Big Sky Debate Page
LAUNCH SAFETY IS A HUGE OBSTACLE FOR SPACE TOURISM TO OVERCOME-Launius and Jenkins ‘07
Download 1.49 Mb.
|
LAUNCH SAFETY IS A HUGE OBSTACLE FOR SPACE TOURISM TO OVERCOME-Launius and Jenkins ‘07 [Roger, Division of Space History, National Air and Space Museum and Dennis, Verville Fellow, National Air and Space Museum; Is It Finally Time for Space Tourism?; Astropolitics; Volume 4, Issue 3, 2007] Another aspect to the launch problem is the issue of safety. Most of the advocates of space tourism call for launch vehicles to be “as safe as airlines.” As one analyst noted, “There has been sufficient experience of manned spaceflight over the past thirty-five years to be confident that there are no insoluble safety problems.” 49 This appears unlikely in the near future. As the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) observed in 2003: “Building rockets is hard.” Part of the problem is that space travel is in its infancy. Although humans have been launching orbital vehicles for almost 50 years now—about half the amount of time we have been flying airplanes—contrast the numbers. Since Sputnik, humans have launched just over 4,500 rockets toward orbit (not counting sub-orbital flights and small sounding rockets). During the first 50 years of aviation, there were over one million aircraft built. Almost all of the rockets were used only once; most of the airplanes were used more often. ADVOCATES FOR SPACE TOURISM CLAIM LAUNCHES WILL BE SAFE, BUT LACK EXPLANATIONS. SPACEFLIGHT IS VERY DANGEROUS-Launius and Jenkins ‘07 [Roger, Division of Space History, National Air and Space Museum and Dennis, Verville Fellow, National Air and Space Museum; Is It Finally Time for Space Tourism?; Astropolitics; Volume 4, Issue 3, 2007] While humankind is getting better at launching rockets, it still falls short compared to most activities we consider “routine.” During the first decade of spaceflight, there were 1,156 attempts to place objects in orbit; 188 (16.3%) of them failed. During the decade ending in 2004, there were 826 attempts, of which 28 (3.4%) failed. This is a remarkable improvement, but still a terrible number. Consider if 3.4% of U.S. airline flights crashed in 2004, that would mean 336,153 jetliners would have been lost around the country. Even allowing that airliners are a mature technology being flown on an operational basis, while orbital spaceflight is still very much an experimental activity, cutting the loss to 1% would mean that nearly 100,000 aircraft would be lost per year. Most of the studies of space tourism contain statements indicating their vehicles will be 10, 100, or 1000 times safer than the Space Shuttle (or Soyuz), but offer few details in exactly how they are going to accomplish this. This is not to say that safer vehicles cannot be built, but so far, both the Russian and U.S. governments have invested considerable resources into making their human spacecraft as safe as possible and have been unable to achieve safety rates greater than 98%. SPACE TRAVEL IS FAR TOO DANGEROUS TO BECOME A MAJOR TOURIST ACTIVITY-Sawaya ‘04 [David; research assistant at OECD; Space Tourism: Is It Safe? OECD Observer; Mar 2004; http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/1242/Space_tourism:_Is_it_safe_.html; retrieved 01 Aug 2011] The tragic break up of the space shuttle Columbia on 1 February 2003 was a reminder of how dangerous space travel still is, despite 40 years of development. In fact, space travel is much more dangerous than any other form of transportation, including driving a car. In the US manned space programme, there have been 17 fatalities in 732 person flights. That means an astonishing 2,320 deaths per 100,000 passengers, which is 45,000 times more dangerous than flying in a commercial airplane. Put another way, two space shuttles have crashed in 113 departures, which is a 1.8% failure rate. This would be unacceptable for commercial airplanes, which see an average of about 0.4 accidents per 100,000 departures per year in the US. In other words, space travel, while desirable, is just too hazardous to become a major tourist activity. It is even more dangerous than so-called “extreme” sports, such as scuba diving or sky diving. ONCE TECHNOLOGY IS DEVELOPED, LIABILITY CONCERNS WILL HAMPER SPACE TOURISM-O’Neil ‘98 [Daniel; General Public Space Travel and Tourism-Volume 1 Executive Summary Volume I; 1998; http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/general_public_space_travel_and_tourism.shtml#Recommendations; retrieved 01 Aug 2011] Even after the technologies needed to make travel and tourism service affordable have matured and the systems have been developed, tested and deployed, uncertainties and risks will remain. This will be true for in-space facilities, but it will be especially true for EO transports. Passenger, crew and vehicle insurance could become available, but would be expensive until transports are proven to be reliable by repeated usage over time. The "third party" liability issue must be addressed by both the vehicle developers and operators, and the Federal government, and this matter is now receiving increased attention. Practices similar to those employed on other so-called "adventure travel" trips, such as mountain climbing in the Himalayas where tourists sign a waiver of liability and proceed at their own risk, may be applicable in this case as well. THERE MUST BE A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE SAFETY OF SPACE TRAVEL FIRST-Freeland ‘10 [Steven; Professor of International Law, University of Western Sydney; Fly Me To The Moon: How Will International Law Cope with Commercial Space Tourism; Melbourne Journal of International Law; 2010] Yet it is self-evident that the loss of 40 per cent of the space shuttle fleet (two out of the original five), after only 130 flights,[68] is itself an unacceptably high failure rate for any type of activity opened to the public, exceeding even NASA’s own safety margin requirements.[69] Once the general public is involved in the activity, the minimum required (and achieved) safety record must be significantly improved — if not, then any realistic possibility for the development of a commercial space industry will disappear even before it has begun. Not only must there be appropriate safety standards pertaining to the design, construction and operation of a space tourism launch vehicle, but a system of responsibility and liability must be established at the international level — supplemented by domestic law — to regulate those circumstances when a space tourist suffers injury, loss or damage, so as to remove current uncertainties surrounding the remedies that may be available, and to ensure that proper risk avoidance procedures are implemented. SPACE TOURISM IS DANGEROUS-Billings ‘06 [Linda; Research Associate, SETI Institute; Exploration for the masses? Or joyrides for the ultra-rich? Prospects for space tourism; Space Policy; August 2006; pgs. 162-164] Stories about space tourism plans are good news, for space flight fans and for journalists as well. Scaled Composites, SpaceShipOne and Virgin Galactic alone offer heroics (lone test pilots), spectacular and record-setting events (the X-Prize contest), pioneering entrepreneurs (Allen, Branson, Rutan), the ultra-rich and other celebrities (Rutan, Allen, Branson, Rutan and Branson's rumored movie-star customers [9] and [12]) and plain old attention-grabbing novelty. It is worth considering, however, that good news does not necessarily make good business, or good sense. First, human space flight is dangerous and expensive. While there is no doubt that Burt Rutan is a brilliant