A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963

A strategy of this sort was based on the notion that even forces of limited size, if geared to a nuclear battlefield, armed with nuclear weapons and prepared to use them effectively against tactical targets (such as enemy stockpiles of war materiel, supply lines and troop concentrations) could make sure that NATO Europe was not overrun during the relatively brief period when the basic sources of Soviet power were being destroyed through the strategic air offensive. Soviet offensive capabilities in Europe would soon wither, and until they did, a nuclear-armed covering force, trained to fight in a nuclear environment, would be able to hold the line on the continent. The MC 48 strategy was thus not, as is sometimes claimed, "a strategy based upon a tactical nuclear response to conventional aggression."⁵²³ The essence of the new strategy was that the response would be both tactical and strategic; the attack on the Soviet Union would be massive, and, above all, very rapid. To quote from MC 48 itself: "it lies within NATO's power to provide an effective deterrent in Europe, and should war come despite the deterrent, to prevent a rapid overrunning of Europe," but only if "the ability to make immediate use of atomic weapons is ensured. Our studies have indicated that without their immediate use we could not successfully defend Europe within the resources available. Any delay in their use--even measured in hours--could be fatal. Therefore, in the event of war involving NATO it is militarily essential that NATO forces should be able to use atomic and thermonuclear weapons in their defense from the outset."⁵²⁴

In adopting MC 48, NATO was embracing a strategy of extremely rapid escalation. No strategy up to that point, and indeed no NATO strategy since, placed such a heavy and unequivocal emphasis on rapid and massive nuclear escalation. This was not an aggressive strategy. It had to be clear, as President Eisenhower and other NATO leaders said repeatedly at the time, that the Soviets were responsible for the war. But as soon as it was clear that the Soviets were to blame, America and her allies had to open up with everything they had. "Our only chance of victory in a third world war against the Soviet Union," Eisenhower told the NSC in December 1954, "would be to paralyze the enemy at the outset of the war." "We are not going to provoke the war," he added; the blame had to rest with the other side. Only in such circumstances could America "use the nuclear weapon," and America had to be able to use it "if we are to preserve our institutions and win the victory in war."⁵²⁵

[Put Figure Six about here]

Did MC 48 presuppose a strategy of preemption? It was certainly taken for granted that the West would, if it could, be the first to launch a massive air-atomic offensive, even in response to a purely conventional Soviet attack. But was the new strategy preemptive in the stronger sense that it assumed that a full nuclear strike might be launched as soon as NATO judged that war was unavoidable, yet before the enemy had actually begun military operations? The indicators are mixed, but the bulk of the evidence does suggest that the MC 48 strategy was preemptive even in this sense. This important conclusion, however, rests largely on construction and inference--on the logic of the strategy as well as on the interpretation of certain key texts.

First of all, it is clear that the MC 48 strategy presupposed that a major war in Europe could not be limited, and that it would rapidly become an all-out conflict. Indeed, if anyone had any doubt on this score, the MC 48 strategy in itself would guarantee that escalation up to the level of all-out war would be extremely rapid. But if nuclear weapons were used against the USSR--and clearly the basic MC 48 decision was that in a European war they would be used against Soviet targets--then the Soviets would certainly want to retaliate in kind. For western Europe, a nuclear-based strategy would only be tolerable if it were not suicidal. It would be acceptable only if the Soviets could be prevented from retaliating on a major scale. But the only way this could be done was to destroy their nuclear capability while it was still vulnerable to attack, which is to say before the bomber force actually became airborne. It was common knowledge, as General Gruenther, the NATO commander and one of the principal architects of the MC 48 strategy, pointed out in a January 1954 press briefing, that "the best way to get control of the air is to destroy enemy planes while they are on the ground."⁵²⁶ And it was clear enough that the only way to do this might well be to strike preemptively, as soon as it became clear that war was unavoidable--that is, while the Soviets were still getting ready for action, but before they had actually struck. With survival quite literally at stake, how could the West afford to allow the Soviets to set the timetable for action and concede to them the first nuclear blow?

This sort of thinking certainly lay at the heart of Eisenhower's basic defense philosophy--an important fact, since it was Eisenhower's personal thinking that was the most important source of the MC 48 strategy. Eisenhower throughout his presidency assumed that war in Europe could not be controlled. Local wars might be possible in the Third World, although even there America was not going to fight with her hands tied; nuclear weapons would in fact be used if U.S. troops were attacked by a sizable enemy force. In the early part of his presidency, he took a very tough line and talked about the need, in such circumstances, to strike at the heart of enemy power; indeed, if such wars became too common, the United States, he said, might even attack the Soviet Union herself. Later on, his attitude became somewhat more moderate and reflected a certain reluctance to engage in nuclear escalation. But even at that point he felt that the State Department, which thought that nuclear weapons "should be used only as a last resort," was being "overcautious" in its approach.⁵²⁷

