A GOP midterm win is key to the Asia Pivot---Democrats would be comparably worse

The pivot solves a US-China conflict---only US assurances can create convergence and maintain stability.

Senior Fellow and Affiliate Professor at the School of Public Policy, George Mason University (Patrick, "How Washington’s Asia pivot and the TPP can benefit Sino–American relations," 2013, www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/06/how-washingtons-asia-pivot-and-the-tpp-can-benefit-sino-american-relations/)

This conflict would be catastrophic and involve nuclear weapons---East Asia is a particulary volatile hotspot

John, has an M.A. in International Affairs from American University and a B.A. in Political Science and History from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. “Maritime Disputes a Likely Source of Future Conflict” http://www.policymic.com/articles/2279/maritime-disputes-a-likely-source-of-future-conflict December]//BM

Exts – TPP Solves China

TPP is key to contain Chinese aggression in the South China Sea

Gordon 2011 – BERNARD GORDON is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of New Hampshire, and the author, most recently, of America’s Trade Follies. (“The Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Rise of China”, Foreign Affairs, November 7, 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136647/bernard-k-gordon/the-trans-pacific-partnership-and-the-rise-of-china?page=show)

The final factor is China’s new foreign policy assertiveness. An early sign was Beijing’s revival, in 2010, of claims to islands in the South China Sea, an issue that has roiled relations between China and its neighbors since the mid-1990s. In 2002, China and its neighbors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations agreed to resolve the claims multilaterally, but China later insisted on dealing bilaterally with each neighbor. China’s foreign minister argued at the time, “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.” Japan bore the brunt of Chinese belligerence in September 2010, when a Chinese fishing trawler rammed one of its coast guard boats. When Japan arrested the trawler’s captain, Beijing demanded that Japan apologize and release him, and it stopped exports to Japan of crucial rare-earth minerals. Maehara, then foreign minister, called China’s reaction “hysterical”; now a central player in the Noda government, he is among Japan’s most popular politicians. In a recent speech in Washington, reflecting Tokyo’s assessment, he expressed worries about how China’s rise “alters the power balance of the game in the region.” Such statements show that Japan has come a long way from where it was in 2009, when former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama urged Japan to integrate more with Asia and to adopt a policy of “equidistance” between Beijing and Washington. The Noda government has instead reinforced its already close ties with Washington, and many Japanese now argue that Japan must join in the booming transpacific trade to escape the economic doldrums of the past two decades. “Japan should harness the energy of the Asia-Pacific region,” Noda said at a Democratic Party of Japan meeting in August, “and use it for economic recovery.” The U.S. ambassador in Tokyo, John Roos, recently remarked that Japan’s inclusion in the TPP would be a “game changer.” He is right. A transpacific trade agreement with Japan on board would be a victory for the principle of an open international system. Moreover, as an adviser to Prime Minister Noda stated earlier this month, Tokyo joining the TPP talks would help it “consolidate a strategic environment that gives China the impression that Japan is a formidable country that can’t be intimidated.” Nations of the region need not succumb to the inevitability of a Pacific dominated by China. A Trans-Pacific Partnership composed of Japan, the United States, Australia, and the group’s smaller economies represents a healthier alternative -- one that realists would recognize as a step toward a classic balance of power.