inventor and designer, even he may not be able to break through the price barrier to commercial space travel. And if it does get off the ground, space tourism will be very pricey. Though Virgin Galactic claims it is “developing space tourism for everybody,” the luxury market is definitely the niche it is after [18]. Second, US interest in the greater militarization of space could get in the way of space tourism [19]. And third, the ethical, legal, and social implications of expanding human presence into space and allowing commercial operations in the space environment have not been thoroughly examined. Advocates claim space tourism will drive the commercial development of space. But is unfettered corporate activity in this environment desirable? Humans are intrusive creatures, and wherever they have gone on Earth, they have made a mess of things: the idea of preserving pristine environments in space [20] deserves some serious consideration. With the 1967 United Nations Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as a foundation, a framework of international law and regulation needs to be put in place to govern commercial space activities. SOLVENCY: REGULATORY FRAMEWORK DOES NOT EXIST
[Daniel; General Public Space Travel and Tourism-Volume 1 Executive Summary Volume I; 1998; http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/general_public_space_travel_and_tourism.shtml#Recommendations; retrieved 01 Aug 2011] A myriad of legal and regulatory aspects of public space travel and tourism must be resolved before viable large scale businesses can emerge. This is especially true of those public agencies with the responsibility to regulate in the interest of public safety. This includes identification of public policies and/or laws that exist or must be enacted to enable business formation, licensing, certification and approval processes for both passengers and vehicles, clearance and over-flight considerations, and environmental and safety issues including atmospheric pollution, solar radiation (flares) and orbital debris. National and international regulatory issues will affect general public space travel and tourism significantly. It will be crucial to assure both the Congress and the general public that this new business is considered to be safe by reasonable standards and acceptable by those who would take space trips. For example, it might be reasonable to expect that the earliest services will be safe by the standards of sky-diving, but not by the standards of today's commercial aviation; recall that the latter required improvement over decades to reach its present high level. Whatever standards are applied, it will be important to streamline regulatory processes and to establish uniformity in those standards and their application. ABSENCE OF LEGAL REGIME MAKES SPACE TOURISM INFEASIBLE-Freeland ‘10 [Steven; Professor of International Law, University of Western Sydney; Fly Me To The Moon: How Will International Law Cope with Commercial Space Tourism; Melbourne Journal of International Law; 2010] In relation to the launch of space tourism vehicles from Earth, it is contended that the applicability of different laws would represent an unsatisfactory and impractical solution and actually lead to greater uncertainty in the absence of a clear defining point for the ‘boundary’ between air space and outer space. A comprehensive and uniform legal regime that specifically envisages and applies to the complete launch and return journey of private individuals should be preferred. However, given the long lead time that would be required to negotiate and agree to a new multilateral treaty, this is perhaps not a very realistic response for the short term and will not solve the immediate problems of today’s space tourism entrepreneurs. UNCERTAIN LEGAL STATUS OF SPACE TOURISM MAKES IT IMPRACTICAL-Freeland ‘10 [Steven; Professor of International Law, University of Western Sydney; Fly Me To The Moon: How Will International Law Cope with Commercial Space Tourism; Melbourne Journal of International Law; 2010] The already uncertain legal position is further complicated by ‘hybrid’ circumstances like the SpaceShipOne example, where there is a launch of the space vehicle from another vehicle (an aircraft) in air space. In this case, perhaps the most appropriate way of regulating such flights under existing legal principles would be to apply air law to the ‘combined’ vehicle (that is, before the launch) and then apply space law to SpaceShipOne from the moment it is launched until its return to Earth. White Knight, of course, would always remain subject to air law. Even this solution, though pragmatic, is somewhat unsatisfactory in that, in the event of an accident during the flight, the applicable legal regime will depend on when the accident occurs. The legal position of the victim will depend on fortuitous circumstances. If anything, this uncertainty further highlights the need for a comprehensive set of rules, based on existing space law principles, to cover all phases of a flight. EXISTING SPACE LAW IS INADEQUATE TO ADDRESS TOURISM-Freeland ‘10 [Steven; Professor of International Law, University of Western Sydney; Fly Me To The Moon: How Will International Law Cope with Commercial Space Tourism; Melbourne Journal of International Law; 2010] In this regard, existing international space law is inadequate. Although it was contemplated that ‘national activities in outer space’ might be undertaken by non-governmental entities, the Outer Space Treaty provides that ‘international responsibility’ for such activities rests with states.[70] This remains the position today, despite the fact that the range of space activities, as well as the number and type of private non-governmental participants involved in these activities, has grown exponentially. Moreover, states are required by the terms of the Outer Space Treaty to authorise and continually supervise those national activities in outer space undertaken by non-governmental entities. As these principles also reflect customary international law, they bind all states. A MODEL FOR INSURANCE MUST EXIST-Freeland ‘10 [Steven; Professor of International Law, University of Western Sydney; Fly Me To The Moon: How Will International Law Cope with Commercial Space Tourism; Melbourne Journal of International Law; 2010] This will also require the development of an effective space tourism insurance market. There is already a well-established space insurance industry, with approximately 30 insurance providers currently offering coverage for launch and in-orbit operations of government and commercial satellites.