An asymmetric threat invokes strategic leader initiative: the joint improvised explosive device defeat organization research paper

Prior to GEN Meigs’ arrival, the JIEDDTF designed an operational assessment architecture for measuring the effectiveness of fielded Joint IED Defeat initiatives. BG Votel recognized that, “We didn’t develop metrics and an OA effort to gauge progress and drive the effort.” (Votel, personal communication, October 7, 2006) At the urging of the Vice Chairman, ADM Ed Giambastiani, BG Votel directed a small group to come up with a plan.

The early Operational Assessment (OA) approach involved Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and several Federally Funded Research and Development Companies (FFRDCs) that each contributed to the effort. According to the professionals from the FFRDCs, unprecedented as it was for them to work together like this, they also recognized none of them could do this alone. It was also clear that the JIEDDTF staff needed outside help for something of this magnitude. The JIEDDTF needed to determine if it was making a difference. It needed a feedback loop into institutional subject matter experts.

BG Votel and ADM (R) Dennis Blair of the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) conducted a decision brief on the OA strategy to ADM Giambastiani who endorsed it and told them to get GEN Abizaid’s approval. A week later ADM Blair and BG Votel briefed GEN Abizaid. The result of that briefing: CENTCOM wanted OA started almost immediately. Before commencing, however, GEN Abizaid wanted concurrence from GEN George Casey, the commanding general of Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I). On December 27, 2005, a small team met with GEN Casey in the Pentagon. GEN Casey neither approved nor disapproved the OA plan. Instead he asked GEN Meigs to “come to the theater for two weeks and feel my pain and then make recommendations” in theater before beginning an effort of this magnitude. GEN Casey didn’t want any more outside help from a lot of “50-pound brains”. Meigs observed from his research on WWII subsurface warfare, there needed to be an intimate relationship linking scientists with military operators to uncover potential technological solutions. (Meigs, 1990) GEN Meigs left for theater the next week with a small team.

Meigs traveled to Iraq and Afghanistan and met with commanders and their staffs. He took Mr. McFarland and Mr. Kirin with him to assist in his theater assessment. GEN Meigs also imparted his initial guidance to the JIEDDO field team leaders.

At the same time GEN Meigs traveled around CENTCOM’s theater, at the direction of the senior intelligence officials in DOD, a five-man joint team of Marines and Army traveled to Iraq. The team conducted an assessment of the tactical-to-strategic intelligence linkages for the Joint IED Defeat effort. The week prior to this trip, GEN Meigs and Mr. McFarland discussed their ideas for expanding the intelligence effort for IED Defeat. Their concept included building capability at the brigade and regiment level in the following areas: a law enforcement intelligence capability, adding investigative skills forward for site exploitation, expanding technical IED exploitation and adding cryptologic support teams at the tactical level.

GEN Meigs’ concept met resistance from both the Army and USMC intelligence chiefs. The team’s purpose was providing DOD decision-makers with an accurate depiction of actions at the brigade combat team or regimental combat team (BCT/RCT) level to defeat insurgent and terrorist use of IEDs and recommending task-organization of teams of individuals and or capabilities for deployment to an Army brigade or Marine regiment. Meigs argued that the experience of senior law enforcement professionals, working closely with brigade and division staffs, would greatly improve units ability to target the nexus of criminal, corrupt former intelligence service operatives, and paramilitary forces that provided the foundation of the IED networks. They also would be able to provide special training in areas in which conventional forces were weak, like sensitive site exploitation and development of the evidentiary materials needed to convict terrorists in Iraqi courts.

The Army G2, LTG Jeffrey Kimmons, suggested the Army lead the survey team. The JIEDDO provided a seasoned operator with IED experience and the USMC provided both intelligence and IED expertise to the team. (McFarland, personal communication, October 24, 2006) All five members were carefully chosen because of previous combat experience in Iraq. General consensus from OIF returnees revealed that the intelligence community could do much more for tactical war-fighters confronted by the IED.

The month long survey traveled throughout Iraq visiting 13 Forward Operating Bases encompassing 35 different units from the Corps staff down to squad level. The in-country portion of the survey culminated with a report to GEN Meigs while he was still in theater. LTG Pete Chiarelli, the commanding general of Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I), and GEN Meigs discussed the findings of the report with GEN Casey. The survey team’s principle finding was that Soldiers and Marines wanted better understanding of the IED threat in their specific employment region. Soldiers were hungry for better intelligence and at times felt unsure of what they would encounter. Another recurring theme emerged relating to enemy agility with IEDs which led one commander to say, “What works today will not work tomorrow simply because it worked today.” (Kirin, personal communication, November 17, 2006)

Many observations of the IED survey team coincided with what GEN Meigs and his team of McFarland and Kirin discovered. GEN Casey approved four areas for operational assessment including: assessment of pre-deployment training, identification of best practices, CREW effectiveness, and he directed study on what he termed, “leap-frog the threat”, implying a red team effort to predict what the enemy would try next. (Kirin, personal communication, November 17, 2006) While the survey team observations remain classified, the report confirmed many of GEN Meigs’ previous thoughts; he used this report to get his point across with leaders in the Pentagon and the intelligence community. With the report finalized, the survey team briefed the intelligence and operations leadership in the Pentagon. These leaders generally accepted the findings and agreed adjustments were necessary.

However, the nature of Pentagon bureaucracy often stifles innovation by agreeing with a proposal and then not acting on it. (McFarland, personal communication, October 24, 2006) The default setting for the institution is to sustain its norm. The institution, designed for the Cold War, performs remarkably for what it was designed to do. But, institutional biases inherent in DOD culture restrict agility and responsiveness when confronted with unexpected challenges.

