Australia and the Asia Pacific R. James Ferguson 2007
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Australia and the Asia Pacific R. James Ferguson © 2007Lecture 1: Introduction: From Australasia to the 'Indo-Pacific' Region Topics: - 1. Regional Frameworks for Foreign Policy 2. Modern Australia's Origins 3. Calibrating Regional Roles 4. From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific 5. Transitional Dynamics in Foreign and Security Policy 6. Bibliography and Resources 1. Regional Frameworks for Foreign Policy This subject is concerned with the interactions among Australia, the Asia Pacific, and the Indian Ocean region. While Australia has sought to engage (and at times disengage) from East Asia, there has also been an awareness of the growing importance of South Asia and particularly India from 1991. India has also begun to increase its interactions with Southeast Asia and ASEAN, especially through 1995-2007. On this basis, it is possible to speak of a wider Indo-Pacific region. The term Indo-Pacific may be unfamiliar to you. 'Indo-Pacific' is shorthand for the wider region of the Asia-Pacific area plus South Asia and the Indian Ocean region: hence Indo + Pacific. This is the key area in which much of Australia's current foreign policy, trade and security issues were transform form the 1990s onwards (though as we shall see, the influence of Great Britain, Europe and Middle Eastern affairs have become more important over the last five years). Understanding the foreign policy or domestic realities of any Asia-Pacific nation today is not possible with looking at the wider regional environment. The same applies if we tried to look at modern Indonesia, Thailand, or India. They would make little sense if the impact of the region, of regional organisations, and great powers that interacted with them, were not taken into effect. This approach is also particularly significant in light of the changes which have taken place in the Asian-Pacific region over the last 30 years, and the changes which are expected to transform South Asia (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal) over a similar period in the future. Now, more than ever, it is appropriate to study nations in their regional and global setting (Ohmae 1993; Chubin 1989; Acharya 2001). The Indo-Pacific is very diverse, and this diversity drives patterns of interaction: conflict, the need for cooperation, and complementarities. We will see this more clearly in later weeks when we compare Indonesian and Australian experiences of national identity and international perspective. Nonetheless, over the last fifty years these diverse nations (cultural, politically, and in levels of power) have had a period of intense interaction and complex interdependence, often based in part on complementary capacities and resources. Australia can be described with some accuracy as the 'odd man in', i.e. a mainly European nation now interacting closely with Southeast Asia and East Asia, and trying to cope with the implications of this for its future economic, foreign affairs and security policies. Australia has been trying to draw closer to East Asia, through its dialogue with ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asian Summit process, its strong initiatives in the formation of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation; through June and September 2007 meetings in Sydney, it will expand its anti-terrorism agenda, Verikios 2007a) and its strong economic engagement with Japan, China and South Korea. Through 1998-2007, there has been some balancing of Asian involvement, with strong bilateral interests in engaging the U.S. and EU, and some recognition that there are dangers in becoming too reliant on the presumed stability of Australia’s engagement with East Asia. Ongoing security concerns in North-Asia (especially North Korea), the perception of a more complex relationship with Indonesia, and fears of transnational terrorism as a destabilising factor for Southeast and South Asia have somewhat altered the direction of Australian foreign policy since 2001. However, through 2004-2005 there has been some return of focus in Australia's East Asia engagement, with FTA's having been negotiated with Singapore (SAFTA) and Thailand (TAFTA), and being negotiated or considered with China, Japan, Malaysia, Chile, South Korea, and ASEAN-New Zealand. As a whole, however, there has now been a tendency for Australia through 2005-2007 to position itself has having global interests (Jennings 2005), thereby supporting its engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan for example, and claiming a stronger role as an ally of great powers. From 1997 Australia under the Howard government began to emphasise that it would not just focus on multilateral affairs and institutions (interactions with multi-national groups and organizations), but would boost bilateral relations. The relations to be particularly emphasized, were those with the U.S., Japan, China and Indonesia (See DFAT 2004; 1997), while over the last few years China and the U.S. have emerged as the main foci of different aspects of Australian foreign policy. Likewise, Australia’s last Defence Review emphasised the importance of stability in our immediate region, and a high level of engagement with regional security networks as part of Australia’s defence (Department of Defence 2000). From 2001 this relationship was focused even more strongly on the United States, both in terms of trade negotiations, foreign investment flows, and in strong alignment with the U.S. security agenda in relation to the ‘war on terror’ and the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. One of the current debates has been whether this has set back earlier engagement strategies, e.g. dialogue with ASEAN. However, as well shall see, the underlying political realities may be different than the domestic use made by politicians of some these issues. (whether in Malaysia, Indonesia, or Australia). 
