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“Scientific” and “sensory” are not the same things. Just as “empirical” and “sensory” are not the same things, so also “scientific” and “sensory” are not the same things. The dividing line between “scientific” and “non-scientific” is not between sensory and non-sensory, physical and metaphysical, but between “experientially testable” and “non-testable proof by authority.” If transpersonal phenomena are to be studied by the scientific method, then science, on the one hand, must recognize that its own method does not rest on narrow empiricism (sensory experience only) but on broad empiricism in the general sense (direct experience in general).
A generalized empirical method. Bernard J. F. Lonergan (1957), in his treatise Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, describes what such a “generalized empirical method” for the study of the data of consciousness might look like.
It may be urged that empirical method, at least in its essential features, should be applicable to the data of consciousness no less than to the data of sense. …We have followed the common view that empirical science is concerned with sensibly verifiable laws and expectations. If it is true that essentially the same method could be applied to the data of consciousness, then respect for ordinary usage would require that a method, which only in its essentials is the same, be named a generalized empirical method (p. 72). …A generalized empirical method that stands to the data of consciousness as empirical method stands to the data of sense. …As applied solely to the data of consciousness, it consists in determining patterns of intelligible relations that unite the data explanatorily. …However, generalized method has to be able to deal, at least comprehensively, not only with the data within a single consciousness but also with the relations between different conscious subjects, between conscious subjects and their milieu or environment, and between consciousness and its neural basis. (p. 243-244)
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The “inner empiricism” of direct experience. Ferrer (2002) refers to transpersonal psychology’s attempt to ground the validity of its knowledge claims in intrasubjective experience or states of consciousness as “inner empiricism” (pp. 41-70).
Transpersonal and spiritual knowledge claims are valid because they can be replicated and tested through disciplined introspection, and can therefore be intersubjectively verified or falsified. Central to inner empiricism, then, is an expansion of the meaning of ‘public’ observation from the merely perceptible through the senses to any potentially intersubjective meaning or referent. (Ferrer, 2002, p. 42)
This extension of the word “empirical” to “experiential” in the name of developing an empiricism of direct experience is a necessary and valuable step if transpersonal knowledge claims are to be accept as valid by mainstream psychology and to the general public who identify psychology as a science.
If an empirical science of transpersonal experience and behavior is theoretically possible, then what would it look like? Methodologically speaking, how would such a science be conducted, what would it reveal, and could it be actually verified? Let us look at two such research paradigms in the field of transpersonal psychology.
Tart’s State-Specific Sciences
State dependent learning. Charles T. Tart (1971, 1976, 1992b) proposes that most transpersonal experiences involve an altered state of consciousness (ASC) (e.g., meditative, mystical, hypnotic, psychedelic) and are therefore subject to state-dependent effects. He proposes the establishment of state-specific sciences to handle the fact that some knowledge may only be available when you are back in that same state of consciousness it was originally created in, something like the “encoding specificity” principle in cognitive psychology – retrieval of information is best if you are in the same context as when you originally encoded the information.
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The “state-specific” paradigm. According to the “state-specific” paradigm, if knowledge gained in an altered state of consciousness is to be tested by another individual, then that individual would have to enter the “same” state of consciousness in order to verify it. “In principle, consensual validation of internal phenomena by a trained observer is possible” (Tart, 1983, p. 213). This assumes that a person is able to enter into the “same” altered state of consciousness as another. Consciousness research indicates that states of consciousness that are experientially, descriptively, and phenomenologically indistinguishable (e.g., psychedelic and mystical experiences) may be produced by different causes (e.g., drugs, meditation, fasting, sensory deprivation) (Grof, 2000) – a phenomenon theoretically referred to as “the principle of causal indifference” (Stace, 1988, p. 29).
Challenges of the “state-specific” paradigm. It may be difficult to demonstrate that one hypnotic, meditative, mystical, psychedelic state of consciousness is equivalent to another, however. Tart recognizes that states of consciousness are not homogeneous, and within the “same” discrete state of consciousness there are many levels. My normal state of consciousness may be your altered state of consciousness, and vice versa, and unless some sort of psychophysical scaling methods are used such as those used to obtain measurements of trance depth in self-hypnosis, state equivalence may be difficult to determine. If shifts in an entire state of consciousness result from changes in the functioning or interaction of a single psychological or neural process (e.g., exteroceptors, interoceptors, input processing, subconscious processes, sense of identity, evaluation and decision-making processes, emotions, space/time sense, memory, motor output), then much experimental control over set and setting will be required to assure the relative stability of any discrete state of consciousness (if such a thing exists).
There are no duplicate states of consciousness. It may be that no identical duplication of states of consciousness is possible, that variations may be slight but are always present, and that the state of consciousness achieved by one individual is never precisely the same state of consciousness reached by another individual (just as identical twins are hardly identical). One state may resemble another, but exact duplication is impossible.
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The very attempt to duplicate a state of consciousness (or even a single thought, for that matter) would create strains and pulls that change it to a greater or lesser degree, actually forcing the psychological or neural processes to line up in a different pattern.
Four basic rules of “essential science.” Despite these difficulties with the state-specific paradigm, Tart (1983, 2001) identifies four useful rules of scientific method that can be applied to transpersonal research into altered states of consciousness.
1. Observation (or experiential apprehension). Observation of psychological processes is more difficult than observation of external objects because of its greater complexity and because our language is well given to describing the world of “outward things” perceived by the physical senses but lacks a proper vocabulary to describe the inner world of thoughts, emotions, and images perceived by the “inner senses.”
2. Public Nature of Observation. Observations are assumed to be replicable by any similarly specially trained observer. Consensual validation may be restricted by the fact that only observers in the same altered state of consciousness (ASC) are able to communicate adequately with each other. They may not be able to communicate adequately to someone in a different state of consciousness. Ultimately, “the validity of state-specific knowledge is anchored in the intersubjective agreement of adequately trained observers” (Ferrer, 2001, p. 47).
3. Theorizing. Theories about altered states of consciousness need to be internally consistent, comprehensive, logical and comprehensible. A person in one state of consciousness might come to a different conclusion about the nature of the same events observed in a different state of consciousness (Globus,1980). It is important therefore that scientists trained in the same state of consciousness check on the logical validity of each other’s theorizing.
4. Observable Consequences. When a certain experience (observed condition) has occurred (if you do this), another (predicted) kind of experience will follow (you will know this).
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