The alliance prevents violent China rise and Chinese social unrest

Armitage and Nye 12 (Richard L. Armitage is president of Armitage International and a trustee of CSIS. From 2001 to¶ 2005, he served as U.S. deputy secretary of state. In the course of his career, he has been engaged¶ in a range of worldwide business and public policy endeavors, as well as frequent public speaking¶ and writing. From 1992 to 1993, Mr. Armitage (with the personal rank of ambassador) directed¶ U.S. assistance to the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. From 1989 to 1992,¶ he filled key diplomatic positions as presidential special negotiator for the Philippines Military¶ Bases Agreement and special mediator for water in the Middle East. President George H.W. Bush¶ sent him as a special emissary to Jordan’s King Hussein during the 1991 Gulf War. In the Pentagon¶ from 1983 to 1989, he served as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. Mr.¶ Armitage graduated in 1967 from the U.S. Naval Academy, where he was commissioned an ensign¶ in the U.S. Navy. He served on a destroyer stationed on the Vietnam gun line and subsequently¶ completed three combat tours in Vietnam. He has received numerous U.S. military decorations, as¶ well as decorations from the governments of Thailand, the Republic of Korea, Bahrain, and Pakistan.¶ In 2010, Mr. Armitage was appointed an honorary companion of the Order of Australia, and¶ in 2005, he became a Knight Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George. Mr. Armitage¶ currently serves on the boards of ConocoPhillips, ManTech International Corporation, and¶ Transcu Group Ltd. He is also a member of the American Academy of Diplomacy. He was most¶ recently awarded the Department of State Distinguished Service Award and has received the Department¶ of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service four times, the Secretary of Defense¶ Medal for Outstanding Public Service, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Award for Outstanding¶ Public Service, the Presidential Citizens Medal, and the Department of State Distinguished Honor¶ Award.¶ Joseph S. Nye is dean emeritus of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and¶ a trustee of CSIS. He joined the Harvard faculty in 1964 and has served as director of the Center¶ for International Affairs, Dillon Professor of International Affairs, and associate dean of arts and¶ sciences. From 1977 to 1979, Dr. Nye served as deputy to the U.S. under secretary of state for¶ security assistance, science, and technology and chaired the National Security Council Group on¶ Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In 1993 and 1994, he was chairman of the National Intelligence¶ Council, which coordinates intelligence estimates for the president. In 1994 and 1995, he¶ served as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. In all three agencies, he¶ received distinguished service awards. Dr. Nye is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and¶ Sciences and the American Academy of Diplomacy and a member of the Executive Committee of¶ the Trilateral Commission. Dr. Nye has also served as a director of the Aspen Strategy Group, as¶ a director of the Institute for East-West Security Studies, as a director of the International Institute¶ for Strategic Studies, as U.S. representative on the UN Advisory Committee on Disarmament¶ Affairs, and as a member of the Advisory Committee of the Institute of International Economics. He received his bachelor’s degree summa cum laude from Princeton University in 1958. He did¶ postgraduate work at Oxford University on a Rhodes scholarship and earned a Ph.D. in political¶ science from Harvard University. Dr. Nye has also taught for brief periods in Geneva, Ottawa,¶ and London and has lived for extended periods in Europe, East Africa, and Central America. He¶ is the author of numerous books, including The Future of Power (PublicAffairs, 2011), The Powers¶ to Lead (Oxford University Press, 2008), and Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics¶ (PublicAffairs, 2004), “The U.S.-Japan Alliance¶ anchoring stability in asia,” August 2012, Online, PDF) GANGEEZY