Australia’s ‘Pacific’ Backyard? How should we define the subregions of the Indo-Pacific? (Map Courtesy PCL Map Library) Beyond this, Australia has also taken up the idea of building coalitions of shared interest, a policy designed to gain flexibility but also clearing influenced by U.S. strategies. This has been expressed as: - Coalition building - putting together a group of countries to pursue shared objectives on specific issues and thereby enabling Australia to achieve more than it could alone - will play an even more important role in achieving Australia's foreign and trade policy objectives over the next fifteen years. Coalition building is closely linked to bilateral relationships. It is frequently through bilateral relationships that coalition partners are identified and strategies developed. Much of the work of coalitions requires the familiarity, access and ease of communications afforded by sound bilateral relationships (DFAT 2004a). Nonetheless, for a ‘medium’ power with high reliance on international trade and engaged in a wide range of international activities, there are still clear benefits from a regional framework for pursuing progressive change in Australasia and the Indo-Pacific. In many ways, regional trends and regional organisations can act as paths of influence, host institutions that tend to create converging codes of conduct, and act as ‘leverage multipliers’ in some cases (for neo-institutional approaches, see Ravenhill 1998). This subject will focus on Australia in the Indo-Pacific region, especially East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific. Secondary themes will include the role of great powers such as the U.S. and China, and prospects for development among Indian Ocean nations. We will also examine particular developmental, social and security trends, and whether a stable system of power relations is likely to emerge in the future. Today, however, we will briefly explore some of origins of Australia as a nation, and briefly position this experience against the emerging international order in the Indo-Pacific area. The subject will move out from Australian policy orientation to look in detail at Indo-Pacific institutions and trends, then move back to asses critical prospects for assessing current regional agenda. The lecture series for 2007 focuses on: - Week 1: Introduction: From Australasia to the 'Indo-Pacific' Region Week 2: Australian Foreign Policy: From Commonwealth Servant to Regional Player Week 3: The Transformation of Indonesia (1997-2007) and its Regional Significance Week 4: An Asia-Pacific 'Concert-of-Powers' or Strategic Imbalance? Week 5: The Meeting of Cultures in the South Pacific (Guest Lecturer) Week 6: The Not-So-Peaceful South Pacific (Guest Lecturer) Week 7: Australian Defence Policy: Old Methods and New Threats Week 8: ASEAN Plus?: The Drivers of Open Regionalism Week 9: Asia-Pacific Patterns of Transnational Transition: Foci of Instability and Underdevelopment Week 10: South Asia and the Indian Ocean: Cooperation or Institutionalised Conflict? Week 11: Models of Regional Engagement and Competing Regionalisms Week 12: Future-Directed Policies for the Asia-Pacific Region 2. Modern Australia's Origins It is important to look back into the use made of earlier history and myth in shaping both national identity and regional outlooks. Thus it is appropriate to consider the unusual character of white Australia's origins, which was originally a collection of remote colonies located within a contested Pacific region (see Hudson 1992). There are a number of features in Australian experience that are often cited as influencing national identity and foreign policy (see further Elder 2007; Clarke 1992). However, as well shall see, these issues are a contested ground, in which political correctness, counter claims, identity-politics and revisions (by either radicals or neo-conservatives) are often fought out. These debates are so intense that they have sometimes been dubbed the 'history wars' (see Vincent & Land 2003; Manne 2003; Windschuttle 2002). They have a strong impact in defining national interest, which is still a rather fuzzy and loosely-defended set of goals within government policy in spite of efforts to focus on good governance and human rights within recent foreign policy (see Camilleri 2003; DFAT 2002), in legitimating aspects of foreign policy, and influencing its vision of regional engagement. A brief list of standard issues underlying Australian national experience would include: - 1) Prior to 1788 (the first white settlement), there was an extremely long human presence on the continent, and a complex linguistic and religious culture extending back for at least 40,000 years (estimates may be pushed back as far as 60,000 years; see Johnson 2006; Flannery 1994). This was a unique group of tribal cultures, the 'Aborigines', who claim that they never migrated to this land, but were created here as part of the Dreamtime (Barlow 1987; Edwards 1987; Hiatt 1978). This culture has never been fully accepted by white culture - indeed, until the Mabo decision (made by the High Court in 1992), Australia was declared prior to this time to be terra nullius, suggesting that the land was not effectively occupied, and that Europeans coming into it settled the land peacefully. This legal fiction for almost one hundred years deprived the indigenous people of many residual rights under British law as a defeated group who had continuous occupation of the land. The role of indigenous culture at the national level remains controversial today, reconciliation limited, and no treaty exists between these different communities (in contrast to the different, but still problematic outcomes from the Treaty of Waitangi, 1840, in New Zealand, see Lashley 2000; Langton 2000). 