Affirmative Advice


AC DA- Meltdown/ Accidents



Download 0.71 Mb.
Page11/16
Date05.08.2017
Size0.71 Mb.
#26517
1   ...   8   9   10   11   12   13   14   15   16

2AC DA- Meltdown/ Accidents




No meltdown risk- oceans are infinite heat sinks- that’s 1AC Chandler

Russia tech alt cause


Wagstaff ’13 (Keith Wagstaff, Journalist @ The Week, “Why floating nuclear power plants might actually be a good idea”, http://news.yahoo.com/why-floating-nuclear-power-plants-might-actually-good-185900472.html, July 8, 2013)

Russia wants nuclear power-generating ships by 2016. It's not as crazy as it sounds At first, the idea of floating nuclear plants seems kind of dangerous, especially after an earthquake and tsunami knocked out the coastal Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Japan in 2011. Russia's biggest shipbuilder, however, plans to have one ready to operate by 2016. Is this a brilliant solution to the country's energy problems or a recipe for floating Chernobyls? SEE ALSO: Facebook's Graph Search goes public: What you need to know Proponents of wind, solar, and other sources of clean energy may not be too happy. Not only is there the question of Russia's less-than-stellar record of nuclear waste disposal, there is also the fact that the floating power plants are being designed to power offshore oil-drilling platforms in the Arctic, according to RT. Still, the barges themselves don't seem to be any more dangerous than Russia's nuclear-powered ice-breaker ships, which use the same KLT-40 naval propulsion reactors. The reactor-equipped barges would hold 69 people, and would have to be towed to their locations. They would also be able to power 200,000 homes, and could be modified to desalinate 240,000 cubic meters of water per day.
Turn- the plan safeguards that nuclear expansion

Loudermilk ’11 (Micah K. Loudermilk, Contributor Micah J. Loudermilk is a Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, contracted through ASE Inc, “Small Nuclear Reactors and US Energy Security: Concepts, Capabilities, and Costs”, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=314:small-nuclear-reactors-and-us-energy-security-concepts-capabilities-and-costs&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375, May 31, 2011)
For years, proponents of nuclear power expansion both in the US and around the world have been proclaiming the onset of a global “nuclear renaissance.” Faced with the dual-obstacles of growing worldwide energy demand and a stronger push for clean energy sources, the stage seemed set for a vibrant revival of the industry. Nuclear power’s 25 years of accident-free operation following the 1986 disaster at Chernobyl shed favorable light upon the industry, dulled anti-nuclear arguments, and brought noted environmentalists into the nuclear camp as they began to recognize the role nuclear power could play in promoting clean energy solutions. The March 2011 failure at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi reactor following a 9.0 magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsunami reignited the debate over nuclear energy and erased much of the goodwill that the nuclear industry had accumulated. Now, at least in the US, where images of Three Mile Island had finally faded, nuclear energy again finds its future in doubt. However, the Fukushima incident notwithstanding, the fundamental calculus driving the renewed push for nuclear power has not changed: in a carbon-conscious world with burgeoning electricity demands, nuclear power represents the only option for substantial and reliable baseload power generation. In recent years, though the “renaissance” has yet to occur, thinking on the nuclear power development front has begun to shift away from traditional gigawatt-plus reactors and towards a new category of small modular reactors (SMRs). Boasting an unprecedented degree of reactor safety and multiple applications in the power-generation process, these reactors could revolutionize the nuclear power industry and contribute to US energy security while also reviving the flagging American nuclear industry. Though they have yet to be built and deployed, years of SMR research, including a two-decade experiment with the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II), a 20 MWe reactor at Argonne-West in Idaho, demonstrate the potential of such technology. Nuclear vs. Nuclear: why go small? As the EBR-II demonstrates, the concept of small reactors is not new, but has resurfaced recently. The United States Navy has successfully utilized small reactors to power many of its vessels for over fifty years, and the earliest power reactors placed on land in the US were mostly similar, though larger, iterations of the Navy’s reactors. Eventually, due to siting and licensing issues affecting economies of scale, reactor outputs were pushed ever higher to between 800 and 1200 MW and new reactors constructed today—such as the ones under construction at the Olkiuoto plant in Finland—approach as much as 1600 MW. In contrast, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines a small reactor as generating under 300 MW of power. On the surface, a move in this direction may appear to be a step backwards in development, however, amid concerns over issues including safety, proliferation risks, and cost, many in the industry are beginning to seriously examine the possible applications of widespread and distributed nuclear power from low-output reactors. Promoting safer nuclear power The debate over nuclear energy over the years has consistently revolved around the central question “Is nuclear power safe?” Certainly, the events at Fukushima illustrate that nuclear power can be unsafe, however, no energy source is without its own set of some inherent risks on the safety front—as last year’s oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico or the long-term environmental consequences of fossil fuel use demonstrate—and nuclear power’s operating record remains significantly above that of other energy sources. Instead, accepting the role that nuclear energy plays in global electricity generation, especially in a clean-energy environment, a more pointed question to ask is “How can nuclear power be made safer?” Although large reactors possess a stellar safety record throughout their history of operation, SMRs are able to take safety several steps further, in large part due to their small size. Due to simpler designs as a result of advancing technology and a heavy reliance on passive safety features, many problems plaguing larger and earlier generations of reactors are completely averted. Simpler designs mean less moving parts, less potential points of failure or accident, and fewer systems for operators to monitor. Additionally, small reactor designs incorporate passive safety mechanisms which rely on the laws of nature—such as gravity and convection—as opposed to human-built systems requiring external power to safeguard the reactor in the event of an accident, making the reactor inherently safer. Furthermore, numerous small reactor concepts incorporate other elements—such as liquid sodium—as coolants instead of the pressurized water used in large reactors today. While sodium is a more efficient heat-transfer material, it is also able to cool the reactor core at normal atmospheric pressure, whereas water which must be pressurized at 100-150 times normal to prevent it boiling away. As an additional passive safety feature, sodium’s boiling point is 575-750 degrees higher than the reactor’s operating temperature, providing an immense natural heat sink in the event that the reactor overheats. Even should an accident occur, without a pressurized reactor no radiation would be released into the surrounding environment. Even on the most basic level, small reactors provide a greater degree of security by merit of providing lower energy output and using less nuclear fuel. To make up for the loss in individual reactor generating capacity, small reactors are generally designed as scalable units, enabling the siting of multiple units in one location to rival the output capacity of a large nuclear plant. However, with each reactor housed independently and powering its own steam turbine, an accident affecting one reactor would be limited to that individual reactor. Combating proliferation with US leadership Reactor safety itself notwithstanding, many argue that the scattering of small reactors around the world would invariably lead to increased proliferation problems as nuclear technology and know-how disseminates around the world. Lost in the argument is the fact that this stance assumes that US decisions on advancing nuclear technology color the world as a whole. In reality, regardless of the US commitment to or abandonment of nuclear energy technology, many countries (notably China) are blazing ahead with research and construction, with 55 plants currently under construction around the world—though Fukushima may cause a temporary lull. Since Three Mile Island, the US share of the global nuclear energy trade has declined precipitously as talent and technology begin to concentrate in countries more committed to nuclear power. On the small reactor front, more than 20 countries are examining the technology and the IAEA estimates that 40-100 small reactors will be in operation by 2030. Without US leadership, new nations seek to acquire nuclear technology turn to countries other than the US who may not share a deep commitment to reactor safety and nonproliferation objectives. Strong US leadership globally on nonproliferation requires a vibrant American nuclear industry. This will enable the US to set and enforce standards on nuclear agreements, spent fuel reprocessing, and developing reactor technologies. As to the small reactors themselves, the designs achieve a degree of proliferation-resistance unmatched by large reactors. Small enough to be fully buried underground in independent silos, the concrete surrounding the reactor vessels can be layered much thicker than the traditional domes that protect conventional reactors without collapsing. Coupled with these two levels of superior physical protection is the traditional security associated with reactors today. Most small reactors also are factory-sealed with a supply of fuel inside. Instead of refueling reactors onsite, SMRs are returned to the factory, intact, for removal of spent fuel and refueling. By closing off the fuel cycle, proliferation risks associated with the nuclear fuel running the reactors are mitigated and concerns over the widespread distribution of nuclear fuel allayed.