China’s meteoric rise in economic heft, military muscle, and political clout over the past three¶ decades has not only dramatically revamped the world’s most populous nation, it has also decisively¶ shaped East Asia’s post–Cold War geopolitical landscape. Far from being a constraint on¶ China’s re-rise, the strong U.S.-Japan alliance has contributed to it by helping to provide a stable,¶ predictable, and secure environment within which China has flourished. The alliance has a stake¶ in China’s success. However, the lack of transparency and ambiguity as to how China intends to¶ use its newfound power—to reinforce existing international norms, to revise them according to¶ Beijing’s national interests, or both—is an area of growing concern.¶ One area of particular unease is China’s possibly expanding core interests. In addition to the¶ official three—Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan—there has been reference to the South China Sea¶ and the Senkaku Islands as emerging interests. While the latter are unofficial and undeclared, the¶ People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s increased presence in the South China Sea and East China¶ Sea leads us to deduce otherwise. The shared theme of sovereignty further raises questions about¶ Beijing’s intentions in the Senkakus and the South China Sea. One thing is certain—China’s ambiguity¶ of core interest claims further reduces its diplomatic credibility in the region.¶ The alliance’s strategy toward China has been a blend of engagement and hedging, befitting¶ the uncertainties about how China might choose to use its rapidly growing comprehensive national¶ power. But most aspects of the allied hedge against China’s growing military power and political¶ assertiveness—the gradual expansion in the geographic scope of alliance activities, joint work on¶ missile defense technologies, heightened attention to interoperability and to missions related to¶ sustaining sea lines of communication, efforts to strengthen regional institutions such as the Association¶ of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), renewed focus on freedom of navigation, and the¶ launch in December 2011 of a new trilateral U.S.-Japan-India strategic dialogue—have been based¶ on the assumption that China will continue along a path of high economic growth, making possible¶ comparable increases in defense spending and capabilities.¶ That assumption is no longer assured. As China moves into its fourth decade since the launch¶ of “reform and opening up” by Deng Xiao-ping in 1979, there are many indications that growth¶ is slowing. Questions exist about the ability of China to move from an export-led to internalconsumption-¶ driven economy. In the years ahead, China’s leaders will have to tackle at least six¶ demons: energy constraints, calamitous environmental degradation, daunting demographic realities,¶ widening income inequality among people and provinces, restive ethnic minorities in Xinjiang¶ and Tibet, and endemic official corruption. Economic success adds to this list the uncertainty¶ of coping with the “middle income trap,” whereby a growing middle income cohort puts exceptional¶ pressure on the Chinese political structure to meet rising expectations. Any one of these¶ challenges could derail China’s economic growth path and threaten social stability. The Chinese¶ Communist Party (CCP) is aware of these daunting challenges, which is one reason its leaders¶ boosted spending on internal security to more than $120 billion for 2012, roughly comparable to¶ the defense budget. The PLA remains focused on developing the wherewithal to deal with external¶ threats, including deterring Taiwan from moves toward de jure independence. But, the CCP is¶ equally concerned about internal threats.¶ A China that stumbles badly could present the alliance with challenges that are not necessarily¶ smaller—just different. We all have much to gain from a peaceful and prosperous China.¶ Alternatively, Chinese leaders confronting severe internal fissures could take refuge in nationalism,¶ perhaps exploiting an external threat, real or imagined, to re-forge unity. To sustain order, the¶ leadership could turn to ever more draconian measures, exacerbating existing human rights violations,¶ alienating some foreign partners, and undermining the political consensus that has driven¶ Western engagement with China since the Nixon opening 40 years ago.

TPP Impact: US-Japan Relations

TPP k2 US-Japan relations

Terada 12 – Takashi Terada is currently a Japan Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, within a program funded by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. In April 2012 he will become Professor of Political Science at Doshisha University. Previously, he was a Professor of International Relations at the Organization for Asian Studies at Waseda University. He received his Ph.D from Australian National University and has served as an Assistant Professor at National University of Singapore (1999-2006) and Associate Professor at Waseda University (2006- 2008). (“Japan and the Trans-Pacific Partnership”, Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, February 2012, http://www.spfusa.org/files/Japanandtpp_terada.pdf)