2) British occupation of Australian land had to be fought for, and certain tribes put up a determined struggle over decades (including the use of guerrilla warfare), to resist occupation of their homelands. However, the Australian aboriginal peoples, comprising hundreds of tribes, we not unified, and in the end were displaced and marginalised almost completely by white settlement. Indigenous leaders have always maintained that this action was unjust, and indeed genocidal, both culturally and in terms of the population destroyed by warfare, execution, imprisonment and disease (see Rose 1994), a view that surprises many white Australians. Today, the issue of reconciliation, proposals for a formal treaty, and the proper representation of the indigenous people remains a major political issue (e.g. controversies through 2004 over ATSIC, the Aboriginal and Tortes Strait Island Commission, leading to this form of indigenous representation being abolished in 2005, see Bradfield 2006). This remains an area where government policy and its implementation remain problematic, with the government moving towards 'main-streaming' services for indigenous groups and perhaps moving towards a de-facto integrationist policy (see Beckett 2004; Bradfield 2006). 3) From the perspective of European settlers, however, something different was happening. Historical reports largely glossed over or ignored the implications aboriginals were treated, including issues such as their use as unfree labour, the reservation system, and the missing generation whereby children were often removed form their parents. Instead, a different kind of struggle was glorified and romanticised in historical and fiction accounts, in music and poetry. The settlers thought of themselves taming a wide fierce land, building homesteads, fighting flood and fire, building up an independent way of life which brought prosperity in a fairly egalitarian society (see Willis 1993, this is also one of the main images revealed in pre-World War II Australian cinema). This perception was not entirely false: immigration from Europe into the Americas, Africa, New Zealand and Australia opened up new horizons for the poor and displaced in Europe (see Wolf 1982), as well as places where oppression for political and religious reasons could be escaped or at least reduced. Migrants included convicts, soldiers, free settlers, and even political prisoners (especially the Fenians from Ireland in the first half of the 19th century). These images were then joined to the image of Australia as a lucky land, a land of opportunity, with a small population, large resources and lots of sunshine. This partly true myth continued down through the 1960s, and was only undermined by the slowing down of the Australian economy in the 1980s. In part this sense of privilege still influences current debates on immigration and who should be allowed to stay in the country, with a trend towards excluding groups who seem alien or dangerous (for the use of these images in recent immigration debates, see McMasater 2002). Indeed, Bereson and Matheson, and Yuan Chung-Ming argue that this anxiety was one of the main factors behind the Federation of the different Australia States to form the Commonwealth of Australia in January 1901 (McMaster 2002, pp130-134; Yuan 1983, p60; Bereson & Matheson 1992). Taken, however, within the broader geopolitical context of the time, this 'fear' thesis cannot be dismissed. Australian settlers were worried by Asian immigration issues, and also by the imperial expansion of other European nations in the Asia-Pacific region, e.g. France and then Germany. On this basis, Australian identity was based on a specific connection to Mother Britain, included definite racial categories that excluded 'others', and on an egalitarianism based on sameness (Murdolo 2002; McMaster 2002, p135). This myth has been challenges by waves of southern European, then Southeast Asian, and more recently Middle Eastern immigrants. Likewise, the perception of unending abundance has since been undermined by the recognition of a certain fragility of soil, water and eco-systems in Australia, including maritime resources, leading to new concerns about the future of agriculture under the conditions of climate change (Johnson 2006; Flannery 1994). In the 21st century, we can ask whether these images still help Australia adapt to its region, and fit in with the demands of the new global economy. 4) Although this experience did build up a sense of independence from authority (common in frontier areas, e.g in the 'wild west' of America and the 'wild far east' in Siberia), Australian consciousness never fully escaped the apron-strings of Imperial Britain. There was a strong sense of Republicanism in 19th century Australia e.g. the Eureka Stockade as a form of protest, as well as the writings of some Republican thinkers and writers. This was partly due to the influence of non-English and Catholic migrants, especially the Irish. From the time of Federation of the Australian States in 1901, however, Australia seemed to revert to a strongly pro-British policy. This was based on economic considerations, on the manifest power of Britain, especially her navy, to defend Australia, and on a strong trade dependency, with Britain the main buyer of Australia primary products, especially wool and wheat. It was also based on a sense of fear that Australia was not safe from the greed of other European powers, or from 'Asian threats', e.g. from Imperial China or Japan. For the first thirty years of the 20th century Australia would proudly see itself as a member of a great Commonwealth of English speaking nations which straddled the globe. In a very real sense, Great Britain was still ‘home’ to many Anglo-Australians. Federation itself was pretexted on this sense of vulnerability, and some see current defence, migration and security policies partly linked to a new sense of vulnerability that has emerged over the last decade (Tazreiter 2002; Burnside 2002). 
Pioneers? Australia was viewed by immigrants as a land of opportunities and plentiful resources. (NSW Timber cutters, circa 1910, from the Goldsmith Photo Archive) 5) It was in this context that Australia experienced her first major modern wars. As an ally of Britain, the Australian government arranged expeditionary forces to support the motherland in the Boer War (in South Africa), in World War I and World War II (as well as sending forces to the Malayan Emergency, circa 1948-1952 [see Kwan 2005], and to Borneo in Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia 1964-1966).