With regard to Europe, the policy was a good deal less ambiguous. A war in Europe, Eisenhower insisted from beginning to end, would be a war with the USSR, and thus inevitably a general war. With so much at stake, both sides would use whatever forces they had. The whole argument about "mutual deterrence"--the idea that both sides would hold back from nuclear use for fear of retaliation, and would therefore fight with conventional weapons only--was in his view "completely erroneous." A war between America and Russia would, practically by definition, be a general war, and nuclear weapons would certainly be used. "It was fatuous," he said in 1956, "to think that the U.S. and USSR would be locked into a life and death struggle without using such weapons." And again in 1960 he stated flatly that no war in Europe could be kept from becoming a general war. That was why, he said, "we must be ready to throw the book at the Russians should they jump us. He did not see how there could be such a thing as a limited war in Europe, and thought we would be fooling ourselves and our European friends if we said we could fight such a war without recourse to nuclear weapons."⁵²⁸

In this sort of situation, in Eisenhower's view, there could be only one war aim, and that was national survival. There could be no winner in such a war, he said, but "we just don't want to lose any worse than we have to." He would hit the Soviet Union as hard as he could. The attack would be unrestrained. "In such a war," he said, "the United States would be applying a force so terrible that one simply could not be meticulous as to the methods by which the force was brought to bear." The President was certainly aware of how devastating a full-scale Soviet nuclear attack on America would be. If America were to survive, the USSR would have to be prevented from mounting such an attack. Given the limited effectiveness of air defense, the only way to protect the United States was therefore to destroy the Soviet force before it got off the ground. This is what Eisenhower meant when he said in May 1956 that "massive retaliation" was "likely to be the key to survival." "Retaliation," for Eisenhower, although he sometimes said the opposite, did not mean simply striking back after absorbing an enemy attack: a simple counter-attack of that sort would do nothing to assure the survival of American society. When Eisenhower said that "there is in reality no defense except to retaliate," what he really meant was that America would have to be the first to launch a "retaliatory" attack--that the United States, as he put it that same day, "must not allow the enemy to strike the first blow."⁵²⁹

And America, he thought, had to concentrate on developing a military force that would enable her to do just that. At the end of 1956, after being briefed about the effects of a nuclear war, Eisenhower wondered "why we should put a single nickel into anything but developing our capacity to diminish the enemy's capacity for nuclear attack."⁵³⁰ A few months later, he noted that given the enormous destruction that would result from a Soviet nuclear attack, "the only sensible thing for us to do was to put all resources into our SAC capability and into hydrogen bombs."⁵³¹ And he fully understood that the only way this additional capability could make a real difference was if the United States used it to destroy the Soviet force before it launched its initial attack--and given the limited effectiveness of air defense, that meant before it had actually left the ground.

Thus massive retaliation, as David Rosenberg says, really meant massive preemption--certainly in operational terms, and to a considerable extent in fundamental strategic terms as well.⁵³² In the words of a major historical study sponsored by the Defense Department, the whole U.S. operational posture, as it had developed during the Eisenhower period, "strained for rapid (indeed preemptive) and massive response to an imminent attack."⁵³³ It was not as though the United States had decided not to launch an attack until after absorbing the enemy's first strike. Under Eisenhower, the top priority, as the President himself said, was "to blunt the enemy's initial threat--by massive retaliatory power and ability to deliver it; and by a continental defense system of major capability."⁵³⁴ The "blunting" of the attack meant, in the idiom of the day, the neutralization to the extent possible of the enemy's strategic capability, and it is important to note that this was not to be done by air defense alone. The "retaliatory" force was to do the major part of the job, and it could do this only if it destroyed that enemy force--the force to be used for the initial attack, and not just whatever was being held in reserve for follow-on strikes--while it was still on the ground.

Eisenhower believed in the importance of "diminishing as much as possible the first blow of an enemy attack," and his policy reflected that basic principle.⁵³⁵ In the President's view, America's "only chance of victory"--really her only chance of survival, since he did not believe it made sense to talk of winners and losers in a war of this sort--was "to paralyze the enemy at the outset of a war."⁵³⁶ And the very top priority was to destroy the enemy's strategic force.⁵³⁷

But did this mean that the United States would strike before the Soviets had actually started the war by beginning hostile military operations? Or was it assumed, for example, that the war might begin with a Soviet conventional attack in Europe, so that the American first strike would take place only after the Soviets had already committed actual acts of military aggression? It is important to understand that American strategy was not built on the assumption that the war would begin in this way, and in fact the idea that the Soviets would deliberately start a war without launching a massive nuclear attack on America was explicitly ruled out by Eisenhower. The president had little doubt that the Soviets would be under "extremely great" pressure to use atomic weapons "in a sudden blow" if they decided to go to war; "he did not see any basis for thinking other than that they would use these weapons at once, and in full force."⁵³⁸

