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| §VI is about Medicare Part D, the privatization starting Jan 06. It discusses adverse selection and, what it considers to be more serious, moral hazard, referring to the joint work with Winter et al. (2006), who had 4739 people of 50 years and older fill out forms on self-administered internet questionnaire from November 7–15, 2005. There were N=1996 Medicare-eligible persons (aged 65 and higher). The paper makes some plausible average-estimates of costs for groups of people, speculates on what optimal decisions are for them, and sees if these groups do what is estimated to be optimal. In particular, they asked subjects to choose between some hypothetical plans, all with same actuarial value. Here subjects often chose suboptimal, such as choose a clearly riskier plan rather than a safer.
P. 23: “The new Medicare Part D prescription drug insurance market illustrates that leaving a large block of uninformed consumers to “sink or swim,” and relying on their self-interest to achieve satisfactory outcomes, can be unrealistic. To make the Part D market work, in the sense that it provides choices that consumers want, and achieves the efficiencies it seeks, CMS will have to make a diligent effort to manage the market, and to reach all consumers and provide them with information and assistance in making wise choices.” Then it pleas for libertarian paternalism, though not taking all the nuances of libertarian paternalism. %} McFadden, Daniel L. (2006) “Free Markets and Fettered Consumers,” American Economic Review 96, 5–29. {% error theory for risky choice %} McFadden, Daniel L. (2010) “Sociality, Rationality, and the Ecology of Choice.” In Stefane Hess & Andrew Daly (eds.) Proceedings from the Inaugural International Chice Modeling Conference, 1–17, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, UK. {% %} McFadden, Myra (1963) “Sets, Relations, and Functions.” McGraw-Hill, New York. {% Guessing games find nonlinear probability weights; p 604/605 says it is difficult to measure subjective probability or utility when neither scale is objectively given and processed linearly; Tradeoff method of Wakker & Deneffe (1996) shows a way! inverse-S: c onfirmed; finds risk seeking for low probability high gains, risk neutrality for prob, of gain between .15 and .22, and risk aversion for higher probabilities, from data on betting behavior in horse races (mostly from 1947-1953). %} McGlothlin, William H. (1956) “Stability of Choices among Uncertain Alternatives,” American Journal of Psychology 69, 604–615. {% If gains and losses are judged jointly on a common bipolar scale than a loss of a similar seize as a gain is judged to generate stronger feelings. If they are judged on different separate scales then this need not be, because subjects may use different normalizations for losses than for gains. This paper also is somewhat related to the question of whether loss aversion in decision making means stronger feelings or similar feelings but being more salient or being weighted more despite not being felt stronger. %} McGraw, A. Peter, Jeff T. Larsen, Daniel Kahneman, & David Schkade (2010) “Comparing Gains and Losses,” Psychological Science 21, 1438–1445. {% foundations of statistics %} McGrayne, Sharon Bertsch (2011) “The Theory That Would Not Die: How Bayes' Rule Cracked the Enigma Code, Hunted down Russian Submarines, and Emerged Triumphant from Two Centuries of Controversy.” Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. {% criticisms of Savage’s basic model: seems to be discussed on p. 13, where they find Wald’s (1950) model more natural than Savage’s (1954). %} McGuire, Charles Bartlett & Roy Radner (1972, eds.) “Decision and Organization.” North-Holland, Amsterdam. {% Newcomb’s paradox; conservation of influence; Biggest problem for evidential decision theory seems to be the medical Newcomb problems. The author argues that new defenses don’t work, and that causation remains essential. %} McKay, Phyllis (2007) “Freedom, Fiction and Evidential Decision Theory,” Erkenntnis 66, 393–407. {% time preference: find that discounting is not constant; Risk averse for gains, risk seeking for losses? %} MacKeigan, Linda D., Lon N. Larson, JoLaine R. Drugalis, J. Lyle Bootman & Lawton R. Burns (1993) “Time Preference for Health Gains versus Health Losses,” Pharmaco Economics 3, 374–386. {% %} Mackenzie, Andrew (2017) “A Foundation for Probabilistic Beliefs with or without Atoms,” working paper. {% natural-language-ambiguity: seems to argue that tolerance of ambiguity (in general natural-language sense) is truly related to individual