In was during this period that other aspects of Australian identity were cemented. The ANZAC experience (the Australia and New Zealand forces that fought in the Gallipoli campaign and then in the Middle East against Turkey in World War I) reflected back to Australia the notion of a small brave country, and reinforced notions such as bravery, individuality and 'mateship'. The fact that the Gallipoli campaign itself was a disaster, with incredibly high casualties, did generate some anti-British feeling, but was soon moulded back into part of the loyal imperial myth. These ANZAC values have been resurrected in relation to Australia’s overseas involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor and the Solomon Islands, with both the main political parties seeking to mobilise support for, and concern over, these deployments (see Verrier 2003). 6) What remained with Australia from these experiences was also a sense of dependency. At first, this dependency was on Britain. With the experience of World War II, especially the unexpected fall of Singapore to the Japanese, this dependence was moved onto the United States. The United States then became the major protector and ally of Australia, underscored by her intervention in the Coral Sea against Japanese forces, and her general dominance in the Pacific. This continued during the Cold War period, with treaty arrangements such as ANZUS Treaty (from 1951-1952) directly linking Australia's foreign policy and defence policy to that of US (New Zealand effectively withdrew from ANZUS in 1985). This Treaty was not an absolute guarantee, but its main provision did link the security of the U.S. and Australia into notion of Pacific Ocean stability: - Article IV Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. Article V For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific. (Access via http://www.australianpolitics.com/foreign/anzus/anzus-treaty.shtml) It was partly in this context that Australian forces became involved in the Korean War, in the Vietnam War, and naval forces were also dispatched in support of the Desert Storm, and into Afghanistan and Iraq, in theory, as part of the ‘war on terror’. There are real costs to this ‘insurance policy’ approach, and it is cannot be assumed that Australian and American interests and values always coincide (see further Camilleri 2003). So is modern Australia an oddity, a freak of history? Or should Australians persist in the celebration of their idiosyncrasies (e.g. its Queen is from a remote country, pride in an ex-convict heritage)? This seems to relate to an underlying problem of national identity - the problem that, in the past, the persistent consciousness of threat came from Australians not really feeling themselves to constitute a nation with a distinct culture. 'Even our history might be regarded as a derivation or a continuation, in a foreign place, of someone else's history.' (Chiddick & Teichmann 1977, p85). Since then, Australian's have gained considerable confidence in themselves and in their ability to operate successfully regional and globally. In the 21st century, it is more the issue of the interaction of national and regional identities, and the role that Australians see themselves playing in global affairs that has become disputed. In 21st century, the view of Australia as still uncertain in its identity is outdated, and greatly underestimates the forward planning of recent Australian governments, as well as an emerging sense of international confidence held by many Australians. This means, however, the foreign policy, regional and global roles still need careful attention. This is how the Federal government would like to see these factors interact: - As a nation, we are interacting more and more with the world, at the level of government, business, non-government organisations and individuals. The international environment is a challenging and testing one. Serious threats to Australia's and the world's security require sustained attention and deft diplomacy. Global economic integration is changing the world and brings opportunities for our increased prosperity. We can be confident that, as a nation, we have strong assets to advance our interests in this testing international environment-a strongly performing economy, good defence and diplomatic capabilities and a distinctive and positive image in the world. (DFAT 2002) 3. Calibrating Regional Roles At a public lecture for the Australian Institute of International Affairs in Brisbane in 1991, former Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, also made some observations on Australia's national and international maturity (Whitlam 1992). Of particular pertinence is the following: Australia's interests in the world can sometimes be best or only advanced by domestic action. This is what I mean by national maturity. More often, Australia's interests in the world can sometimes be best or only advanced in association with other countries. Hitherto this association has principally been with historic allies. Henceforth it must increasingly be within organisations whose members include countries in our region and, better still, in all regions. This is what I mean by international maturity. (Whitlam 1992, p42) It is precisely such sentiments that have come to fruition between 1992 and 2007. Australia is now an extremely active regional player in international affairs and in multilateral organisations. Australia, along with Japan, was instrumental in setting up APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), has been a very active dialogue partner in the ASEAN Region Forum (ARF), has sought deeper engagement through requested links to the ASEM (Asia-Europe meetings form 1996), and through 2004-2006 has argued that it should be granted special status alongside China, PRC, and South Korea in dialogue and a strong engagement with ASEAN, leading to admission into the East Asian Summit from 2005. Beyond this, Australia has been very selectively active in a wider pattern of UN operations, especially where they converged with Australian policies: 'core interests in terms of the UN's agenda continue to lie in areas such as international security and disarmament, environment, human rights machinery, targeted development programs, and those technical agencies dealing with issues such as agriculture, refugees and international nuclear safeguards" (DFAT 2006a). Australia from 1999 also became deeply involved in a humanitarian mission (International Force for East Timor INTERFET, in support of UN Assistance Mission in East Timor, UNAMET) in East Timor, an action that will have long term implications militarily and economically. Aside from an immediate lift in defence of approximately one billion dollars annually over a four year period, this engagement indicated a serious commitment to human rights and independence in the small community of East Timor (population approximately 800,000), a country still going through political and economic turbulence through 2006, with some stabilisation via successful presidential elections concluded in May 2007. Likewise, stabilisation of the Solomon Islands has emerged as a long-term project from which Australia cannot quickly withdraw (see Wainwright 2003). However, such engagements also involve real costs and risks. Using East Timor as an example, we can see that several 'costs' needed to be calibrated in international terms, including: -