This impression of Pentagon bureaucracy isn’t prophetic. For the past several years, DOD leaders led by Secretary Rumsfeld recognized transformation as necessary to overcome cultural biases and preclude bureaucratic incoherence. It took a leader with the seniority of a four-star general to push ideas through the Pentagon. GEN Meigs had the vision, leadership, and importantly, the trusted relationships with senior leaders in the Pentagon to accomplish the work. The IED effort required entrepreneurial freedom and a degree of independence from bureaucratic norms. Since the institution accepted GEN Meigs, he could work on the fringes of Service hierarchies. While the DOD leadership embraced GEN Meigs, an internal Pentagon report written for CENTCOM critical of the Joint IED Defeat campaign, stated the JIEDDO effort was “poorly focused” and overly reliant on large defense contractors providing Cold War technical solutions. The report claimed the JIEDDO approach neglected the human terrain. (The Project on Government Oversight, 2006)

“The Americans may have all the wristwatches, but we have all the time.” – Taliban leader (Barno, 2006)

GEN Meigs and GEN Abizaid both felt the long-term answer to the IED problem required the Iraqi people to deal with the insurgency. (Meigs, September 8, 2006). GEN Abizaid stated that technical solutions and devices coming out of the Pentagon would not stop the bombings, only people could stop the bombings, indicating only the Iraqi people would eventually solve the IED problem. (The Boston Globe, June 25, 2006) Comments written by LTG Chiarelli’s in his article published in Military Review demonstrate the subtleties of fighting an insurgency.

“[A] task force could win engagements by killing or capturing an insurgent emplacing an improvised explosive device, and it could win battles by targeting, disrupting, and killing off insurgent cells. But it could only win the campaign if the local populace revealed insurgent and terrorist cells and, accordingly, denied sanctuary.” (Chiarelli & Michaelis, Jul/Aug 2005)
The codependent relationship between hostile IED use in the broader context of combating insurgency and terrorism resulted in JIEDDO supporting a wide range of training and education initiatives for the military institution. Although not as widely known, possibly because the initiatives did not involve big defense contractors and large funding commitments, both JIEDDTF and JIEDDO supported initiatives in counterinsurgency. Returning commanders and JIEDDTF field team personnel learned the importance of cultural understanding and language training. Taught the advantages of high-technology, commanders witnessed its limitations as well. A recurring theme emerged from Soldiers and Marines, they needed more detailed information on community leaders, individuals, tribes, political parties, past attack areas, social gathering places, etc. for the areas where they lived and fought. GEN Casey could only effect rapid capability formation in Iraq and the leaders deploying to his command desperately needed counterinsurgency training. To prepare newly deployed commanders for the intellectual rigors of their duties in counterinsurgency, GEN Casey created a Counterinsurgency Academy in Taji, Iraq. JIEDDO contributed a portion of the instruction and funding for the academy. Providing targeting support for identification of bomb-makers and the enabling activities that support IED use: financing, recruiting, supply, targeting, etc… required improved intelligence on bomb-makers’ customers as well as their innocent victims. (McFate, 2005)

Familiarity with the Iraqi judicial process provides a valuable example of how cultural understanding impacted the early IED effort. Investigative skills proved vital when prosecuting cases against alleged IED attackers. Investigation skills such as: preserving a crime scene, evidence collection and processing, witness questioning, and developing community crime trends, common among law enforcement professionals, support the Iraqi government’s enforcement of the rule of law. The Iraqi judicial system, historically a confession-based process, was at times uncomfortable with scientifically obtained evidence. Both the JIEDDTF and JIEDDO, invested in biometric technology, metal detection scanners, surveillance equipment, and explosive residue detectors for the purpose of obtaining evidence against suspected IED attackers. Convincing Iraqi courts using American evidentiary standards becomes difficult when prosecuting IED cases, especially involving individuals accused of enabling IED attacks, such as: financiers, suppliers, recruiters, and bomb-makers. In all but cases involving individuals that actually handled explosives where physical explosive residue implicated an attacker, the cases proved difficult to close, absent the required evidence. Demonstrating the science behind the equipment eased the concerns of judges and improved acceptance of some technologies. Judges preferred certain evidence gathering techniques over others. Based on feedback from deployed commanders, JIEDDO adjusted equipment purchases to judicial preferences. Understanding the nuances of Iraqi society with this sort of cultural awareness required institutional reform.

The Services adjusted education and training across the force as a prerequisite for success in the Long War. (McFarland, 2005) In 2004, JIEDDTF contracted cultural anthropologists and social scientists developing a pilot effort called the Cultural Preparation of the Environment (CPE). Military training and education on cultural issues provided knowledge in only the broadest terms, so this initiative closed a significant institutional gap potentially providing information to current commanders and their successors. It provided clear recognition of the linkage between counterinsurgency success and success against the IED. Units needed new organizational approaches to enhance investigative skills.

Weapons Intelligence Teams

The JIEDDO provided funding and training oversight to the development of Weapons Intelligence Teams (WITs) for brigade-level incident investigation and site exploitation. WITs followed an example used by the United Kingdom. Implementation of the WIT concept offset the constrained availability of EOD forces. JIEDDTF hoped WITs could help span this void and initiated a modest prototype effort. The Army mobilized a reserve component military intelligence battalion, assigned it a completely new mission, and retrained the battalion’s personnel while forming the WITs.

