Anthropic Bias Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy Nick Bostrom
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Unfortunately, we can construct a similar line of assumptions to show that any other possible universe would have been equally surprising. Let E# be the proposition that  has some particular boring character. For instance, we can let E# say that is a universe which consists of nothing but such-and-such a pattern of electromagnetic radiation. We then have  . We can let K be the same as before. Now, if we suppose that  and  then the truth of E# will be classified as surprising. This is counterintuitive. And if it were true that every possible universe would be just as surprising as any other then fine-tuning being surprising can surely not be what legitimizes the inference from fine-tuning to the multiverse hypothesis. We must therefore deny either or (or both). At the same time, if the truth of E is to be surprising, we must maintain that  and  . This means that the anthropic theorizer wishing to ground her argument in an appeal to surprise must treat E# differently from E as regards these conditional probabilities. It may be indeed be correct to do that. But what is the justification? Whatever is it, it cannot be that the truth of E is surprising whereas the truth of E# is not. For although that might be true, to simply assume it would be to make the argument circular.
Directory: preprints preprints -> Digitally-assisted discovery and proof preprints -> Reorienting the Logic of Abduction preprints -> Supplementary Material Table 1 Download 9.31 Mb. Share with your friends:
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