As generous as this might seem at first glance, it is the resource corporations that receive the bulk of the profits in the JDPA, as elsewhere in the Timor Sea. Furthermore, while such an agreement appears to be a very gracious split of government revenue in East Timor's favour, and has been sold as such by the Australian government, the JDPA represents only one portion of the oil and gas reserves that are being contested in the Timor Sea. Falling beyond the JDPA are extensive gas and oil fields that Australia and East Timor both claim. In short, the East Timorese argue that a seabed boundary should be based on a median line between the two countries, which would give East Timor exclusive access to the JDPA, and to a majority of the oil and gas fields. The Australian government, on the other hand, argues that the maritime boundary should be based on where it claims the Australian continental shelf finishes. The Australian government maintains that in international law a median line is not required when two countries do not have a continental shelf in common. . . . The difference between the two claims is substantial in terms of which government may reap the greatest benefits from oil and gas revenues. While the JDPA agreement gives East Timor the bulk of the revenue, as arrangements stand it is predicted that Australia will receive seventy-two per cent of the total petroleum revenues from the Timor Sea. In contrast, if the line were based on the median point, East Timor would gain some sixty-eight per cent of the total petroleum revenues. In estimates from the East Timor government's Timor Sea Office, a median line would mean that total revenue for East Timor would increase from an estimated $4 billion to $12 billion (Grenfell 2004). Through April-May 2005 there were improved negotiations leading to a January 2006 agreement between the two countries, that 'indicate that permanent maritime boundary delimitation negotiations will be deferred for up to 60 years' but in return East Timor will gain several billion more dollars in revenues. The logic of the new agreement suggests a compromise based on mixed interests: - The draft agreement therefore suits Australia, which is concerned that acceding to East Timorese demands for a median line will jeopardize its existing maritime boundary agreements with neighbouring states, especially Indonesia. At the same time the agreement secures several billion dollars in additional revenue for East Timer over and above the amount to be provided under existing agreements. The alternative is, in any case, unpalatable for East Timer as Australia has made it abundantly clear that were East Timer to continue to press for a permanent boundary delimitation, this could take considerable time and result in East Timer missing out on very substantial oil and gas revenues. While it could be argued that East Timor's hand has been to some extent forced, it is worth noting that the agreement will be without prejudice to the sovereignty claims of either party. Overall, the agreement therefore appears to be a creative and mutually beneficial one, albeit born of some necessity on East Timor's part. Ultimately, the negotiation has resulted in both sides making significant concessions and for East Timor, the agreement potentially goes a long way towards dispelling the dire prospect of East Timer becoming the world's latest failed state if the oil revenues are used wisely: a "fair go" for both states. (Schofield 2005)
The controversy has taken a new turn ahead of Wednesday's second round of presidential elections after Prime Minister Jose Ramos Horta ordered a halt to the hunt for Major Reinado. The major is the renegade former head of the country's military police who is wanted for murder and rebellion. . . . The order puts Brigadier Mal Rerden, commander of the 800-strong Australian force in East Timor, in a difficult position. Without a letter from the Timorese leadership, including Fretilin, he cannot officially call off the hunt. Fretilin said it would refuse to sign such a letter, accusing Mr Ramos Horta of using his position to manipulate the Australian troops in a blatant attempt to win votes. (Murdoch 2007) This example clearly indicates that foreign policy initiatives, even when generally successful, have a regional impact that needs careful calibration and follow up, both in relation to human and resource costs, but also in relation to ongoing responsibilities after the initial intervention. In general, Australia has often sought a larger role regionally, e.g. involvement in the ASEM (Asia-Europe meetings, first held in March 1996 and active through 2002). In spite of some initial support from Thailand, Australia has not been accorded a seat in this inter-regional dialogue process. Likewise, through late 2003-2005, Australia also sought a status comparable to the ASEAN-Plus-Three process, thereby hoping to gain virtual parity with this special dialogue process between Southeast Asia, China, Japan and South Korea. This request was not accepted to date, but is now being renegotiated by Australia, in part through active forward diplomacy with Indonesia through 2005. This did lead to admission to the East Asian Summit in late 2005, but only on the basis of a conditional signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, ensuring that disputes and ASEAN members would be resolved on peaceful basis and without interference in the internal affairs of these countries (ASEAN's non-interference principle, discussed further in week 6). In general, however, it would be correct to regard Australian foreign policy through 2001-2007 as becoming more assertive, but working across bilateral, multilateral and global fronts. PM Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer seem to share that view that Australia should project itself as ‘a middle power with global interests’, rather than 'a smaller player focused on Asia’ (Jennings 2005). Peter Jennings, in particular, has argued that Australia’s enhanced global role has made it more important to its Asian neighbours (Jennings 2005). However, this presents a so-called 'middle power' with a very large 'footprint' of activities, and concerns have been raised through 2003-2007 as to whether Australia diplomatically and military has the resources to sustain all these roles effectively. 