Here the symbol R denotes the assumed constant value of R(t) (not to be confused with the Ricci curvature scalar). This explains why Einstein was originally led to introduce a non-zero cosmological constant , because if we assume a static universe and the Cosmological Principle, the field equations of general relativity can only be satisfied if the density is proportional to the cosmological constant. However, it was soon pointed out that this static model is unstable, so it is apriori unlikely to correspond to the physical universe. Moreover, astronomical observations subsequently indicated that the universe (on the largest observable scale) is actually expanding, so we shouldn't restrict ourselves to models with R(t) = constant. If we allow R(t) to be variable, then the original field equations, without the cosmological term (i.e., with = 0), do have solutions. In view of this, Einstein decided the cosmological term was unnecessary and should be excluded.
Interestingly, George Gamow was working with Friedmann in Russia in the early 1920's, and he later recalled that "Friedmann noticed that Einstein had made a mistake in his alleged proof that the universe must necessarily be stable". Specifically, Einstein had divided through an equation by a certain quantity, even though that quantity was zero under a certain set of conditions. As Gamow notes, "it is well known to students of high school algebra" that division by zero is not valid. Friedmann realized that this error invalidated Einstein's argument against the possibility of a dynamic universe, and indeed under the condition that the quantity in question vanishes, it is possible to satisfy the field equations with a dynamic model, i.e., with a model of the form given by the Robertson-Walker metric with R(t) variable. It's worth noting that Einstein's 1917 paper did not actually contain any alleged proof that the universe must be static, but it did suggest that a non-zero cosmological constant required a non-zero density of matter. Shortly after Einstein's paper appeared, de Sitter gave a counter-example (see Section 7.6), i.e., he described a model universe that had a non-zero but zero matter density. However, unlike Einstein's model, it was not static. Einstein objected strenuously to de Sitter's model, because it showed that the field equations allowed inertia to exist in an empty universe, which Einstein viewed as "inertia relative to space", and he still harbored hopes that general relativity would fulfill Mach's idea that inertia should only be possible in relation to other masses. It was during the course of this debate that (presumably) Einstein advanced his "alleged proof" of the impossibility of dynamic models (with the errant division by zero?). However, before long Einstein withdrew his objection, realizing that his argument was flawed. Years later he recalled the sequence of events in a discussion with Gamow, and made the famous remark that it had been the biggest blunder of his life. This is usually interpreted to mean that he regretted ever considering a cosmological term (which seems to have been the case), but it could also be referring to his erroneous argument against de Sitter's idea of a dynamic universe, and his unfortunate "division by zero".
In any case, the Friedmann universes (with and without cosmological constant) became the "standard model" for cosmologies. If k = +1 the manifold represented by the Robertson-Walker metric is a finite spherical space, so it is called "closed". If k = 0 or 1 the metric is typically interpreted as representing an infinite space, so it is called "open". However, it's worth noting that this need not be the case, because the metric gives only local attributes of the manifold; it does not tell us the overall global topology. For example, we discuss in Section 7.4 a manifold that is everywhere locally flat, but that is closed cylindrically. This shows that when we identify "open" (infinite) and "closed" (finite) universes with the cases k = -1 and k = +1 respectively, we are actually assuming the "maximal topology" for the given metric in each case.
Based on the Robertson-Walker metric (3), we can compute the components of the Ricci tensor and scalar and substitute these along with the simple uniform stress-energy tensor into the field equations (1) to give the conditions on the scale function R = R(t):
where dots signify derivatives with respect to t. As expected, if R(t) is constant, these equations reduce to the ones that appeared in Einstein's original 1917 paper, whereas with variable R(t) we have a much wider range of possible solutions.