[83] Most of these insurance providers are large insurance (or reinsurance) companies, which allocate and manage their maximum exposure to the space industry. It is by no means certain that they would have sufficient capacity or enthusiasm to actively enter into another space related insurance market, particularly in the early days of space tourism with (at least in relative terms) untested technology. In addition, although their level of expertise in relation to current space activities has developed significantly with experience — the space insurance market is now over 20 years old — this does not (yet) extend to space tourism. The advent of commercial space tourism activities available to the public will bring with it the need for new and complex risk management assessment procedures. Past experience has demonstrated that the requisite level of insurance-related expertise for new activities such as this may only emerge on a ‘trial and error’ basis. A COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK MUST EXIST-Freeland ‘10 [Steven; Professor of International Law, University of Western Sydney; Fly Me To The Moon: How Will International Law Cope with Commercial Space Tourism; Melbourne Journal of International Law; 2010] The corpus of existing international space law represents an important base from which to develop the legal tools to properly regulate the next stage of space activities. Yet it is not sufficient even for present purposes, let alone for the coming decades. The advent of space tourism raises many unanswered legal questions, some of which have been highlighted in this article. Other legal issues will also arise. As more space tourism (and other) activities take place, appropriate dispute resolution procedures must be agreed upon in order to deal with conflicts that will inevitably arise, both at the public and private international law level. Detailed traffic management systems must be developed. Moreover, a comprehensive legal framework must be established at the international level to reflect the wishes of the wider (global) community and provide certainty. At the same time, however, the broader philosophical and ethical aspects of human activities in outer space — indeed the place of human beings in the universe — demand that we continually reassess the ‘why’ and ‘what’ in relation to our ongoing exploration and use of outer space. SPACE TOURISM WILL UNDERMINE LEGAL CONCEPTS; MUST DEVELOP A LEGAL FRAMEWORK-Freeland ‘10 [Steven; Professor of International Law, University of Western Sydney; Fly Me To The Moon: How Will International Law Cope with Commercial Space Tourism; Melbourne Journal of International Law; 2010] In relation to space tourism activities, not only intellectual property rights (for example, how does Richard Branson protect the rights to his ‘Virgin’ label in outer space?), but various forms of tangible property rights may also become relevant. To take one example, it is quite foreseeable that as space tourism activities develop, the demand will emerge for the constant presence of tourists on the Moon and other celestial bodies, necessitating the construction of celestial hotels. Naturally, it will be important for the ‘owner’ of such a structure to gain some legal protection in relation to the site of the hotel — perhaps akin to some form of a leasehold (or even freehold) title, with which we are familiar on Earth. Here the problem presents itself: in the absence of ‘sovereignty’, it is not possible under existing international space law to assert that any particular jurisdiction applies to the area on which the hotel is to be constructed, and perhaps even within the hotel, given that ‘jurisdiction and control’ only arises upon the registration of a ‘space object’. The definition of a ‘space object’ is vague[91] and unlikely to include a structure such as a hotel, which is designed as a stationary, (semi-)permanent construction. Even if it could be interpreted as falling within the meaning of a ‘space object’, this would only solve the jurisdictional questions relating to the inside of the hotel but not to the surface of the Moon. Without a right of any state to exercise jurisdiction — that is, to make (and enforce) laws — it is impossible to determine how such a title can be established. LACK OF REGULATORY STANDARDS WILL ENDANGER SPACE TOURISTS-Marsh ‘06 [Melinda; Graduate Student in Space Studies U. of North Dakota; Ethical and Medical Dilemmas of Space Tourism; Advances in Space Research; Volume 37, Issue 9; 2006; pgs. 1823-1827] In the fledgling field of space tourism, new companies are being confronted with major problems relating to the current lack of industry regulations. Since there are no regulating bodies, CEOs who do not have a strong personal code of ethics may be tempted to cut corners and hope for the best. This is an unwise decision given the space tourism industry’s potential for disaster. What if a private-sector Challenger or Columbia disaster occurred? What if SpaceShipOne had exploded or crashed while it was on one of its X-prize flights? An explosion caught live on television would certainly spell doom for the space tourism industry, as it would no doubt severely reduce the enthusiasm of the 35–80% of people who claim they would like to go into space one day (2002). Likewise, it would reinforce the fears of those whose prime concern is safety (Berinstein, 2002). Space hotels are another fledgling industry that may very well suffer due to the current blur between ethics and legality, as “space hotel” regulations are neither well designed nor well developed at this stage. This is unfortunate since safety and medical guidelines should be of paramount importance due to the extreme nature of space travel. It is therefore difficult to imagine what is likely to be the minimum legal requirements for safe travel from a biomedical standpoint. In order to provide an experience that is enjoyable as well as safe, various medical dilemmas need to be considered, such as what to do in the event of a medical emergency, and the general disclosures that should be provided because of possible physiological changes due to microgravity. The information that follows is of particular interest to start up space businesses which will require more risk acceptance on the part of the tourists. As space tourism becomes more commonplace and more studies are performed, it is likely that the risks will be better understood and mature space businesses may not need to worry as much about the risks to their customers. Space Militarization Negative INHERENCY: US IS ALREADY WEAPONIZING SPACE SPACE WEAPONIZATION HAS ALREADY OCCURRED-Dickens and Ormrod ‘08 [Peter; professor @ Universities of Brighton and Cambridge, and James, lecturer in sociology in the School of Applied Social Science, University of Brighton; Who Really Won the Space Race?; Monthly Review; February 2008;http://monthlyreview.org/2008/02/01/who-really-won-the-space-race; retrieved 28 Jun 2011] What other investments does the United States have in space? Since the days of President Eisenhower there has been a remarkable revival in the national missile defense program. Under the Bush administration, military spending has risen greatly. The only other epochs when the United States spent as much on national defense in constant dollar terms were during the Second World War and the Korean War. The military-industrial-space complex has experienced a remarkable revival, one spurred on by the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the consequent discovery of new “enemies” in Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, and North Korea. At this point we must return to the likes of Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and Lockheed Martin. Employing around one million people, they are the largest coordinated bloc of industry in the United States with strong political connections. They are among the “big metal benders,” the major corporations in contemporary America’s military-industrial-space complex. Unlike the Star Wars image of rockets and missiles fighting it out in outer space, the reality of today’s outer space militarization is rather mundane. It is simply a means by which hostilities are conducted on earth. But the fact that outer space is integral to contemporary “everyday” warfare makes it even more important to understand. As Loring Wirbel puts it in his book Star Wars: “when a precision bomb is dropped on Tikrit, guided to its target by Global Positioning System satellites, a space weapon has been used. When an unmanned aerial ‘robot’ plane fires a missile at a car full of suspected Al Qaeda operatives in Yemen, using electronic intelligence