The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) developed and sponsored the initiative and received JIEDDTF funding for the first phase of the effort, when six of these WITs deployed to Iraq. The concept provided a crime scene investigation (CSI) capability at IED post-blast sites or uncovered weapons and ammunition caches. Pairing the skills of intelligence analysts and law enforcement professionals with EOD technicians afforded intensive investigative capacity.

The JIEDDO expanded the program based on the success of the pilot effort approved previously by the JIEDDTF. All maneuver brigades eventually received a WIT team in Iraq. After JIEDDO efforts soliciting support from federal law enforcement agencies failed, JIEDDO provided funding for private contractors to supplement brigade investigation capability with former law enforcement professionals. Additionally, with WITs habitually aligned with specific maneuver brigades, ground commanders now turned to an organic resource for detailed analysis. JIEDDO also provided law enforcement criminologists to its field teams bolstering on-site investigation skills and providing feedback to brigade commanders. The WITs, universally accepted by maneuver commanders, proved a valuable organizational initiative which the military institution evaluated for permanent inclusion into the force structure.

The combined capability of the CEXC and the WITs improved technical exploitation and the forensics analysis capacity of Coalition Forces. Trends in the construction of IEDs, identification of employment patterns and emergent technologies were now possible at forward locations. Additionally, the JIEDDTF and JIEDDO provided oversight and funding for enhanced forensics exploitation in the US by partnering with the FBI. Gathering the IED components and transporting them to the TEDAC followed after initial exploitation by the WITs and CEXCs. High priority IED components were sent to the FBI’s Terrorist Explosive Device Analysis Center (TEDAC). The influx of IEDs from Iraq quickly exceeded the capacity of TEDAC. JIEDDO provided additional funds for increasing the staff of the TEDAC and JIEDDO oversight insured proper scheduling for priority exploitation and analysis. At the TEDAC, components underwent detailed analysis to enable gathering of biometric evidence. Existing international criminal databases occasionally confirmed suspected terrorists. This evidence proved useful for decisions on detainee releases and criminal cases in Iraqi courts. Although designed with a common vision, the two theaters employed this technical exploitation capability in different ways.

Organizational Approaches CJTF-76 and MNC-I

While there are significant differences in the nature of the IED threat between Iraq and Afghanistan, it is natural as well as valuable to compare the situation, approaches, and solutions in both countries. In terms of magnitude, a typical day of IED activity in Iraq represented a month of IED attacks in Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan the command embraced the JIEDDTF field team. The JIEDDTF field team formed the nucleus of a counter-IED task force for CJTF-76 called Task Force Paladin. The Commander of Combined Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF-76), MG Ben Freakley, selected the JIEDDO field team leader, COL Chuck Waggoner, who served concurrently as the TF Paladin commander. Waggoner’s purview included all forces and capabilities related to countering the IED. Source documents for TF Paladin complicated the staffing of the organization because the requests and authorizations came in a piecemeal fashion. The harsh terrain and remote widely dispersed locations of forces necessitated forward positioning of counter IED assets, collocated with maneuver units. TF Paladin focused its support on the brigade combat teams at their forward locations in a dynamic, tailored fashion. (Allyn, personal communication, October 17, 2006) Waggoner distributed his CEXC personnel as members of the regional counter IED teams for responsive IED exploitation. While CJTF-76 created a task force offering a dual mission for the JIEDDO Afghanistan field team, the magnitude of the IED threat in Iraq required a different approach. GEN Meigs left Afghanistan having witnessed a significantly different threat environment than what he would see in Iraq.

In Iraq, XVIII Airborne Corps turned over authority to LTG Pete Chiarelli and his V Corps forming the new MNC in Iraq during January 2006. The Corps leadership formed a counter-IED task force of its own, called Task Force Troy. Approval of the task force concept and source documents occurred with XVIII Corps, but TF Troy was just forming at the time of GEN Meigs’ visit.

TF Troy, more typical of a hierarchical organization, followed a support brigade model and centralized its CEXC in Baghdad. (Allyn, personal communication, October 17, 2006) The British had a corresponding CEXC cell in Basra. The approach in Iraq used the JIEDDO field team in an advisory role to MNC-I and not at all in the same fashion as GEN Meigs saw in Afghanistan. He naturally questioned why and offered his views and assistance to both LTG Chiarelli and GEN Casey.

Challenges with theater integration of emergent requirements resulted in institutional friction over the previous months, not the least of which was CREW fielding. GEN Meigs thought now that DOD created a permanent organization for IED Defeat the JIEDDO should take a larger but behind the scenes role, especially with the fielding of CREW. The new organization, as well as deployed operational commanders, had yet to define and understand the role, authorities, and scope of mission of the JIEDDO.

The rapid growth of the Joint IED Defeat effort coupled with the increased authority entrusted to GEN Meigs and the JIEDDO through the DOD directive required interpretation among forward deployed commanders. Explaining roles and responsibilities for JIEDDO seemed prudent. The JIEDDO provides support to the combatant commanders by performing the following key tasks:

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  Manage, resource, and focus the strategic to tactical IED Defeat effort for Department of Defense by supporting the Combatant Commanders in their operational and tactical efforts,
  
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  Provide the appropriate influence across the Services and coordinated with the COMCENT,
  
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  Provide oversight for the Joint CREW Fielding Office (JCFO) and CREW fielding in support of Navy effort to man electronic warfare officer (EWO) positions and all other EW efforts,
  
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  Provide the strategic linkage and reach-back capability for forward elements for technical and forensics exploitation for the long war,
  
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  Serve as the "gatekeeper and sponsor" for all IED Defeat technology entering theater,
  
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  Coordinate CREW strategy and resources that support MNC-I and CJTF-76.
  