On November 11, 2011, the day before the United States hosted the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders’ Summit in Honolulu, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda announced, “I have decided to enter into consultations toward participating in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations with the countries concerned.” While the Prime Minister’s announcement was less than a forceful articulation of intent, with Japan’s economy twice the size of the eight countries currently participating in TPP negotiations with the United States, Japan’s potential entry is important for the pact’s emergence as the preeminent trade agreement in the Asia Pacific. TPP, moreover, has developed into the most important issue on the U.S. trade agenda and is vitally linked to Washington’s new “rebalancing” strategy toward the Asia Pacific. Japan’s potential entry into the agreement has thus become a focal point of the U.S.- Japan relations with important implications for the future of that relationship and the region’s broader economic architecture. Japan’s decision on TPP likely will also be viewed as an indication of the direction the country chooses to take as its population ages and decreases in size, its economy declines relative to that of China and much of the rest of East Asia, and as the country seeks to rebuild in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake. To examine the economic, political and strategic implications of Japan’s potential entry into TPP, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, in cooperation with the Brookings Institution, convened a half-day conference on December 2, 2011. Senior current and former government officials, representatives of the business and academic communities from both countries, the first director general of the World Trade Organization and other experts participated. The commentary below builds on the results of that conference. Prime Minister Noda’s predecessor, Naoto Kan, asserted that the impact of joining TPP, along with progress on other smaller trade initiatives, would constitute “the third opening of Japan.” In effect, he viewed Japan’s accession to TPP and the implementation of a final agreement as comparable to the revolutionary changes the country undertook first in the Meiji era, and second, in the aftermath of World War II. While Kan’s description exaggerates the impact of TPP on Japan, current member countries—Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Brunei, Vietnam, Chile, Peru and the United States—are seeking a highly ambitious trade and investment accord addressing regulatory convergence, issues posed by stateowned enterprises, supply chains, intellectual property and other so-called “21st century” issues that in some cases go beyond current World Trade Organization rules. Participating countries are seeking to make TPP a model free trade agreement, one that will be open to new members and will serve as a stepping stone to a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) encompassing the world’s most dynamic region and economies representing more than half of global economic output and trade. Within Japan, support for the country’s accession to TPP is led by the business community. As Kiyoaki Aburaki, the U.S Representative of Keidanren, the Japan Business Federation, noted at the SPFUSA/ Brookings conference, TPP will provide Japan opportunities for global business and domestic reforms that will benefit Japan’s economy, enhance U.S.-Japan economic integration and strengthen the overall trans-Pacific trade architecture. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), has asserted that if Japan fails to join TPP, the country would lose ¥10.5 trillion yen in gross domestic product as of 2020 (about 2% of GDP), while the Cabinet Office has estimated that participation in TPP would boost Japan’s real GDP by ¥2.5-3.2 by 2018.

The alliance solves multiple threats to escalate to global nuclear war

Gates 11 (Robert, U.S. Secretary of Defense, “U.S.-Japan Alliance a Cornerstone of Asian Security”, Speech to Keio University, 1-14, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1529)