What this meant was that if America was to get in the first nuclear blow--viewed as vital to the survival of the western world, and thus a prime goal of the strategy--she would in all likelihood have to launch her attack before the enemy had actually struck. Hence the great emphasis placed on speed, something which would have made little sense if America and NATO as a whole had opted for a simple retaliatory strategy in the normal sense of the term. "Victory or defeat," Eisenhower wrote, "could hang upon minutes and seconds used decisively at top speed or tragically wasted in indecision."⁵³⁹

This view was widely shared by top American military authorities. General J. Lawton Collins, former Army Chief of Staff and now America's representative on the NATO Military Committee, stressed the point in his remarks to that body in December 1953. "Even short delays in granting Commanders the authority to initiate retaliatory operations," Collins declared, "might well lead to a serious disintegration of our military position."⁵⁴⁰ And General Alfred Gruenther, the NATO Commander, emphasized the point in his very important "Capabilities Study," one of the key documents on which MC 48 was based. To accomplish his main mission of defending Europe, Gruenther wrote, SACEUR's "authority to implement the planned use of atomic weapons must be such as to ensure that no delay whatsoever will occur in countering a surprise attack." The choice of the term "countering," as opposed to "responding to" or "reacting to," probably again reflected an assumption that the West might have to act preemptively in a crisis.⁵⁴¹

The MC 48 strategy was rooted in this kind of thinking. NATO, it was assumed, would have to move fast. If the USSR's nuclear capability was to be effectively neutralized, the West's air-atomic offensive had to be launched "without any delay." It was vital, in SACEUR's view, that the attack be "directed initially against the adversary's atomic capability and his key positions: in this area, where the time factor is decisive, measures must be taken to reduce to a minimum the time needed for decision and execution." The aim here was to "free the West from the threat of a Soviet nuclear attack." But the only way NATO could do this was to destroy the Soviet nuclear force before it was able to strike at the NATO countries. And since no one could take it for granted that the USSR would be so obliging as to start a war with a purely conventional attack and then wait patiently for the West to deliver the first nuclear strike, this implied that NATO might have to strike before the Soviets committed an overt act of aggression.⁵⁴²

Western leaders, of course, thought of themselves as the kind of people who would never start a war, and in a number of documents a strategy of preemption was explicitly ruled out.⁵⁴³ But it is hard to take such statements at face value, given both the logic of the strategy and the many documents that point in the opposite direction.⁵⁴⁴ Thus Dulles, for example, commented in December 1953 on the "great importance" of developing a "mechanism which can go into effect instantly on an alert."⁵⁴⁵ And Eisenhower himself, just days after MC 48 was adopted, emphasized "his firm intention to launch a strategic air force immediately in case of alert of actual attack."⁵⁴⁶ Once again, the phrasing is significant, suggesting that the bomber force would be launched when it became clear that the Soviets were still preparing for war but had not yet actually begun their attack.⁵⁴⁷

The general thinking at NATO headquarters during this period was that, for the time being at least, the Soviets would have to build up their forces in Central Europe before they could launch an assault on NATO Europe and that such a build-up would in itself give warning of attack. Gruenther thought the "alert period" would last for five to seven days. When warning was received, a General Alert would be called, carrying with it an automatic grant of authority to SACEUR to order nuclear operations. In other words, the decision to use nuclear weapons would be made "before either side opens fire."⁵⁴⁸

As Eisenhower put it in a letter to Churchill, one had to consider most carefully the circumstances in which the NATO should react "explosively."⁵⁴⁹ The fact that this is treated as a difficult issue once again supports the idea that Eisenhower and the other makers of the strategy were thinking in terms of preemption. A decision to retaliate against a Soviet nuclear attack, or even to order a full nuclear strike in response to a massive Soviet conventional attack on western Europe, would not be hard to make, but defining the conditions for preemptive action was obviously a much more difficult problem.