to confirm its target, a space weapon has been used.” THE UNITED STATES UNDER OBAMA AND BUSH IS COMMITTED TO SPACE WEAPONIZATION- Zhang ‘11 [Baohui; Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Lingnan University; The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship; Asian Survey; Volume 51, No. 2; 2011; pgs. 311-332] The first factor that caused the security dilemma in the Sino-U.S. military space relationship is the professed American quest for space dominance. This quest is a reflection of the U.S. obsession with primacy that predates the Obama administration. The primacy strategy demands undisputed military dominance in different areas, including space, to ensure the best possible protection of U.S. national security. The U.S. is the only country in the world that has articulated a coherent national strategy for space dominance. As emphasized by Michael W. Wynne, former Air Force secretary, “America’s domination of the space domain provides an unrivaled advantage for our nation and remains critical to creating the strategic and tactical conditions for victory.” The U.S. is the leader in the militarization of space. It was the first country that established a dedicated command, the U.S. Space Command, to unify military operations in space. In fact, as its Vision for 2020 proclaims, the Space Command seeks to achieve “full spectrum dominance” in space.13 Furthermore, it envisions permanent dominance in the military dimension of space operations: “Today, the U.S. is the preeminent military space power. Our vision is one of maintaining that preeminence—providing a solid foundation for our national security.” US WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE HAS ALREADY BEGUN-Duvall and Havercroft ‘06 [Raymond and Jonathan; Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and empire of the future; Center for International Relations Working Paper; 2006; http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=111193; retrieved 01 Aug 2011] So, in a certain sense, the military colonization of orbital space has already begun to a significant extent—it is no longer a distant future vision, nor an unrealizable fiction. We are not in a position to detail all of the technological or strategic manifestations of this important development. Pretending to be able to do so would distract from the purposes of this paper. Our concern, instead, is with the broad forms of space weaponization that are now being actively pursued—again, especially by the U.S.—and/or that are very much alive on the drawing board and in the U.S. military imagination. THE US IS SO FAR AHEAD OF EVERYONE IN TERMS OF SPACE MILITARIZATION; NO NEED TO RUSH IN-Moore ‘08 [Mike; retired as editor of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; Space War, The Logical Next Mistake for US Exceptionalism; Disarmament Diplomacy; Spring 2008] Readers of Disarmament Diplomacy are painfully aware that the world is not likely to get a Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) treaty soon, if at all. In tracing that dismal history, one is forced to conclude that the United States has been the principal naysayer. So it has been; so it is today. But why? The standard reasons don't wash. There is no arms race in space, so why worry? It is not possible to define a space weapon, so why get in a sweat over it? Even if a treaty could be drafted, it would be impossible to verify, so why do it in the first place? I believe that all of these objections could be overcome if all space-faring nations truly wanted a new treaty. The plain fact is that the United States does not want one. It prefers to "keep its options open". America's knee-jerk resistance to a new treaty is puzzling and dismaying to those of us who think a tough new treaty is the surest way to prevent an arms race in space and - possibly - a new cold war. The United States, which has roughly half of the world's 800-plus satellites, would have the most to lose if a conflict in space ever broke out. Further, the United States is so many years ahead of everyone else in the military uses of space that it could safely afford to spend time exploring whether a new space treaty was feasible and verifiable. If it became clear after, say, two or three years that negotiations weren't going anywhere, the United States would still have the option of going its own way in space. Yes, the United States is that far ahead.
[John; US Space Weapon Now Circling the Globe; Toward Freedom; 27 May 2010; http://towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/1980/1/; retrieved 14 August 2011] The US space weapon X-37 is now circling the globe in relative secrecy. It is an unmanned space plane that looks like a smaller version of the Space Shuttle and was launched from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station on April 22, 2010. This new weapon poses threats to global peace and risks sparking an arms race in space. "At one time, [the X-37] was going to replace the Space Shuttle," said Bruce Gagnon, director of the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space. The replacement plan was scrapped, however. In 2004 NASA handed over the X-37 to DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) and the Phantom Works at Boeing, the major aerospace player racing to develop space weapons and missile defense systems with millions of taxpayer dollars. The X-37 officially is a US Military Space Place or MSP, and like most US space weapons, spreading anxiety across the globe. The Pentagon also has an unknown number of "dual purpose" space planes in the works; the Pentagon has publicly stated in their budgets these prototypes have been tested in wind tunnels. They might be space bombers, but no one is completely sure. They're so secret, no one can say what they'll be used for or how far developed they are. HARMS: NO NEED FOR SPACE WEAPONS GROUND-BASED WEAPONS MEET OUR NEEDS-Moore ‘09 [Mike; a research fellow with the Independent Institute; Space Debris: From Nuisance to Nightmare; Foreign Policy; 12 Feb 2009;http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/02/11/space_debris_from_nuisance_to_nightmare; retrieved 16 Jun 2011] No one, including the United States, is likely to have actual weapons in space in the foreseeable future. Space control does not require such weapons. Ground-based, sea-based, and even air-based antisatellite weapons (ASATs) can do the trick. The United States has long been working on a variety of highly sophisticated ASAT programs -- indeed, the infrastructure for missile defense is the sort of infrastructure needed for ASAT systems. SATELLITES COULD BE DEFENDED WITH MUCH LESS EXPENSIVE, TERRESTRIAL SYSTEMS-Deblois, Garwin, et al ‘05 [Bruce, director of systems integration for BAE Systems and Richard, IBM Fellow Emeritus at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center; Star Crossed; Spectrum; March 2005; http://www.princeton.edu/~rskemp/IEEE%20Spectrum%20-%20Star%20Crossed.pdf; retrieved 09 Jul 2011]
Moreover, we have seen that there are a number of ways to render military space systems inoperable without destroying the satellites themselves, such as attacks on their ground stations. In such cases, space weapons would be rendered useless. We have also argued that satellites could be better defended with redundant systems that would mitigate attacks, or with stand-in capabilities provided by UAVs or balloons above the battlefield. As for denying adversaries the use of space, this may likewise be more readily achieved by less-expensive terrestrial alternatives, such as electromagnetic jamming and the temporary blinding of adversaries’ reconnaissance systems.