4. From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific One of the key factors behind Australia's vision of itself has been the radical changes occurring in Asia as a whole. A great deal has been written in recent years about the 'miracle' of economic growth in East Asia, with a gap through 1997-1999, followed by fair growth again through 2002-2007. The terms 'Asia-Pacific' and 'Pacific Rim' have become part of everyday language in accounts of the regional dynamic. In part this is due to the straightforward economic growth and modernisation of most of these nations. A debate has raged, however, over both the causes and meaning of this economic growth, especially after the financial crisis of 1997-1998. Background factors include: - 1) A straightforward economic interpretation based on a 'lift-off' effect once these economies were retooled after the end of World War II. The idea here was that once warfare was reduced, most of nations could begin developing their economies, and went through rapid industrialisation and agricultural development (the 'green revolution'). Their high growth through the 1980s and early 1990s was based on their catching up with the already developed nations (hence the term NIC, Newly Industrialised Country), but over the last 5 years has begun to push PRC, Singapore, Malaysia, and even Thailand towards more developed economies. Huge energy demands, particularly in India and China, as well as resource demands for coal, iron-ore, and nickel have also been noted as part of the ongoing dynamic of the East Asia in the 21st century, with energy politics emerging as one of the drivers of global politics over the next several decades. This has serous implications for both Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific, with the potential to cause future 'turbulence in the international order' (Zha 2006) as aggressive drives for such resources maintains prices and causes intense competition across strategic regions in the South China Sea, Central Asia and the Middle East. 2) Some see this economic growth as based in part on cultural factors. The heart of this argument has centred on the idea of a unique post-Confucian culture which respects hard work, political authority, 'rule-by-man' and education. From this viewpoint, all the post-Confucian cultures in Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore) have been able to mobilize themselves more effectively than most nations, and are not burdened by the indecisiveness or welfare-state requirements of Western liberal democracies (Chan 1990; Little & Reed 1989; MacFarquhar 1980). This model has been broadened to include the notion of an emerging shared Asian consciousness, which includes much of East and Southeast Asia (Sopiee 1995, pp190-191). This view has been criticised on a large number of grounds, including a lack of rigour in demonstrating any hard correlation between cultural factors and economic performance (See for example He 2004; Dupont 1996 & Villegas 1996; Dellios 1996). Furthermore, such notions can be used as excuses to slow down democratic and liberal reforms. Over the last decade a group of Southeast Nations are opting for greater political openness, e.g. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. However, this has not automatically led to stability, as indicated by political turmoil in Indonesia and the Philippines, so that the issue of transition to stable democratic systems becomes very important (see Ananta 2003). In general, however, economic growth and some enhanced multilateral cooperation has aided the power of PRC (PRC began to move towards more multilateral approaches from 2002) and to a lesser degree the region as a whole. 3) The return to a more natural Asian economy, based on its huge population, agricultural and resource bases (Garran 1996). From this perspective, Japan, China and Southeast Asia (taken as a whole) have all the necessary physical and human resources for 'Comprehensive National Strength'. However, serious financial and political problems have emerged in some regional countries, e.g. Indonesia, the Philippines and Pakistan, and it is not clear whether all these countries are well adapted to the new globalising world economy. Both PRC and Japan have strong economic potentials, but have been hampered by a range of factors from translating this strength into regional leadership, including a possible rise in mutual competition through 2004-2007. It is not clear then, whether either an East-Asian or Asia-Pacific regional order with strong cohesion can be developed over the next decade (for these problems, and the prospects of a regional 'concert of powers', see Lecture 4). In this setting, too, threat perceptions of PRC have increased in Japan, the US and even Australia, which was warned by China in early 2005 not to become involved in the Taiwan dispute, even in the light of Australia’s treaty relationship with the U.S. (Sutter 2005). Likewise, concern has continued as to whether PRC's continued growth will be a 'peaceful development', or, in spite of Chinese reassurances, will translate into a stronger military power that might emerge as a regional hegemon and then directly challenge U.S. interests (for some of these debates, see Jia 2005). 4) A less rigorous but quite popular model has been the 'rise and fall of empires' approach. Made immortal by Gibbon's classic study of the Roman Empire, modern writers like P.M. Kennedy (1987) have applied economic versions of this model to suggest that several European nations have peaked and declined. From this viewpoint it is now the time for U.S. power to decline, in favour of Japan or China. Although loosely persuasive, the model is less able to predict which 'superpower' will emerge next. Furthermore, the U.S. remains the world's most powerful economy and the only true military superpower. Indeed, it still retains power-preponderance regionally and seems able to structure a network of bilateral alliances across the Asia-Pacific region (for the implications, see Bell 2003; Tow 1997). Nonetheless, the 'rise and fall of great powers' approach and the idea of 'rising hegemons' has been used to help explain the very difficult relations between China and the U.S., which are likely to be central to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region in the next decade (see Stuart-Fox 2004). These problems may devolve more on the issue of acceptable regional leadership, than just the issue of simple power calculations, e.g. through PRC's power is recognised within ASEAN due to growing economic engagement, but Southeast Asia also retains high levels of defense cooperation with the U.S. as a form of security guarantee (important directly to Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and to a limited extent Thailand). All these explanations are likely to be partly true. There are a number of other important factors which need to be mentioned. The Asia-Pacific region in recent years has also been brought together by a high level of regional cooperation. Aside from ASEAN and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation process), since 1993 the region has seen a certain level of economic cooperation between the major economies of Asia-Pacific. Likewise, the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), ASEM (Asia-Europe), and CSCAP, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (from 1992 CSCAP membership has expanded to include not just Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the USA, but also New