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DETERRENCE FAILS DUE TO THE RISK OF UNAUTHORIZED USE
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| DETERRENCE FAILS DUE TO THE RISK OF UNAUTHORIZED USE James A. Stegenga. Deterrence Bankrupt Ideology Policy Sciences, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Nov, 1983), pp. 127-1145. Social science and common experience also cast doubt on another key assumption of nuclear deterrence the leader's tight, near-perfect control of a large number of subordinates in a complex organization spread over a huge country and beyond at sea. For nuclear deterrence to be as dependable as its exponents suggest it is, the possibility for human error or communications breakdown or unauthorized action must be reduced to near zero this is clearly a difficult if not impossible task, people, organizations, and machines being what they are. Mechanical errors or computer failures must also be eliminated or reduced to near zero, another formidable task, as we know from reports of problems in the American military machinery that we are told - not very reassuringly, actually - is more sophisticated and more carefully operated by more carefully screened functionaries than is the Soviet machinery. How confident can we be that the collective leadership in Moscow has such tight control over its strategic forces that a single rogue Soviet ICBM launch officer or submarine commander cannot independently send his missiles with multiple warheads towards dozens of American targets How confident can we be that the Soviet Union's surveillance satellites, radars, sensors, and computers - all technologically primitive compared to those of the United States - will not malfunction disastrously, leading to the catastrophe 10NFL1-Nuclear Weapons Page 57 of 199 www.victorybriefs.com Download 1.23 Mb. Share with your friends:
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