GEN Meigs previous writings about asymmetric threats, Slide Rules and Submarines and Unorthodox Thoughts on Asymmetric Warfare prepared him for his new role. “The ability to deploy a new weapon without the enemy’s knowledge offers an opportunity to attack him from a dimension he does not perceive…Asymmetries in capability accelerate the killing.” (Meigs, 1990, p. 214) He also commented, “The combination of asymmetry and the terrorists’ ability continually to devise idiosyncratic approaches presents our real challenge.” (Meigs, 2003, p. 4) These writings form the blueprint for his approach to the IED problem. GEN Meigs concluded that there is a need to combine the ingenuity of scientists and rigorous operational analysis with savvy military leaders to develop innovative but pragmatic solutions to unique problems of operational art. (Meigs, 1990)

Where the JIEDDTF focused on innovation and speed to get solutions in theater rapidly, GEN Meigs recalibrated the JIEDDO effort to develop turnkey solutions, still rapidly but with a more complete package at something better than the previous 51% solution. (McFarland, personal communication, October 24, 2006) GEN Meigs heard the complaints of commanders about the challenges they experienced with equipment fielding, training soldiers to use it, and developing CONOPs on the fly. GEN Meigs pushed for improved integration and interoperability of IED Defeat initiatives. He guided JIEDDO using an investment banking strategy providing venture capital for promising technologies. He thought investment money for R&D was “the bread and butter of our effort”. (Meigs, personnel communication, December 11, 2006) The first 90 days of GEN Meigs tenure at the helm of JIEDDO concluded with a presentation to the President explaining DOD’s Joint IED Defeat strategy.

Brief to the POTUS

By March 2006, JIEDDO hit the radar screen of President George W. Bush. On Saturday, 11 March, GEN Meigs accompanied Secretary Rumsfeld to the White House for a classified briefing to President Bush. BG Votel and a small team, a few months earlier, presented a classified intelligence update to Vice President Cheney, but the meeting with the President led to something significantly different.

The President included the work JIEDDO was doing on the IED threat as part of a speech citing it as a vital part of his focus on the Global War on Terror. The brief outlined what Bush called the nation’s plan to defeat the threat of IEDs. The plan had three components: Targeting, Training, and Technology.

The President also addressed a factor needing more attention. Iraqis were the principle victims of IED attacks and this form of terror attack could erode their confidence in the future of a free Iraq. Tips from Iraqis provided critical intelligence to target terrorists and bomb-makers. What the President failed to do, undoubtedly because of his preoccupation with IED casualties in Iraq, was order comprehensive, long-term interagency support. Expanding DOD’s mandate as lead agency for the Joint IED Defeat mission and authorizing formal IA agreements never occurred. Pursuing the global aspect of the JIEDDO mission seems futile without a comprehensive IA strategy.

DOD Directive 2000.19 promoted institutional continuity and unity of effort for DOD’s Joint IED Defeat campaign. A Presidential Directive could similarly enable greater IA acceptance and involvement with the JIEDDO effort. The ad hoc, hierarchical nature of the IA process created unnecessary impediments to the effort. GEN Meigs’ subsequent pursuit of increased intelligence support for JIEDDO relied on more support from the IC. Following the President’s speech emphasizing the IED threat, JIEDDO assembled a small group of outside senior thinkers for charting a new course for the organization.

At an offsite conference in April 2006, GEN Meigs’ advised his team to, “Use ambiguity in the IED Defeat Directive as an opportunity to apply organizational strengths. We are not here to solve today’s problem. We are here to decide how to preempt tomorrow’s problem.” (Meigs, personal communication, April 7, 2006)

One of the out-of-the-box thinkers that frequently works with DOD organizations, Bran Ferren said, “We, [meaning DOD], tend to spend more time looking for answers than asking the right questions.” (Ferren, personal communication, April 7, 2006) The group outlined six challenges: complexity management, educating the audience on the nature of the problem, acquisition, technology transfer and system engineering, drive necessary R&D effort by coordinating what’s being done, and outreach interface (branding, image, salesmanship). Three temporal regimes framed the challenges: current, emerging and future. GEN Meigs settled on three operating principles for his strategy:

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  Take a long, broad view
  
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  Develop a good organization with trust and talent
  
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  Shape the battle
  

Eliminating the IED threat required collaboration and orchestration of the IA process and international effort.  (Mendelsohn, 2005) The envisioned JIEDDO organizational structure enhanced the capacity for synchronizing a more comprehensive approach than previously possible. How and why did the JIEDDO grow the way it did? The internally generated growth from GEN Meigs’ desired expansion of the intelligence and OA capacity represented only part of the reason behind the organization’s growth. A retrospective examination of organizational stressors and past successes and failures of the JIEDDTF answers many of these questions.

Self-awareness of previous external demands beckoned the need for organizational growth. As a small, manageable sized JTF for BG Votel, the JIEDDTF experienced recurring requirements from Congress, the media, and senior DOD leadership. This shifted BG Votel’s primary effort, and an inordinate amount of his time, to strategic communication. Preparing him for these sessions consumed the small staff detracting from the amount of support it provided deployed commanders. Industry inquiries and follow-up on research or test developments on initiatives under JIPT consideration consumed a significant portion of the JIEDDTF technical and support staff. The internal environment within Pentagon bureaucracy necessitated greater depth of experience and knowledge of business processes. Institutional, Pentagon-centric expertise was significantly different than the SOF-based, tactically-focused training advice originally envisioned when the Army initiated the task force. Cold War founded R&D, acquisition, procurement, and contracting policies and processes formed cumbersome barriers to rapid fielding of IED solutions. Finding work-around alternatives required greater expertise in DOD institutional processes. Demands on the nimble JIEDDTF outpaced its ability to sustain the effort. The decision for a permanent DOD IED effort resulted in significant organizational growth.

