10nfl1-Nukes-Cover
ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES ARE LIKELY
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| ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES ARE LIKELY Kenneth N. Waltz. Nuclear Myths and Political Realities The American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (Sep, 1990), p. Many of the obstacles to arms reduction among conventional powers disappear or dwindle among nuclear nations. For the former, the careful comparison of the quantities and qualities of forces is important. Because this is not so with nuclear weapons, the problem of verifying agreements largely disappears. Provisions for verification maybe necessary in order to persuade the Senate to ratify an agreement, but the possibility of noncompliance is not very worrisome. Agreements that reduce one category of conventional weapons may shift competition to other types of weapons and lead to increases in their numbers and capabilities. Because with nuclear weapons sufficiency is easily defined, there is no military reason for reductions in some weapons to result in increases in others. Conventionally, multiparty agreements are hard to arrive at because each party has to consider how shifting alignments may alter the balance of forces if agreements are reached to reduce them. IN a world of second-strike nuclear forces, alliances have little effect on the strategic balance. The Soviet Unions failure to insist that British, French, and Chinese forces be counted in strategic arms negotiations may reflect its appreciation of this point. Finally, conventional powers have to compare weapons of uncertain effectiveness. Arms agreements are difficult to reach because their provisions may bear directly on the prospects for victory or defeat. Because in a nuclear world peace is maintained by the presence of deterrent forces, strategic arms agreements do not have military but economic and political significance. They can benefit countries economically and help to improve their relations. Download 1.23 Mb. Share with your friends:
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