personality traits rather than a situation-dependent/content-specific expression of psychological stress. %} McLain, David L. (1993) “The MSTAT-I: A New Measure of an Individual's Tolerance for Ambiguity,” Educational and Psychological Measurement 53, 183–189. {% natural-language-ambiguity: seem to investigate tolerance of ambiguity (in general natural-language sense) not only from negative perspective regarding threat, discomfort, and anxiety, but also regarding positive aspects such as curiosity and attraction toward ambiguous situations. %} McLain, David L., Efstathios Kefallonitis, & Kimberly Armani (2015) “Ambiguity Tolerance in Organizations: Definitional Clarification and Perspectives on Future Research,” Frontiers in Psychology 6, 1–7. {% time preference: study order effects. HYE is measured one-stage, p. 115 bottom agrees with criticisms of the two-stage; holistic as well as composite value assessment for lifetime treatment paths? %} MacKeigan, Linda D., Bernie J. O’Brien, & Paul I. Oh (1999) “Holistic versus Composite Preferences for Lifetime Treatment Sequences for Type 2 Diabetes,” Mediocal Decision Making 19, 113–121. {% common knowledge %} McKelvey, Richard & Talbot Page (1986) “Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information,” Econometrica 54, 109–127. {% P. 1325 uses the idea to pay in probability at a prize so as to obtain linear utility, referring to a working paper Grether (1981) for it. %} McKelvey, Richard & Talbot Page (1990) “Public and Private Information: An Experimental Study of Information Pooling,” Econometrica 58, 1321–1339. {% DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1023 Introduced the beautiful concept of Quantal response equilibrium (QRE): Each player assigns a value to each strategy. The players do not choose the best strategy with probability 1, but choose each strategy with a probability depending on the value of the strategy and some noise parameter. The value of a strategy depends on the probabilities with which the other players choose strategies (e.g. it is its expected utility, or its prospect-theory value). This generates a circularity, with values depending on probabilities and probabilities on values. If such “circular” values and probabilities can nevertheless be assigned consistently, then we have a QRE. %} McKelvey, Richard & Thomas Palfrey (1995) “Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games,” Games and Economic Behavior 10, 6–38. {% Have N=64 students do hypothetical intertemporal choice, and fit exponential discounting and three hyperbolic discounting families, one 1-parameter and two 2-parameter. The 2-parameter fit much better, although they do not statistically punish for the extra parameters. %} McKerchar, Todd L., Leonard Green, Joel Myerson, T. Stephen Pickford, Jade C. Hill, & Steven C. Stout (2009) “A Comparison of Four Models of Delay Discounting in Humans,” Behavioural Processes 81, 256–259. {% completeness-criticisms & quasi-concave so deliberate randomization: considers cases where persons prefer to have a lottery over prospects rather than any of them, as an instance of incompleteness (called undecideness on p. 239), and other configurations of incompleteness. P. 244 discusses Danan’s operationalization through preference for delay (may relate to changes of mind), and Eliaz & Ok’s (2006) intransitivity operationalization. %} McKiernan, Daniel Kian (2012) “Indifference, Indecision, and Coin-Flipping,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 48, 237–246. {% SIIA/IIIA %} McLean, Iain (1995) “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives before Arrow,” Mathematical Social Sciences 30, 107–126. {% between-random incentive system (paying only some subjects): 1/10 of subjects was paid. real incentives/hypothetical choice: for time preferences: receive payment in either 2 or 5 weeks. Implementation not further specified, and subjects sampling not either. Investigate how people predict intertemporal choices by others. %} McLeish, Kendra N. & Robert J. Oxoby (2009) “Stereotypes in Intertemporal Choice,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 70, 135–141. {% statistics for C/E %} McNeil, Barbara J., Robert A. Dudley, Bernard Hoop, Charles Metz, Mark Thompson, & James Adelstein (1981) “A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Screening for Hepatitis B Surface Antigen in India,” Medical Decision Making 1, 345–359. {% framing à la Asian disease; %} McNeil, Barbara J., Stephen G. Pauker, Harold C. Sox, & Amos Tversky (1982) “On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies,” New England Journal of Medicine 306, 