The organization grew from a temporary, ad hoc task force of less than 20 personnel working in the basement of the Pentagon to a 365-person jointly-manned, permanent organization with senior professionals at the helm. JIEDDO grew in more ways than just size. A significant increase in talent and experience accompanied the growth of the JIEDDO. The Army IED Task Force began with a lone general officer and a single mobilized National Guard colonel guiding it. The JIEDDO transformation included four Senior Executive Service (SES) civilian positions, one a former four-star general, and two brigadiers, one the Deputy Director for Operations and one with a dual mission at the JCOE and the NTC. Also, the staff expanded with a dozen or so colonels and very experienced civilian contractors, most of them recently retired colonels. It took nearly ten months however for completion of all the requirements for manning through the DOD personnel system. Anticipating an influx of new personnel over the next several months, GEN Meigs wanted an internally focused organizational strategy written based on the results of the brainstorming discussion.

GEN Meigs wanted a short, to the point, strategy document, akin to the commander’s intent. This document shaped the organizational culture for JIEDDO. Much of the writing took inspiration from Chinese philosopher, Sun Tzu, emphasizing the new emphasis on intelligence and operational assessment following the notion, “If ignorant of your enemy and yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.” (Sun Tzu, 450BC/1963, p. 84) There was extensive editing by JIEDDO’s leadership along the way. GEN Meigs previous writing best capture his thoughts as noted below.

“Defeating these new threats requires us to restructure our decision systems for operations and to reorganize our structures for intelligence requirements, collection, and fusion. It requires hybrid teams of out-of-the-box thinkers, scientists, and military professionals working under pressure together. It relies on matching agency expertise and access to the operational setting as a matter of national mandate.” (Meigs, 2003, p. 18)

The quote above represents both the driving challenge and the opportunity JIEDDO balances daily in regards to the IED effort. Although he did not know it at the time he wrote it, GEN Meigs’ comments about relying on “matching agency expertise and access” applies particularly well to the needs of the Joint IED Defeat strategy. The typical hierarchical, ad hoc IA process does not provide operational continuity or consistent IA staff representation. How does one grow an organization of the type described by Meigs and keep a fresh, agile mind-set while engaging in the IA processes and systems inherent in big government bureaucracy? The answer seemed to grow the capability of JIEDDO, specifically its capacity for robust intelligence and operational assessment while enabling IA connectivity with IA liaisons. More capacity in these two areas proved vital to GEN Meigs for accomplishing JIEDDO’s basic concept vision as an organization. JIEDDO now strove for integrated application of many techniques in its drive toward success. It was this organizational self-awareness, conceptualized during the brainstorming session that permitted a cultural transition for JIEDDO. (Builder, 1989) JIEDDO’s threat specific intelligence focus enabled development of integrated operational capabilities in support of the COCOM commanders. JIEDDO refined the methodology for measuring operational effect of IED solutions and the organization.

The OA strategy previously conceived required modification. The initial OA concept relied heavily on FFRDCs. Kirin realized keeping the FFRDCs current with IED specific data had become problematic. The FFRDC’s could not provide full-time, in-house personnel to JIEDDO, limiting the effectiveness of the original approach. Kirin assessed a demand of one man-year of effort to monitor and synchronize four man-years of support from JIEDDO’s external partners. While contracts for outside support from the FFRDCs and others occurred, JIEDDO planned for significant increases in the organic OA staff as well. (Kirin, personal communication, November 17, 2006)

Initially, until the assignment of full permanent staff, JIEDDO hired contractors for critical skill positions, broadening the effort and bringing in more expertise. JIEDDO reached out for key individuals with whom GEN Meigs had worked with in past assignments. McFarland had a good understanding of what the general wanted. Developing enhanced threat specific intelligence support was McFarland’s initial task. However, threat specific intelligence accounted for much more than the IED as simply a device. The threat constituted the network of activities that enabled IED use. In essence the IED network accounts for the global insurgency, but JIEDDO concentrated primarily on CENTCOM’s region. McFarland created recurring senior level forums throughout the IC for IED specific intelligence issues. He also developed a network of IA liaisons working at JIEDDO. “The enemy innovates on a global scale so we have to deal with them globally.” (McFarland, personal communication, October 24, 2006) McFarland’s personal effort and the work of JIEDDO required the IA and international community to address the threat comprehensively.

“The essence of interagency coordination is the effective integration of multiple agencies with their diverse perspectives and agendas.” (Joint Publication [JP] 3-08 volume 1, 2006, p. I-7) The JIEDDO’s encouraging strides with IA liaisons remained somewhat personality driven, dependent on agency politics, coercive diplomacy, and goodwill. Rather, the IED effort calls for a formal IA agreement that defines agency responsibilities, assigns milestones, and establishes agency accountability for specific objectives. Formal agreements permit a structured, collaborative IA enterprise capable of producing desired strategic effects in support of the geographic COCOMs. JIEDDO also improved its support to the COCOMs offering assistance in tracking high value individuals (HVIs), trend and pattern analysis, informing materiel development, and strategic attack. JIEDDO built a new capability within its organization addressing the concerns and desires uncovered by commanders over the previous two years. The Counter-IED Operational Integration Center (COIC) enhanced JIEDDO’s ability for direct support (DS) to forward deployed commanders.