[Bruce, director of systems integration for BAE Systems and Richard, IBM Fellow Emeritus at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center; Star Crossed; Spectrum; March 2005; http://www.princeton.edu/~rskemp/IEEE%20Spectrum%20-%20Star%20Crossed.pdf; retrieved 09 Jul 2011]
In an all-out shooting war on Earth, we cannot expect that space would be a sanctuary for military systems supporting the weapons of that war. But the scenario sketched here, with the United States leading an urgent effort to ban space weapons and antisatellite tests or use, would help ensure that a shooting war on Earth would not be provoked by weapons in space. HARMS: CHINA IS NOT A THREAT THE CHINESE ASAT TEST WAS NOT EVIDENCE OF THE NEED FOR SPACE WEAPONS, BUT A SIGN OF THE DANGER DEPLOYING THEM-Johnson ‘07 [Rebecca; PhD, The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy; Threat of Weaponisation; 09 October 2007; http://www.acronym.org.uk/space/congo.htm; retrieved 19 Jul 2011] China's ground-to-space destruction of its own satellite on January 11, 2007, widely regarded as an ASAT test, gave indication of its capability to conduct ASAT missions. As noted by the Space Security Index 2007, China's test "demonstrates the country's advanced tracking, targeting and precision guidance capabilities in space, as well as its ability to use those technologies for space negation purposes". But this must also not be exaggerated: what China accomplished was on the level of US and Russian ASAT testing in the 1980s. The cold war powers discontinued such tests because hits on satellites created an uncontrollable debris problem. China's strike likewise proved to be a two-edged sword: while it may have fed into the SpaceCom agenda of frightening Americans into the weaponisation lobby, it also reminded the world of the dangerous, indiscriminate consequences and folly of physical ASAT attacks. If neutralising or negating military space power is the aim, it would be far cleverer and more accessible to jam or disable the telemetry, communication links and ground stations. Some Americans already refer to such threats as 'weaponisation of space', but though they target the operations of space-based military assets, such threats do not involve weapons in or from space, which is what I shall focus on in the next section. VERIFICATION OF SPACE TREATIES WOULD BE CHALLENGING, BUT IT IS WITHIN THE TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE US-Moore ‘08 [Michael; former editor, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; Twilight War: The Folly of U.S. Space Dominance; 10 Jun 2008; http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/0048.html; retrieved 21 Jul 2011] There would have to be ironclad verification. I think that could be managed, but you've got to begin switching over to different paradigms to manage that. Right now, the kind of intrusive verification I talk about, on-the-ground verification as well as in-space verification, would probably reveal some proprietary secrets. That's a big thing with us, and really it's a big thing with the Chinese and the Russians. They're a little iffy about verification. They say, "Let's do a treaty and worry about verification later." I don't believe that. I think you've got to do verification, and it is going to be hard. But if you look at a possible catastrophe that could be the end result of an arms race in space, I think it might focus the mind. Maybe we would think differently about tough verification. If you think about the opportunity cost, I think maybe we would think differently about it. But I don't want to suggest it is going to be an easy thing. It won't be. You've got to have a situation-awareness network. That means simply keeping track of everything in space from the time it is launched until the time it dies. We can do it. We don't do it yet. We have sort of a random situational awareness. But we could do it. It is within the technological capabilities of the United States. IT IS MISTAKEN TO CONSTRUCT CHINA AS A THREAT-Nye ‘11 [Joseph; Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Clinton Administration, and currently a professor at Harvard University; Should China Be Contained; Al Jazeera News; 08 Jul 2011; http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/07/20117591135770761.html; retrieved 11 Jul 2011] As I argue in my new book The Future of Power, one of the major power shifts of the twenty-first century is Asian revival. In 1800, Asia represented half the world's population and half the world's economy. By 1900, the industrial revolution in Europe and North America drove down Asia's share of global output to 20 per cent. By the middle of this century, Asia should again represent half the world's population and GDP. This is a natural and welcome evolution, as it enables hundreds of millions of people to escape from poverty. At the same time, however, it has given rise to fears that China will become a threat to the US. Such fears appear exaggerated, particularly when one considers that Asia is not one entity. It has its own internal balance of power. Japan, India, Vietnam, and other countries do not want to be dominated by China, and thus welcome a US presence in the region. Unless China develops its "soft power", the rise in its military and economic power is likely to frighten its neighbours into seeking coalitions to balance its rise. It is as if Mexico and Canada sought an alliance with China to balance US power in North America.
[Joseph; Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Clinton Administration, and currently a professor at Harvard University; Should China Be Contained; Al Jazeera News; 08 Jul 2011; http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/07/20117591135770761.html; retrieved 11 Jul 2011] After the 2008-2009 financial crisis, as China recovered rapidly and resumed ten per cent annual economic growth, some Chinese officials and commentators urged a more assertive foreign policy to reflect China's new strength. Many mistakenly believed that the US was in decline, and that the crisis presented new strategic opportunities for China. For example, China began pressing territorial claims in the South China Sea, as well as escalating a longstanding border dispute with India. The net result is that over the past two years, China has worsened its relations with Japan, India, South Korea, Vietnam, and others - quite a remarkable record that confirms the US strategic premise that "only China can contain China". But it would be a mistake to focus only on the hedging part of American strategy. The US and China (as well as other countries) have much to gain from collaborating on transnational issues. One cannot devise and implement solutions to global financial stability, climate change, cyber terrorism, or pandemics without such cooperation. If power is the ability to obtain the outcomes one wants, it is important to remember that sometimes our power is greater when we act with others rather than merely over others. This important dimension of a "smart power" strategy for the twenty-first century is not captured by the concept of containment. When Kissinger landed in Beijing four decades ago, he ushered in not only a Cold War transformation, but also a new era of US-Chinese engagement. THE PRESIDENT COULD INCREASE AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY BY NEGOTIATING WITH CHINA-Hitchens and Chen ‘08 [Theresa, Center for Defense Information, and David, CENTRA Technology; Forging a Sino-US Grand Bargain in Space; Space Policy; 18 Jul 2008; pgs. 128-131] Unfortunately, the existing trend in both nations is for promoting an offensive space strategy aimed primarily at one another. With a new US administration, whichever candidate enters office will face the challenge of finding viable alternatives to the anti-satellite arms race that lies at the end of the present course, an outcome that would be in neither party’s interest. The incoming president might avoid such a security dilemma with China by utilizing the full range of US soft power, backed by realistic hard power consequences. This will require the incoming administration to expand its understanding of what constitutes a space issue, and to develop a deeper knowledge of what motivates China’s leadership. Using both persuasion and dissuasion to craft a kind of ‘‘grand bargain’’ with China regarding space, the next president may be able to steer Sino-US competition toward trade, economics and sport, rather than military oneupmanship. Accomplishing this would strengthen US national security and international stability in the Pacific region. CHINA IS WILLING TO ABANDON SPACE