behalf of the defendant that he was not
13 materially involved in these acts, but at the same time
14 it being said on his behalf and on behalf of the
15 State of Qatar, importantly, that these allegations
16 involved acts that would trigger State immunity if they
17 took place that would be the nature of the acts, if they
18 took place as per the claimant's case.
19 Your Lordship may have seen, and I will come back to
20 it if I have to in reply, that the Attorney General, and
21 indeed the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was very, very
22 clear in their evidence, that State immunity is taken as
23 a point on behalf of the State of Qatar, its case being
24 that it is being impleaded in this case.
25 The next point then being taken by the claimant, as

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1 I understand it, is that, well, it is not enough for us


2 to rely simply on what is said to have been done by
3 other Qatari officials than the defendant, but
4 your Lordship has our simple answer to that, which is,
5 well, we are not relying simply on the acts of other
6 Qatari officials. We are saying they are part of the
7 picture with the defendant being sued and allegations
8 being made against him as having exerted influence under
9 colour of his office. That phrase "under colour of his
10 office" is, of course, one also referred to in the Jones
11 case.
12 That then also means, for the reasons that we have
13 already discussed, that there is nothing in the Court of
14 Appeal's decision in Belhaj that undermines our case on
15 State immunity here. Belhaj probably was that the
16 relevant officials of the foreign States in question
17 were not being sued, but here the defendant, an official
18 of the foreign State in question, is being sued.
19 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: Yes.
20 MS CARSS-FRISK: My Lord, that then completes our
21 submissions for now on State immunity.
22 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: Thank you very much.
23 (10.40 am)
24 Submissions by MR DE LA MERE
25 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: Just before you get underway,

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1 Mr De La Mere, can you so arrange it round about 11.30


2 to have a pause and a break for the shorthand writers.
3 MR DE LA MERE: Of course, my Lord.
4 My Lord, you will be aware that this cases arises,
5 my client says and you must assume for the purposes of
6 this strike out, from the culmination of a long-running
7 feud between him and the defendant. That feud started
8 when or shortly after the claimant was, on his account,
9 purged from his office as a spokesman for the
10 State of Qatar. It then escalated through disputes
11 about fee payments, salary, compulsory purchase of land,
12 and then culminated in the high point, which is
13 effectively, my client would say, the extraordinary
14 rendition that occurred in Saudi Arabia and his
15 subsequent unlawful incommunicado detention in Qatar of
16 such duration and of such intensity intended to inflict
17 psychological harm and so as to amount to torture.
18 It is a critical part of that feud that it started
19 or at least escalated with the defendant's actions being
20 taken in what is obviously a private capacity.
21 Now, in the context of this case it is, in my
22 submission, critically important to realise that the
23 defendant throughout the 2000s has continued to pursue
24 his extensive private business interests, even when
25 Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of Qatar.

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1 For proof positive of that you need look no further


2 than his multi-billion pound investment in Barclays Bank
3 in 2008 at the height of the credit crisis. It was an
4 investment made in his private capacity for his own or
5 his own family's exclusive benefit through his
6 Challenger private investment vehicle, and it was an
7 investment made alongside another multi-billion pound
8 investment by the Qatari Sovereign Wealth Fund, the
9 Qatari Investment Authority or QIA, which he also
10 chaired at the same time.
11 The unchallenged evidence in relation to that you
12 can find in Mr Barnett's witness statement, bundle 2,
13 tab 12, page 187, paragraphs 60 to 63.
14 Those investments and the circumstances surrounding
15 them are the subject of an ongoing and high profile SFO
16 investigation against Barclays, I must emphasise, in
17 which one must anticipate there is every prospect that
18 the defendant will be a highly significant witness if
19 compellable.
20 I mention this, because to English, indeed western
21 eyes, this untroubled blending of private interests and
22 public functions at the highest level of the Qatari
23 State is, to say the least, anomalous, and yet, as we
24 shall see, it would appear to be the order of business
25 in Qatar. It is relevant context because the feud with

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1 my client is just one aspect of the defendant dealing in


2 this way, simultaneously, if you like, as a kind of
3 Warren Buffet of Qatari investment whilst being the
4 Prime Minister or Foreign Minister of the State.
5 One can see the private realm dimension to the
6 dispute with my client in a number of contexts. First
7 of all, for instance, the interference with the success
8 fee that my client says was due to him for his work in
9 assisting recovery of assets misappropriated by the then
10 former Emir. Proceedings were brought in order to
11 recover State funds misappropriated by the former Emir,
12 and my client says he was entitled to a success fee,
13 which was then effectively knocked down, and then it
14 moved into the beginnings of dispute about the Al-Rayyan
15 land, if one looks at paragraphs 18 to 22 of the
16 evidence.
17 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: Of the particulars of claim or ...
18 MR DE LA MERE: Of his witness statement.
19 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: Of your client's witness statement?
20 MR DE LA MERE: Yes. That initially began with the
21 defendant attempting to persuade my client to sell him
22 the Al-Rayyan land in a purely private capacity, and my
23 client's evidence is that the defendant was angry and
24 upset when rebuffed because the price was insufficient.
25 As detailed at paragraphs 20 to 21, my client says that