Moving Forward

Counter-IED Operational Integration Center

The COIC represents JIEDDO’s attempt at synchronizing a team of relevant IA players working on problems identified by combat commanders. “Due to the diverse interests of individual agencies, previous attempts at interagency coordination failed for lack of national-level perspective, a staff for continuity, and adequate appreciation of the need for an institutionalized coordination process.” (JP 3-08 volume 1, p. II-2) The COIC facility offers a networked work environment capable of fusing operational, intelligence, and embedded IA teams for improved support to combat maneuver commanders. This operations and intelligence fusion center, interconnected to the combat theater, provides access to real-time data and analysis. The digitized network permits horizontal linkages allowing action officers (AOs) to collaboratively swarm on problems and develop cross-agency solutions in direct response to field commanders’ support requests.

The design of the COIC, as depicted in Figure 5, involved developing a systems integration lab (Sims lab) to test-drive new materiel and CONOP initiatives using real data from theater for modeling and simulation (M&S), and to develop new analytical tools. An operations lab monitored real-time events in theater using state of the art technology and provided a venue for predeployment battle staff training. An IA intelligence collection and analysis cell informed the simulation process and materiel developers as well as reach back DS to commanders in theater. (McFarland, personal communication, October 24, 2006) Personnel in the operations lab refined CONOPs, developed ideas for employment with

Figure 5, Capability transition from temporary JIEDDTF to permanent JIEDDO (Discussion Mr. Maxie McFarland & COL Bill Adamson, 24 OCT 2006)

JIEDDO’s strategic relevance will increase if it can predict emergent threats and exploit solutions which permit preemption. As the COIC Red Team matures, it may serve the purpose of preemption. However, the scope of JIEDDO’s current charter restricts its mission to improvised explosive threats. Broadening JIEDDO’s effort may prove prudent in the near future. “Just as our adversaries will continuously change tactics and approaches to seek our weaknesses, so must we be able to counter them through continuous adaptation. If we do not, we risk the mistakes of the past.” (Skelton, 2004, p.128) However, the rate of technological change makes prediction even harder in the future.

Had predictive intelligence analysis forecast the prevalent use of IEDs as a tactic in the GWOT, military forces would not be in the predicament experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the IED effort had started as a truly preemptive response, the lead agency would properly belong within the intelligence community (IC). Internal reform and mission overload in the IC cripples its capacity for additional effort. Michelle Flournoy, an analyst at the CSIS, claimed that, “The US operational capacity rests almost entirely in the Department of Defense.” (Flournoy and Murdock, p.8) Evolution of the IED threat compels DOD to seek greater support from the IA. Unfortunately, military forces engaged in combat do not have the luxury of waiting for a perfect approach.

In retrospect, the conditions which led to the formation of the JIEDDO reveal a strategic flaw in pursuing a military-centric approach. Much of the international constituency the US must rely on in future conflicts has grown weary of US dominated military responses. Additionally, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006 concedes that the US military does not conceive of future military operations without assistance from international and IA partners. The consequences of the IA resisting a broader role against emerging IED threats reflects a continuation of unsatisfactory performance and an incomplete strategy capable of delivering only military-centric solutions.

The hostile use of IEDs by global insurgents necessitates a response properly cultivated by intelligence and law enforcement agencies. These agencies require strong linkages into international partners aligned under DOD for specific operations like, OIF and OEF. The following line of reasoning develops a proposal for enhancing the IED effort, improving operational performance against the IED threat.

As previously described, DOD responded to the IED threat initially in a reactive, defensive mode relying primarily on technology to decrease casualties in Iraq. By establishing JIEDDO, DOD entrusted the organization as a “change agent” for the IED effort. The necessity for greater intelligence support for offensive operations resulted in a recalibration of the JIEDDO main effort. Intelligence driven operations attacking IED support networks in CENTCOM became the main effort. Concurrently, the internal realignment of the IC under the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the consolidation of 22 federal agencies under DHS resulted in significant agency turbulence preventing optimal support. Understandably, agency reform and organizational turbulence curbed willingness by the IA to provide support combating IEDs. By default, the predominant response to the IED threat comes from the military institution. Other government agencies participated cautiously in the IED effort launched by DOD. Because the IFF paid for the IED effort and CENTCOM casualties rose because of IEDs, JIEDDO pursued a CENTCOM-centric strategy. The US government must underwrite entrepreneurial risk and institute a coherent IA process that supports the operational need resulting from the hostile use of IEDs.

The dynamic Joint IED Defeat strategy requires even greater IC involvement. However, decision by committee or taking a team vote rarely optimizes organizational performance. Teams build franchises around key players. The US government needs an IA team of players with long-term focus and commitment, not sporadic involvement. The team needs 100% commitment from everyone for optimal performance. Preferably, an Executive Branch decision selecting a lead agency fosters agency-wide, laser-like concentration on the hostile use of IEDs. This lead agency must do more than coordinate meetings and forums for information exchange. The lead agency requires regulatory authority over a consolidated IA team.

