A story of Canadian Military Communications 1903 2013 bgen William J. Patterson omm, cd (Ret’d)



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505 transportable satellite communications sys- tem and both Link-11 and Link-16 data link capability. 42 Radar Squadron moved to the Cold Lake Air Weapons Range and its Remote Operations Training Centre was located on the Cold Lake flight line. The MOB radar units maintain the capability to deploy with 72 hours notice in support of air defence, sovereignty, or training missions. The assigned aerospace controllers are able to conduct deployed op- erations using unit ground-air-ground radios. Each unit consisted of one Telecommunica- tions Officer and eleven technicians. In 2011, contracts were signed to replace the AN/TPS- 70 radars with a more modern system, the GM403M3-D long range, air defence radar. Scheduled to come on line in 2013, this new radar system will ensure Canada maintains a transportable air surveillance and aerospace control capability.

Another key element of the Air Defence Master Plan was the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACs), a combination flying radar and command and control system, that had been brought into service in the late 1970s to support NORAD air defence operations. Al- though flying AWACS aircraft on a 24/7 patrol basis was not feasible, the system was available




A NWS Short Range Radar Site, Labrador 3.




to complement or replace ground-based radar sensors and command and control facilities in the event of an airborne attack. While flying in a NORAD role, Canadian CELE Air officers and ATIS technicians formed part of AWACS crews. Two Canadians, Sgt D.L. Pitcher, Air De- fence Technician, and MCpl J.J.P. Legault, Communication Technician, were killed on 22 September 1995 in the only AWACS fatal crash. The accident occurred on take-off from El- mendorf Air Force Base, Alaska; it was caused by multiple Canada Goose bird strikes.

About the same time that the NWS was be- coming operational, the Cold War abruptly ended. Almost immediately, the US and Cana- dian governments began looking forward to a “peace dividend.” Under the Cost Reduction Initiative, the NWS Office worked in concert with the O&M contractor, Frontec Logistics, and the USAF to relax response requirements and to implement technological upgrades. This enabled the reduction of staffing at LRR sites and, eventually, conversion to unat- tended status. The Canadian LSS were made responsible for the LRR sites as well as the SRR sites. This initiative was completed by 1996 and resulted in a fifty per cent reduction in maintenance costs. The NWS, although now consisting of unattended sites, less the LRR site at Lady Franklin Point, Nunavat (it was de- stroyed by fire in January 2000) has had a number of upgrades and continues to provide the essential information to meet the NORAD attack warning and assessment mission.

In 1996-97, the Canadian NORAD Region was moved from North Bay to Winnipeg, where it was collocated with 1 Canadian Air Division HQ. The day-to-day, air defence oper- ations continued to be conducted at North Bay with technical support from 22 Wing Telecommunications and Information Sys- tems Squadron (WTISS).

At 0600 hours 11 September 2001, NORAD staff was preparing for a routine air defence exercise. By chance, Russia was conducting its cyclical Long Range Aviation (LRA) training, which gave the NORAD staff an opportunity to practice real-world operations. After about two hours into the exercise, attention was drawn to

A 42 Radar Squadron Cold Lake deployed AN/TPS 70 radar.

communication activity between the FAA and NORAD controllers in northeastern USA. This was followed a few minutes later with a picture on one of the main situational screens of smoke billowing out of the North Tower of the World Trade Centre in New York Ciy. When about five minutes later a second aircraft was seen flying into the South Tower, the staff re- alized the first crash was not an accident.

The Command Centre went to Battle Sta- tions. By chance, the commanders of the Command Post and Command Centre, in- cluding the Air Director, were all filled by CF personnel. The Command Director was Cana- dian MGen E. Findley who ordered a Combat Air Patrol of about 300 fighter aircraft. With the news of more aircraft crashes, the massive blast doors to the CMAS were closed for the first time in its history. The FAA ordered all air- borne aircraft to land, which meant many in- bound overseas flights had to land in Canada. The Russian LRA crews wisely called off their exercise and returned to base. After 9/11, NORAD contingency plans were amended to cope with both external and internal threats. The system, however, proved its worth during the critical hours of the terrorist attack by pro- viding valuable information about aircraft movement.

After September 11, 2001 (9/11), a new US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was or- ganized in 2002 to be responsible for conti- nental security. Its commander, a four star general, was double-hatted as the commander


of NORAD as well. The NORAD Command Centre in Cheyenne Mountain and the US- NORTHCOM Command Centre at Peterson AFB in Colorado Springs were amalgamated but each retained its own dedicated Opera- tions and Plans directorates. The new bi-na- tional, joint, unified Command consisted of three regions: Alaska NORAD Region (ANR), Canada NORAD Region (CANR), and Conti- nental NORAD Region (CONR). CANR was or- ganized with two Air Defence Sectors, East (EADS) and West (WADS); its commander also commands 1 Canadian Air Division. Each sec- tor functions at the tactical level, providing surveillance, identification, tracking, and weapons control. The NWS, Canadian Coastal Radars (CCRs), the Alaskan SEEK IGLOO radars along the northern and coastal ap- proaches, and the Joint Surveillance System (JSS) along the perimeter of the CONR protect the continent from both an outside aerospace threat and an inside threat. The monitoring of interior flights, an ATC responsibility, is shared by the US Federal Aviation Administra- tion (FAA) and NAV Canada.

In 2006, the AN/FYQ-93 computers were re- placed by the next generation, Battle Control System-Fixed (BCS-F). The underground North Bay complex was closed and replaced by a new above ground facility.

The aftermath of 9/11 resulted in a new mission statement for NORAD:

In close collaboration with homeland de- fence, security, and law enforcement part- ners, prevent air attacks against North America, safeguard the sovereign air- spaces of the United States and Canada by responding to unknown, unwanted and unauthorized air activity approaching and operating within these airspaces, and pro- vide aerospace and maritime warning for North America.

The addition of maritime security added a new facet to NORAD responsibilities. In Canada, a Maritime Security Operations Cen- tre (MSOC) was opened on each coast in 2004. An example of the worth of this organ- ization was the interception in August 2011 of the Sun Sea carrying 492 Tamil migrants with the aim of smuggling them into Canada. Its position was relayed to the Canadian Navy, the RCMP, and the Canadian Border Services Agency when the ship was 500 miles off the coast of British Columbia. The value of moni- toring civilian aircraft was evident on 3 June 2005 when the crew of a Virgin Atlantic Air- bus transmitted a code word signifying a hi- jack was underway. Canadian CF-18s were scrambled and the aircraft was directed to Halifax where a police response team was alerted. The transmission turned out to be a crew mistake but it was an example of the sys- tem working.

After 54 years of service NORAD is still work- ing. There are 9,000 personnel dedicated to the system compared to 250,000 in the 1960s. In the intervening years, technological ad- vances have made it possible to replace men with machines, even in the face of expanded responsibilities. NORAD is a working example of cooperation between two sovereign nations wishing to remain free.



The RCAF commitment to the air defence and air sovereignty of Canada and the USA has been unwavering for the past 60 years and will continue in the future. Today’s CELE Air offi- cers and ATIS technicians and their industrial partners, continue to deliver the operational capability to achieve the mission as they follow in the footsteps of their Telecommunication predecessors.

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