2015 Section 702 Aff 1ac 2 Observation 1: Inherency 3 Thus the plan 5


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Inherency Extensions

Surveillance Increasing

The NSA mass surveillance records, stores, parses, and searches all electronic communication—and it’s increasing offline as well


Fairfield and Luna 14 (Joshua-Prof of Law, Washington and Lee; Erik, Sydney Lewis Prof of Law, Washington and Lee, “Digital Innocence,” 99 Cornell L. Rev. 981, L/N)

The recent National Security Agency (NSA) data scandal has revealed what technologists have long suspected: every aspect of online life is tracked and recorded. The NSA maintains programs that cover "nearly everything a typical user does on the internet" n1 and collect "pretty much everything it can" n2 - e-mail and text messages, voice and video chats, photos and videos, file transfers, social networking information, Internet browsing histories and searches, and so on - rendering all of this data searchable by the government. n3 Pursuant to secret court orders, Americans' telephone and Internet metadata records are being proactively recorded, stored, parsed, and searched. n4 From the massive datasets derived from this data, it is possible to determine whom people talk to, where they are, what they are interested in, and even to predict what they might do next. n5 Outside of the NSA context, government monitoring has expanded through the use of third-party data and by the creation of state-run databases. Digital surveillance is increasing offline as well. For example, some police cars [*983] now use license plate readers to create a database of driver locations. n6 New overhead camera technology permits tracking of the location and activities of everyone in an entire city for hours. n7 In the Boston bombing investigation, street cameras, cellphone recordings, and even a municipal facial recognition system were employed in pursuit of the culprits. n8



Social media and the observation of social media is increasing significantly


Miller 10 (Rich Miller on September 16, 2010 http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2010/09/16/facebook-50-million-a-year-on-data-centers/)

An analysis of Facebook’s spending with data center developers indicates that the company is now paying about $50 million a year to lease data center space, compared to about $20 million when we last analyzed its leases in May 2009. That jump in spending reflects increased investment in infrastructure as the social network has grown from 200 million users in mid-2009 to more than 500 million today. During that period, Facebook has added multiple data centers in two major Internet hubs: Ashburn, Virginia and Silicon Valley in California. The company has also announced plans to build a 300,000 square foot data center in Prineville, Oregon for additional expansion.


XKeyscore Overarching Data Collection


Shneier 15 (Bruce, “More about NSA’s XKeyscore”. Shneier on Security. July 7) https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/07/more_about_the_.html

I've been reading through the 48 classified documents about the NSA's XKEYSCORE system released by the Intercept last week. From the article: The NSA's XKEYSCORE program, first revealed by The Guardian, sweeps up countless people's Internet searches, emails, documents, usernames and passwords, and other private communications. XKEYSCORE is fed a constant flow of Internet traffic from fiber optic cables that make up the backbone of the world's communication network, among other sources, for processing. As of 2008, the surveillance system boasted approximately 150 field sites in the United States, Mexico, Brazil, United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, Nigeria, Somalia, Pakistan, Japan, Australia, as well as many other countries, consisting of over 700 servers. These servers store "full-take data" at the collection sites -- meaning that they captured all of the traffic collected -- and, as of 2009, stored content for 3 to 5 days and metadata for 30 to 45 days. NSA documents indicate that tens of billions of records are stored in its database. "It is a fully distributed processing and query system that runs on machines around the world," an NSA briefing on XKEYSCORE says. "At field sites, XKEYSCORE can run on multiple computers that gives it the ability to scale in both processing power and storage." There seems to be no access controls at all restricting how analysts can use XKEYSCORE. Standing queries -- called "workflows" -- and new fingerprints have an approval process, presumably for load issues, but individual queries are not approved beforehand but may be audited after the fact. These are things which are supposed to be low latency, and you can't have an approval process for low latency analyst queries. Since a query can get at the recorded raw data, a single query is effectively a retrospective wiretap.


USA Freedom Act Doesn’t Solve

USA FREEDOM Act doesn’t reform Section 702


Geiger 15 (Harley, Advocacy Director and Senior Counsel at the Center for Democracy & Technology, “Q&A on the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015,” Center for Democracy and Technology-Security and Surveillance, April 28, https://cdt.org/blog/q-a-on-the-usa-freedom-act-of-2015/)

Q2: Why is this bill worth supporting when it doesn’t address 702 backdoor searches or the DEA‘s criminal bulk collection authority?¶ A2: CDT is definitely invested in addressing these problems, and we’d certainly prefer to see the USA FREEDOM Act make far more reforms than it does. However, it is not an omnibus surveillance reform bill. The USA FREEDOM Act addresses one category of problems, mainly domestic bulk collection under the PATRIOT Act. [Note: the DEA authority is criminal and was not created in the PATRIOT Act.] Congress should view the bill through this lens too – as one step, not the final step. We believe that enacting effective reform to domestic bulk collection under the PATRIOT Act will create a more favorable environment in Congress to enact reforms in other areas – especially around the sunset for Sec. 702 in 2017.



702 is Expanding

702 authorizes broad collection of internet data—NSA’s interpretations continue to expand reach.


Donohue 15 (Laura, Prof of Law at Georgetown U Law Center, “Security vs. Freedom: Contemporary Controversies: The Thirty-Third Annual Federalist Society National Student Symposium on Law and Public Policy 2014: Article: Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content,” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter 2015, L/N)

Three points related to the volume and intrusiveness of the resulting surveillance deserve notice. First, to obtain "about" communications, because of how the Internet is constructed, the NSA must monitor large amounts of data. n180 That is, if the NSA may [*163] collect not just e-mail to or from the target's e-mail account (badguy@ISP.com), but, in addition, other communications happening to mention badguy@ISP.com that pass through the collection point, then the NSA is monitoring a significant amount of traffic. And the agency is not just considering envelope information (for example, messages in which the selector is sending, receiving, or copied on the communication) but the actual content of messages. n181¶ Second, wholly domestic conversations may become swept up in the surveillance simply by nature of how the Internet is constructed. Everything one does online involves packets of information. Every Web site, every e-mail, every transfer of documents takes the information involved and divides it up into small bundles. Limited in size, these packets contain information about the sender's IP address, the intended receiver's IP address, something that indicates how many packets the communication has been divvied up into, and what number in the chain is represented by the packet in question. n182¶ Packet switched networks ship this information to a common destination via the most expedient route--one that may, or may not, include the other packets of information contained in the message. If a roadblock or problem arises in the network, the packets can then be re-routed, to reach their final destination. Domestic messages may thus be routed through international servers, if that is the most efficient route to the final destination. What this means is that even if the NSA applies an IP filter to eliminate communications that appear to be within the United States, it may nevertheless monitor domestic conversations by nature of them being routed through foreign servers. In this manner, a student in Chicago may send an e-mail to a student in Boston [*164] that gets routed through a server in Canada. Through no intent or design of the individual in Chicago, the message becomes international and thus subject to NSA surveillance.¶ Third, further collection of domestic conversations takes place through the NSA's intercept of what are called multi-communication transactions, or MCTs. It is important to distinguish here between a transaction and a communication. Some transactions have only single communications associated with them. These are referred to as SCTs. Other transactions contain multiple communications. If even one of the communications in an MCT falls within the NSA's surveillance, all of the communications bundled into the MCT are collected.¶ The consequence is of significant import. FISC estimated in 2011 that somewhere between 300,000 and 400,000 MCTs were being collected annually on the basis of "about" communication--where the "active user" was not the target. So hundreds of thousands of communications were being collected that did not include the target as either the sender or the recipient of the communication. n183


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