Seriously, zero risk


Rosner and Goldberg ‘11 (Robert Rosner, Stephen Goldberg, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, The Harris School of Public Policy Studies, November 2011, SMALL MODULAR REACTORS –KEY TO FUTURE NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION IN THE U.S., https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalcopy.pdf)
While the focus in this paper is on the business case for SMRs, the safety case also is an important element of the case for SMRs. Although SMRs (the designs addressed in this paper) use the same fuel type and the same light water cooling as gigawatt (GW)-scale light water reactors (LWRs), there are significant enhancements in the reactor design that contribute to the upgraded safety case. Appendix A provides a brief overview of the various technology options for SMRs, including the light water SMR designs that are the focus of the present analysis. Light water SMR designs proposed to date incorporate passive safety features that utilize gravity-driven or natural convection systems – rather than engineered, pump-driven systems – to supply backup cooling in unusual circumstances. These passive systems should also minimize the need for prompt operator actions in any upset condition. The designs rely on natural circulation for both normal operations and accident conditions, requiring no primary system pumps. In addition, these SMR designs utilize integral designs, meaning all major primary components are located in a single, high-strength pressure vessel. That feature is expected to result in a much lower susceptibility to certain potential events, such as a loss of coolant accident, because there is no large external primary piping. In addition, light water SMRs would have a much lower level of decay heat than large plants and, therefore, would require less cooling after reactor shutdown. Specifically, in a post-Fukushima lessons-learned environment, the study team believes that the current SMR designs have three inherent advantages over the current class of large operating reactors, namely: 1. These designs mitigate and, potentially, eliminate the need for back-up or emergency electrical generators, relying exclusively on robust battery power to maintain minimal safety operations. 2. They improve seismic capability with the containment and reactor vessels in a pool of water underground; this dampens the effects of any earth movement and greatly enhances the ability of the system to withstand earthquakes. 3. They provide large and robust underground pool storage for the spent fuel, drastically reducing the potential of uncovering of these pools. These and other attributes of SMR designs present a strong safety case. Differences in the design of SMRs will lead to different approaches for how the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements will be satisfied. Ongoing efforts by the SMR community, the larger nuclear community, and the NRC staff have identified licensing issues unique to SMR designs and are working collaboratively to develop alternative approaches for reconciling these issues within the established NRC regulatory process. These efforts are summarized in Appendix B; a detailed examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.

SMRs solve


Schimmoller ‘11 (Brian, contributing editor to Power Engineering “Go Small or Go Home,” July, Power Engineering115. 7 (Jul 2011): 12.)
Safety: the smaller size of SMRs equates to a smaller inventory of radionuclides in the core, reducing the source term. In other words, a smaller reactor vessel means smaller impacts if an accident should occur. Most SMR designs rely on passive cooling systems to provide decay heat removal, reducing dependence on pumps and electric power to support cooling. Also, because some designs envision below-grade construction, the vulnerability to certain external events (airline crash, other terrorist act) is theoretically reduced. If an accident like Fukushima did happen, proponents contend the underground construction means that any external impacts could be relatively contained.