1259–1262. {% %} McNeil, Barbara J., Stephen G. Pauker, & Amos Tversky (1982) “On the Framing of Medical Decisions.” In David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa, & Amos Tversky (1988, eds.) “Decision Making, Descriptive, Normative, and Prescriptive Interactions,” 562–568, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. {% simple decision analysis cases using EU; real incentives/hypothetical choice: this paper is a classic that founded medical decision making. It uses the CE (certainty equivalent) method to elicit the utility of life duration. These questions can only be hypothetical (p. 1398 top). By the criterion, advocated by many experimental economists, that only real-incentive choices should be considered, this paper should be ignored, and most of the field of medical decision making should be closed down. They find extreme risk aversion . %} McNeil, Barbara J., Ralph Weichselbaum, & Stephen G. Pauker (1978) “Fallacy of the Five-Year Survival in Lung Cancer,” New England Journal of Medicine 299, 1397–1401. {% simple decision analysis cases using EU; utility elicitation; Use CEs (certainty equivalents) to measure utility for life duration, then TTOs for artificial speech, then calculated adjusted TTO. %} McNeil, Barbara J., Ralph Weichselbaum, & Stephen G. Pauker (1981) “Speech and Survival: Tradeoffs between Quality and Quantity of Life in Laryngeal Cancer,” New England Journal of Medicine 305, 982–987. {% paternalism/Humean-view-of-preference: Opening sentences say, as did Arrow long ago, that long time both normative and descriptive studies assumed rationality, and that it changed early 1980s, when they departed. Now there is what the authors call the reconciliation problem. P. 556: freedom interpretation appeals to free choice and consumer sovereignty. (Evolutionary justification could be: if let all choose what they want, the best will survive. This evolutionary argument ignores evolution at the group level.) Section 2 nicely relates Kahneman et al.’s (1997) Back to Bentham to the happiness literature. I favor the approach described in Abdellaoui, Barrios, & Wakker (2007), where introspective data is to be used when it can be related to revealed-preference data. We should keep the virtues of the ordinal revolution. Section 3 uses term soft paternalism to combine libertarian and asymmetric paternalism. P. 560 top says that nudging takes advantage of preference incoherence. I would rather take it as preference incompleteness, although one can lead that into incoherence by letting variations in framing decide. P. 560 ll. -9 ff. takes loss aversion as a “fundamental asymmetry in human desire, rather than a mistake …” This is opposite to definitions/intrpretations that I prefer, where loss aversion is a pure framing effect distinct from the rational basic utility. P. 561 discusses Bleichrodt, Pinto, & Wakker (2001) but, incorrectly, claims that BPW would consider reference dependence as true preference rather than a bias. This is not so. Section 4 is on consumer sovereignty as discussed by some people. %} McQuillin, Ben & Robert Sugden (2012) “Reconciling Normative and Behavioural Eonomics: The Problems to Be Solved,” Social Choice and Welfare 38, 553–567. {% Builds on Sugden’s model where freedom of choice and opportunity sets have intrinsic value. %} McQuillin, Ben & Robert Sugden (2012) “How the Market Responds to Dynamically Inconsistent Preferences,” Social Choice and Welfare 38, 617–634. {% Noncooperative coalitional bargaining, solvable by backward induction, leading to Shapley value. %} Mcquillin, Ben &Robert Sugden (2016) “Backward Induction Foundations of the Shapley Value,” Econometrica 84, 2265–2280. {% utility families parametric: use (Eq. 10) an IPT (inverse-power transformation) family, 1/(1+exp((1/k)log(1+kX))) which is S-shaped. %} Meade, Nigel & Towhidul Islam (1995) “Forecasting with Growth Curves: An Empirical Comparison,” International Journal of Forecasting 11, 199–215. {% measure of similarity; Do what their title says. %} Medin, Douglas L., Robert L. Goldstone, & Arthur B. Markman (1995) “Comparison and Choice: Relations between Similarity Processes and Decision Processes,” Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 2, 1–19. {% losses from prior endowment mechanism: subjects received $2. They could either insure a 0.01 probability of losing the $2, or reeive the expected value of it, $0.02. Most preferred the insurance. This may be due to loss aversion and probability weighting. Here transaction costs of the $0.02 transaction may also play a role. %} Meeker, Daniella, Christin Thompson, Greg Strylewicz, Tara