It may not be obvious that these two equations have a simultaneous solution, but notice that if we multiply the first condition through by R(t)3 and differentiate with respect to t, we get
The left-hand side is equal to times the left-hand side of the second condition, which equals zero, so the right hand side must also vanish, i.e., the derivative of (8/3)GR(t)3 must equal zero. This implies that there is a constant C such that
With this stipulation, the two conditions are redundant, i.e., a solution of one is guaranteed to be a solution of the other. Substituting for (8/3)G in the first condition and multiplying through by R(t)3, we arrive at the basic differential equation for the scale parameter of a Friedmann universe
Incidentally, if we multiply through by R(t), differentiate with respect to t, divide through by , and differentiate again, the constants k and C drop out, and we arrive at
With = 0 this is identical to the gravitational separation equation (2) in Section 4.2, showing that the cosmological scale parameter R(t) is yet another example of a naturally occurring spatial separation that satisfies this differential equation. It follows that the admissible functions R(t) (with = 0) are formally identical to the gravitational free-fall solutions described in Section 4.3. Solving equation (4) (with = 0) for and switching to normalized coordinates T = t/C and X = R/C, we get
Accordingly as k equals -1, 0, or +1, integration of this equation gives
A plot of these three solutions is shown below.
In all three cases with = 0, the expansion of the universe is slowing down, albeit only slightly for the case k = -1. However, if we allow a non-zero cosmological constant , there is a much greater variety of possible solutions to Friedmann's equation (2), including solutions in which the expansion of the universe is actually accelerating exponentially. Based on the cosmic scale parameter R and its derivatives, the three observable parameters traditionally used to characterize a particular solution are
In terms of these parameters, the constants appearing in the Friedmann equation (4) can be expressed as
In principle if astronomers could determine the values of H, q, and with enough precision, we could decide on empirical grounds the sign of k, and whether or not is zero. Thus, assuming the maximal topologies (and the large-scale validity of general relativity), we could determine whether the universe is open or closed, and whether it will expand forever or eventually re-contract. Unfortunately, none of the parameters is known with enough precision to distinguish between these possibilities.
One source of uncertainty is in our estimates of the mass density of the universe. Given the best current models of star masses, and the best optical counts of stars in galaxies, and the apparent density of galaxies, we estimate an overall mass density that is only a small fraction of what would be required to make k = 0. However, there are reasons to believe that much (perhaps most) of the matter in the universe is not luminous. (For example, the observed rotation of individual galaxies indicates that they ought to fly apart unless there is substantially more mass in them than is visible to us.) This has led physicists and astronomers to search for the "missing mass" in various forms.
Another source of uncertainty is in the values of R and its derivatives. For example, in its relatively brief history, Hubble's constant has undergone revisions of an order of magnitude, both upwards and downwards. In recent years the Hubble space telescope and several modern observatories on Earth seem to have found strong evidence that the expansion of the universe is actually accelerating. If so, then it could be accounted for in the context of general relativity only by a non-zero cosmological constant (on a related question, see Section 7.6), with the implication that the universe is infinite and will expand forever (at an accelerating rate).
Nevertheless, the idea of a closed finite universe is still of interest, partly because of the historical role it played in Einstein's thought, but also because it remains (arguably) the model most compatible with the spirit of general relativity. In an address to the Berlin Academy of Sciences in 1921, Einstein said
I must not fail to mention that a theoretical argument can be adduced in favor of the hypothesis of a finite universe. The general theory of relativity teaches that the inertia of a given body is greater as there are more ponderable masses in proximity to it; thus it seems very natural to reduce the total effect of inertia of a body to action and reaction between it and the other bodies in the universe... From the general theory of relativity it can be deduced that this total reduction of inertia to reciprocal action between masses - as required by E. Mach, for example - is possible only if the universe is spatially finite. On many physicists and astronomers this argument makes no impression...
This is consistent with the approach taken in Einstein's 1917 paper. Shortly thereafter he presented (in "The Meaning of Relativity", 1922) the following three arguments against the conception of infinite space, and for the conception of a bounded, or closed, universe:
(1) From the standpoint of the theory of relativity, to postulate a closed universe is very much simpler than to postulate the corresponding boundary condition at infinity of the quasi-Euclidean structure of the universe.
(2) The idea that Mach expressed, that inertia depends on the mutual attraction of bodies, is contained, to a first approximation, in the equations of the theory of relativity; it follows from these equations that inertia depends, at least in part, upon mutual actions between masses. Thereby Mach's idea gains in probability, as it is an unsatisfactory assumption to make that inertia depends in part upon mutual actions, and in part upon an independent property of space. But this idea of Mach's corresponds only to a finite universe, bounded in space, and not to a quasi-Euclidean, infinite universe. From the standpoint of epistemology it is more satisfying to have the mechanical properties of space completely determined by matter, and this is the case only in a closed universe.
