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Yes EscalationEscalation is uniquely likelyContreras, 12 – Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (Dominic, citing Monica Duffy Toft, associate professor of public policy at the Kennedy School of Political Science at Harvard and director of the Belfer Center’s Initiative on Religion in International Affairs, citing Stephen M. Walt, the Robert and Renee Belfer professor of international affairs and faculty chair of the Belfer Center’s International Security Program, February 1, 2012, “Winning the War on War?”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21707/winning_the_war_on_war.html?breadcrumb=%2Fproject%2F52%2Fintrastate_conflict_program, Hensel) In a jointly authored December 2011 op-ed in the New York Times, Pinker and Goldstein wrote that “the departure of the last American troops from Iraq brings relief to a nation that has endured its most painful war since Vietnam. But the event is momentous for another reason. The invasion of Iraq was the most recent example of an all-out war between two national armies. And it could very well be the last one.” Speaking at the forum, both echoed their assessment that war is less and less often being used as a tool for societies and states to resolve conflicts, but they differed in their views of what brought about this change. Speaking to the main argument of his book “Winning the War on War: the Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide,” Goldstein, professor emeritus of international relations at American University, largely credited international institutions for the pacification of the international community, stating that “After World War II we did something new…we founded the United Nations…and we’ve developed this tool, peacekeeping…that has successively, progressively, over a number of years, made it possible to resolve more conflicts without violence, to reduce violence when it has already occurred, and to sustain peace when you’re able to negotiate a peace agreement.” “The international community is not an oxymoron,” Goldstein said, “it actually works.” Pinker, the Johnstone family professor of psychology at Harvard and author of the much heralded book “The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined,” concurred with Goldstein’s assessment of a new peace taking hold. But he went a step further, arguing that in addition to the international community promoting peace, interpersonal norms and the development of social restraints have fostered a shift away from violence. Pinker cited “psychological changes through cosmopolitanism and literacy… [and the] expansion of empathy and the consideration of others,” as driving forces in the societal tilt away from war. He also pointed to changing attitudes towards violence as explaining this shift. “Violence is seen as something to be solved and something we can throw our wits against… society sees it as a problem, not a solution,” Pinker said. Pinker and Goldstein both declared that they are not optimists and had approached trends in warfare as pessimists, only reaching their conclusions through rigorous scholarly analysis. Toft and Walt, however, were not so easily convinced that the data bear out the hopeful view. Toft, an associate professor of public policy at the Kennedy School and director of the Belfer Center’s Initiative on Religion in International Affairs, praised both authors and their books, but pointed to what she perceived as a Eurocentric tilt in their data pools. She also cited changing global power dynamics, and wondered if the trend would hold. Responding to Pinker’s argument that societies have become more civilized Walt, the Robert and Renee Belfer professor of international affairs and faculty chair of the Belfer Center’s International Security Program, said, “It’s not obvious to me that the civilizing instinct at the interpersonal level translates to more civilized behavior between states or between states and other people.” Walt pointed to Bosnia and Iraq as examples of cases in which boundary conditions change and violence quickly emerges from seemingly peaceful societies. Devoid of a strong central state, both Yugoslavia after the fall of Tito, and Iraq after the toppling of Saddam both descended into civil war as competing groups vied for control and power. Furthermore, Walt pointed to the post-Cold War U.S. that has gone to war four times through democratic processes and has chosen warfare as a rational and preferred option. The panel largely agreed that global war on the scale of World War I and II is unlikely to occur again, because, according to Goldstein, “trade is now basis of prosperity [whereas] conquering land used to be.” However, they agreed, modern exceptions abound; in some cases the United Nations, which is charged with upholding peace, can sanction war, and in others, states can decide that war is in their interest. Whether or not war is on the way out in the long-term is up for debate, but according to Pinker, “you can’t miss the trend line.” Yes MiscalculationShorter flight times and lack of second strike capacity make miscalculation more likely.Cimbala 8 (Stephen, Political Science Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, March, “Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia” Comparative Strategy, Vol 27 No 2, p 113-132, InformaWorld) The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia , or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another's vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike-vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale wars between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare. For theorists, the argument that the spread of nuclear weapons might be fully compatible with international stability, and perhaps even supportive of international security, may be less sustainable than hitherto.17 Theorists optimistic about the ability of the international order to accommodate the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the present century have made several plausible arguments based on international systems and deterrence theory. First, nuclear weapons may make states more risk averse as opposed to risk acceptant, with regard to brandishing military power in support of foreign policy objectives. Second, if states' nuclear forces are second-strike survivable, they