Australian Quarantine Review Secretariat Australian Quarantine a shared responsibility



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INTERNATIONAL MAIL

Incoming international mail is screened to minimise the risk to human, animal and plant health from the potential introduction of exotic pests and diseases to Australia through the postal system, while facilitating the movement of mail.


ACS screens mail at all international mail exchanges. Screening is based on declarations and intuition, with screening of Letter Class and Other Articles (LCOA — envelopes and small parcels weighing less than 2 kg) limited to ACS ‘target country’ lists. Quarantine staff examine only those items referred to them by ACS screeners. About 87% of ACS mail detections are of a quarantine nature.
A major cause of quarantine concern with the current system derives from the ACS–Australia Post agreement that at least 85% of LCOA mail is released following the application of the ACS profiling system. The Review Committee understands that AQIS is not a signatory to this agreement and was not consulted on its preparation. Because the ACS profiling system reflects customs priorities and ACS drug detector dogs are not trained for quarantine items, the current arrangements effectively mean that a maximum of only 15% of LCOA mail is screened for quarantine purposes.
The level of quarantine risk associated with LCOA mail is unknown, but intuitively it would appear to be high, given the number of detections of items of quarantine concern (such as budwood and seeds). A joint survey is planned with ACS and should provide a sound basis for assessing the risk of LCOA mail. However, it does not appear to be feasible to base quarantine risk profiles simply on the country of origin. One approach being investigated is the targeting of mail being sent to high risk destinations in Australia. In this regard, a database is currently being developed to coordinate information about high risk countries of origin, linked to high risk seasons (such as Easter, Christmas, or Chinese New Year) and high risk destinations in Australia.
Australia Post estimates that there are about 40 private courier companies in competition with it on overseas mail operations. A recent substantial decline in Australia Post receivals of overseas mail is some measure of the market share of these courier carriers. Quarantine screening of this material is largely done on the basis of referral of suspect items by ACS.
This situation indicates that private courier companies are not undergoing the same degree of quarantine inspection as Australia Post. To date, little attention has been paid to this element of international mail. Although ACS refers some mail items to quarantine, most go largely unchecked. There is clearly a need for an extension of the detector dog program into this area, and the Review Committee understands that when the detector dog program is fully expanded into mail exchanges, random checks of private courier mail will be undertaken. Electronic manifesting should also be considered, as should greater random sampling. Surveillance of private couriers and Australia Post should be consistent, subject to the findings of risk analysis (as recommended in Section 8.3.1).
The United States operates a defence forces mail centre at Mascot. Mail examination at this centre is based on accompanying declarations and quarantine staff visit this centre once a day for inspection of declared and, from time to time, undeclared mail. The Review Committee believes that there is scope for the occasional use of detector dogs at the site and targeted publicity material should also be developed for users of this specialised service.
The application of X-ray technology and the use of detector dogs in screening international mail is discussed in Sections 8.5.1 and Section 8.5.3.3 respectively.
Recommendation 78: The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia undertake an immediate review of international mail operations to ensure that quarantine surveillance of all international mail is effective.

8.12 WASTE DISPOSAL




      1. Aircraft

For many years, galley waste from overseas aircraft has been perceived as a significant potential quarantine risk, and disposed of by incineration, deep burial or heat treatment, under quarantine supervision.


Aircraft food is of high quality, prepared in hygienic conditions and subject to manufacturer’s or supplier’s strict specifications. In the absence of any recent scientific analysis to the contrary, the Review Committee believes that aircraft galley waste presents a manageable risk to humans, animals and plants when disposed of under standard waste controls, subject to audit by Quarantine Australia. By standard waste controls the Review Committee means that the waste would be taken to a municipal or other commercial waste disposal facility, dumped and covered with other refuse or filling in the usual way. These facilities are safe and are required to be fenced or otherwise protected from unauthorised access, including access by animals. Disposal should be audited periodically by Quarantine Australia.
Although it is true that birds could feed on waste before it is covered, it must be remembered that all links in the chain of exposure must be completed for an exotic incursion or establishment to occur. Thus for an incursion to occur, a piece of food containing or contaminated with an exotic agent must first escape the scrutiny of the catering company. It must then persist and retain infectivity after processing, handling and exposure to varying conditions by the catering company and the airline. It must not be consumed in flight, be close to the top of the dumped waste, collected by a bird and eaten or be dropped by that bird in an area of quarantine importance and consumed by a susceptible animal of another species. Throughout this whole chain, the exotic agent must persist and retain infectivity, and be in such quantity and of such virulence to cause infection. For the incursion to lead to establishment, the infected animal or plant would have to go unnoticed by its farmer or owner. Any break in this chain, at any point, would stop the potential incursion and establishment of the pest or pathogen involved. Even if all links in this chain were maintained, the justification for current disposal requirements is questionable. For example, a passenger could disembark from the same aircraft and carry the spore of an exotic pathogen on his or her clothing and introduce an exotic disease direct to a farm or into the natural environment.
The Review Committee has been advised that costs to the airline industry of highly secure disposal of quarantine waste from international aircraft is a considerable imposition. Provided adequate precautions are put in place to ensure that this waste is not disposed of other than at a municipal or other waste disposal facility with adequate mechanisms for coverage of the waste and with suitable audit, the need to continue these high security and expensive arrangements for the disposal of galley waste from aircraft can not, in the view of the Review Committee, be justified.
Recommendation 79: The Review Committee recommends that galley waste and other refuse from international aircraft may be disposed of at a municipal or other commercial waste disposal facility under standard waste control measures, and subject to audit by Quarantine Australia.
      1. Vessels

Galley waste from ships poses a high quarantine risk. Considerable amounts of uncooked meats and dairy produce may be carried on board all vessels regardless of size and type, and meals tend to be prepared on these vessels. From a quarantine perspective, these vessels generally have the added disadvantage of poorly educated crews who do not appreciate the risks of uncooked or unprepared produce being taken ashore and disposed of carelessly. Adequate disposal and auditing arrangements such as those already in place are necessary and should remain, and monitoring and auditing of these arrangements should be intensified. Where deep burial is involved, the burial site used for disposal should be clearly marked to minimise the risk of the area being excavated for re-use.


Recommendation 80: The Review Committee recommends that disposal of galley refuse from vessels continue by means of incineration, deep burial at marked sites or by heat treatment, and that auditing of this disposal be intensified.

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