JIEDDO’s mission for DOD affords a unique position as coordinator of the strategic IED effort. DOD invested the resources, developed business processes, identified key leadership, and allocated the personnel in JIEDDO for a broad mission. JIEDDO established linkages into the IA and across the COCOMs. The geographic COCOMs execute the global IED strategy for DOD with JIEDDO in support. Regional COCOM areas of responsibility (AOR) preclude a global focus for the geographic COCOMs. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) becomes the global partner for all geographic COCOM’s. DOD’s planned expansion of SOF affords an opportunity for greater collaboration on the IED threat. SOCOM’s current counterterrorist mission as part of the GWOT compels stronger links between the JIEDDO and SOCOM. SOCOM’s worldwide mission fosters global operational continuity and offers adequate military force for preemptive offensive missions against insurgent sanctuaries. SOF missions of this type require approval in consultation with the geographic COCOMs.

In combat operations like OIF and OEF, DOD through its COCOMs, leads the operational response. The COCOMs, along with the Department of State (DOS), should persuade like-minded global partners for support, using an international element of power to deny global insurgents sanctuary in the relatively ungoverned areas of sovereign territory. Taking preventive and preemptive offensive measures developed in concert with international partners supports the global main effort.

Much of the work on counterterrorism accomplished by other agencies and countries complements JIEDDO’s existing effort, easing concerns about greater collaboration. Developing intelligence on terrorist networks proved difficult because of a lack of human intelligence assets. Technical and biometric forensics from IEDs proved a force multiplier that enabled precise targeting of insurgent networks and provided valuable evidence, increasing the probability of convictions in criminal courts. Threat specific IED intelligence developed by IA teams in the COIC represents a preliminary step in what should become an on-going, robust collaborative effort. The DNI, linked to DOD through JIEDDO, SOCOM, and the geographic COCOMs, properly continues the intelligence focus against IED networks abroad. Domestically, DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) assume the main effort in an enforcement role detaining suspects based on intelligence from overseas sources fostered by DNI as well as their own domestically obtained intelligence. Collectively, an interconnected IA team engages in a more enduring offensive approach against the global IED threat in the Long War than accomplished solely by JIEDDO. In the Long War, the IED threat constantly evolves, and JIEDDO must first finish the task at hand in CENTCOM.

JIEDDO’s wartime support to CENTCOM remains unwavering, but as discussed, realizing success against hostile IED use depends on the IA and SOCOM accepting greater roles. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006 concedes that the US military does not conceive of future military operations without assistance from international and IA partners. (Flournoy, 2006, pp.77-79) DOD’s strategy must permit iterative recalibrations as JIEDDO welcomes focused IA involvement into a more extensive Joint IED Defeat enterprise. Assigning focused responsibilities, milestones, and objectives to every collaborating agency enables concurrent multi-agency discovery of global terrorists and insurgents reliant on IEDs.

The JIEDDO is well structured eventually to assume an even broader role in the Long War. The tunnel-vision the military has with Iraq and Afghanistan restricts the current focus of JIEDDO’s effort. Hostile elements in those theaters of war remain elusive, adaptive, and committed to the use of IEDs. Achieving success against the global IED threat depends on greater assistance from SOCOM and the IA.

What Have We Learned?

“It is through change that we find purpose.” - Heraclitus

The IED persists as a weapon of indiscriminate destruction with constituent effect. The enemy proved to be quick learning and innovative, changing TTPs in response to the success of DOD efforts to counter and defeat the hostile use of IEDs. The enemy campaign evolved from employment of individual, simply constructed IEDs to multiple IEDs in combined-arms ambushes. Hostile elements use increasingly more sophisticated devices, killing first-responders, and indiscriminately targeting civilians using suicide VBIEDs. The JIEDDO priority remains CENTCOM-centric, focused predominately on the nation’s malaise on Iraq.

In CENTCOM, the combined efforts of JIEDDO and the COCOM are not producing the effects desired. The definition of success in the CENTCOM Counter-IED Campaign remains as elusive as victory in Iraq. Violence in all of its dimensions increased during the formation of JIEDDO evidenced by the rising sectarian-based insurgency in Iraq. The early technology-centric IED effort produced limited benefits for war-fighting commanders but did force the enemy to double the number of attacks to produce the same amount of casualties. (Allyn, personnel communication, January 25, 2007) Even with all the investments in detection technology, an observant human eye detects the vast majority of IEDs. (Kirin, personal communication, November 17, 2006) IED casualties remain about the same in spite of a four-fold increase in IED use in Iraq. Casualty rates per IED attack are down indicating that the cumulative effort of training, better protective equipment, and improved intelligence had a positive effect.

Initially viewed as a tactical challenge for combat units, the terrorist and insurgent use of the IED demanded institutional change. Commanders in the combat zone reconsidered the nature of 360 Degree Warfare and the impact of the IED to their operations. The early focus of the Army IED Task Force, formed in 2003, reduced combat casualties through the dissemination of effective tactics and promising technical solutions. The TAT, along with the partnership JIEDDO nurtured with the AWG, provided relevant, current lessons learned through advisors possessing recent regional operational experience. The initial OSD response, dominated by the quest for a technological solution to save lives, evolved into a more comprehensive approach. The military institution repeatedly demonstrated its resilience, learning and adapting to the IED threat. Some suggest that updates to doctrine or writing new doctrine serves as an organizational metric of learning and adaptation. (Nagl, 2002) One must conclude that the work of JIEDDO with JFCOM, the JCOE, and TRADOC captured the doctrinal essence of the IED threat explaining concepts and training approaches to prevail. Important modifications to standard bureaucratic decision systems in the Pentagon, CENTCOM, and at war-fighting headquarters enhanced the DOD’s institutional response to the asymmetric challenge brought by the IED. DOD established the JIEDDO to “defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence”. During the establishment of JIEDDO, institutional decisions resulted in adjustments to DOD business processes ranging from: acquisition, test, R&D, training, intelligence, and operations.

