NUCLEAR DETERRENCE CONTRIBUTES TO A POSSIBILITY OF ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH. Missiles and Morals A Utilitarian Look at Nuclear Deterrence. Douglas P. Lackey. Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Summer, 1982), pp. 189-231. Published by Blackwell Publishing. Stable URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2264898 As for the prevention through deterrence of large-scale nuclear war, it can be argued that every decrease in the chance of a nuclear first strike that results from fear of a retaliatory second strike is matched by an increase in the chance of a nuclear first strike that results from accident or mistake, human or mechanical failure that every decrease in the chance that innocent millions will die from an undeterred first strike is matched by an increase in the chance that innocent millions will die from a nuclear second strike that cannot be stopped after initial deterrence has failed.
