Signals Equipment, Design, and Development

At the beginning of the War, the RCCS, es- pecially the NPAM, had mostly First World War signal equipment, with the exception of 100 WS No. 1 that had been made by Northern Electric in 1935. Only the NWT&Y Radio Sys- tem had up-to-date radio equipment, much of it made by the Signal Inspection and Test De- partment (SI&TD) in Ottawa, because the funding for it came from sources other than the RCCS budget. The staff of the SI&TD, six officers and 20 men in 1939, was much too small to begin to provide the many types and hundreds of communication devices required. The pre-war policy had been to rely on British designed equipment but after the losses at Dunkirk and the desperate need by the British Army to replenish its own equipment, Canada was forced to rely on its own resources. In May 1940, a technical group of SI&TD was trans- ferred to the Branch of the Master General of the Ordnance (MGO) and made responsible for the design, development, procurement, and inspection of signal equipment. In the years that followed, a number of technical es- tablishments achieved this aim.

In May 1941, the remainder of the SI&TD staff was incorporated into the Directorate of Technical Research, which had obtained draw- ings and specifications of British equipment. Signals personnel co-ordinated the production of this equipment in Canada through the De- partment of Munitions and Supply. At the same time, the Canadian Signals Experimental Establishment (CSEE) was formed to function in a similar way as did the old SI&TD. Early in 1942, the Signals portion of the Directorate of Technical Research was reconstituted as the Directorate of Signal Design and placed under the Army Engineering Design Branch with a strength of 27 officers, 90 men, and 43 civil- ians. In May 1942, as the production of signal

equipment grew, a Signal Production Branch consisting of 10 RCCS officers was created within the Department of Munitions and Sup- ply. On 16 July 1943, a Directorate of Electrical and Communication Design (DE&CD) was cre- ated within the MGO and the CSEE was placed under the control of DE&CD. Brig H.E. Taber, the only RCCS officer with a Doctorate in Elec- trical Engineering, was appointed Director over 30 officers, 47 men, and 44 civilians. The CSEE, which later in 1943 grew into the Cana- dian Signals Research and Development Estab- lishment (CSRDE) was located in pristine quarters in the National Research Council Annex just outside Ottawa. It was commanded by LCol J.E. Cumming, a PF officer, who had a staff of 16 officers and a number of civilians. There was an Inspection Board, headed by Col

R.A.H. Galbraith, a PF officer, who also had a staff of 10 officers. A good example of the work undertaken by the more than 70 officers in these various agencies was the development of the Canadian Wireless Set (WSC) No. 29, which came into service at the end of the War. It was designed to improve on the popular WS No. 19 and did have some innovative and ad- vanced features. Unfortunately, it came too late for the War and only small numbers were manufactured..
Hong Kong
While, on the whole, the Canadian Army in Canada was involved in the recruitment and training of men for overseas service in the Eu- ropean Theatre, and the provision of all the equipment necessary for a modern mobile army, it did have an operational role in the de- fence of Canada. There was one exception, that in retrospect should have never hap- pened, the sending of a Canadian force to bol- ster the defences of Hong Kong. The grievous loss of Canadian soldiers, both in combat and as a result of unspeakable treatment as prison- ers of war (POW) by the Japanese was stagger- ing. The Canadian losses at Hong Kong amounted to 290 killed or died of wounds, while 267 perished as POW, 557 out of the 1,975 all ranks sent there. The rate of fatalities,
28.8 per cent, was much greater than that of Dieppe’s 18.8 per cent, yet the story of Dieppe has always overshadowed that of Hong Kong.