WEAPONS PROGRAM-Zhang ‘11 [Baohui; Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Lingnan University; The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship; Asian Survey; Volume 51, No. 2; 2011; pgs. 311-332] Perhaps reflecting this new context of space security, when meeting with the heads of foreign air force delegations in November 2009, President Hu Jintao promised that China would “unswervingly uphold the principle of peaceful use of space and actively participate in international cooperation on Space security.”7 Li Daguang, a leading PLA space war expert known for his pessimistic views on international space cooperation, recently argued that “ensuring the peaceful use of outer space and preventing its weaponization represent a consensus of the international community.”8 These messages show that China has perhaps modified its previous assessment of the feasibility of arms control in outer space. This shift, together with President Obama’s new space policies, could dilute the security dilemma between China and the U. S. and pave the way for arms control. TURN:IT IS THE AMERICAN DRIVE FOR SPACE SUPERIORITY WHICH DRIVES CHINESE WEAPONIZATION- Zhang ‘11 [Baohui; Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Lingnan University; The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship; Asian Survey; Volume 51, No. 2; 2011; pgs. 311-332] In both cases, Chinese security experts believe that the U.S. seeks “absolute security” in order to maximize protection for the American population from external threats.9 This means that China at least recognizes the defensive motivations behind the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense. However, with the chaotic nature of international relations, one country’s efforts to maximize its security could degrade the security of others by changing the balance of power. Inevitably, the U.S. quest for “absolute security” evokes countermeasures from other countries. As Kenneth Waltz observes, when a great power seeks superiority, others will respond in kind, since “maintaining status quo is the minimum goal of any great power.” According to Robert Jervis, “The heart of the security dilemma argument is that an increase in one state’s security can make others less secure, not because of misperceptions or imagined hostility, but because of the anarchic context of international relations.” In this context, “Even if they can be certain that the current intentions of other states are benign, they can neither neglect the possibility that the others will become aggressive in the future nor credibly guarantee that they themselves will remain peaceful.”11 Inevitably, when one state seeks to expand its military capability, others have to take similar measures. SOLVENCY: SPACE WEAPONS ARE INEFFECTIVE/COSTLY
[Steven; Vice President, Budget Studies, at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Arming the Heavens: A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential Cost and Cost-Effectiveness of Space-Based Weapons; 31 Oct 2007; retrieved 21 Jul 2011; http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2007/10/arming-the-heavens-a-preliminary-assessment-of-the-potential-cost-and-cost-effectiveness-of-space-based-weapons/] This analysis, which focuses on the potential for deploying space based weapons over the next 20 years, suggests five broad observations and conclusions: First, a constellation of space-based weapons designed to defend the United States against an attack with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would be extremely costly to acquire and support. Moreover, at least based on the technology likely to be available over the next twenty years, such a system would probably not prove to be a cost effective investment, especially when measured against the cost to a potential adversary of defeating such a system. MANY SPACE-BASED WEAPONS SYSTEMS WILL BE FAR MORE EXPENSIVE-Kosiak ‘07 [Steven; Vice President, Budget Studies, at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Arming the Heavens: A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential Cost and Cost-Effectiveness of Space-Based Weapons; 31 Oct 2007; retrieved 21 Jul 2011; http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2007/10/arming-the-heavens-a-preliminary-assessment-of-the-potential-cost-and-cost-effectiveness-of-space-based-weapons/] Second, while space-based weapons intended to strike terrestrial based targets could, in some cases, cost substantially less to acquire and support than space-based ballistic missile defense systems, such weapons would likely prove more costly—and, in some instances, far more costly—than comparably effective terrestrial-based alternatives. THERE IS NO COST OR EFFECTIVENESS CASE FOR SPACE-BASED ASAT WEAPONS-Kosiak ‘07 [Steven; Vice President, Budget Studies, at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Arming the Heavens: A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential Cost and Cost-Effectiveness of Space-Based Weapons; 31 Oct 2007; retrieved 21 Jul 2011; http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2007/10/arming-the-heavens-a-preliminary-assessment-of-the-potential-cost-and-cost-effectiveness-of-space-based-weapons/] Third, while space-based ASAT weapons would also generally be less costly to acquire and support than space-based ballistic missile defense systems, there does not appear to be a compelling need, on either cost or effectiveness grounds, to acquire a dedicated space-based ASAT capability—in part, because the US military already possesses or is acquiring a range of terrestrial-based weapons with significant inherent ASAT capabilities. ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS OFFER LITTLE BENEFIT TO AMERICAN SECURITY- Hitchens and Chen ‘08 [Theresa, Center for Defense Information, and David, CENTRA Technology; Forging a Sino-US Grand Bargain in Space; Space Policy; 18 Jul 2008; pgs. 128-131] First, in the matter of dissuasion, many analysts have pointed out that anti-satellite weapons provide very little in terms of added security for US space assets. Rather, the best way to preserve US conventional force lethality and information dominance is through implementation of defensive measures for on-orbit assets, transition to more flexible networks of satellite constellations, and diversification to alternative service delivery platforms. These measures would spread the risk of losing any one segment of the network, reducing the potential strategic or tactical payoff in targeting the space segment in the first place [9]. Such measures require no bilateral negotiation, and can in effect enhance the bargaining position of the USA. Given very real resource constraints, the Chinese military may elect to divert to other projects the investment needed for research, development, and procurement of an effective and reliable anti-satellite capability. Therefore, an early and decisive policy of dissuasion on the part of the USA, and allies, could effectively dampen enthusiasm in China for destructive technologies and behaviors. PLANS TO DEVELOP SPACE WEAPONS ARE WASTEFUL FANTASIES-Weeden ‘08 [Brian; technical consultant with the Secure World Foundation; Space Weaponization: Aye or Nay?; Arms Control Today; November 2008; http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_11/Book_review; retrieved 05 Jul 2011] Although the 1967 Outer Space Treaty banned military installations on celestial bodies, including the moon, today’s military visions of space are nearly as flawed. Much of the military still sees space as only existing to support the war-fighter on the ground, land, and sea and considers doing “space for space reasons” a waste of money and resources. Large numbers of military leaders are still ignorant of the fundamental physics of outer space, which leads to serious discussion of fantasy ideas such as space planes dropping Marines into combat anywhere around the world. Similarly, as Dwayne Day recalls, the military has long toyed with the idea of a military space plane. Day examines previously classified Air Force plans from their inception in 1958, before NASA and Project Mercury, to when they went underground after President Dwight Eisenhower’s mandate that NASA should assume the manned spaceflight role. The program eventually led to two threads: plans for military space vehicles and military space stations, of which only certain aspects, Dyna-Soar and Manned Orbiting Laboratory, have previously been known. Although the military years ago realized that unmanned spacecraft could do a far better and cheaper job in orbit and abandoned serious plans in this arena, the