Atsb transport safety investigation report
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- History of the flight
- Contributing factors
- Douglas DC-8: March 1991
- Boeing 767: August 1999
Boeing 757: January 1990
History of the flightOn 16 January 1990, the crew of a Boeing Company 757-222 aircraft, registered N505UA, were preparing the aircraft for a scheduled passenger service from New York to Denver, US. Onboard the aircraft were two crew, five cabin crew and 169 passengers. During the flight preparation stage, the first officer inadvertently calculated the take-off performance data based on Boeing 767 data. The speeds were not verified by the captain. Both pilots set their respective airspeed bugs with the incorrect V speeds. During the takeoff, the aircraft was over-rotated, resulting in a tailstrike. The flight was continued to the destination. Contributing factorsThe following factors were identified throughout the subsequent investigation: The first officer's improper use of the aircraft's flight manual, which resulted in the incorrect calculation of the V speeds.
Inadequate supervision by the captain regarding the verification of the take-off data. Douglas DC-8: March 1991
History of the flightOn 12 March 1991, a Douglas DC-8 aircraft, registered N730PL, was being operated on a non-scheduled cargo flight from New York, US to Brussels, Belgium. In preparation for takeoff, the flight engineer calculated the V speeds and horizontal stabiliser trim setting. The captain and first officer did not confirm the data. During the takeoff, the captain (the pilot flying) noticed that the force required to rotate the aircraft was greater than normal and that at the V speeds calculated, the aircraft would not fly. In response, the captain rejected the takeoff. The crew were unable to stop the aircraft within the remaining runway length. The aircraft struck the instrument landing system equipment, the landing gear collapsed and all four engines were torn away. The aircraft was destroyed in the ensuing fire. Contributing factorsThe following factors were identified throughout the subsequent investigation: The flight engineer calculated the take-off performance data based on a take-off weight (TOW) of 242,000 lbs (109,771 kg) instead of 342,000 lbs (155,131 kg). Shortcomings were identified in the airlines crew training program, and questionable scheduling of qualified, but marginally experienced crew for the accident flight.
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of Joe Pries (http://joepriesaviation.net) Boeing 767: August 1999
History of the flight:On 24 August 1999, a Boeing 767-383 aircraft, registered OY-KDN, was scheduled to operate a passenger flight from Copenhagen, Denmark to Tokyo, Japan. Onboard the aircraft were 181 passengers and 10 crew members, including the captain, first officer and relief pilot. The relief pilot was not assigned any duties for the takeoff or landing phases of flight. Prior to engine start, the first officer entered the runway in use, temperature, and other flight details into the aircraft communication and reporting system (ACARS). The TOW was not entered as the crew had not yet received the loadsheet. The loadsheet was subsequently delivered and the captain entered the zero fuel weight (ZFW) into the flight management system (FMS) using the multifunction control and display unit (MCDU). The first officer noted the ZFW, TOW, planned landing weight, fuel figures and passengers numbers. The first officer then entered the ZFW into the aircraft TOW prompt in ACARS. This data was then sent to the mainframe computer where the take-off performance calculations were made and transmitted back to the crew and printed out. The relief pilot noticed that the mean aerodynamic chord (MAC) was 7.0 %, which did not appear to be correct. According to the loadsheet the MAC was 19.0%; the first officer amended the ACARS accordingly. The crew checked the new print out and determined it was correct. The captain entered the V speeds into the FMS. During the takeoff, the tail skid pad came into contact with the runway. The aircraft failed to become airborne and the captain rejected the takeoff.
Contributing factorsThe following factors were identified throughout the subsequent investigation: The first officer entered the ZFW into the ACARS instead of the TOW, resulting in low V speeds.
The first officer had a limited amount of experience on the Boeing 767. The first officer had previously flown a McDonnell Douglas MD-80 aircraft, where the ZFW was the take-off input parameter. The crew checked the take-off performance data on the second print; however, their attention was focused on the MAC value and not the incorrect TOW and V speeds. The layout of the ACARS print out could have resulted in a misinterpretation of the TOW, with the crew possibly believing ‘they had found the value they were looking for’, but at the wrong location. The crew’s normal procedures may have been interrupted by the relief pilot observing the MAC value discrepancy, which in turn, may have stopped the crew from checking the remaining take-off data. The first officer could have been experiencing some stress due to the delayed departure. Directory: media media -> Applications to Drill media -> Unicef voices of Youth Chat Theme: Children and aids nigeria and Zimbabwe 13 October 2006 Background media -> Tsunami Terror Alert: Voices of Youth media -> Biblical Eschatology Presentation by: D. Paul Beck May 4, 2016 Ground Rules media -> Guide to completing the collection using the Omnibus system media -> The milk carton kids media -> Events Date and Location media -> The Gilded Age: The First Generation of Historians by H. Wayne Morgan University of Oklahoma, April 18, 1997 media -> Analysis of Law in the United Kingdom pertaining to Cross-Border Disaster Relief Prepared by: For the 30 June 2010 Foreword media -> Cuba fieldcourse 2010 Download 0.67 Mb. Share with your friends:
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