Nuclear theft/terrorism THERE IS ALWAYS A RISK OF NUCLEAR THEFT. Matthew Bunn Senior research associate @ the JFK School of Government, ʻ06] A Mathematical Model of the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 607 (Sep, 2006), pp. 103-120 The risk of outsider or insider theft is dominated by those facilities or transport legs where nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear material exist that have the weakest security because terrorists and thieves are more likely to choose those points of attack and more likely to succeed if they do. The probability of successful outsider theft depends on the security levels at the various sites or transport legs and the levels of capability the terrorists could bring to bear to steal what they wanted from them. Terrorists are likely to face substantial uncertainties on both points but the information available to defenders about what capabilities terrorists might have is far more limited. No one really know how clever a plan, with how many attackers, what weapons, or what capabilities, terrorists might be able to bring to bear to accomplish a nuclear theft.