Japan, though allied to Germany and Italy since September 1940, remained neutral to- wards the European War. In 1941, relations between Japan and the United States deterio- rated, and Britain, standing alone and at bay in Europe, viewed the weakness of her posi- tion in the Far East with concern. Since the disaster at Dunkirk, every man and every gun was needed to repel the expected invasion at home. British Intelligence believed that Japan would not attack Britain or the United States but would join Germany in the war against Russia, which had begun in June 1941. War with Japan was a recognized possibility, though not a probability in the opinion of the British military authorities. Prime Minister Winston Churchill believed Hong Kong could not be held or relieved in a war with Japan and should not be reinforced but was swayed from his position before the request for aid was made to Canada. The decision to seek rein- forcements for Hong Kong was primarily a po- litical one: to bolster Chinese morale, to encourage the United States, and to deter Japan. It was, as well, based on the British mil- itary appreciation of the combat capability of the Japanese Army as poor. Unfortunately, that analysis turned out to be totally incorrect. On 19 September 1941, the British War Of- fice requested of Canada one or two battalions to reinforce the Hong Kong garrison. After se- rious consideration, the Canadian govern- ment agreed to the proposal ten days later on the strength of the British Intelligence’s eval- uation of the Far Eastern situation. Two bat- talions would be sent from Canada, not from the Canadian forces in England. On 11 Octo- ber, the War Office asked also for a brigade headquarters and certain specialist units, in- cluding a Signals section. The two battalions chosen, The Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers, for the Canadian Con- tingent, named “C” Force, were among the nine battalions in Canada considered to be “not recommended for operational consider- ation at present.” The Royals had just re-

turned from garrison duty in Newfoundland and the Grenadiers from similar duties in Ja- maica; neither had participated in field exer- cises, nor had any training with live ammunition with the 2 or 3-inch mortar. Since both battalions were being sent to per- form garrison duties, it was felt that further training in Hong Kong would bring them up to an acceptable standard. Unfortunately, for the Canadians, from the time they landed in Hong Kong until the Japanese attacked was only a period of three weeks, barely time to be familiar with the local topography that was far more mountainous than appreciated.

The Signals’ contribution to “C” Force, commanded by Brig J.K. Lawson, RCR, con- sisted of a reduced brigade signal section of one officer and 32 signallers. There were 22 radio operators, 6 DRs, and 4 linemen, from the original 4^th Infantry Divisional Signals at Barriefield. Individually, they were well trained in their respective trades but had little opportunity to work together as a Signals sec- tion. Capt G.M. Billings, a PF officer, on de- tached duty from 1^st Cdn Corps Sigs in England, was named to command the Signals section but before he could even appraise his men the whole force was embarked on 27 Oc- tober 1941 from Vancouver aboard the Aus- tralian liner SS Awatea and the escort vessel, HMCS Prince Robert. The first time Billings saw his men was on board ship on 28 October. Be- cause of hasty planning, “C” Force sailed with- out its transport, and none of its 221 vehicles had arrived when the Japanese attacked 40 days after the departure from Canada.

The Force reached Honolulu on 2 Novem- ber, and Manila 12 days later, where the British cruiser HMS Danae joined the Prince Robert as escort. On board ship, every effort was made to maintain a training program. Some of the officers realized that if war did come there was slight chance that the colony could be held for long against the superior numbers which Japan could throw into the battle. Training in small arms was therefore emphasized. Visual signaling practice was carried on by the Signals section but no wireless practice was possible because of the necessity for radio silence.




When the Canadian force arrived on 16 November, the Hong Kong Garrison was or- ganized into two brigades. The first or Main- land Brigade, commanded by British Brig C. Wallis, was to be deployed in the defence of the Kowloon Peninsula, and the second for the protection of Hong Kong Island. Brig J.K. Lawson’s Canadian Infantry along with the British 1^st Middlesex Regt, formed the “Island Brigade.” The Canadian Signal Section was mostly attached to Brig. Wallis and his British Mainland Brigade HQ, which needed wireless to supplement fortress line communications. Others were attached to Brig Lawson’s HQ, and three signallers were attached each to the Royals and the Grenadiers. So small was the Crown Colony area that all the Canadians, whether serving on the mainland or on the is- land, could be billeted together. “C” Force Sig- nals, intended to fill gaps in the Royal Signals Hong Kong Establishment, was solely a group of tradesmen, among which no orderly room or administrative personnel were included. In

the actual fighting, however, they had to act as a skeleton Brigade Signal Section and the lack of administrative personnel soon became ap- parent, as the Chinese civilians employed as cooks and batmen disappeared at the sound of the first shot.