K. Knight, & Jason N. Doctor (2015) “Use of Insurance Against a Small Loss as an Incentive Strategy,” Decision Analysis 12, 122–129. {% %} Meester, Ronald, Marieke Collins, Richard Gill, & Michiel van Lambalgen (2006) “On the (Ab)Use of Statistics in the Legal Case against the Nurse Lucia de B.,” Law Probability and Risk 5, 233–250. {% Introduced the equity premium puzzle; if people who bought stocks just before the 1929 stock market crash held on to their stocks for 30 years they would be better off than with bonds. Use power utility, p. 154 list about five empirical estimates of power. %} Mehra, Rajnish & Edward C. Prescott (1985) “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle,” Journal of Monetary Economics 15, 145–162. {% Trivial rewriting of an axiom of Keeney & Raiffa and much talking that that increase insight etc. %} Mehrez, Abraham & Amiram Gafni (1985) “A Note on an Application of the Trade-Off Method in Evaluating a Utility Function,” Managerial Decis. Econ. 6, 191–192. {% utility elicitation %} Mehrez, Abraham & Amiram Gafni (1987) “An Empirical Evaluation of Two Assessment Methods for Utility Measurement for Life Years,” Socio-Econ. Plann. Sci. 21, 371–375. {% utility elicitation %} Mehrez, Abraham & Amiram Gafni (1987) “The Optimal Treatment Strategy: A Patient’s Perspective,” Management Science 33, 1602–1612. {% utility elicitation %} Mehrez, Abraham & Amiram Gafni (1989) “Quality-Adjusted Life-Years, Utility Theory and Healthy Years Equivalents,” Medical Decision Making 9, 142–149. {% utility elicitation %} Mehrez, Abraham & Amiram Gafni (1990) “Evaluating Health Related Quality of Life: An Indifference Curve Interpretation for the Time Trade-Off Technique,” Social Science and Medicine 31, 1281–1283. {% utility elicitation %} Mehrez, Abraham & Amiram Gafni (1991) “Healthy Years Equivalents: How to Measure Them Using the Standard Gamble Method,” Medical Decision Making 11, 140–146. {% utility elicitation %} Mehrez, Abraham & Amiram Gafni (1993) Reply, Medical Decision Making 13, 168–169. {% utility elicitation; %} Mehrez, Abraham & Amiram Gafni (1993) “Healthy Years Equivalents versus Quality-Adjusted Life Years: In Pursuit of Progress,” Medical Decision Making 13, 287–292. {% one-dimensional utility %} Mehta, Ghanshyam B. (1998) “Preference and Utility.” In Salvador Barberà, Peter J. Hammond, & Christian Seidl (eds.) Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. 1, Principles, 1–47, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. {% %} Mehta, Judith, Chris Starmer, & Robert Sugden (1992) “An Experimental Investigation of Focal Points in coordination and Bargaining: Some Preliminary Results.” In John F. Geweke (ed.) Decision Making under Risk and Uncertainty: New Models and Findings, 211–220, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. {% %} Mehta, Judith, Chris Starmer, & Robert Sugden (1994) “Focal Points in Pure Coordination Games: An Experimental Investigation,” Theory and Decision 36, 163–185. {% Apparenty the first paper to systematically do the informal tests of focal points that Schelling had done informally. They add things such as a control group to verify that there is no system in random answering, so that there is really a focal-point thing going on. %} Mehta, Judith, Chris Starmer, & Robert Sugden (1994) “The Nature of Salience: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games,” American Economic Review 84, 658–674. {% Christiane, Veronika & I %} Meier-Pesti, Katja & Erich Kirchler (2003) “Attitudes towards the Euro by National Identity and Relative National Status,” Journal of Economic Psychology 24, 293–299. {% foundations of probability %} Meijs, Wouter (2005) “Probabilistic Measures of Coherence,” Ph.D. dissertation. {% Peep & I: under heading of “Post-Experimental Interviews,” just before Discussion: they confronted participants with their violations of dominance. All participants then wanted to change their replies. %} Mellers, Barbara A., Patricia M. Berretty, & Michael H. Birnbaum (1995) “Dominance Violations in Judged Prices of Two- and Three-Outcome Gambles,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 8, 201–216. {% %} Mellers, Barbara A., Shi-jie Chang, Michael H. Birnbaum, & Lisa D. Ordóñez (1992) “Preferences, Prices, and Ratings in Risky Decision Making,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 18, 347–361. {% %} Mellers, Barbara A. & Alan D.J. Cooke (1992) “Tradeoffs Depend on Attribute Range,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 20, 1055–1067. {% %} Mellers, Barbara A., Lisa D. Ordóñez, & Michael H. Birnbaum (1992) “A Change-of-Process Theory for