Over the course of its history, the U.S.-Japan alliance has succeeded at its original core purpose – to deter military aggression and provide an umbrella of security under which Japan – and the region – can prosper. Today, our alliance is growing deeper and broader as we address a range of security challenges in Asia. Some, like North Korea, piracy or natural disasters, have been around for decades, centuries, or since the beginning of time. Others, such as global terrorist networks, cyber attacks, and nuclear proliferation are of a more recent vintage. What these issues have in common is that they all require multiple nations working together – and they also almost always require leadership and involvement by key regional players such as the U.S. and Japan. In turn, we express our shared values by increasing our alliance’s capacity to provide humanitarian aid and disaster relief, take part in peace-keeping operations, protect the global commons, and promote cooperation and build trust through strengthening regional institutions. Everyone gathered here knows the crippling devastation that can be caused by natural disasters – and the U.S. and Japan, along with our partners in the region, recognize that responding to these crises is a security imperative. In recent years, U.S. and Japanese forces delivered aid to remote earthquake-stricken regions on Indonesia, and U.S. aircraft based in Japan helped deliver assistance to typhoon victims in Burma. We worked together in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, earthquakes in Java, Sumatra, and Haiti, and most recently following the floods in Pakistan. These efforts have demonstrated the forward deployment of U.S. forces in Japan is of real and life-saving value. They also provide new opportunities for the U.S. and Japanese forces to operate together by conducting joint exercises and missions. Furthermore, U.S. and Japanese troops have been working on the global stage to confront the threat of failed or failing states. Japanese peacekeepers have operated around the world, including the Golan Heights and East Timor and assisted with the reconstruction of Iraq. In Afghanistan, Japan represents the second largest financial donor, making substantive contributions to the international effort by funding the salaries of the Afghan National Police and helping the Afghan government integrate former insurgents. Japan and the United States also continue to cooperate closely to ensure the maritime commons are safe and secure for commercial traffic. Our maritime forces work hand-in-glove in the Western Pacific as well as in other sea passages such as the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia, where more than a third of the world’s oil and trade shipments pass through every year. Around the Horn of Africa, Japan has deployed surface ships and patrol aircraft that operate alongside those from all over the world drawn by the common goal to counter piracy in vital sea lanes. Participating in these activities thrusts Japan’s military into a relatively new, and at times sensitive role, as an exporter of security. This is a far cry from the situation of even two decades ago when, as I remember well as a senior national security official, Japan was criticized for so-called “checkbook diplomacy” – sending money but not troops – to help the anti-Saddam coalition during the First Gulf War. By showing more willingness to send self-defense forces abroad under international auspices – consistent with your constitution – Japan is taking its rightful place alongside the world’s other great democracies. That is part of the rationale for Japan’s becoming a permanent member of a reformed United Nations Security Council. And since these challenges cannot be tackled through bilateral action alone, we must use the strong U.S.-Japanese partnership as a platform to do more to strengthen multilateral institutions – regional arrangements that must be inclusive, transparent, and focused on results. Just a few months ago, I attended the historic first meeting of the ASEAN Plus Eight Defense Ministers Meeting in Hanoi, and am encouraged by Japan’s decision to co-chair the Military Medicine Working Group. And as a proud Pacific nation, the United States will take over the chairmanship of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum this year, following Japan’s successful tenure. Working through regional and international forums puts our alliance in the best position to confront some of Asia’s toughest security challenges. As we have been reminded once again in recent weeks, none has proved to be more vexing and enduring than North Korea. Despite the hopes and best efforts of the South Korean government, the U.S. and our allies, and the international community, the character and priorities of the North Korean regime sadly have not changed. North Korea’s ability to launch another conventional ground invasion is much degraded from even a decade or so ago, but in other respects it has grown more lethal and destabilizing. Today, it is North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and proliferation of nuclear know-how and ballistic missile equipment that have focused our attention – developments that threaten not just the peninsula, but the Pacific Rim and international stability as well. In response to a series of provocations – the most recent being the sinking of the Cheonan and North Korea’s lethal shelling of a South Korean island – Japan has stood shoulder to shoulder with the Republic of Korea and the United States. Our three countries continue to deepen our ties through the Defense Trilateral Talks – the kind of multilateral engagement among America’s long-standing allies that the U.S. would like to see strengthened and expanded over time. When and if North Korea’s behavior gives us any reasons to believe that negotiations can be conducted productively and in good faith, we will work with Japan, South Korea, Russia, and China to resume engagement with North Korea through the six party talks. The first step in the process should be a North-South engagement. But, to be clear, the North must also take concrete steps to honor its international obligations and comply with U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Any progress towards diffusing the crisis on the Korean