“C” Force Signals was equipped with WS No. 11 for battalion to brigade communications, and No. 18 sets for communications within the two battalions. The sets were held for some time by the Hong Kong Ordnance, which had unloaded them from the Awatea. They were finally released but no vehicles or motorcycles were made available to the sec- tion. Until the start of the fighting the section was limited for transport to the services of a station wagon loaned by Royal Army Service Corps, when it was free of other duties. Nev- ertheless, ingenious schemes were devised to familiarize men of the Signals section, partic- ularly the DRs, with the terrain on the main- land and to give them some practice in carrying messages, even without the benefit of


motorcycles. The linemen were detailed to various Royal Signals Line sections and em- ployed on fortress communications with which they had little experience.

In addition to limited training and the com- mitment to provide wireless communications for the mainland brigade, the section was re- sponsible for instructing wireless to selected in- fantry signallers of the British Mainland Brigade: the 2^nd Royal Scots, the 2/14 Pun- jabis, and the 5/7 Rajputs. Despite the delay in getting release of WS No. 18 sets from Ord- nance, these infantry signallers were trained to an elementary level in the field use of wireless. No training on maintenance was possible so that when sets broke down later in action they were discarded. However, the loss of these sets during the fighting on the Island was not of se- rious consequence since the Island was ade- quately served by fortress underground lines. On 7 December 1941, the Japanese launched their infamous attack on Pearl Har- bour. That same fateful day, 8 December (Hong Kong time), the Mainland Brigade had prepared, co-incidentally, a “manning exer- cise” as a test of operational efficiency. Thus, by accident, the Canadian Signalmen were at their posts, loading supplies into their only ve- hicle when Japanese planes raided the Kai Tak aerodrome, and shortly afterwards bombed a prominent building in Sham Shu Po. Two sig- nalmen, Cpl R. Routledge and Sigmn J.L. Fair- ley, were wounded. Captain Billings immediately commandeered a number of civilian vehicles, and the DRs obtained some motorcycles from the Ordnance Depot on Hong Kong Island. Now the Signal Section had the transport that had been withheld. A DR service was established and operated suc- cessfully until the evacuation of the mainland. Early on the morning of 8 December, Japan- ese troops crossed the border into the New Ter- ritories and encountered British troops carrying out a series of demolitions prior to falling back to their main defensive position, the Gin Drinkers Line. It was a prepared posi- tion of some strength and was held by the three British battalions of the Mainland Brigade. The most important strong point was the Shing

Mun Redoubt on the left flank held by a com- pany HQ and a platoon of the Royal Scots. The Japanese made a surprising night attack on it on the 9^th and overran its defenders. This loss was disastrous but the British made no attempt to counter-attack. D Company of the Grenadiers was moved from the Island to Kowloon to act as a reserve. The Japanese re- sumed the attack on the 11^th and easily rolled up the rest of the Drinkers Line, forcing the British to retreat to the Island, except for the 5/7 Rajput Regt which was to hold the Devil’s Peak. By the 13^th, the Rajputs had to be with- drawn as well, because there was no way to get supplies to them. After only five days of very lit- tle fighting the British had been driven from the Mainland and withdrawn to the Island. This precipitous retreat had a serious effect on the general morale of the Garrison.

During the withdrawal phase on the 13^th, RCCS Cpl C.J. Sharp had been ordered to evacuate a group of non-essential men and ve- hicles from the Kowloon Headquarters. This entailed a drive to the ferry terminal through surprisingly heavy guerilla opposition. With his charges safely aboard the ferry, Sharp at- tempted to return to report to Captain Billings. He was turned back by stiffening enemy opposition, and failed to get through even on foot. The remainder of the day he spent helping to engage enemy patrols. Even- tually, he crossed to the Island on a sampan whose crew he intimidated with his sub-ma- chine gun. Some RCCS operators attached to the Royal Scots drove commandeered buses to assist in the evacuation.