And indeed, at an NSC meeting held on November 4, 1954, Eisenhower issued a directive ordering the establishment of a special subcommittee of the NSC Planning Board. This committee was to prepare a report on "possible Soviets actions which might constitute clear indication of hostile intent." Eisenhower personally drafted the subcommittee's terms of reference. This body was, first of all, "to try to anticipate, by a judgment on indications of Soviet hostile intent, the need for immediate U.S. military action to save the U.S. from attack. Our own counter-measures to such established indications would include orders for the evacuation of American cities, for the dispersal of SAC, for mobilization, etc., and for possible U.S. preventive military action. The President indicated that should the need so require, he might be prepared to give advance authority to local commanders to act."⁵⁵⁰

The MC 48 strategy, in fact, explains one of the most extraordinary features of the NATO system that took shape in the 1950s: the effective delegation to SACEUR of authority to initiate nuclear operations in an emergency. At the time, it was argued repeatedly that with survival hanging in the balance, one simply could not afford to waste precious minutes going through a cumbersome process of political consultation, and the American government insisted from the very outset on its ultimate right to order its nuclear forces into action unilaterally. There could be no doubt, Eisenhower wrote Admiral Radford, the JCS Chairman, about what the United States would do if one of the allies tried to "impose a veto on actions which the United States considers essential to its security or to the security of it armed forces exposed to enemy attack. We should not let the British and French have any illusions as to U.S. intentions." And Secretary Dulles often argued forcefully along similar lines.⁵⁵¹

But it is important to note not just that the U.S. government was reserving to itself this supreme power. The more crucial point to emerge from the new evidence is that this authority was effectively delegated to the NATO Commander--or more precisely, to SACEUR in his capacity as the U.S. Commander-in-Chief in Europe, or CINCEUR. The NATO military authorities for some time had been pressing for a predelegation of authority to launch a nuclear attack. General Ridgway, in one of his last acts as SACEUR in 1953, had requested a delegation of authority "to put into effect his atomic counter-offensive immediately on the outbreak of war."⁵⁵² The idea was also a basic feature of the Gruenther strategy in 1954.⁵⁵³ The military authorities in Washington wanted to get a formal acceptance of this principle by the allies as part of the MC 48 strategy.⁵⁵⁴

It was clear from the start, however, that it would be hard to win explicit allied approval for such an arrangement. The Europeans were in fact sensitive to the great dilemma posed by the new strategy: the conflict between the military need for extremely rapid action, and the political requirement that the crucial decision be made by duly constituted civil authority. This sense of basic imperatives in conflict comes out over and over again in the newly released documents. Thus a British document discussed a NATO Standing Group report on Gruenther's "capabilities study" as follows:

Politically the implications of initiating atomic warfare are so grave that there would be the greatest objection to delegating the decision to use atomic weapons to SACEUR. Militarily there is no question now as to the importance of instant atomic retaliation to any major attack whether with or without the use of atomic weapons; this will be of even greater importance by 1957 since SACEUR's forces will be committed to the atomic warfare strategy. . . . The proposal in the Standing Group Draft goes some way towards meeting SACEUR's requirement but still leaves open the question of what will happen in the event of there not being time for SACEUR to obtain the Council's consent to a General Alert. Militarily it is desirable to give SACEUR discretion in this event, politically this is probably impossible.⁵⁵⁵

In the end, no formal decision was reached on the control question. The French plan for a three-power committee was not adopted, but the Americans decided not to press the Europeans too hard on the fundamental question of nuclear use. General Gruenther was against pushing for "express agreements in NATO on the right to use nuclear weapons." "Getting a plan" like MC 48 "approved in principle," he argued, would "permit implementation in fact to take place and lay the groundwork for any future action."⁵⁵⁹ Dulles agreed, and the JCS went along with this approach. Instead of pressing for categorical commitments, the view was that "the Europeans should be led into the atomic era gradually and tacitly."⁵⁶⁰

In formal terms, the NATO Council simply approved MC 48 "as a basis for defense planning and preparations by the NATO military authorities, noting that this approval does not involve the delegation of the responsibility of governments for putting plans into action in the event of hostilities."⁵⁶¹ But this sort of phrasing was somewhat disingenuous. In agreeing to MC 48, the NATO governments were not just approving it as a basis for planning. They were also accepting--and, for the British and French at least, knowingly accepting--the whole concept of operations it embodied.⁵⁶² As for the Americans, the Eisenhower administration certainly did not take the proviso about the governments' responsibility for deciding on war and peace too literally. "For political purposes" the U.S. government was willing to go along with a text reserving "final decisions" to the governments. But, when the time came, the United States was not going to hold back simply because an allied government was opposed to action.⁵⁶³ In general, when pressed on the question of how NATO would actually go to war, the basic tactic was to finesse the issue. "Events would take care of the political decisions," Dulles said in this context, especially since the United States retained "its own freedom of action" and would do what was necessary "because it would be our troops that would have the atomic weapons which they would be able to use in their own defense and that would be decisive."⁵⁶⁴ Indeed, throughout the 1950s, NATO did not have a real procedure for determining when and how force would be used: this crucial issue was deliberately evaded throughout the Eisenhower period.⁵⁶⁵ So in December 1954, Dulles did not press for a clear grant of authority. It was enough simply to rule out any NATO Council decision suggesting that action by SACEUR, in an emergency, had to await approval by all the NATO members.