Navy disproves


Loudermilk and Andres ’10 (Richard B. Andres is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University and a Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College, Micah J. Loudermilk is a researcher at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, “Small Reactors and the Military's Role in Securing America's Nuclear Industry”, http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/100823646-small-reactors-and-the-militar.htm, April 23, 2010)
Faced with the dual-obstacles of growing worldwide energy demand and a renewed push for clean energy, the stage is set for a vibrant revival of the nuclear power industry in the United States. During his 2008 campaign, President Barack Obama committed to setting the country on the road to a clean, secure, and independent energy future - and nuclear power can play a vital role in that. With abundant energy resources available and near-zero emission levels, nuclear power offers a domestically-generated, clean, and long-term solution to America's energy dilemma. While countries around the world are building new reactors though, the U.S. nuclear power industry has remained dormant - and even borders on extinction - as no new plants have been approved for construction in the more than three decades following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. Although Congress and the Executive Branch have passed laws and issued proclamations over the years, little actual progress has been made in the nuclear energy realm. A number of severe obstacles face any potential entrant into the reactor market - namely the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which lacks the budget and manpower necessary to seriously address nuclear power expansion. Additionally, public skepticism over the safety of nuclear power plants has impeded serious attempts at new plant construction. However, despite the hurdles facing private industry, the U.S. military is in a position to take a leading role in the advancement of nuclear reactor technology through the integration of small reactors on its domestic bases. While the Obama Administration has pledged $8 billion in federal loan guarantees to the construction of two new reactors in Georgia and an additional $36 billion in new guarantees to the nuclear industry, this comes on top of $18.5 billion budgeted, but unspent, dollars. Despite this aid, it is still improbable that the U.S. will see any new large reactors now or in the foreseeable future as enormous cost, licensing, construction, and regulatory hurdles must be overcome. In recent years though, attention in the nuclear energy sphere has turned in a new direction: small-scale reactors. These next-generation reactors seek to revolutionize the nuclear power industry and carry a host of benefits that both separate them from their larger cousins and provide a legitimate opportunity to successfully reinvigorate the American nuclear industry. When compared to conventional reactors, small reactors have a number of advantages. First, the reactors are both small and often scalable - meaning that sites can be configured to house one to multiple units based on power needs. Although they only exist on paper and the military has yet to embrace a size or design, the companies investing in these technologies are examining a range of possibilities. Hyperion, for example, is working on a so-called "nuclear battery" - a 25 MWe sealed and transportable unit the size of a hot tub. Similarly, Babcock & Wilcox - the company which built many of the Navy's reactors - is seeking licensing for its mPower reactor, which is scalable and produces 125 MWe of power per unit. Other designs, such as Westinghouse's International Reactor Innovative and Secure (IRIS) model, have a generating capacity of up to 335 MWe. Second, large reactors come with enormous price tags - often approaching $10 billion in projected costs. The costs associated with building new reactors are so astronomical that few companies can afford the capital outlay to finance them. Additionally, the risks classically associated with the construction of nuclear reactors serve as an additional deterrent to interested utilities. As a result, companies must be willing to accept significant financial risks since ventures could potentially sink them or result in credit downgrades - as evidenced by the fact that 40 of 48 utilities issuing debt to nuclear projects suffered downgrades following the accident at Three Mile Island. All of this adds up to an environment that is not conducive to the sponsorship of new reactor plants. On the other hand, small reactors are able to mostly circumvent the cost hurdles facing large reactors. During the construction of large reactors, utilities face "single-shaft risk" - forced to invest and tie up billions of dollars in a single plant. However, small reactors present the opportunity for utilities to buy and add reactor capacity as needed or in a step-by-step process, as opposed to an all-or-nothing approach. Small reactors are also factory-constructed and shipped, not custom-designed projects, and can be built and installed in half the time - all of which are cost-saving measures. Additionally, despite concerns from critics over the proliferation and safety risks that a cadre of small reactors would potentially pose, the reality is considerably different. On the safety side, the new designs boast a number of features - including passive safety measures and simpler designs, thus reducing the number of systems to monitor and potential for system failure, enhancing the safety of the reactors. Small reactors can often be buried underground, are frequently fully contained and sealed (complete with a supply of fuel inside), can run longer between refueling cycles, and feature on-site waste storage - all of which serve to further insulate and secure the units. Finally, due to their small size, the reactors do not require the vast water resources needed by large reactors and in the event of an emergency, are far easier to isolate, shut off, and cool down if necessary. Notwithstanding all of these benefits, with a difficult regulation environment, anti-nuclear lobbying groups, and skeptical public opinion, the nuclear energy industry faces an uphill - and potentially unwinnable - battle in the quest for new reactors in the United States. Left to its own devices it is unlikely, at best, that private industry will succeed in bringing new reactors to the U.S. on its own. However, a route exists by which small reactors could potentially become a viable energy option: the U.S. military. Since 1948, the U.S. Navy has deployed over 500 reactors and possesses a perfect safety record in managing them. At the same time, grave concern exists over the fact that U.S. military bases are tied to and entirely dependent upon the civilian electric grid - from which they receive 99% of their power. Recently, attention has turned to the fact that the civilian grid, in addition to accidents, is vulnerable to cyber or terrorist attacks. In the event of a deliberate attack on the United States that knocks out all or part of the electric grid, the assets housed at the affected bases would be unavailable and U.S. global military operations potentially jeopardized. The presence of small-scale nuclear reactors on U.S. military bases would enable these facilities to effectively become "islands" - insulating them from the civilian grid and even potentially deterring attacks if the opponent knows that the military network would be unaffected. Unlike private industry, the military does not face the same regulatory and congressional hurdles to constructing reactors and would have an easier time in adopting them for use. By integrating small nuclear reactors as power sources for domestic U.S. military bases, three potential energy dilemmas are solved at the same time. First, by incorporating small reactors at its bases, the military addresses its own energy security quandary. The military has recently sought to "island" its bases in the U.S. -protecting them from grid outages, be they accidental or intentional. The Department of Defense has promoted this endeavor through lowering energy consumption on bases and searching for renewable power alternatives, but these measures alone will prove insufficient. Small reactors provide sufficient energy output to power military installations and in some cases surrounding civilian population centers. Secondly, as the reactors become integrated on military facilities, the stigma on the nuclear power industry will ease and inroads will be created for the adoption of small-scale reactors as a viable source of energy. Private industry and the public will see that nuclear reactors can indeed be utilized safely and effectively, resulting in a renewed push toward the expansion of nuclear power. Although many of the same hurdles will still be in place, a shift in public opinion and a stronger effort by utilities, coupled with the demonstrated success of small reactors on military bases, could prove the catalysts necessary for the federal government and the NRC to take more aggressive action. Finally, while new reactors are not likely in the near future, the military's actions will preserve, for a while longer, the badly ailing domestic nuclear energy industry. Nuclear power is here to stay around the globe, and the United States has an opportunity to take a leading role in supplying the world's nuclear energy and reactor technology. With the U.S. nuclear industry dormant for three decades, much of the attention, technology, and talent have concentrated overseas in countries with a strong interest in nuclear technology. Without the United States as a player in the nuclear energy market, it has little say over safety regulations of reactors or the potential risks of proliferation from the expansion of nuclear energy. If the current trend continues, the U.S. will reach a point where it is forced to import nuclear technology and reactors from other countries. Action by the military to install reactors on domestic bases will both guarantee the survival of the American nuclear industry in the short term, and work to solidify support for it in the long run. Ultimately, between small-scale nuclear reactors and the U.S. military, the capability exists to revitalize America's sleeping nuclear industry and promoting energy security and clean energy production. The reactors offer the ability to power domestic military bases, small towns, and other remote locations detached from the energy grid. Furthermore, reactor sites can house multiple units, allowing for greater energy production - rivaling even large reactors. Small reactors offer numerous benefits to the United States and a path initiated by the military presents a realistic route by which their adoption can be achieved.