concept of a military space plane has not gone away. At least once a decade, the idea is dusted off and given new funding and rhetoric, only to result years later in failure and wasted taxpayer funds. THE COSTS OF SPACE WEAPONIZATION, INCLUDING ASAT WEAPONS AND PROLIFERATION, OUTWEIGH THE BENEFITS-Blazejewski ‘08 [Kenneth; lawyer focusing primarily on international corporate and financial transactions; Space Weaponization and US-China Relations; Strategic Studies Quarterly; Spring 2008; http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf; retrieved 05 Jul 2011] I recommend that the United States accept a commitment to forgo placement of weapons in outer space. The costs of space weaponization simply outweigh the benefits. Above, I argue that China would respond to US space weaponization with some level of military buildup. In the least, this response would include the deployment of a more robust ASAT system capable of attacking and potentially eliminating space weapons.52 After all, space weapons, like military satellites, make for vulnerable military targets.53 The use of space-based weapons in a conflict must be discounted by the likelihood that they would be eliminated by Chinese ASAT attack. More importantly, increased ASAT deployment would have the counterproductive effect of exposing US satellites to greater threat. Aside from ASAT issues, Chinese response to US space weaponization would include an increase in China’s ICBM fleet and nuclear arsenal. Vertical proliferation cannot be in the interests of the United States, if only for the increased peacetime risks of accidental launch or the terrorist risk associated with increased availability of weapons technology and components. Finally, the United States should not discount the possibility, often cited by opponents of space weaponization, that the deployment of US space weapons would instigate a space arms race. SOLVENCY: ASYMMETRIC RESPONSE UNDERMINES SPACE WEAPONS CHINA ALREADY HAS AN ASYMMETRICAL CAPACITY TO DESTROY ANY WEAPONS THE US DEPLOYS--Van Ness ‘10 [Peter; The Time Has Come for A Treaty to Ban Weapons in Space; Asian Perspective; Volume 34, No. 3; 2010; pgs. 215-225] It is important at the outset to distinguish space-based weapons from land-based weapons capable of attacking space. There are no space-based weapons in place yet, so there is still a possibility to keep them out. The United States would be unhappy about a ban on space-based weapons because it leads in this Technology, but Zhang Hui at Harvard, for one, has argued that the PRC already has an asymmetrical capacity in its demonstrated ASAT capability to destroy almost anything that the United States may choose to orbit in space.16 Given this relationship, without an agreement, the United States might commit itself to an immensely expensive, one-sided arms race in space that, even now, it could not necessarily win. SPACE WEAPONS WOULD BE USELESS AGAINST A WIDE VARIETY OF EXISTING CHINESE WEAPONS-Blazejewski ‘08 [Kenneth; lawyer focusing primarily on international corporate and financial transactions; Space Weaponization and US-China Relations; Strategic Studies Quarterly; Spring 2008; http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf; retrieved 05 Jul 2011] In addition, it is not clear that space weapons could provide effective defense for US satellites. Space weapons would be useless against a wide variety of assaults on satellites that may be within China’s reach.65 For instance, China could cut off communication between US military forces and US satellites by means of electronic jamming, blinding satellites through the use of laser technology, or hacking into a satellite signal. Most obviously, space weapons would also fail to deter conventional attacks on satellite ground communication stations. Such attacks on ground stations are easier to execute than a ground-to-space ASAT assault. AMERICAN WEAPONS IN SPACE WILL COME AT A STAGGERING COST AND BE CHEAPLY COUNTERED BY ADVERSARIES-Johnson-Freese ‘07 [Joan; The New US Space Policy: A Turn Towards Militancy; Issues in Science & Technology; Winter 2007] Other countries, Russia and China in particular, are interested in many of the same technologies as the United States, especially ground-based, laser antisatellite weapons (ASATs), co-orbital microsatellites, air-launched direct-ascent ASATs, and missile defenses. Threat assessments of other countries' capabilities and intents in these areas vary widely, with exaggerations being common and possible because the technological difficulties involved are not well understood. Although the United States adamantly rejects arms control as a limitation on what it could do, arms control would constrain others from doing things that place important U.S. assets at risk. If the United States proceeds with development of these technologies, at staggering cost, others can and will do the same, only in a cheaper, easier, defensive mode. WEAPONIZATION PERPETUATES A FALSE BELIEF THAT SPACE ASSETS CAN BE DEFENDED-Johnson-Freese ‘07 [Joan; The New US Space Policy: A Turn Towards Militancy; Issues in Science & Technology; Winter 2007] Hence, the real danger of the new space policy could well be the perpetuation of the false belief that space assets can be defended. In reality, it is impractical if not impossible from a technical perspective to defend space assets. They are easily seen objects traveling in known orbits and hence much easier to target than the incoming missiles that the United States seems convinced it can shoot down with missile defense. The only way to protect assets is to outlaw attacks and the technologies that enable attacks, and to try to implement a regime under which attacks can be verified. But the new policy specifically rejects new legal regimes or other restrictions that would inhibit U.S. access to space. Attacks on satellites should be strongly stigmatized, in the same way that the use of chemical or biological weapons is stigmatized, with assurances of severe retribution sanctioned by the international community. SOLVENCY: SPACE WEAPONS WILL ENCOURAGE ARMS RACE/CONFLICT A US MOVE TO MILITARIZE SPACE WILL SPARK A COSTLY, DESTABILIZING ARMS RACE IN SPACE AND ON EARTH-Hui ‘06 [Zhang; Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom; Space Weaponization And Space Security: A Chinese Perspective; 2006; http://www.wsichina.org/attach/CS2_3.pdf; retrieved 05 Jul 2011] China has seen much evidence to suggest the movement by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush toward space weaponization is real. A number of U.S. military planning documents issued in recent years reveal the intention to control space by military means. In practice, the United States is pursuing a number of research programs to enable the development of space weapons, which could be used not only to attack ballistic missiles in flight but also to attack satellites and targets anywhere on Earth. Chinese officials have expressed a growing concern that U.S. plans would stimulate a costly and destabilizing arms race in space and on Earth, with disastrous effects on international security and the peaceful use of outer space. This would not benefit any country’s security interests. Beijing believes the most effective way to secure space assets would be to agree on an international ban on weapons in space. SPACE WEAPONS WILL NOT CREATE AN INSURMOUNTABLE EDGE FOR AMERICAN FORCES, BUT SIMPLY ENCOURAGE ESCALATION-Weeden ‘08 [Brian; technical consultant with the Secure World Foundation; Space Weaponization: Aye or Nay?; Arms Control Today; November 2008; http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_11/Book_review; retrieved 05 Jul 2011] The final factor is perhaps the ultimate law of warfare: for every action, there is a reaction. This is the crux of the axiom “no plan survives first contact with the enemy.” Plans are developed against a static set of assumptions and facts, while an active opponent in the field is as intelligent and motivated as the attacker. As a result, occupying forces throughout history have been surprised by the ingenuity, resourcefulness, and effectiveness of a supposedly inferior enemy who refuses to submit. The same lessons should be applied to offensive space-to-ground weapons: They will not create an insurmountable advantage for the U.S. military; they will only spur other states and actors to find ways to counter such weapons or avoid their effects. A UNILATERAL AMERICAN APPROACH ON SPACE WEAPONIZATION WILL INEVITABLY LEAD TO CONFLICT IN SPACE-Weeden ‘08 [Brian; technical consultant with the Secure World Foundation; Space Weaponization: Aye or Nay?; Arms Control