The remaining Canadian Signals and Head- quarters personnel moved to the Kai Tak air- port shoreline, where small boats had been waiting to evacuate them to Devil’s Peak. When it was agreed by the British Com- mander that there was no point in the Cana- dians to go to Devil’s Peak, permission was granted for volunteers to make a run to the vehicular ferry in order to take all the Signal equipment over to the Island. Captain Billings gathered up all the vehicles he could and with motorcycle outriders, and half dozen cars and trucks loaded with Signals stores he and his
men raced to the dock through enemy-held territory in total blackout with only minor damage from enemy fire. Signals lost only a WS No. 11 that was with the 5/7 Rajput Regi- ment, whose operators had to destroy every- thing in their withdrawal from Devil’s Peak.

The section reformed at its billets in the villa Casa Bianca that served as the Island Sig- nal Pool. A hot meal was waiting, the first in five days, and the men enjoyed the luxury of several hours’ uninterrupted sleep. Both brigades deployed for the defence of the is- land. The East Brigade, commanded by Brig Wallis, consisted of the Royal Rifles, 40 offi- cers and 921 men commanded by LCol W.J. Home, a PF officer, and the 5/7 Rajputs.The West Brigade, commanded by Brig Lawson consisted of the Grenadiers, 40 officers and 873 men commanded by LCol J.L.R. Sutcliffe, MC and the 2/14 Punjabs. The Middlesex Bat- talion manned pill boxes around the perime- ter of the island, which was generally divided between the East and West Brigades. The Royal Scots were put in reserve. Capt Billings and 14 Signallers were attached to Brigadier Lawson’s “West Brigade,” the HQ of which was located at Wong Nei Chong in the centre of the Island. The separation of the Canadian Battalions was not a good idea because they had no experience working with British units. Five days elapsed before the enemy crossed the strait and during that time an operational communications system functioned under constant aerial observation and heavy shelling. Every attempt to use wireless brought down an immediate enemy artillery barrage. DR runs along the exposed roads on the north side of the Island to Victoria Headquar- ters were extremely dangerous in the days pre- ceding and immediately after the Japanese crossing. Cpl L.C. Speller and Sigmn R. Damant and E.R. Thomas made many of these trips as volunteers; Thomas lost his life in the course of this duty when machine gunners caught him on an open stretch of shore road. During the night of 18 - 19 December, three Japanese regiments landed about 2100 hours at three places on the northeast end of the Is- land. “C” Company of the Royals made a

counter attack in the area of Sun Mun Bar- racks but were unable to stem the tide, mostly because a Japanese force had ascended the high ground at Mount Parker and were able to bring down fire from its commanding posi- tion. The Japanese, is spite of losses, made rapid progress and by the morning of the 19^th were in possession of Jardine’s Lookout and close to Wong Nei Chong Gap. Further ad- vances went on during the day and by the 20^th the Japanese had reached Repulse Bay and had cut the Island defences in two. By the af- ternoon of the 19^th, Brig Wallis, having lost most of the 5/7 Rajputs and with the Japanese holding the high ground, withdrew his forces, the Royals and some remnants of the Middle- sex to the area of Stone Hill and Stanley Vil- lage. A defensive line was established from Stanley Mound through Sugar Loaf Hill to Palm Villa by companies of the Royals. Wallis began on the morning of the 20^th an advance toward Repulse Bay with the object of making contact with the West Brigade at Wong Nei Chong Gap. By just a few hours, Japanese troops had reached Repulse Bay first and when “A” Company of the Royals approached the Repulse Bay Hotel, a fire fight com- menced. The Hotel was captured but the ad- vance could go no further. “D” Company moved to the right around the Japanese on Middle Spur but after failing to drive the Japanese off Violet Hill, it withdrew to Stanley View. Another attempt was made to advance by the remaining Royals toward the area of the Ty Tam Tuk Resevoir on the following day but once again the Japanese holding the high ground were too strong. Several more at- tempts were made to advance beyond Repulse Bay on the 21^st and 22^nd by British troops and “A” Company but they could not get past the Ridge on the road to Wong Nei Chong. Fi- nally, on the 23^rd, all the troops were with- drawn to the Royals position at Stanley. The Japanese made constant attacks forcing the Royals, who were worn out by constant com- bat, no hot food, and little sleep for five days, to withdraw to the Stanley Peninsula on the night of the 23^rd. By the 24^th, LCol Home in- sisted that his battalion had to be taken out of
the line to recuperate. Only part of his battal- ion could do so since “B” Company was hold- ing out at Chung Hum Kok and “C” Company was ordered to hold the high ground north of the Fort. A rested “D” Company made another counter-attack on the morning of 25 Decem- ber, without artillery support, and was beaten back with a loss of 26 killed and 75 wounded. Later in the morning, “A” Company tried to return to Stanley Village but lost 6 killed and 12 wounded in a Japanese artillery barrage. About noon, all fighting stopped as word was received that the Governor of Hong Kong had surrendered the Colony. The formal surren- der of Stanley forces took place on the morn- ing of the 26th.