Contextual Effects and Preference Reversals in Risky Decision Making,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 52, 331–369. {% %} Mellers, Barbara A., Virginia Richards, & Michael H. Birnbaum (1992) “Distributional Theories of Impression Formation,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 51, 313–343. {% Show that risk attitudes depend on the domain of risk, also if only financial risk. It has often been found that people get more risk averse in insurance contexts. This paper p. 2 gives refs. %} Mellers, Barbara A. & Ilana Ritov (2010) “How Beliefs Influence the Relative Magnitude of Pleasure and Pain,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 23, 369–382. {% Ask participants, after lottery is played, how elated versus disappointed they felt. Obviously, elation/disappointment depends on the other options and outcomes. Thus, a negative outcome in some situation can give higher elation than a positive outcome in another situation. Note that elation/disappointment is not hedonic utility as in Kahneman, Wakker, & Sarin (1997) but is only a special regret-like emotion. The term “emotional” in the title refers to this measure of elation/disappointment real incentives/hypothetical choice: they told the participants there would be real payment according to the sum total of the payments in all the gambles they participated in, but in reality gave each participant a predetermined payment which the participants seem not to have noticed. %} Mellers, Barbara A., Alan Schwartz, Katty Ho, & Ilana Ritov (1997) “Decision Affect Theory: Emotional Reactions to the Outcomes of Risky Options,” Psychological Science 8, 423–429. {% %} Mellers, Barbara A., Alan Schwartz, & Ilana Ritov (1997) “Decision Affect Theory: Regret, Disappointment, and Utility.” {% Nice title. P. 229 Figure 4 depicts the basic model, with H transforming physical stimulus (probability, outcome, or whatever) into subjective perception (decision weight, utility, or whatever), then C turning subjective perception into subjective value evaluation (such as EU), and then J turning this subjective value into response to experimental question (e.g. monetary equivalent, binary choice, and so on). The authors discuss the related separation for some models, where it is usually debatable obviously. Then they discuss it for their preferred theory: change-of-process theory. The latter assumes subjective perception H (or at least utility u) constant, and only what comes after changes per context. Pp. 231 ff. describes the theory that is the authors’, and also my, favority: change-of-process theory. It assumes that the utility function is invariant, and it is the other components that are changing and causing preference reversals (something the title also refers to). But what I found missing is any argument for it. It is presented out of the blue. My argument comes from something that psychologists do not think about: the normative approach. I think that EU is normative, so each person has a utility function representing him if-he-were-rational. Hence I try to find their utility functions, resolving all biases at best no matter how many they are. Thus I have a prior belief in the existence of invariant utility prior to having seen any data. The authors do not think this way, at the end of §VII doubting the very existence of true preferences. P. 232: strangely enough, the authors assume a model for one-nonzero-outcome prospects that combines probabilities and outcomes additively rather than multiplicatively. This cannot work well for probability 0 (and, similarly, outcome 0). They investigate this mathematical problem the way: by running an experiment. (So they had subject choose between a 0 chance of gaining $200 and a 0 chance of gaining $100, for instance). P. 234 3rd para describes the results: the experiment confirms the mathematical failure of their model. To defend, they resort to ’ ultimate weapon: context dependence! Section VII last para similarly investigates the philosophical question of the existence of true preference by doing an experiment. Pp. 242-243, risky utility u = strength of preference v (or other riskless cardinal utility, often called value): they indicate the support of their change-0of-process theory, and their supportive experimental findings, for this view. %} Mellers, Barbara A., Elke U. Weber, Lisa Ordonez, & Alan D.J. Cooke (1995) “Utility Invariance despite Labile Preferences,” The Psychology of Learning and Motivation 32, 221–245. {% On the violations of monotonicity generated by the zero-outcome effect. For example, (.95, $96; .05, $24) receives lower CE (certainty