While evidence of both, institutional friction and some Service prejudice surfaced during the establishment of JIEDDO, there was also cooperation due to operational need. The Joint Service consensus approving the expansion and permanency of JIEDDO along with the creation of its subordinate joint training center, the JCOE, signaled long-term institutional adjustments were expected. Allocating JIEDDO an organizational budget coupled with Joint Service manning mitigated inter-service rivalries, biases, and prejudice. This paper gathered emerging lessons from the evolution of the Joint IED Defeat effort as it expanded during the Long War.

Table 1, JIEDDO Lessons Observed

Strengths Strategic-level leader initiative & commitment Senior leaders underwrite risk High threshhold funding authority Investment Banking strategy providing venture capital for technology development Coalition embeds and collaboration Adaptive joint testing process Technology review & assessment Joint Service and IA LNOs representation Entrepreneurial acquisition & fielding process CREW development and fielding US Navy assistance with EWOs JFCOM collaboration and doctrinal updates Contractor manning for JIEDDO growth Targeting support to combat units Weapons Intel Teams at brigade level Rapid “best practice” dissemination and TRADOC doctrinal FM Formation of JCOE for IED Defeat Strategic-to-tactical linkages TAT and ATAT program with multi-service reach into both the active and reserve component Field Teams that embed with tactical units as advisors

Challenges Personnel regulations for manning a JTF Maintaining continuity and expertise midst personnel rotations Building a technology path or roadmap Institutional biases Innovation and speed affected by bureaucratic time constants Joint Service consensus building IA autonomy degraded unity of effort Responsive CONOP development and new equipment training for forward deployed units Creating counterpart organizations at various levels of command Institutionalizing change in structure, equipment, and the training base Synchronizing DOTLMPF midst rapid change Sustaining organizational agility midst a large bureaucracy

Military leaders often must translate lessons learned from past conflicts into applications for innovative training, tactics, and technology. (Meigs, 1990) [See Table 1]

Prudence compels institutions to learn from the past in order to better prepare for the future. The Services created new organizations, mobilized and realigned units, and developed a joint training center specifically for the IED threat. Updates to the curricula of military schools and training institutions occurred, an indication of organizational learning and adaptation. (Nagl, 2002) JIEDDO support to the MNF-I Counterinsurgency Academy helped prepare newly deployed commanders for the intellectual rigors of counterinsurgency. Incorporating embedded international members and IA liaisons laid the foundation for closer collaboration with these vital partners. A holistic strategy reliant on intelligence driven targeting support was offered to maneuver units. This strategy enabled attacks against the entire IED network through a new facility, the COIC, serving in Direct Support of deployed commanders. The JIEDDO marshaled limited IA support through its entrepreneurial leadership and personal relationships built with counterpart leaders in the IC. While integration of IA liaisons occurred at the COIC, the IED response developed by DOD lacked comprehensive IA commitment. The inclusion of contracted, experienced law enforcement professionals on brigade and division staffs improved the ability of units to target the nexus criminal, corrupt former regime intelligence services, and paramilitary forces that constitute the operational capacity of IED networks. Even with changes to the military, the time horizons of the DOD procurement and acquisition cycle were not agile or responsive enough to stay ahead of asymmetric threats with materiel or technical solutions alone. Venture capital provided by JIEDDO for R&D investments on promising materiel solutions became the “bread and butter” of the JIEDDO technological effort.

By their nature, asymmetric challenges require entrepreneurial freedom and a degree of independence from cyclic DOD programming and budget norms. By underwriting entrepreneurial risk, senior DOD leaders, such as: the Deputy Secretary, the Vice Chairman JCS, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the CENTCOM commander, and the commanding generals of MNF-I, MNC-I, and CJTF-76, all instilled the JIEDDO leadership with the drive needed for implementing change while JIEDDO built trusted relationships among senior leaders in government. Personal involvement of strategic-level leaders enabled JIEDDO’s rapid impact on the use of IEDs. A stronger partnership between JIEDDO, SOCOM, and the geographic COCOMs advances the effort against the IED threat. However, the IED problem, like the insurgency in Iraq, requires more than simply a military solution.

Because of the military’s deep involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan with counterinsurgency, DOD quickly adapted institutionally, outpacing the rest of the IA. A permanent IA constituency would greatly benefit the Joint IED Defeat effort. Differing priorities and mission focus among the various IA partners reconfirms that agencies’ divergent core missions contribute to lack of cohesion against a complex threat. DOD’s ability to learn quickly and create solutions to the IED threat will assist IA partners when participating in “nation building” or stability and reconstruction operations with DOD. During these kinds of operations, IED use will likely proliferate.

Effective attack of IED networks requires coordinated IA approaches with clear, common objectives adopted in collaboration with IA partners. Victory over the prolific threat posed by the hostile use of IEDs will take the combined synergy of international and interagency partnering. It is paramount for agencies to inculcate DOD’s lessons and develop a joint IA doctrine, modeled after the Goldwater-Nichols Act that enforces consensus approaches and subordinates IA autonomy to operational need. (Meigs, 2003, p. 18) Greater agency participation working collaboratively with DOD as the lead agency constitutes the IA team needed for accomplishing the global aspect of the JIEDDO mission. Congressional legislation mandating IA reform may be uncomfortable for some agencies, but there couldn’t be anything more central for success against the global IED threat.

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