No impact


WNA ’11 [World Nuclear Association, “Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors”, (updated December 2011), http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf06.html]
From the outset, there has been a strong awareness of the potential hazard of both nuclear criticality and release of radioactive materials from generating electricity with nuclear power. As in other industries, the design and operation of nuclear power plants aims to minimise the likelihood of accidents, and avoid major human consequences when they occur. There have been three major reactor accidents in the history of civil nuclear power - Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima. One was contained without harm to anyone, the next involved an intense fire without provision for containment, and the third severely tested the containment, allowing some release of radioactivity. These are the only major accidents to have occurred in over 14,500 cumulative reactor-years of commercial nuclear power operation in 32 countries. The risks from western nuclear power plants, in terms of the consequences of an accident or terrorist attack, are minimal compared with other commonly accepted risks. Nuclear power plants are very robust.

2AC DA- Waste

Russia tech alt cause


Wagstaff ’13 (Keith Wagstaff, Journalist @ The Week, “Why floating nuclear power plants might actually be a good idea”, http://news.yahoo.com/why-floating-nuclear-power-plants-might-actually-good-185900472.html, July 8, 2013)

Russia wants nuclear power-generating ships by 2016. It's not as crazy as it sounds At first, the idea of floating nuclear plants seems kind of dangerous, especially after an earthquake and tsunami knocked out the coastal Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Japan in 2011. Russia's biggest shipbuilder, however, plans to have one ready to operate by 2016. Is this a brilliant solution to the country's energy problems or a recipe for floating Chernobyls? SEE ALSO: Facebook's Graph Search goes public: What you need to know Proponents of wind, solar, and other sources of clean energy may not be too happy. Not only is there the question of Russia's less-than-stellar record of nuclear waste disposal, there is also the fact that the floating power plants are being designed to power offshore oil-drilling platforms in the Arctic, according to RT. Still, the barges themselves don't seem to be any more dangerous than Russia's nuclear-powered ice-breaker ships, which use the same KLT-40 naval propulsion reactors. The reactor-equipped barges would hold 69 people, and would have to be towed to their locations. They would also be able to power 200,000 homes, and could be modified to desalinate 240,000 cubic meters of water per day.

Turn- SMR’s solve waste disposal


Szondy ‘12 (David, writes for charged and iQ magazine, award-winning journalist [“Feature: Small modular nuclear reactors - the future of energy?” February 16th, http://www.gizmag.com/small-modular-nuclear-reactors/20860/)
SMRs can help with proliferation, nuclear waste and fuel supply issues because, while some modular reactors are based on conventional pressurized water reactors and burn enhanced uranium, others use less conventional fuels. Some, for example, can generate power from what is now regarded as "waste", burning depleted uranium and plutonium left over from conventional reactors. Depleted uranium is basically U-238 from which the fissible U-235 has been consumed. It's also much more abundant in nature than U-235, which has the potential of providing the world with energy for thousands of years. Other reactor designs don't even use uranium. Instead, they use thorium. This fuel is also incredibly abundant, is easy to process for use as fuel and has the added bonus of being utterly useless for making weapons, so it can provide power even to areas where security concerns have been raised.

