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NC/1NR Ban Drones Counterplan



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2NC/1NR Ban Drones Counterplan

2NC/1NR Ban Drones COUNTERPLAN- Overview




The plan is a reform of the use of drones by the USFG, while the counterplan is an outright rejection of the use of drone technology. Prefer a ban on drones to the reform of their use- our 1NC uniqueness evidence states that the Obama administration is attempting to cut back on its use of extrajudicial drones strikes for counterterrorism operations. The plan increases the publics’ confidence in the responsible uses of drone technology- our 1NC evidence indicates that this support from the public allows drone strikes to continue unabated. By banning drone use, the COUNTERPLAN ensures that the USFG does not use drones in military operations, which our evidence states would embolden terrorists and cause a nuclear war

2NC/1NR- ANSWERS TO: Perm Do Both

  1. The COUNTERPLAN is functionally competitive- the USFG could not reform its use of drones and also ban them. By banning the use of the technology there would be no concerns over privacy rights for domestic use, since the USFG could not conduct surveillance operations with the technology.

  2. The COUNTERPLAN is textually competitive- to curtail means to reduce or limit that’s their own 2AC evidence, however, to ban means to prohibit



Merriam Webster Dictionary http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ban

Full Definition of BAN

transitive verb

1

archaic : curse



2

: to prohibit especially by legal means




2NC/1NR- ANSWERS TO: No Solvency

  1. The counterplan solves the affirmative’s privacy and credibility advantages. By prohibiting the use of the UAVs, the COUNTERPLAN ensures that the USFG cannot spy on citizens, solving international perception and their value to life claims

  2. Even if we cannot resolve the internal link to their agriculture advantage, we will win that a terrorism strike outweighs- our Ayson evidence indicates that these wars go nuclear through miscalculation, which means no intervening actors could prevent the conflict. However, our 1NC impact defense evidence states that food shortages will not cause conflict – there have ben multiple food shortages in the last decade that have not caused a nuclear conflict

2NC/1NR- ANSWERS TO: Add-On




1. There is not impact to a lack of aerospace innovation


Axe 2009 (David, military correspondent, regular contributor to The Washington Times, C-SPAN, and Wired, 3/30/9, http://www.warisboring.com/2009/03/30/f-22s-versus-russias-rusting-ramshackle-air-force/)

Analyst Gregory Martin, a retired Air Force general, said the erosion of world influence is largely the result of weak public support for the F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters, which are built by Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Northrop Grumman. “If you can’t afford that [mix], then your national objectives have to be scaled back,” Martin said. In other words, stealth fighters equal national power. And the absence of stealth fighters equals weakness. Hogwash. The economic crisis is having an effect on every country, unevenly. Arguably, the U.S. is faring better than most as investors flee to the comparative safety of the dollar. Power in the world is a relative thing: if everyone else gets much weaker, and we stay the same or only grow a little weak, then we are, in fact, more powerful than we were before. Get it? The global recession, alone, does not mean we are losing influence. In fact, the recession might even boost our influence, by underscoring just how much the world depends on America as a consumer market. But more importantly, American national power does not hinge on fighter jets. We could retire every single fighter in the U.S. Air Force, tomorrow, and still remain the most powerful nation in the world, by far. National power is a complex and shifting thing, comprising military force, financial and cultural influence, leadership in international coalitions and organizations and even language. Every country in the world teaches American English to its business students, aviators and sea captains. Does that have anything to do with the F-22? Do some of our biggest exports — music, movies and television — depend on a squadron of F-35s flying orbits over North Dakota? Ignore the noise coming out of Washington’s punditocracy as the Obama Administration shapes its first defense budget. And when that budget is published, and it (inevitably) includes cuts to Air Force fighter programs, take a deep breath before panicking and consider: Nearly everyone telling you we must buy a given quantity of stealth fighters, or lose global influence, has a financial stake in advocating such purchases. Of the speakers at the Wednesday confab: * Loren Thompson, from the Lexington Institute, runs a private consultancy for the defense industry, with clients including Lockheed Martin * Thompson’s colleague, Rebecca Grant, also runs her own consultancy for the defense industry * Gregory Martin has been a Northrop Grumman consultant The U.S. Air Force is in deep trouble, but it’s trouble of its own making. And it’s testimony to just how overwhelming, and sustainable, is America’s military, cultural, linguistic and financial dominance in the world that our primary military air service can commit slow, institutional suicide without alarming too many people, aside from a few hardware nerds like me and the consultants who get rich gabbing about certain pointy airplanes on behalf of wealthy corporate clients.