(3) An infinite universe is possible only if the mean density of matter in the universe vanishes. Although such an assumption is logically possible, it is less probable than the assumption of a finite mean density of matter in the universe.
Along these same lines, Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler ("Gravitation") comment that general relativity "demands closure of the geometry in space as a boundary condition on the initial-value equations if they are to yield a well-determined and unique 4-geometry." Interestingly, when they quote Einstein's reasons in favor of a closed universe they omit the third without comment, although it reappears (with a caveat) in the subsequent "Inertia and Gravitation" of Ciufolini and Wheeler. As we've seen, Einstein was initially under the mistaken impression that the only cosmological solution of the field equations are those with
where R is the radius of the universe, is the mean density of matter, and is the gravitational constant. This much is consistent with modern treatments, which agree that at any given epoch in a Friedmann universe with constant non-negative curvature the radius is inversely proportional to the square root of the mean density. On the basis of (5) Einstein continued
If the universe is quasi-Euclidean, and its radius of curvature therefore infinite, then would vanish. But it is improbable that the mean density of matter in the universe is actually zero; this is our third argument against the assumption that the universe is quasi-Euclidean.
However, in the 2nd edition of "The Meaning of Relativity" (1945), he added an appendix, "essentially nothing but an exposition of Friedmann's idea", i.e., the idea that "one can reconcile an everywhere finite density of matter with the original form of the equations of gravity [without the cosmological term] if one admits the time variability of the metric distances...". In this appendix he acknowledged that in a dynamic model, as described above, it is perfectly possible to have an infinite universe with positive density of matter, provided that k = -1. It's clear that Einstein originally had not seriously considered the possibility of a universe with positive mass density but overall negative curvature. In the first edition, whenever he mentioned the possibility of an infinite universe he referred to the space as "quasi-Euclidean", which I take to mean "essentially flat". He regarded this open infinite space as just a limiting case of a closed spherical universe with infinite radius. He simply did not entertain the possibility of a hyperbolic (k = -1) universe. (It's interesting that Riemann, too, excluded spaces of negative curvature from his 1854 lecture, without justification.) His basic objection was evidently that a spacetime with negative curvature possess an inherent structure independent of the matter it contains, and he was unable to conceive of any physical source of negative curvature. This typically entails "ad hoc" boundary conditions at infinity is precisely what's required in an open universe, which Einstein regarded as contrary to the spirit of relativity.
At the end of the appendix in the 2nd edition, Einstein conceded that it comes down to an empirical question. If (8/3)G is greater than H2, then the universe is closed and spherical; otherwise it is open and flat or pseudospherical (hyperbolic). He also makes the interesting remark that although we might possibly prove the universe is spherical, "it is hardly imaginable that one could prove it to be pseudospherical". His reasoning is that in order to prove the universe is spherical, we need only identify enough matter so that (8/3)G exceeds H2, whereas if our current estimate of is less than this threshold, it will always be possible that there is still more "missing matter" that we have not yet identified. Of course, at this stage Einstein was assuming a zero cosmological constant, so it may not have occurred to him that it might someday be possible to determine empirically that the expansion of the universe is accelerating, thereby automatically proving that the universe is open.
Ultimately, was there any merit in Einstein's skepticism toward the idea of an "open" universe? Even setting aside his third argument, the first two still carry some weight with some people, especially those who are sympathetic to Mach's ideas regarding the relational origin of inertia. In an open universe we must accept the fact that there are multiple, physically distinct, solutions compatible with a given distribution of matter and energy. In such a universe the "background" inertial field can in no way be associated with the matter and energy content of the universe. From this standpoint, general relativity can never gives an unambiguous answer to the twins paradox (for example), because the proper time integral over a given path from A to B depends on the inertial field, and in an open universe this field cannot be inferred from the distribution of mass-energy. It is determined primarily by whatever absolute boundary conditions we choose to impose, independent of the distribution of mass-energy. Einstein believed that such boundary conditions were inherently non-relativistic, because they require us to single out a specific frame of reference - essentially Newton's absolute space. (In later years a great deal of work has been done in attempting to develop boundary conditions "at infinity" that do not single out a particular frame. This is discussed further in Section 7.7.)