1AR- SMRs Solve Waste

More evidence


Spencer and Lorris ‘11 (Jack Spencer is Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, and Nicolas D. Loris is a Research Associate in the Roe Institute, at The Heritage Foundation “A Big Future for Small Nuclear Reactors?”, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/02/a-big-future-for-small-nuclear-reactors, February 2, 2011)
The lack of a sustainable nuclear waste management solution is perhaps the greatest obstacle to a broad expansion of U.S. nuclear power. The federal government has failed to meet its obligations under the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended, to begin collecting nuclear waste for disposal in Yucca Mountain. The Obama Administration’s attempts to shutter the existing program to put waste in Yucca Mountain without having a backup plan has worsened the situation. This outcome was predictable because the current program is based on the flawed premise that the federal government is the appropriate entity to manage nuclear waste. Under the current system, waste producers are able to largely ignore waste management because the federal government is responsible. The key to a sustainable waste management policy is to directly connect financial responsibility for waste management to waste production. This will increase demand for more waste-efficient reactor technologies and drive innovation on waste-management technologies, such as reprocessing. Because SMRs consume fuel and produce waste differently than LWRs, they could contribute greatly to an economically efficient and sustainable nuclear waste management strategy.

SMRs solve


James and Anniek Hansen ‘8 (James and Anniek Hansen, That really smart climate dude, http://www.pdfdownload.org/pdf2html/pdf2html.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.columbia.edu%2F~jeh1%2Fmailings%2F20081229_DearMichelleAndBarack.pdf&images=yes, December 29, 2008,)
(3) Urgent R&D on 4 th generation nuclear power with international cooperation. Energy efficiency, renewable energies, and a "smart grid" deserve first priority in our effort to reduce carbon emissions. With a rising carbon price, renewable energy can perhaps handle all of our needs. However, most experts believe that making such presumption probably would leave us in 25 years with still a large contingent of coal-fired power plants worldwide. Such a result would be disastrous for the planet, humanity, and nature. 4 th generation nuclear power (4 th GNP) and coal-fired power plants with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) at present are the best candidates to provide large baseload nearly carbon-free power (in case renewable energies cannot do the entire job). Predictable criticism of 4 th GNP (and CCS) is: "it cannot be ready before 2030." However, the time needed could be much abbreviated with a Presidential initiative and Congressional support. Moreover, improved (3 rd generation) light water reactors are available for near-term needs. In our opinion, 4 th GNP ii deserves your strong support, because it has the potential to help solve past problems with nuclear power: nuclear waste, the need to mine for nuclear fuel, and release of radioactive material iii . Potential proliferation of nuclear material will always demand vigilance, but that will be true in any case, and our safety is best secured if the United States is involved in the technologies and helps define standards. Existing nuclear reactors use less than 1% of the energy in uranium, leaving more than 99% in long-lived nuclear waste. 4 th GNP can "burn" that waste, leaving a small volume of waste with a half-life of decades rather than thousands of years. Thus 4 th GNP could help solve the nuclear waste problem, which must be dealt with in any case. Because of this, a portion of the $25B that has been collected from utilities to deal with nuclear waste justifiably could be used to develop 4 th generation reactors. The principal issue with nuclear power, and other energy sources, is cost. Thus an R&D objective must be a modularized reactor design that is cost competitive with coal. Without such capability, it may be difficult to wean China and India from coal. But all developing countries have great incentives for clean energy and stable climate, and they will welcome technical cooperation aimed at rapid development of a reproducible safe nuclear reactor.

2AC DA- Terror/ Prolif

Russia tech alt cause


Wagstaff ’13 (Keith Wagstaff, Journalist @ The Week, “Why floating nuclear power plants might actually be a good idea”, http://news.yahoo.com/why-floating-nuclear-power-plants-might-actually-good-185900472.html, July 8, 2013)

Russia wants nuclear power-generating ships by 2016. It's not as crazy as it sounds At first, the idea of floating nuclear plants seems kind of dangerous, especially after an earthquake and tsunami knocked out the coastal Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Japan in 2011. Russia's biggest shipbuilder, however, plans to have one ready to operate by 2016. Is this a brilliant solution to the country's energy problems or a recipe for floating Chernobyls? SEE ALSO: Facebook's Graph Search goes public: What you need to know Proponents of wind, solar, and other sources of clean energy may not be too happy. Not only is there the question of Russia's less-than-stellar record of nuclear waste disposal, there is also the fact that the floating power plants are being designed to power offshore oil-drilling platforms in the Arctic, according to RT. Still, the barges themselves don't seem to be any more dangerous than Russia's nuclear-powered ice-breaker ships, which use the same KLT-40 naval propulsion reactors. The reactor-equipped barges would hold 69 people, and would have to be towed to their locations. They would also be able to power 200,000 homes, and could be modified to desalinate 240,000 cubic meters of water per day.
Turn- the plan safeguards that nuclear expansion