Zealand, Russia, North Korea, Mongolia, the EU, PRC, Vietnam, India, PNG and Cambodia) forums have also developed a conscious awareness of an Asia-Pacific which can cooperate on certain goals. This cooperation is complicated by certain rivalries, e.g. China and U.S. tensions, but has so far not broken down. In large measure this has been due to the recognition of the complementarity and interdependence of the economies in the wider region. Moreover, the experience of several horrific Asian wars (World War II, the Korean conflict, two wars in Vietnam and the civil war in Cambodia) has also shown the real cost of straight-forward power politics and military intervention, even to the victors. Likewise, the act of small groups of terrorists or insurgents, whether operating in India, Indonesia, or southern Thailand has caused a regional response to fears of future instability. On this basis, the region is a security complex (following Buzan 1997), but has not yet be able to forge a genuine security community in which mutual threats are solved through cooperation (see Acharya 2001), though through 2003-2005 ASEAN has begun the development of such an agenda within Southeast Asia (as parts of ASEAN Concord II, discussed in lecture 6). In such a setting, human security and human rights will continue to be major issues that remain problematic, and engage regional debate about the standards sustained by governments in the region. One area of ‘underdevelopment’, moreover, has been the connection of South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) to the broader East Asian and Australasian setting. The question of whether 'India Turns East' is complicated by many factors. Earlier Chinese-Indian conflicts have not resulted in recent conflict between China and India, but tensions do remain. Rather, this competition has been limited to some concerns over Chinese economic penetration into Burma, and an awareness of the Chinese strategic presence, including ballistic missiles stationed in Tibet. However, Indian strategic analysts have always been much more concerned about Pakistan, about internal security, and the ongoing conflict within Sri Lanka. Furthermore, while India has been locked into a game of diplomatic and strategic manoeuvre with Pakistan, this has made cooperation with states such as China, Malaysia and Indonesia (with their large Islamic populations) rather complex. In late 1996 and early 1997 there were some positive signs, with India and China entering into more friendly relations, and with hopes of meetings between Indian and Pakistani foreign ministerial officials. In 1998 this progress was halted by the policies of the newly elected BJP (the Bharatiya Janata Party), and by the decision of India to conduct declared nuclear tests, thereby moving from a threshold power to a nuclear power. This move was soon mirrored by nuclear tests in Pakistan. Renewed tensions almost resulted in conflict through late 2001 and early 2002. It is not yet clear whether Pakistan and India can readily improve their relationship in the near future, but for the present a major 'hot' conflict seems unlikely (see lecture 10). At present, the development of nuclear weapons in South Asia has made the region much more important to Russia, China, Japan, the U.S. and Australia, with de facto acceptance of nuclear status, but there is no guarantee that this will lead to greater stability (see Hewitt 2000; Limaye 2000). Some indirect moderation of tensions has occurred between India and China through these regional organisations, with both India and China agreeing to ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) through late 2003, committing both to resolve disputes peacefully. There has been some reduction of tensions among India, Pakistan and China through 2003-2006, but it remains to be seen whether this can be sustained, with some tensions emerging again in 2007 (in the SAARC, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Meeting in April 2007, with PRC wanting to contribute development funds, and get influence, in South Asia, Loudon 2007). India, in particular, has established a strong dialogue with countries such as Singapore and Malaysia, is a dialogue partner with ASEAN, and is part of the ASEAN Regional Forum. Furthermore, there has been surprisingly limited diplomatic or economic cooperation between India and Australia, in spite of efforts through 2003-2005 to boost trade, reach agreements on areas such as aviation and telecommunications access, and some efforts to improve cooperation over WTO issues (UPI 2004). In the future, however, there is a distinct possibility that India might find a stronger role for itself in relations with Southeast Asia, Australia, the U.S., and possibly even China and Japan. If so, a truly integrated Indo-Pacific region might emerge at the political and cultural levels. Certainly Australia, as a nation facing two major oceans (the Indian and Pacific) and one major peninsula to the north (Southeast Asia), would be unwise not to develop a constructive 'westward' policy towards India (see Sheridan 2007). It is in this context that an Indian Ocean cooperative group has also been suggested to balance APEC for the Asia-Pacific. Although this remains an organisation with limited roles and members (IOR-ARC, The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation, see lecture 10), it suggests an interesting way to link some African, Middle Eastern, South Asian, some Southeast Asian nations and Australia into a more cooperative framework. 5. Transitional Dynamics in Foreign and Security Policy Australia before 1972 used to view itself as a white Australia, firmly attached to a specific British heritage, more generally to European culture, and protected by an American alliance. No longer a Dominion in the proud British Empire, it was still part of a Commonwealth of Nations distinctly influenced by the English heritage culturally and institutionally. Australia largely defined itself by the 'otherness' of those around it, and whom it often feared. China, Japan, Indonesia, and even indigenous aboriginals formed part of an earlier negative definition of identity. Australia is now firmly entrenched in the Asia-Pacific regional system. Its major trading partners include Japan, the U.S., China, South Korea, and ASEAN nations, with Britain and Europe being somewhat less important than before. Australia was a foundation member of APEC, has been an active dialogue in the ASEAN regional meetings, as well as sustaining a strong if at time critical dialogue with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Australia was also one of the first nations to enter into diplomatic relations with the PRC (People's Republic of China), and from the late 1980s has also made strong pro-Japanese statements in relation to its stance on trade and security issues. Through the 1990s, both Labour and the Howard government viewed their economic and diplomatic interests being closely tied to the Asia-Pacific region. This engagement has led to some 'Asianisation' of Australian affairs, but not in the sense of Australia