Today; November 2008; http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_11/Book_review; retrieved 05 Jul 2011] Adopting a unilateral security strategy, as is the current U.S. approach, does have its advantages, but one of the fundamental disadvantages is lack of engagement and influence in the actions of others that one would have through a cooperative approach. A recent example that demonstrates this clearly was the decision by European states to create their own space surveillance system. When first announced a few years ago, the U.S. position was basically to ignore the issue. When the Europeans demonstrated that they were serious and starting working to actually fund such a system, suddenly the U.S. position changed. The United States started talking about space situational awareness and cooperation within the context of NATO to try to shift European surveillance activities to that forum, where the United States is a partner and has a seat at the table and thus can exert influence more readily. This leads to the larger fundamental truth: the rest of the world is quickly developing suites of space capability and interest. Although most states will never individually develop equal capabilities to the United States in terms of space power, technology is rapidly changing the game, as it has in every other field. Every state has the same sovereign right as the United States to fully utilize space for its own socioeconomic development and pursue its own self interests. If every state pursues the same U.S. path of unilateral action, opposition of legal regimes prohibiting or limiting their access or use of space, and reservation of the right to deny adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to their national interests, then ultimately conflict in space will happen. That conflict is likely to have lasting detrimental effects on the use of space by all states. EVEN IF THE US WINS THE SPACE ARMS RACE, THE DESTABILIZATION WILL HURT IT-Dickens and Ormrod ‘08 [Peter; professor @ Universities of Brighton and Cambridge, and James, lecturer in sociology in the School of Applied Social Science, University of Brighton; Who Really Won the Space Race?; Monthly Review; February 2008;http://monthlyreview.org/2008/02/01/who-really-won-the-space-race; retrieved 28 Jun 2011] So the issue of “who won the space race” turns out to be complex. In regard to surveillance, it is again the powerful using the cosmos as a means of exerting their authority. In regard to militarization, U.S. companies, mediated by the U.S. government, may seem to have won. But militarizing and weaponizing outer space as a means of exerting further military control over the globe is a worrying definition of “winning.” Furthermore, triumphalism of this kind might well be short-lived since higher levels of global instability are a likely result. The Chinese government recently demonstrated a capacity for destroying satellites with ground-based missiles by taking out one of its own satellites in January 2004. This development potentially challenges U.S. military domination of outer space. It also raises the specter of war in outer space as a result of U.S. dominance. Who is likely to “win” under this scenario? AN ARMS RACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA WOULD BE ENORMOUSLY DESTABILIZING-Van Ness ‘10 [Peter; The Time Has Come for A Treaty to Ban Weapons in Space; Asian Perspective; Volume 34, No. 3; 2010; pgs. 215-225] An arms race in space among the major powers would be immensely dangerous, destabilizing, and expensive. Russia, which has a long history in space technology dating back to Sputnik in 1957, does not today have the resources or the political will to sustain such a race. But China does. This is principally an issue between the United States and China. Some analysts say that it is too late to conclude a treaty to ban weapons in space, but others argue that if a treaty cannot be negotiated, then perhaps a code of conduct might work. It is in the interests of both the United States and the People’s Republic of China—and the world, for that matter—that the weaponization of space be stopped. On June 28, President Obama announced a New National Space Policy with a central goal “to promote peaceful cooperation and collaboration in space,” and he invited arms control proposals to help make that happen.1 We must take advantage of this opportunity. EFFORTS TO WEAPONIZE SPACE WILL ONLY SEE THE US SPENDING IN AN ONE-SIDED ARMS RACE--Van Ness ‘10 [Peter; The Time Has Come for A Treaty to Ban Weapons in Space; Asian Perspective; Volume 34, No. 3; 2010; pgs. 215-225] First and foremost in designing an agreement is the need to ban space-based weapons before any are deployed. Both China and Russia are adamantly opposed to these weapons, and Chinese analysts make a strong case that a U.S. space-based, boost-phase missile defense system would indeed threaten the PRC’s basic nuclear deterrent.12 Space-based weapons, if they are ever developed, would be hugely expensive, difficult to deploy, and vulnerable to attack by China’s and Russia’s existing ASAT capabilities. What China seems to be saying to the United States, by its actions more than its words, is: If you go to the expense of developing and deploying space-based weapons, we will be able to defend against them with our current ASAT, missile defense, and cyber war capabilities. If it should come to a military conflict between us, we could destroy those weapons in space or confound their command and control by means of cyber attacks. As a result, the United States would be engaged in a one-sided arms race in space, trying to gain dominance by means of space-based weapons, while ignoring the fact that the weapons are vulnerable to asymmetrical attack. AMERICAN SPACE MILITARIZATION WILL CREATE ASYMMETRIC WEAKNESSES, UNDERMINING GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER-Deblois, Garwin, et al ‘05 [Bruce, director of systems integration for BAE Systems and Richard, IBM Fellow Emeritus at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center; Star Crossed; Spectrum; March 2005; http://www.princeton.edu/~rskemp/IEEE%20Spectrum%20-%20Star%20Crossed.pdf; retrieved 09 Jul 2011]
The United States itself, our analysis suggests, would discover that the military advantages that might be gained from space-based weapons are outweighed by their political and economic costs. It would also create new, asymmetric vulnerabilities to U.S. armed forces, as we will describe in this article. In addition, such systems would be a significant political and strategic departure from 50 years of international law and diplomatic relations. THE REST OF THE WORLD CANNOT ACCEPT AMERICAN EFFORTS TO BE SUPREME IN SPACE- Zhang ‘11 [Baohui; Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Lingnan University; The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship; Asian Survey; Volume 51, No. 2; 2011; pgs. 311-332] This strategy of space dominance, however, generates the classic security dilemma between the U.S. and other countries. Although the U.S. may be motivated by defensive purposes, such as shielding the American population from nuclear weapons and other threats, other countries have to assume the worst in an anarchic world. As observed by Joan Johnson-Freese, “I would argue that the rest of the world accepts U.S. space supremacy. What the Bush Administration claims is space dominance, and that’s what the rest of the world won’t accept.” US DECISION TO WEAPONIZE SPACE WILL BE MATCHED BY MANY NATIONS-Deblois, Garwin, et al ‘05 [Bruce, director of systems integration for BAE Systems and Richard, IBM Fellow Emeritus at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center; Star Crossed; Spectrum; March 2005; http://www.princeton.edu/~rskemp/IEEE%20Spectrum%20-%20Star%20Crossed.pdf; retrieved 09 Jul 2011]
U. S. satellite would be regarded as an attack on U.S. territory. Directory: file -> fetch fetch -> 11 th Lit Semester 1 Final Study Guide!!! fetch -> Industrial Revolution Inventors fetch -> Analysis for Galveston Hurricane of 1900 fetch -> The Illuminators (Team 2) 1900 Galveston Hurricane Cycle a team Assignment fetch -> Team csi-utb ruth Reyes Jose Ferrer fetch -> Galveston Hurricane of 1900 Cycle a-teacher as a Problem Solver fetch -> Is Climate Change Starting a New Dust Bowl? Cycle A fetch -> What makes a storm a hurricane fetch -> The 1950s were the "Happy Days" because it was a time of economic prosperity, technology development, new entertainment, new fashion and family growth. The 1950s was a great time fetch -> Sputnik and The Dawn of the Space Age Download 1.49 Mb. Share with your friends:
|