The only alternative (in an open universe) that Einstein could see in 1917 was for the metric to degenerate far from matter in such a way that inertia vanishes, i.e., we would require that the metric at infinity go to something like
Such a boundary condition would be the same with respect to any frame of reference, so it wouldn't single out any specific frame as the absolute inertial frame of the universe. Einstein pursued this approach for a long time, but finally abandoned it because it evidently implies that the outermost shell of stars must exist in a metric very different from ours, and as a consequence we should observe their spectral signatures to be significantly shifted. (At the time there was no evidence of any "cosmological shift" in the spectra of the most distant stars. We can only speculate how Einstein would have reacted to the discovery of quasars, the most distant objects known, which are in fact characterized by extreme redshifts and apparently extraordinary energies.)
The remaining option that Einstein considered for an open asymptotically flat universe is to require that, for a suitable choice of the system of reference, the metric must go to
at infinity. However, this explicitly singles out one particular frame of reference as the absolute inertial frame of the universe, which, as Einstein said, "is contrary to the spirit of the relativity principle". This was the basis of his early view that general relativity is most compatible with a closed unbounded universe. The recent astronomical findings that seem to indicate an accelerating expansion have caused most scientists to abandon closed models, but there seems to be some lack of appreciation for the damage an open universe does to the epistemological strength of general relativity. As Einstein wrote in 1945, "the introduction of [the cosmological constant] constitutes a complication of the theory, which seriously reduces its logical simplicity".
Of course, in both an open and a closed universe there must be boundary and/or initial conditions, but the question is whether the distribution of mass-energy by itself is adequate to define the field, or whether independent boundary conditions are necessary to pin down the field. In a closed universe the "boundary conditions" can be more directly identified with the distribution of mass-energy, whereas in an open universe they are necessarily quite independent. Thus a closed universe can claim to satisfy Mach's principle at least to some degree, whereas an open universe definitely can't. The seriousness of this depends on how seriously we take Mach's principle. Since we can just as well regard a field as a palpable constituent of the universe, and since the metric of spacetime itself is a field in general relativity, it can be argued that Mach's dualistic view is no longer relevant. However, the second issue is whether even the specification of the distribution of mass-energy plus boundary conditions at infinity yields a unique solution. For Maxwell's equations (which are linear) it does, but for Einstein's equations (which are non-linear) it doesn't. This is perhaps what Misner, et al, are referring to when they comment that "Einstein's theory...demands closure of the geometry in space ... as a boundary condition on the initial value equations if they are to yield a well-determined (and, we now know, a unique) 4-geometry".
In view of this, we might propose the somewhat outlandish argument that the (apparent) uniqueness of metrical field supports the idea of a closed universe - at least within the context of general relativity. To put it more explicitly, if we believe the structure of the universe is governed by general relativity, and that the structure is determinate, then the universe must be closed. If the universe is not closed, then general relativity must be incomplete in the sense that there must be something other than general relativity determining which of the possible structures actually exists. Admittedly, completeness in this sense is a very ambitious goal for any theory, but it's interesting to recall the famous "EPR" paper in which Einstein criticized quantum mechanics on the grounds that it could not be a complete description of nature. He may well have had this on his mind when he pointed out how seriously the introduction of a cosmological constant undermines the logical simplicity of general relativity, which was always his criterion for evaluating the merit of any scientific theory.
We can see him wrestling with this issue, even in his 1917 paper, where he notes that some people (such as de Sitter) have argued that we have no need to consider boundary conditions at infinity, because we can simple specify the metric at the spatial limit of the domain under consideration, just as we arbitrarily (or empirically) specify the inertial frames when working in Newtonian mechanics. But this clearly reduces general relativity to a rather weak theory that must be augmented by other principles and/or considerable amounts of arbitrary information in order to yield determinate results. Not surprisingly, Einstein was unenthusiastic about this alternative. As he said, "such a complete resignation in this fundamental question is for me a difficult thing. I should not make up my mind to it until every effort to make headway toward a satisfactory view had proved to be in vain".
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