Loudermilk ’11 (Micah K. Loudermilk, Contributor Micah J. Loudermilk is a Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, contracted through ASE Inc, “Small Nuclear Reactors and US Energy Security: Concepts, Capabilities, and Costs”, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=314:small-nuclear-reactors-and-us-energy-security-concepts-capabilities-and-costs&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375, May 31, 2011)
For years, proponents of nuclear power expansion both in the US and around the world have been proclaiming the onset of a global “nuclear renaissance.” Faced with the dual-obstacles of growing worldwide energy demand and a stronger push for clean energy sources, the stage seemed set for a vibrant revival of the industry. Nuclear power’s 25 years of accident-free operation following the 1986 disaster at Chernobyl shed favorable light upon the industry, dulled anti-nuclear arguments, and brought noted environmentalists into the nuclear camp as they began to recognize the role nuclear power could play in promoting clean energy solutions. The March 2011 failure at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi reactor following a 9.0 magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsunami reignited the debate over nuclear energy and erased much of the goodwill that the nuclear industry had accumulated. Now, at least in the US, where images of Three Mile Island had finally faded, nuclear energy again finds its future in doubt. However, the Fukushima incident notwithstanding, the fundamental calculus driving the renewed push for nuclear power has not changed: in a carbon-conscious world with burgeoning electricity demands, nuclear power represents the only option for substantial and reliable baseload power generation. In recent years, though the “renaissance” has yet to occur, thinking on the nuclear power development front has begun to shift away from traditional gigawatt-plus reactors and towards a new category of small modular reactors (SMRs). Boasting an unprecedented degree of reactor safety and multiple applications in the power-generation process, these reactors could revolutionize the nuclear power industry and contribute to US energy security while also reviving the flagging American nuclear industry. Though they have yet to be built and deployed, years of SMR research, including a two-decade experiment with the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II), a 20 MWe reactor at Argonne-West in Idaho, demonstrate the potential of such technology. Nuclear vs. Nuclear: why go small? As the EBR-II demonstrates, the concept of small reactors is not new, but has resurfaced recently. The United States Navy has successfully utilized small reactors to power many of its vessels for over fifty years, and the earliest power reactors placed on land in the US were mostly similar, though larger, iterations of the Navy’s reactors. Eventually, due to siting and licensing issues affecting economies of scale, reactor outputs were pushed ever higher to between 800 and 1200 MW and new reactors constructed today—such as the ones under construction at the Olkiuoto plant in Finland—approach as much as 1600 MW. In contrast, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines a small reactor as generating under 300 MW of power. On the surface, a move in this direction may appear to be a step backwards in development, however, amid concerns over issues including safety, proliferation risks, and cost, many in the industry are beginning to seriously examine the possible applications of widespread and distributed nuclear power from low-output reactors. Promoting safer nuclear power The debate over nuclear energy over the years has consistently revolved around the central question “Is nuclear power safe?” Certainly, the events at Fukushima illustrate that nuclear power can be unsafe, however, no energy source is without its own set of some inherent risks on the safety front—as last year’s oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico or the long-term environmental consequences of fossil fuel use demonstrate—and nuclear power’s operating record remains significantly above that of other energy sources. Instead, accepting the role that nuclear energy plays in global electricity generation, especially in a clean-energy environment, a more pointed question to ask is “How can nuclear power be made safer?” Although large reactors possess a stellar safety record throughout their history of operation, SMRs are able to take safety several steps further, in large part due to their small size. Due to simpler designs as a result of advancing technology and a heavy reliance on passive safety features, many problems plaguing larger and earlier generations of reactors are completely averted. Simpler designs mean less moving parts, less potential points of failure or accident, and fewer systems for operators to monitor. Additionally, small reactor designs incorporate passive safety mechanisms which rely on the laws of nature—such as gravity and convection—as opposed to human-built systems requiring external power to safeguard the reactor in the event of an accident, making the reactor inherently safer. Furthermore, numerous small reactor concepts incorporate other elements—such as liquid sodium—as coolants instead of the pressurized water used in large reactors today. While sodium is a more efficient heat-transfer material, it is also able to cool the reactor core at normal atmospheric pressure, whereas water which must be pressurized at 100-150 times normal to prevent it boiling away. As an additional passive safety feature, sodium’s boiling point is 575-750 degrees higher than the reactor’s operating temperature, providing an immense natural heat sink in the event that the reactor overheats. Even should an accident occur, without a pressurized reactor no radiation would be released into the surrounding environment. Even on the most basic level, small reactors provide a greater degree of security by merit of providing lower energy output and using less nuclear fuel. To make up for the loss in individual reactor generating capacity, small reactors are generally designed as scalable units, enabling the siting of multiple units in one location to rival the output capacity of a large nuclear plant. However, with each reactor housed independently and powering its own steam turbine, an accident affecting one reactor would be limited to that individual reactor. Combating proliferation with US leadership Reactor safety itself notwithstanding, many argue that the scattering of small reactors around the world would invariably lead to increased proliferation problems as nuclear technology and know-how disseminates around the world. Lost in the argument is the fact that this stance assumes that US decisions on advancing nuclear technology color the world as a whole. In reality, regardless of the US commitment to or abandonment of nuclear energy technology, many countries (notably China) are blazing ahead with research and construction, with 55 plants currently under construction around the world—though Fukushima may cause a temporary lull. Since Three Mile Island, the US share of the global nuclear energy trade has declined precipitously as talent and technology begin to concentrate in countries more committed to nuclear power. On the small reactor front, more than 20 countries are examining the technology and the IAEA estimates that 40-100 small reactors will be in operation by 2030. Without US leadership, new nations seek to acquire nuclear technology turn to countries other than the US who may not share a deep commitment to reactor safety and nonproliferation objectives. Strong US leadership globally on nonproliferation requires a vibrant American nuclear industry. This will enable the US to set and enforce standards on nuclear agreements, spent fuel reprocessing, and developing reactor technologies. As to the small reactors themselves, the designs achieve a degree of proliferation-resistance unmatched by large reactors. Small enough to be fully buried underground in independent silos, the concrete surrounding the reactor vessels can be layered much thicker than the traditional domes that protect conventional reactors without collapsing. Coupled with these two levels of superior physical protection is the traditional security associated with reactors today. Most small reactors also are factory-sealed with a supply of fuel inside. Instead of refueling reactors onsite, SMRs are returned to the factory, intact, for removal of spent fuel and refueling. By closing off the fuel cycle, proliferation risks associated with the nuclear fuel running the reactors are mitigated and concerns over the widespread distribution of nuclear fuel allayed.