equivalent) than (.95, $96; .05, $0) (p. 339 2nd column 2nd paragraph.). real incentives/hypothetical choice: pp. 82-83 explain that 36% violated dominance with real incentives, 45% with hypothetical; difference was nonsignificant. %} Mellers, Barbara A., Robin Weiss, & Michael H. Birnbaum (1992) “Violations of Dominance in Pricing Judgments,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5, 73–90. {% Nice didactical introduction to topology, very elementary (explaining sets, intersections, etc.). Especially nice because there is a whole chapter on the elementary aspects of connectedness. %} Mendelson, Bert (1962) “Introduction to Topology.” Dover Publications, New York. (3rd edn. 1990) {% foundations of statistics; p. 1143, 2nd paragraph refers to some people who criticize p-value for violating likelihood principle %} Meng, Xao-Li (1994) “Posterior Predictive p-Values,” Annals of Statistics 22, 1142–1160. {% Measure risk attitudes for three groups: (1) subjects who did DUR before; (2) subjects who did decision under ambiguity before where they knew the set of possible outcomes; (3) subjects who did decision under ambiguity before where they did not entirely know the set of possible outcomes. As the authors discuss on p. 153, Case (3) can be considered to be a special case of Case (2), but it is one with more ambiguity. The authors find that subjects become more risk averse as they before were exposed to more ambiguity. This is a spill over effect. %} Mengel, Friederike, Elias Tsakas, & Alexander Vostroknutov (2016) “Past Experience of Uncertainty Affects Risk Aversion,” Experimental Economics 19, 151–176. {% Seems to be one of the inventors of marginal utility, together with Jevons and Walras. marginal utility is diminishing: according to Larrick one of the first to suggest decreasing marginal utility. %} Menger, Karl (1871) “Principles of Economics.” Translated into Englisch by James Dingwall & Bert F. Hoselitz, Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1950. {% Points out that St. Petersburg-like gambles with infinite expected utility can be constructed as soon as utility is unbounded. Suggests that people ignore (discount?) small probabilities. Suggests that people would not pay one dollar for a probability of 1/10,000,000 to gain $10,000,000. However, big lotteries in Spain suggest otherwise. Footnote 11 on p. 221 in the English translation (and, it seems to be, a footnote on p. 471 of the original) refers to Buffon as the first to suggest that people neglect very small probabilities. Buffon seems to take as example a probability of 1/10189 for a fifty-year old man to die within the next 24 hours, which, he says, people perceive as zero. %} Menger, Karl (1934) “Das Unsicherheitsmoment in der Wertlehre,” Zeitschrift für National-ökonomie 51, 459–485. Translated into English by Wolfgang Schoellkopf as “The Role of Uncertainty in Economics,” in Shubik, Martin (1967, ed.) “Essays in Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern,” Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 211–231. {% DOI: 10.1214/14-STS467; Foreword announcing many papers propagatng the Bayesian approach %} Mengersen, Kerrie L. & Christian P. Robert (2014) “Big Bayes Stories—Foreword,” Statistical Science 29, 1. {% %} Menges, Günter (1974, ed.) “Information, Inference and Decision.” Reidel, Dordrecht. {% Gissel Benartzi & Thaler (1995) like explanation for the paradox of momentum returns. The momentum returns claims that buying stock that fared well last period and selling those that fared worst give better returns than market. %} Menkhoff, Lukas & Maik Schmeling (2006) “A Prospect-Theoretical Interpretation of Momentum Returns,” Economics Letters 93, 360–366. {% Consider seven ways to measure risk aversion, of which four relate to incentivized risky choices, one to hypothetical choice, and two concern introspective measurements. Combinations of the seven of course improve predictive power. %} Menkhoff, Lukas & Sahra Sakha (2017) “Estimating Risky Behavior with Multiple-Item Risk Measures,” Journal of Economic Psychology 59, 59–86. {% statistics for C/E %} Mennemeyer, Stephen T. & Louis P. Cyr (1997) “A Bootstrap Approach to Medical Decision Analysis,” Journal of Health Economics 16, 741–747. {% value of information: estimates value of future research by taking expected value of info and then simulating results of the future research. %} Menzies, Nicolas A. (2016) “An Efficient Estimator for the Expected Value of Sample Information,” Medical Decision Making 36, 308–320. {% Seems to give definition of nonatomic finitely additive probability measure but is abstract %} Mertens, Jean-François (1990) “Extension of Games, Purification of Strategies, and Lyapunov’s Theorem.” In Jean-Jaskold Gabszewicz, Jean-François Richard, & Laurence A. Wolsey (eds.) Economic Decision-Making: Games, Econometrics and Optimisation, Contributions in Honour of Jacques H. Drèze, North-Holland, Amsterdam. {% Harsanyi (1968) formulated games with incomplete information with the concept of type of player, getting a Nobel prize for it. But Harsanyi is not 100% mathematician because because type is a circular definition, comprising probability distributions over types. Zamir once told me, in positive words, that Harsanyi was very good because he made the “right mistakes.” As I see it, Mertens & Zamir (1985) did the real work, in this paper. Unfortunately, this paper has been written in a completely inaccessible manner, as I had to decide after investing some three days, and others confirmed. Brandenburger & Dekel (1993) seems to be readable version. %} Mertens, Jean-François & Shmuel Zamir (1985) “Formulation of Bayesian Analysis for Games with Incomplete Information,” International Journal of Game Theory 14, 1–29. {% %} Merton Robert C. (1969) “Lifetime Portfolio Selection under Uncertainty: The Continuous-Time Case,” Review of Economics and Statistics 51, 247–257. {% utility families parametric: Table I p. 389 describes the HARA (hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) family. It contains (1) For 1: the power family with powers not exceeding 1, where both the function and its argument can be translated. (2) For 1 < : (kx) only for x k. For x exceeding k the function would be decreasing for natural numbers and imaginary for other , so not nice. This function is again concave. (3) The exponential family (for = ). . %} Merton, Robert C. (1971) “Optimum Consumption and Portfolio Rules in a Continuous-Time Model,” Journal of Economic Theory 3, 373–413. {% Seems to discuss that often time is ready for a good idea, and then many researchers independently invent that idea. Example can be rank-dependent utility by Weymark (1981), Quiggin (1982), Yaari (1987), Allais (1988), with the same idea for uncertainty by Schmeidler (1989). %} Merton, Robert C. (1973) “The Sociology of Science.” University of Chicago Press, Chicago. {% %} Merton, Robert C. (1993) “Operation and Regulation in Financial Intermediation: A Functional Perspective.” In Peter Englund (ed.) Operation and Regulation of Financial Markets, 17–68, The Economic Council, Stockholm. {% Consider some properties of functionals defined on infinite sequences x1,x2, …, such as comononic additivity, with several examples with special roles for liminf, limsup, and the like. Nice term: infinitary operator. No reference to Koopmans or intertemporal choice, but oriented towards the fuzzy literature. %} Mesiar, Radko & Endre Pap (2008) “Aggregation of Infinite Sequences,” Information Sciences 178, 3557–3564. {% DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMon1211064 Finds a very strong positive correlation between chocolate consumption and number of Nobel prizes in economics, per inhabitant, for countries. An exception is Sweden that has way more Nobel prizes, maybe because of a home bias. %} Messerli, Franz H. (2012) “Chocolate Consumption, Cognitive Function, and Nobel Laureates,” New England Journal of Medicine 367, 1562–1564. {% game theory for nonexpected utility: seem to study Nash equilibria under RDU (CEU (Choquet expected utility)). Point out that rank-ordering then is subtle issue. %} Metzger, Lars P. & Marc Oliver Rieger (2010) “Equilibria in Games with Prospect Theory Preferences,” Working Paper. {% Nice clear proof of the claim that I formulated as: a linear function is a function of linear functions if and only if it is a linear function of linear functions. %} Meyer, Bernard De & Philippe Mongin (1995) “A Note on Affine Aggregation,” Economics Letters 47, 177–183. {% decreasing ARA/increasing RRA: reviews several studies, and mostly supports it. This paper examines what a transformation of a scale does to the index of relative risk aversion, theoretically, and in some empirical studies. %} Meyer, Donald J. & Jack Meyer (2005) “Relative Risk Aversion: What Do We Know?,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 31, 243–262. {% conservation of influence: paper proposes to use marginal utility rather than absolute utility, supporting the view that differences of utility are more basic than utility, which is the insight of the marginal revolution. It nicely takes up Pratt’s (1964) insights. Download 7.23 Mb. Share with your friends:
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