becoming Asian culturally, nor on the basis of Asian ethnic immigration (less than 5% of Australians have emigrated from Asia). Rather, the Australian government, and Australia's education, business and administrative elites have accepted that Australia's need to engage diplomatically and economically with East and then South Asia. There has also been a relatively wide acceptance of this in the public arena, supported by some growing interest in Asian affairs and Asian cultures. This remains true in spite of occasional outbursts of xenophobia, lingering racism at some levels, and calls for a stop to Asian immigration, sparked off by small radical groups who want to return to a 'white Australia', or somewhat wider fears of a drop in Australia's standard of living. Many take this transformation for granted. Australia's relationship with Southeast Asia can accurately described as one of 'comprehensive engagement' (Evans & Grant 1995, pp195-8). Yet this is a not complete revolution in the Australian perspective. Rather, this is a 'regionalisation' of Australian perspectives, not an 'Asianisation' (contra Sheridan 1995, p10). Moreover, the setting among different areas of engagement (Northeast and Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Pacific Islands, the special relationship with the U.S.) has not yet fully stabilised. There is also a real possibility of over-reach, with ambitious foreign and security policies for which a country such as Australia has not developed adequate human or physical resources. Through 2001-2007, critical choices have emerged for Australia, neighbouring countries and regional organisations. These issues include: - 1) The degree to which the region can meeting ongoing and new transnational challenges, including international terrorism (see Singh 2004), drug and arms flows, people smuggling, uncontrolled migration flows, transboundary environmental degradation, transnational organised crime and international piracy. These issues have emerged has a major complication within ASEAN, as well as among bilateral partners, e.g. Indonesia and Australia, China and Australia. There has also been a recognition that weak states (see Wainwright 2003) are, or might become, foci for such activity, ranging from drug networks, to international money laundering through to un-regulated issuing of passports (factors of concern in relations to states as diverse as Burma, Indonesia, the Solomon Islands, and East Timor). 2) The roles that different regional organisations play in the region, and the different types of regionalism they try to establish, e.g. based on economics, security concerns, or shared value systems (see He 2004; Acharya 2001). Here, patterns of exclusion and inclusion will affect how these organisations are viewed, e.g. whether ASEAN can still steer the wider agenda of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, the later Forum includes great powers such as PRC, Japan, and the superpower the U.S.), or whether ASEAN will come to see the East Asian Summit process as more important than the ARF. 3) Strong interactions among level of democratisation, developmental strategies and human rights in the broadest sense have begun to emerge, with widely varying outcomes across the region. Thus, even as Indonesia both democratised and decentralised from 1998-2005, there were also patterns of increased poverty and reports of local corruption that undermined some of these political benefits (see Ananta 2003). The worst case scenario is a combination of poverty, unequal wealth distribution, authoritarianism, and corruption, with limited options for peaceful reform (as in Burma), but no magic model of development can be posited for the region’s diverse countries. In the case of Thailand, for example, even with strong democratisation and improvements in the national economy, rural and sub-regional pockets of entrenched poverty remain a major focus for local discontent, especially in the south, and have lead to ongoing activities by Muslim insurgent groups (see Abuza 2006; McCargo 2002). 4) The way that nations and regional groups engage in the wider processes of economic, informational, and rule-based globalisation. For Australia, this has led to a recognition of the large number of players engaged in international activities (second-track and multilateral diplomacy, as well as transnational business and interest groups), as well as greater enmeshment in multilateral agreements (see Wesley 2002). This has lead to a more complex management and informational task which cannot be steered by governments alone. Issues ranging from environmental policy, through to asylum-seekers, and the role of near global-level agencies take on greater significance but are less amenable to modification by individual states. 5) Australia has also had to take on a careful balancing of bilateral engagements, e.g. balancing diverse PRC and US interests, a need to maintain close but critical relations with Indonesia, and an effort in early 2007 to engage Japan via the Australia-Japan 'Security Pact', which supports joint training and closer defence cooperation (ABC 2007b). You might like to think of what other critical issues need to be added to this list as we consider prospects for the 2007-2020 period. We will explore these themes in later lectures, at first working out from a more detailed assessment of Australia’s foreign affairs and security policy, a closer look at Indonesia, an assessment of power-relations in the region, and then to an assessment of key regional organisations, including ASEAN, the ASEAN-plus-three and the ARF in the middle of the subject, then move onto alternative patterns of regional organisation in the latter part of the subject. 6. Bibliography and Further Resources Useful Resources A fair newspaper with International and Australian coverage is the Sydney Morning Herald, which can be found at http://www.smh.com.au/index.html The Pacnet Newsletter has a wide range of brief but up-to-date articles on issues that affect Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, located at: http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pacnet.html The Factiva news database provides access to global and Australian news-services, searchable on multiple criteria (located off the Bond Library Databases webpage). Asia Times is a useful online newspaper with interesting (and alternative) viewpoints on wider Asia-Pacific affairs, located at http://www.atimes.com/ A number of useful research papers (and other publications), focusing on Australian politics and international relations, can be located from the online page of the Parliament of Australian Parliamentary Library at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/ One view of indigenous and reconciliation issues will be found at Reconciliation Australia at http://www.reconciliation.org.au/i-cms.isp Directory: wbip wbip -> Week 8 The Meeting of Cultures in the Pacific1 Part 1: The Physical Geography of the Southwest Pacific Download 114.53 Kb. Share with your friends:
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