2AC DA- REM

Alt cause – clean tech


Pappagallo ‘12 (Linda studying a Masters in International Affairs with a concentration in Energy and the Environment in New York [“Rare Earth Metals Limits Clean Technology’s Future”, http://www.greenprophet.com/2012/08/rare-earth-metal-peak/, August 5, 2012)
As the world moves toward greater use of zero- carbon energy sources, the supply of certain key metals needed for such clean-energy technologies may dry up, inflating per unit costs and driving the renewable energy market out of business. We’ve talked about peak phosphorus for food; now consider that rare earth metals like neodymium which are used in magnets to help drive wind energy turbines, and dysprosium needed for electric car performance are becoming less available on the planet. Until the 1980s, the most powerful magnets available were those made from an alloy containing samarium and cobalt. But mining and processing those metals presented challenges: samarium, one of 17 so-called “rare earth elements”, was costly to refine, and most cobalt came from mines in unstable regions of Africa. In 1982, researchers at General Motors developed a magnet based on neodymium, also a rare earth metal but more abundant than samarium, and at the time, it was cheaper. When combined with iron and boron, both readily available elements, it produced very strong magnets. Nowadays wind turbines, one of the fastest-growing sources of emissions-free electricity, rely on neodymium magnets. In the electric drive motor of a hybrid car neodymium-based magnets are essential. Imagine that one kilogram of neodymium can deliver 80 horsepower, enough to move a 3,000-pound vehicle like the Toyota Prius. When the second rare earth metal dysprosium is added to the alloy, performance at high temperatures is preserved. Soaring Demand for Rare Earth Metals These two metals have exceptional magnetic properties that make them especially well-suited to use in highly efficient, lightweight motors and batteries. However, according to a new MIT study led by a team of researchers at MIT’s Materials Systems Laboratory and co-authored by three researchers from Ford Motor Company, the supply of both elements neodymium and dysprosium — currently imported almost exclusively from China — could face significant shortages in coming years. The study looked at ten so-called “rare earth metals,” a group of 17 elements that have similar properties and which have some uses in high-tech equipment, in many cases in technology related to low-carbon energy. Of those ten, two are likely to face serious supply challenges in the coming years. Neodymium and dysprosium are not the most widely used rare earth elements, but they are the ones expected to see the biggest “pinch” in supplies, due to projected rapid growth in demand for high-performance permanent magnets. The biggest challenge is likely to be for dysprosium: Demand could increase by 2,600 percent over the next 25 years while Neodymium demand could increase by as much as 700%. A single large wind turbine (rated at about 3.5 megawatts) typically contains 600 kilograms of rare earth metals. A conventional car uses approximately a half kilogram of rare earth materials while an electric car uses nearly ten times as much. The picture starts to become clear, clean technology requires a lot of rare elements, and relying on clean technology is what the whole world is striving for – including the Middle East and North Africa. Rare earth metals will become the next political obsession.

Their authors assume large reactors not SMRs


Zyga 11 (Science Reporter for PhysOrg, quoting analysis by Abbott, Prof. of Electrical Engineering, 2011)
[5/11/11, Lisa, BA in rhetoric from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, known science reporter for PhysOrg, Derek Abbott, Professor of Electrical and Electronic Engineering at the University of Adelaide in Australia, “Why nuclear power will never supply the world’s energy needs,” PhysOrg, http://phys.org/news/2011-05-nuclear-power-world-energy.html]

Land and location: One nuclear reactor plant requires about 20.5 km2 (7.9 mi2) of land to accommodate the nuclear power station itself, its exclusion zone, its enrichment plant, ore processing, and supporting infrastructure. Secondly, nuclear reactors need to be located near a massive body of coolant water, but away from dense population zones and natural disaster zones. Simply finding 15,000 locations on Earth that fulfill these requirements is extremely challenging.


Shortage is self-correcting


Whitehouse ‘11 (Tom, Chairman of the London Environmental Investment Forum [“Critical Metals and Cleantech – Part 1,” http://blog.cleantechies.com/2011/10/11/critical-metals-and-cleantech-part-1/, October 11, 2011)
Is China and its rare earth supply restrictions actually doing cleantech a favor? On the one hand, limiting the supply of these metals, which are used in the manufacture of many clean technologies, clearly isn’t great for the growth of the low carbon economy. Swiss-based VC firm Mountain Cleantech says it’s a troubling area for a number of prominent clean energy technologies such as wind turbines, electric vehicles, fuel cells and energy efficient lighting and that, in the short term at least, cleantech could suffer from a supply risk. On the other, China’s supply limitations are driving efforts in other parts of the world to develop solutions to recover and recycle these metals from waste streams, rather than be at the mercy of virgin supply. This will not only reduce waste but will have much less environmental impact than mining operations. Rare earths have been getting most of the attention lately, but it’s worth noting that generally strong prices across the metals markets as a whole, and increasing efficiencies in recovery processes, mean many other metals also have compelling recovery or ‘urban’ mining financials. Old mobile phones are one example. According to Mountain Cleantech, in 1 billion mobile phones (in 2009, 1.4 billion were sold worldwide), you’ll find 15,000 tonnes of copper, 3,000 tonnes of aluminum, 3,000 tonnes of iron, 2,000 tonnes of nickel, 1,000 tonnes of tin, 500 tonnes of silver, 100 tonnes of gold and 20 tonnes of other metals like palladium, tantalum and indium. And when you look at the numbers from Umicore, which compared the amount of silver that’s extracted from one tonne of ore from a primary mine (5 grams), with that from a tonne of mobile phones (300 – 350 grams), you get an indication of just how valuable the market for recovery and recycling is from just one waste stream. But it’s the opportunities for recovering metals in the ‘critical’ category – tantalum and indium for example and, yes, rare earths – which are getting investors and innovators particularly excited. Because these metals are found in such tiny quantities, recovering them economically is not without its challenges though (an issue I’ll explore in more detail in the next parts of this blog). So, how does a metal make it onto the ‘critical’ list? Different analysts have different criteria. Oakdene Hollins is a UK consultancy focused on the low carbon sector which has produced several reports analysing the metals markets. It says that while there’s no precise definition, most studies don’t just base criticality on physical scarcity but also look at factors such as political risk, concentration of production and ‘importance’ of the materials. Taking these factors into account, Oakdene formed the following consensus on the current critical nature of certain metals: Highly critical: Beryllium, gallium, indium, magnesium, platinum group, rare earths, tin, tungsten Moderately critical: antimony, cobalt, germanium, manganese, nickel, niobium, rhenium, tantalum, tellurium, zinc Near critical: bismuth, chromium, fluorspar, lead, lithium, silicon / silica sand, silver, titanium, zirconium Not critical: aluminium, boron / borates, cadmium, copper, molybdenum, selenium, vanadium The majority of those in the ‘highly’ and ‘moderately’ critical categories are low volume specialty metals which are used for hi-tech applications such as smart phones, tablets, flat panel displays, semiconductors, photovoltaics, magnets, specialist alloys and catalysts. The notable exceptions are nickel, magnesium, tin and zinc, which have bulk uses in alloys, batteries and tooling. Oakdene then conducted a review of supply-demand forecasts for 2015 to 2020. The rare earths, neodymium and dysprosium; as well as tellurium, indium, gallium, platinum group, tantalum and graphite, were identified as those having increasing demand for specific applications and where there are also limitations on increasing supply. This projected supply deficit provides positive support for prices and big opportunities for recovery. But we should remember that it’s not just recovery measures that offer solutions to the critical metals crisis. Considerable effort is also going into finding alternatives to these materials and success here could meaning they’ll lose some of their main markets. This will affect the supply-demand imbalance and negatively impact on prices.