contribute to reduced fears of surprise attack. Third, the motives of states with respect to the existing international order are crucial. Revisionists will seek to use nuclear weapons to overturn the existing balance of power; status quo-oriented states will use nuclear forces to support the existing distribution of power, and therefore, slow and peaceful change, as opposed to sudden and radical power transitions. These arguments, for a less alarmist view of nuclear proliferation, take comfort from the history of nuclear policy in the “first nuclear age,” roughly corresponding to the Cold War.18 Pessimists who predicted that some thirty or more states might have nuclear weapons by the end of the century were proved wrong. However, the Cold War is a dubious precedent for the control of nuclear weapons spread outside of Europe. The military and security agenda of the Cold War was dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, especially with regard to nuclear weapons. Ideas about mutual deterrence based on second-strike capability and the deterrence “rationality” according to American or allied Western concepts might be inaccurate guides to the avoidance of war outside of Europe.19 Deterrence doesn’t take into account irrational decision-making, global alliances, and hazardous situations – history proves that war is still likely.Hellman, Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering at Stanford University, ‘8 [Martin, “Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear Weapons,” 10/21/2008, http://nuclearrisk.org/soaring_article.php, Nisarg] A similar situation exists with nuclear weapons. Many people point to the absence of global war since the dawn of the nuclear era as proof that these weapons ensure peace. The MX missile was even christened the Peacekeeper. Just as the laws of physics are used to ensure that a pilot executing a low pass will gain enough altitude to make a safe landing, a law of nuclear deterrence is invoked to quiet any concern over possibly killing billions of innocent people: Since World War III would mean the end of civilization, no one would dare start it. Each side is deterred from attacking the other by the prospect of certain destruction. That's why our current strategy is called nuclear deterrence or mutually assured destruction (MAD). But again, it's important to read the fine print. It is true that no one in his right mind would start a nuclear war, but when people are highly stressed they often behave irrationally and even seemingly rational decisions can lead to places that no one wants to visit. Neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev wanted to teeter on the edge of the nuclear abyss during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, but that is exactly what they did. Less well known nuclear near misses occurred during the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and NATO's Able Archer exercise of 1983. In each of those episodes, the law of unintended consequences combined with the danger of irrational decision making under stress created an extremely hazardous situation. Because the last date for a nuclear near miss listed above was 1983, it might be hoped that the end of the Cold War removed the nuclear sword hanging over humanity's head. Aside from the fact that other potential crises such as Taiwan were unaffected, a closer look shows that the Cold War, rather than ending, merely went into hibernation. In the West, the reawakening of this specter is usually attributed to resurgent Russian nationalism, but as in most disagreements the other side sees things very differently. The Russian perspective sees the United States behaving irresponsibly in recognizing Kosovo, in putting missiles (albeit defensive ones) in Eastern Europe, and in expanding NATO right up to the Russian border. For our current purposes, the last of these concerns is the most relevant because it involves reading the fine print – in this case, Article 5 of the NATO charter which states that an attack on any NATO member shall be regarded as an attack on them all. It is partly for that reason that a number of former Soviet republics and client states have been brought into NATO and that President Bush is pressing for Georgia and the Ukraine to be admitted. Once these nations are in NATO, the thinking goes, Russia would not dare try to subjugate them again since that would invite nuclear devastation by the United States, which would be treaty bound to come to the victim's aid. But, just as the laws of physics depended on a model that was not always applicable during a glider's low pass, the law of deterrence which seems to guarantee peace and stability is model-dependent. In the simplified model, an attack by Russia would be unprovoked. But what if Russia should feel provoked into an attack and a different perspective caused the West to see the attack as unprovoked? Just such a situation sparked the First World War. The assassination of Austria's Archduke Ferdinand by a Serbian nationalist led Austria to demand that it be allowed to enter Serbian territory to deal with terrorist organizations. This demand was not unreasonable since interrogation of the captured assassins had shown complicity by the Serbian military and it was later determined that the head of Serbian military intelligence was a leader of the secret Black Hand terrorist society. Serbia saw things differently and rejected the demand. War between Austria and Serbia resulted, and alliance obligations similar to NATO's Article 5 then produced a global conflict. Directory: file -> fetch fetch -> 11 th Lit Semester 1 Final Study Guide!!! fetch -> Industrial Revolution Inventors fetch -> Analysis for Galveston Hurricane of 1900 fetch -> The Illuminators (Team 2) 1900 Galveston Hurricane Cycle a team Assignment fetch -> Team csi-utb ruth Reyes Jose Ferrer fetch -> Galveston Hurricane of 1900 Cycle a-teacher as a Problem Solver fetch -> Is Climate Change Starting a New Dust Bowl? Cycle A fetch -> What makes a storm a hurricane fetch -> The 1950s were the "Happy Days" because it was a time of economic prosperity, technology development, new entertainment, new fashion and family growth. The 1950s was a great time fetch -> Sputnik and The Dawn of the Space Age Download 441.34 Kb. Share with your friends:
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