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1 the steps thereafter taken were effectively taken in


2 a private capacity, seeking to use his influence and
3 power to secure that the State did something he wanted
4 it to do.
5 Now, this will lead when we come to the State
6 immunity side of the case to a critical problem of
7 categorisation and a critical problem of ascertaining
8 where influence lies, because what is central in this
9 case is effectively that the defendant has two strands
10 to his power base, two strands to his influence. He has
11 formal power, and real power, accrued through office,
12 and he has real power, real politik power acquired
13 through his business interests, his family connections,
14 his connections to whoever may be the Emir at the time,
15 and whether or not he has the ability to exert influence
16 through persuasion and so forth. It is a different
17 analysis one must conduct in Qatar, which is after all
18 ultimately a form of absolute monarchy than one would
19 ordinary exercise in the context of a State.
20 Critically for this claim the feud culminated in my
21 client who had left Qatar by that stage to escape the
22 hostile attentions of the defendant to being
23 extraordinarily rendered from Saudi Arabia. That is
24 a horrible legal euphemism that we are all familiar
25 with. In ordinary language, he was in effect forcibly

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1 taken in Saudi Arabia, a like attempt having failed in


2 Doha, by unidentified officers, now said to be Saudi
3 security officers, and forcibly taken from Saudi Arabia
4 where he was legally resident to Qatar. The said basis
5 for this was that he had committed crimes against the
6 State by disclosing State secrets in the course of
7 administrative proceedings he had brought to seek to
8 recover his salary, which had been withdrawn. Again, he
9 says, at instigation of the defendant.
10 All of this was done with no legal process whatever
11 as he was entitled to, both as a Qatari citizen, and
12 indeed -- and Ms Carss-Frisk was at pains to point this
13 out -- a Qatari citizen with a diplomatic passport --
14 that in itself is extraordinary -- but also as a British
15 citizen holding a British passport.
16 The evidence is clear that he was held in
17 incommunicado detention between October 2009
18 and May 2011. He was held in solitary confinement, with
19 no family contact whatever, no contact with anyone, for
20 instance other prisoners, other than guards who were
21 instructed to minimise contact, and his evidence, see
22 paragraph 63 of his statement, is he wasn't even allowed
23 to speak to his lawyer in that initial period in whose
24 presence he was but twice.
25 Solitary confinement came to an end in May 2011 when

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1 in effect, according to my client, he did a deal, and


2 the deal was in effect he would ask his sister not to
3 picket or petition at the Qatari World Cup bid that was
4 then in progress in Switzerland in return for which
5 there would be an alleviation of his prison conditions,
6 family contact would be allowed and he would be allowed
7 to make calls to his family, and one can see that very
8 clearly documented at paragraphs 72 to 73. What my
9 client's further evidence is, is that solitary
10 confinement was effectively restored after the success
11 of the Qatari bid for the World Cup.
12 He then attempted to escape. There was a threat of
13 charges against him for his attempts to escape.
14 Thereafter he wasn't charged but remained in a form of
15 administrative detention.
16 I should probably at that juncture address the point
17 my Lord directed to Ms Carss-Frisk. I think one of the
18 very real issues in this case will be whether or not the
19 form of detention in question was administrative
20 detention subject to review by some form of bail
21 restriction or detention pursuant to a court order, and
22 I know my Lord is well aware that as matter of English
23 law administrative detention subject to bail is if the
24 underlying detention is unlawful capable of a claim of
25 false imprisonment, and indeed there is a very

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1 substantial claim pending in relation to administrative


2 detention by the UK in such circumstances arising out of
3 the events in Libya.
4 Now, I mention all of this, and in particular the
5 incommunicado detention of this kind and duration
6 because it really goes to what the underlying essence of
7 this claim is. My client has a claim that he was in
8 substance subjected to a form of psychological torture.
9 These are not empty words. During this period, his
10 case was vigorously taken up by the UN special
11 rapporteur on torture, and his case has figured
12 prominently in various national country reports, and NGO
13 country risk reports from this period, from 2010 and
14 2011. The reference to the UN special rapporteur report
15 is at paragraph 1 footnote in our skeleton.
16 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: Do I have the report in the ...
17 MR DE LA MERE: I believe you do at the reference given in
18 the skeleton.
19 These are claims that, of course, in essence seek to
20 vindicate his civil rights, civil rights that are
21 consequent upon the international abhorrence of kidnap
22 and rendition, and even more particularly of arbitrary
23 detention of such severity, such stricture as to amount
24 to torture.
25 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: Is this special rapporteur engaged as

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1 a result of any treaty obligations of the Emirate --