Meanwhile, the West Brigade had organ- ized several flying columns of platoon size that attempted to blunt the Japanese advances on the night of the 18 - 19th but were defeated by the rapid seizure of the high ground by Japanese infantry. On the 19^th, a more serious attempt was made by the Grenadier’s “A” Company to clear Jardine’s Lookout and to press on to Mount Butler. Initially, it was suc- cessful but after serious fighting during which all the officers were killed or wounded the Company was surrounded and forced to sur- render. It was during this action that CSM J.R. Osborn earned Canada’s first Victoria Cross in the Second World War by throwing himself on a Japanese grenade to save the lives of his men. When it became clear on the 19^th, that Brig Lawson’s HQ was in danger of being over- run, he decided to stage a withdrawal. An ad- vance party was sent to an alternative position at Mount Nicholson but so rapid was the enemy advance that there was no time for an orderly withdrawal of the skeleton staff at Brigade Headquarters. Small arms fire was raking the position and the staff was pinned down. Brigadier Lawson finally gave the every- man-for-himself order. Each man crawled and fought his way up the exposed slope towards the intended new headquarters to the south- west. During one period Corporal Sharp and his men held a vital road position on their own initiative, stalling the Japanese advance in that sector until relieved by a larger force.

Brigadier Lawson had delayed his departure to destroy documents and was killed soon after leaving the command shelter. When Cap- tain Billings attempted to leave by the same route he was wounded but later he and the Staff Captain of the Brigade made their way in an abandoned vehicle travelling northwest to the Winnipeg Grenadiers’ headquarters at Wan Chai Gap. “D” Company of the Grenadiers holding vital ground in the area of the Wong Nei Chong Gap managed to hold off the Japanese until the 22^nd, before surren- dering. Attempts to relieve “D” Company by both “A” Company and the Royal Scots on the 19^th failed, mainly because of a lack of effec- tive command after the death of Brig Lawson. About noon on the 20^th, Col H.B. Rose, a British Regular Officer, assumed command of the West Brigade. On the evening of the 20^th, “B” Company, which had been at Pok Fu Lam, came up to Mount Nicholson to prepare for a counter-attack on the 21^st. Once again, the Japanese had beaten the Canadians to the hill- top and repulsed all attacks that night and on the 21^st. The Grenadiers gathered up all avail- able men and reinforced by a platoon of Royal Engineers occupied Mount Cameron and re- sisted Japanese attempts on the 22^nd to take it. Due to some confusion over orders, the Grenadiers left Mount Cameron and with- drew to Wan Chai Gap but the hill continued to be held by the Royal Scots.