2. There is no impact to an economic decline


Thirlwell 2010

—MPhil in economics from Oxford U, postgraduate qualifications in applied finance from Macquarie U, program director in International Economy for the Lowy Institute for International Policy (Mark, September 2010, “The Return of Geo-economics: Globalisation and National Security”, Lowy Institute for International Policy, google scholar,)



Summing up the evidence, then, I would judge that while empirical support for the Pax Mercatoria is not conclusive, nevertheless it’s still strongly supportive of the general idea that international integration is good for peace, all else equal. Since there is also even stronger evidence that peace is good for trade, this raises the possibility of a nice virtuous circle: globalisation (trade) promotes peace, which in turn promotes more globalisation. In this kind of world, we should not worry too much about the big power shifts described in the previous section, since they are taking place against a backdrop of greater economic integration which should help smooth the whole process. Instead of ending this section on that optimistic note, however, it’s worth thinking about some reasons why the Pax Mercatoria might nevertheless turn out to be a poor, or at least overly optimistic, guide to our future. The first is captured by that all important get-out-of-gaol-free card, ‘all else equal’. It’s quite possible that the peace-promoting effects of international commerce will end up being swamped by other factors, just as they were in 1914. Second, perhaps the theory itself is wrong. Certainly, a realist like John Mearsheimer would seem to have little time for the optimistic consequences of the rise of new powers implied by the theory. Here’s Mearsheimer on how the US should view China’s economic progress, for example: ‘ . . . the United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead . . . A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.’ 62 Such pessimistic (or are they tragic?) views of the world would also seem to run the risk of being self-fulfilling prophecies if they end up guiding actual policy. Finally, there is the risk that the shift to a multipolar world might indirectly undermine some of the supports needed to deliver globalisation. Here I am thinking about some simple variant on the idea of hegemonic stability theory (HST) – the proposition that the global economy needs a leader (or ‘hegemon’) that is both able and willing to provide the sorts of international public goods that are required for its smooth functioning: open markets (liberal or ‘free’ trade), a smoothly functioning monetary regime, liberal capital flows, and a lender of last resort function. 63 Charles Kindleberger argued that ‘the 1929 depression was so wide, so deep, and so long because the international economic system was rendered unstable by British inability and US unwillingness to assume responsibility for stabilizing it’, drawing on the failures of the Great Depression to make the original case for HST: ‘ . . . the international economic and monetary system needs leadership, a country that is prepared . . . to set standards of conduct for other countries and to seek to get others to follow them, to take on an undue share of the burdens of the system, and in particular to take on its support in adversity...’ 64 Kindleberger’s assessment appears to capture a rough empirical regularity: As Findlay and O’Rourke remind us, ‘periods of sustained expansion in world trade have tended to coincided with the infrastructure of law and order necessary to keep trade routes open being provided by a dominant “hegemon” or imperial power’. 65 Thus periods of globalisation have typically been associated with periods of hegemonic or imperial power, such as the Pax Mongolica, the Pax Britannica and, most recently, the Pax Americana (Figure 9). The risk, then, is that by reducing the economic clout of the United States, it is possible that the shift to a multipolar world economy might undermine either the willingness or the ability (or both) of Washington to continue to supply the international public goods needed to sustain a (relatively) smoothly functioning world economy. 66 That in turn could undermine the potential virtuous circle identified above.



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