2 MR DE LA MERE: I'm sorry, my Lord?
3 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: Is the function of the UN special
4 rapporteur engaged because of any treaty obligations of
5 the --
6 MR DE LA MERE: Yes, the CAT to police the Convention
7 against torture.
8 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: Yes.
9 MR DE LA MERE: It is part of the apparatus --
10 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: Qatar is a signatory to CAT.
11 MR DE LA MERE: As I understand it, yes.
12 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: But not to the ICCPR.
13 MR DE LA MERE: No. What is significant is that throughout
14 these episodes, compare and contrast, as we will see
15 when we come to State immunity, compare and contrast the
16 Jones case, the defendant has no necessary formal role
17 in this. He is not the captor. He is not the governor
18 of the prison at which the torture is being
19 administered. He is not the party who has exercised
20 a formal leaver of power. The Attorney General says it
21 is effectively his function to secure the treatment in
22 question. He is not like the Mallen case my learned
23 friend referred to via Jones. He is not in a situation
24 of someone flashing their badge, exercising power to
25 gain access before an abuse.

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1 The essence of our case is that this is an


2 individual exercising his very considerable influence of
3 both forms to get what he wants. So the nub of the
4 question when we come to State immunity will be whether
5 the exercise of informal influence of real politik
6 influence by an individual wearing on any view two hats,
7 is also excused from scrutiny. No such issue arose in
8 Jones, and the issue is a thorny one.
9 What I am going to do, my Lord, then with those
10 introductory remarks by way of background, is I am going
11 to address the two bases of strike out in the order that
12 my learned friend addressed those, diplomatic immunity
13 first and then sovereign immunity. But before I do so,
14 can I emphasise that both points are of extreme
15 importance. For if the defendant loses for instance on
16 diplomatic immunity, but succeeds on State immunity, the
17 logical consequence will be that at least he is liable
18 to potential criminal proceedings in relation to the
19 psychological torture of my client, and that is because
20 the exemption from State impunity in Pinochet
21 necessarily exempts from liability for criminal
22 proceedings those officers of state, and it is a crime
23 defined by the misuse of state or power, involved in the
24 torture in question.
25 So if my learned friend is right that all of these

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1 events are covered by State immunity, but wrong in


2 relation to diplomatic immunity, her client will be
3 exposed to potential criminal investigation for a crime
4 of universal jurisdiction. That is why both points are
5 of importance. And, of course, the diplomatic issue is
6 obviously of much wider importance to the defendant,
7 given the wider immunity it provides whether from
8 proceedings being called as a witness, tax and so on,
9 and so forth.
10 Now, on diplomatic immunity, the nub of
11 Ms Carss-Frisk's line is that effectively the
12 ministerial certificate issued on 4 January pursuant to
13 section 4 of the DPA now presents an open and shut case.
14 The way that it is put is that effectively that
15 certificate is conclusive proof of the fact that the
16 defendant is a diplomat. In truth we say this case
17 raises two groups of issues.
18 The first group of issues is about what is entailed
19 by being a diplomat who is in principle covered or
20 capable of being covered by an Article 31 and Article 39
21 immunity. Our case in substance is that in order to
22 benefit from these immunities, you have to be in
23 substance a diplomat.
24 Secondly, you have to be in post as such a diplomat
25 at the relevant time, the relevant time being clear from

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1 Empson v Smith, being the time that the point falls to


2 be decided by the court. We say that issue, who is in
3 substance a diplomat, entails a functional test.
4 A functional test is, is the person intended to and do
5 they in fact undertake diplomatic functions?
6 A person cannot be appointed to a position simply in
7 addition to confer an immunity problem. You cannot have
8 a sham arrangement. Nor ultimately can immunity be
9 conferred if a person never in fact takes up a post,
10 even if they travel to the country in question. Nor is
11 it enough, in our submission, that if someone is
12 appointed to what the sending State considers to be
13 a diplomatic post if the functions undertaken are
14 clearly not diplomatic functions.
15 So we say that the job of a diplomat, whether or not
16 someone discharges it, has a justiciable substantive
17 content, and a justiciable substantive content supplied
18 primarily by Article 3 of the Vienna Convention,
19 considered in direct and necessary contradistinction to
20 Article 42. It is only functions of a certain kind that
21 justify the provision of an immunity, and an individual
22 must prove that he is indeed discharging such functions.
23 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: On that submission, one could have the
24 court exercising what you invite the court to do,
25 a functional approach, and the protocol department of

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1 the FCO giving a certificate which is said to be


2 conclusive on the facts in the certificate that someone
3 has been appointed and recognised as having been
4 appointed as a diplomat. And, therefore, that approach
5 certainly opens up the possibility of two different
6 issues as to whether a person as a diplomat and, well --
7 MR DE LA MERE: The first thing is --
8 MR JUSTICE BLAKE: -- one voice doctrine becomes historic
9 then, does it not?
10 MR DE LA MERE: With respect, no. Firstly, for this reason.
11 The one voice doctrine is, in my submission, confined to
12 those circumstances where agreement is required. It is
13 confined to those issues like recognition of
14 a government, recognition of a mission, recognition of



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