Australian Quarantine Review Secretariat Australian Quarantine a shared responsibility

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR NATIONAL COORDINATION

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PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

9.7 RESPONSIBILITIES FOR NATIONAL COORDINATION

The Review Committee appreciates that the provision of effective systems for monitoring, surveillance and reporting of animal and plant health — including the provision of diagnostic services — is almost exclusively the province of State Governments and is generally supported by State legislation. However, a number of submissions to the Review raised concerns about whether or not current systems are fully effective, especially given substantial cutbacks in some of these services by States in recent years.

In its submission to the Review, the Australian Academy of Science argued strongly that two specific recommendations on monitoring and surveillance from the 1988 Lindsay Review have not been adequately implemented. The Academy noted that 'no significant progress has been made on establishing a national coordinated program to survey and monitor pests and diseases throughout Australia' and 'with the exception of a program for monitoring mosquitoes at international airports, no national program for monitoring and control of insect vectors and pests of significance to agricultural quarantine and human health has been established at international airports and seaports'.
The Review Committee is concerned at the lack of a national approach to monitoring and surveillance programs. The Review Committee recognises that considerable resources are dedicated to monitoring and surveillance of particular pests and diseases by individual States, organisations and industry sectors, but questions whether the full benefit of these collective resources is being realised. In the first instance, it is important to have full intelligence on the individual programs in place through Australia to identify gaps in Australia's monitoring and surveillance network. The Review Committee notes that this is the approach currently being taken by the AAHC Task Group on animal health services.
The Review Committee believes that it is imperative that the CVO and CPPO in DPIE take responsibility for ensuring national coordination of the disparate programs currently in place for monitoring and surveillance. DPIE should also be responsible for helping, in consultation with State Governments and industry, to identify gaps in monitoring and surveillance networks and associated databases and information systems, and for helping to develop strategies for addressing these gaps.
Recommendation 94: The Review Committee recommends that the Chief Veterinary Officer and the Chief Plant Protection Officer in the Commonwealth Department of Primary Industries and Energy take leadership roles to ensure national coordination of monitoring and surveillance of pests and diseases of animals and plants in Australia, and the development of pest and disease databases and information systems.
However, the CVO and the CPPO should not supplant the monitoring and surveillance work currently undertaken by States and industry. Rather, the CVO and CPPO should act as catalysts to ensure that programs are being coordinated and gaps identified and addressed. States and industry are essential partners in the delivery of effective monitoring and surveillance programs. In this respect, the Review Committee supports the work being undertaken by AAHC in driving animal health issues, including the assessment of monitoring and surveillance programs for animal pests and diseases. This work should continue and be replicated in the plant sector by APHC upon its formation. Both Councils appear to be the appropriate organisations for ensuring adequate delivery of national monitoring and surveillance programs, and the development and management of national pest and disease databases and information systems.
Recommendation 95: The Review Committee recommends that the Australian Animal Health Council and the Australian Plant Health Council take responsibility for coordinating the national delivery of monitoring and surveillance programs relevant to Australia's animal and plant health status, respectively.
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, monitoring and surveillance for exotic pests and diseases are important components of the post-border element of the continuum of quarantine. It is therefore essential that Quarantine Australia takes responsibility for ensuring that monitoring and surveillance programs are in place to effectively address the potential entry of exotic pests and diseases, particularly in high risk areas.
Sites may be regarded as having a high potential risk for the introduction and spread of exotic pests and diseases because of factors such as:
· locational characteristics (e.g. the discharge of ballast water at seaports, or the attractiveness of wilderness areas to ecotourists);
· abundance of natural hosts (e.g. major agricultural production areas or rainforests);
· importance as entry points for people and products (e.g. airports, seaports); and
· proximity to countries where pests and disease of concern are endemic (e.g. northern Australia, including the Torres Strait region).
In the discharge of this duty, Quarantine Australia needs to liaise closely with the Offices of the CVO and CPPO, with AAHC and APHC, and with other relevant stakeholders. An effective national monitoring and surveillance network will help build community confidence in the application of manageable risk to border activities of Quarantine Australia.
Recommendation 96: The Review Committee recommends that Quarantine Australia coordinate targeted national monitoring and surveillance for pests and diseases of quarantine importance in high risk areas, in liaison with the Chief Veterinary Officer, Chief Plant Protection Officer, Australian Animal Health Council and the Australian Plant Health Council.

PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

10.1 INTRODUCTION

In addition to monitoring and surveillance, post-border activities include preparedness for and response to incursions of exotic pests and diseases. Although traditionally much of the focus of quarantine has been on border activities, the Review Committee believes that preparedness and response form an integral and essential part of the post-border element of the continuum of quarantine.

Industry also recognises the importance of preparedness and response, as illustrated by the submission to the Review from the National Farmers' Federation, which noted that 'Australia's quarantine policy framework includes not only operations at international barriers to prevent diseases, pests and weeds entering Australia, and analytical quarantine assessment procedures; but also preparedness for barrier breakdowns within Australia'. The importance of these activities has received significantly increased recognition in the two years preceding this Review. Soon after its establishment in October 1995, the Australian Animal Health Council (AAHC) established three Task Groups, two of which address issues and concerns related to Australia's capability in preparedness for and response to incursions of exotic pests and diseases of animals (see Section 9.6.1). Subsequently, the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Resource Management (SCARM) established a Task Force on Incursion Management in May 1996. The SCARM Task Force is specifically to address arrangements for detecting and responding to pest and disease incursions of animals and plants.
In considering Australia's capability in preparedness for and response to incursions of exotic pests and diseases of animals and plants, the Review Committee noted that, in general, arrangements are far better established in the animal sector than in the plant sector. The one area of exception in the animal sector is that of aquatic animals, where arrangements are only now being developed at a national level. Animal health has long had the advantage of a national focus for pest and disease preparedness and response provided by the Office of the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO). A similar focus is needed for plants, as recommended in discussion on creating an Office of the Chief Plant Protection Officer (CPPO) in Section 9.6.4. Much of the discussion in this chapter derives from the Review Committee's consideration of the positive aspects of preparedness and response in the animal sector. Many of the recommendations are designed to extend the same principles and strategies into the plant sector and into those animal subsectors where they are not yet in place.
Effective preparedness against pest and disease incursions requires a number of elements, including early detection and confirmation, known reporting lines, and developed contingency plans. Once a diagnosis of an exotic pest or disease is confirmed, an agreed decision-making process and coordinated emergency arrangements are needed for an effective response.

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