By midnight on the 23^rd, there were Grenadiers near Mount Cameron and on Bennet’s Hill with Battalion HQ at Wan Chai Gap, a company of the Middlesex at Little Hong Kong and another on Leighton Hill and the Royal Scots with the remnants of the two Indian Battalions on the northern and western slopes of Mount Cameron. All troops were extremely tired and were being con- stantly shelled and bombed. On the 24^th, the Japanese drove the Royal Scots down into the lower slopes of Mount Cameron and cap- tured Leighton Hill. In the morning of the 25^th, the Japanese renewed their offensive tak- ing Mount Parish and advanced into Wan Chai Gap. At 1515 hours, the British Com- mander surrendered realizing that further re-

The Signals detachments, many of them walking wounded, had gathered at Wan Chai Gap. Shelling became heavy, and the men had scarcely settled into a villa when three of them were killed by a direct hit: Sgt C.J. Sharp, Sigmn R. Damant and H. Greenberg, and four were wounded, two of whom died of their wounds, Sigmn J.L. Fairley and J.E. Horvath. The last scene of this tragic piece was played out at Victoria Barracks. Remnants of Brigade Headquarters Staff and others, under com- mand of Captain Billings, took up positions round about the barracks for a last-ditch de- fence of the area. Instructions were to stand or fall. For several days, they patrolled an ever diminishing perimeter, fighting off Japanese attacks at close range. Shortly before noon on Christmas Day, they were ordered to lay down arms. This they did after destroying all equip- ment, including the last link with Canada, a high-powered wireless station working through England. The capture of Hong Kong had taken 18 days.

The surviving troops were fated to endure almost three and a half years in prison camps of indescribable squalor and horror. Insuffi- cient food and unclean conditions led to bouts of dysentery, which often proved fatal. After a few months, the POW were put to work, in spite of their weakened condition. Initially, all 1,685 Canadian POW were kept at Hong Kong, where 128 died including LCol Sut- cliffe and three Signallers: Sigmn J.S. Little, 5

tinguished themselves far beyond the call of duty. Sgt. R. Routledge, one of the four RCCS members who remained imprisoned at Hong Kong, assumed the perilous role of go-be- tween for senior officer prisoners and Chi- nese Chungking agents. Messages concerning plans for mass escapes were passed by the Ser- geant on work parties. A Japanese agent in- tercepted one of these, and Sgt Routledge was taken into custody. In the full knowledge that his predecessors in this venture had been executed, the NCO refused to divulge the names of his colleagues, despite the torture, starvation, and beating to which he was sub- jected. Sgt A.R. Squires, although he had no medical training, volunteered to be a medical orderly and became so proficient he was made the head medical orderly in the Hong Kong Hospital. He managed to survive in spite of the close proximity to many diseases, particularly diphtheria.

This distressing episode at Hong Kong re- mains a sad chapter in the history of Canadian arms. The Royal Canadian Corps of Signals can be justly proud of the caliber of its repre- sentatives there. All ranks,

in the words of the British Chief Signal Officer, “did all he could have hoped.” The following signalmen were awarded decorations: Sgt R. Routledge, DCM; Cpl L.C. Speller, MM; Sgt A.R. Squires, BEM; Sgt C.J. Sharp and Sigmn R. Damant,

June 1942; LSgt W.J. White, 25 September

MiDs (posthumously).

DCM


1942; and Sigmn T. Redhead, 30 September 1942. Beginning in January 1943 followed by

a second contingent in July and a third group in De- cember, Canadian POW, in- cluding 19 signallers, were sent to Japan to work in var- ious industries, mainly min- ing. There, 136 more died with the Signals contingent sharing in all the misery, hunger and degradation.

On 22 October 2010, a new dining facility at Vimy Barracks, Kingston, the home station of the Communications and Electronics Branch, was dedicated and named Routledge Hall. The Routledge name has come to repre- sent the quiet courage required of every sol- dier regardless of the time or conflict in which Canadians may be asked to serve. Sgt. Rout- ledge’s DCM, second only to the VC as a mark of courage, was the only one awarded to a member of the RCCS in the Second World War, and only one awarded to a Canadian


Pacific Star

Several Signals POW dis-

while in captivity. After returning to Canada,

Sgt R. Routledge being presented with the Distinguished Conduct Medal by the Governor General HE, FM,The Viscount Alexander of Tunis, KG, GCB, CSI, DSO, MC, in 1947.

Sgt Rutledge continued to serve in the RCCS, into which he was later commissioned.

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