2AC DA- IAEA Overstretch

SMRs solve IAEA overstretch


Scherer ‘10 (C. Scherer, Los Alamos Natl Laboratory, et al. R. Bean, Idaho Natl Laboratory, M. Mullen, Los Alamos Natl Laboratory, and G. Pshakin, State Scientific Centre of the Russian Federation-Institute for Physics and Power Engineering, (http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/Symposium/2010/Documents/PapersRepository/164.pdf, 2010)
Abstract: Incorporating safeguards early in the design process can enhance the safeguardability of a nuclear facility by influencing and becoming part of the intrinsic design. This concept is transformational because historically safeguarding nuclear facilities was often considered after completion of the facility design or even construction of the facility. Safeguards concepts and applications were therefore retrofit to the design. By designing safeguards into the facility practical solutions from best practices and lessons learned can be implemented, thus improving the safeguardability of the facility and making safeguards more efficient and cost effective for both the plant operator and international inspectors. A methodology for integrating Safeguards-by-Design early into the facility design process is proposed. The architecture field uses the following design phases: Planning, Schematic, Design Development, and Construction Documents. During the Planning phase defining functions and listing requirements for the facility is essential; at this time safeguards requirements should be documented and become part of the facility functions and requirements list. The schematic phase is the beginning of early design drawings; the design addresses the functions and requirements needs, space utilization begins and the facility design begins taking on volume and shape. Early planning allows evaluation and incorporation of improved solutions from best practices and lessons learned. The safeguardability of the facility could become part of the intrinsic design. It is during the planning and into the schematic design phases that the customer or facility operator has the most influence on the design. Considering International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards verification requirements at this design stage, allows for inclusion of concepts that maximize efficiency and minimize inspection impact. Design changes during the Design Development, and later design phases tend to be very costly; at later stages of the design process, design changes are retrofit into the existing space envelope and are generally much less efficient and economical. Planning for safeguards early in the design process therefore has benefit to both the facility operator and IAEA inspectors. With the emerging nuclear renaissance IAEA inspections will need to be more efficient and economical. Safeguards-by-Design offers a process to design in this efficiency for both the facility operator and the IAEA inspectors. Safeguards experts from the United States and the Russian Federation are cooperating to jointly develop and demonstrate this safeguards-by-design concept for advanced nuclear energy systems.

Tradeoffs now and fails


Findlay ’12 (Trevor Findlay, Senior Fellow at Centre for International Governance Innovation and Director of the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance. Professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, 2012, UNLEASHING THE NUCLEAR WATCHDOG: strengthening and reform of the iaea, http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/IAEA_final_0.pdf)
In spite of this well-deserved reputation and its apparently starry prospects, the Agency remains relatively undernourished, its powers significantly hedged and its technical achievements often overshadowed by political controversy. This evidently prized body has, for instance, been largely unable to break free of the zero real growth (ZRG) budgeting imposed on all UN agencies from the mid-1980s onwards (ZRG means no growth beyond inflation). As a result, the Agency has not been provided with the latest technologies and adequate human resources. Moreover, despite considerable strengthening, its enhanced nuclear safeguards system is only partly mandatory. Notwithstanding the increasing influence of its recommended standards and guides, its safety and security powers remain entirely non-binding. Although the Agency’s long-term response to the Fukushima disaster remains to be seen, its role in nuclear safety and security continues to be hamstrung by states’ sensitivity about sovereignty and secrecy, and by its own lack of capacity. Many states have shown a surprising degree of ambiguity towards supporting the organization both politically and financially. The politicization of its governing bodies has increased alarmingly in recent years, crimping its potential. Most alarming of all, the Agency has failed, by its own means, to detect serious non-compliance by Iraq, Iran and Libya with their safeguards agreements and, by extension, with the NPT (although it was the first to detect North Korea’s non-compliance). Iran’s non- compliance had gone undetected for over two decades. Most recently, the Agency missed Syria’s attempt to construct a nuclear reactor with North Korean assistance. Despite significant improvements to the nuclear safeguards regime, there is substantial room for improvement, especially in detecting undeclared materials, facilities and activities.6



Download 0.71 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   ...   8   9   10   11   12   13   14   15   16



The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message
    Main page
united states
primary source
army corps
final step
current rate
cost-effectiveness
complete range
most efficient means
present rate
energy crisis
transportation sector
natural progression
energy output