Peninsula must include the active support of the People’s Republic of China – where, as you probably know, I just finished an official visit. China has been another important player whose economic growth has fueled the prosperity of this part of the world, but questions about its intentions and opaque military modernization program have been a source of concern to its neighbors. Questions about China’s growing role in the region manifest themselves in territorial disputes – most recently in the incident in September near the Senkaku Islands, an incident that served as a reminder of the important of America’s and Japan’s treaty obligations to one another. The U.S. position on maritime security remains clear: we have a national interest in freedom of navigation; in unimpeded economic development and commerce; and in respect for international law. We also believe that customary international law, as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, provides clear guidance on the appropriate use of the maritime domain, and rights of access to it. Nonetheless, I disagree with those who portray China as an inevitable strategic adversary of the United States. We welcome a China that plays a constructive role on the world stage. In fact, the goal of my visit was to improve our military-to-military relationship and outline areas of common interest. It is precisely because we have questions about China’s military – just as they might have similar questions about the United States – that I believe a healthy dialogue is needed. Last fall, President Obama and President Hu Jin Tao made a commitment to advance sustained and reliable defense ties, not a relationship repeatedly interrupted by and subject to the vagaries of political weather. On a personal note, one of the things I learned from my experience dealing with the Soviet Union during my earlier time in government was the importance of maintaining a strategic dialogue and open lines of communication. Even if specific agreements did not result – on nuclear weapons or anything else – this dialogue helped us understand each other better and lessen the odds of misunderstanding and miscalculation. The Cold War is mercifully long over and the circumstances with China today are vastly different – but the importance of maintaining dialogue is as important today. For the last few minutes I’ve discussed some of the most pressing security challenges – along with the most fruitful areas of regional cooperation – facing the U.S. and Japan in Asia. This environment – in terms of threats and opportunities – is markedly different than the conditions that led to the forging of the U.S-Japan defense partnership in the context of a rivalry between two global superpowers. But on account of the scope, complexity and lethality of these challenges, I would argue that our alliance is more necessary, more relevant, and more important than ever. And maintaining the vitality and credibility of the alliance requires modern izing our force posture and other defense arrangements to better reflect the threats and military requirements of this century. For example, North Korea’s ballistic missiles – along with the proliferation of these weapons to other countries – require a more effective alliance missile defense capability. The U.S.-Japan partnership in missile defense is already one of the most advanced of its kind in the world. It was American and Japanese AEGIS ships that together monitored the North Korean missile launches of 2006 and 2008. This partnership –which relies on mutual support, cutting edge technology, and information sharing – in many ways reflect our alliance at its best. The U.S. and Japan have nearly completed the joint development of a new advanced interceptor, a system that represents a qualitative improvement in our ability to thwart any North Korean missile attack. The co-location of our air- and missile-defense commands at Yokota – and the associated opportunities for information sharing, joint training, and coordination in this area – provide enormous value to both countries. As I alluded to earlier, advances by the Chinese military in cyber and anti-satellite warfare pose a potential challenge to the ability of our forces to operate and communicate in this part of the Pacific. Cyber attacks can also come from any direction and from a variety of sources – state, non-state, or a combination thereof – in ways that could inflict enormous damage to advanced, networked militaries and societies. Fortunately, the U.S. and Japan maintain a qualitative edge in satellite and computer technology – an advantage we are putting to good use in developing ways to counter threats to the cyber and space qdomains. Just last month, the Government of Japan took another step forward in the evolution of the alliance by releasing its National Defense Program Guidelines – a document that lays out a vision for Japan’s defense posture. These guidelines envision: A more mobile and deployable force structure; Enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities; and A shift in focus to Japan’s southwest islands. These new guidelines provide an opportunity for even deeper cooperation between our two countries – and the emphasis on your southwestern islands underscores the importance of our alliance’s force posture. And this is a key point. Because even as the alliance continues to evolve – in strategy, posture, and military capabilities – to deal with this century’s security challenges, a critical component will remain the forward presence of U.S. military forces in Japan. Without such a presence: North Korea’s military provocations could be even more outrageous -- or worse; China might behave more assertively towards its neighbors; It would take longer to evacuate civilians affected by conflict or natural disasters in the region; It would be more difficult and costly to conduct robust joint exercises – such as the recent Keen Sword exercise – that hone the U.S. and Japanese militaries ability to operate and, if necessary, fight together; and Without the forward presence of U.S. forces in Japan, there would be less information sharing and coordination, and we would know less about regional threats and the military capabilities of our potential adversaries.  

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