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ANSWERS TO: Bioterror Unlikely



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ANSWERS TO: Bioterror Unlikely




Al-Qaeda is gearing up for bioterror attacks – disrupting groups key


Obwale 12 [David, Clinical and Experimental Medicine graduate, University College London Clinical and Experimental Medicine graduate, 8/5/12, The Observer, “Ebola a potential bio-terror weapon,” http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=20215:ebola-a-potential-bio-terror-weapon&catid=37:guest-writers&Itemid=66, accessed 9/3/12, JTF]

Ebola has capabilities of biological weaponization with catastrophic consequences, especially due to the fact that it lacks adequate and effective vaccines and therapeutics that would counter any prospective mass attacks. Its zoonotic origin, distribution route and exposure in the tropical climatic conditions conceal its incubation and concurrence in these belligerent conditions.¶ Also, Ebola, being highly contagious, presents an adaptability factor likely to be exploited by biological terrorists willing to be infected by these bio-hazardous agents. The terrorists would then have to deliberately transport themselves into their targeted areas during the incubation period in order to initiate person-to-person transmission, either by secretion contact or airborne dissemination.¶ The relatively low production cost, that only entails human contact and enormous availability of willing volunteers, which already exists amongst Al Qaeda radicals, poses a threat of unprecedented scale. Al Qaeda and its extremist networks have already carried out numerous terrorist attacks around the globe. Needless to say, arming themselves with Ebola, as a highly effective weapon, would lend them the capacity to unleash a high-impact attack causing mass civilian casualties.¶ Proliferation of the Ebola virus for bioterrorism may also arise from the way biological specimens are stored, which is unique to agents of viral hemorrhagic fevers. Most virological laboratories are not specialized and equipped adequately for rapid diagnosis and appropriate examination of the Ebola samples. The storage of Ebola virus samples requires maximum security in the specimen laboratories.¶ This has resulted into the monopoly by some reference laboratories dealing with scientific repositories’ management. This raises the issues of sharing specimens and the illicit use of these infectious agents which can stream into the possible risk of bioterrorism during diagnostic research and procedures.

Bioterror is coming now---wide range of motivational factors and new technical capabilities ensure CBRN use


Asal et al. 12—Professor in the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy at the University at Albany–SUNY—AND Gary Ackerman, Member of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland—AND R. Karl Rethemeyer, Professor in the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy at the University at Albany–SUNY (Victor, “Connections Can Be Toxic: Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of CBRN Weapons,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 35, Issue 3, Taylor & Francis)

The State of the Literature A recent survey of over 120 books, journal articles, monographs, and government reports dealing with CBRN terrorism10 revealed that there are a disproportionate number of studies and publications dealing with the potential for terrorists to attain a CBRN weapons capability and the response to the consequences of a CBRN attack, as opposed to the terrorists’ motivations for using CBRN weapons. Within that portion of the literature that does delve into aspects of intentionality, the closest thing to a consensus among scholars is the following set of assertions: 1. There is a wide variety of motivational incentives that might make the acquisition and/or use of CBRN weapons attractive to terrorists. These range from (a) ideological or psychological imperatives, such as an apocalyptic worldview or a fetishistic relationship toward technology, to (b) operational or instrumental objectives, such as the ability to inflict mass casualties or contaminate large areas, to perhaps most importantly, (c) the singularly tremendous psychological effects exerted on targeted societies by CBRN agents. There are also a host of corresponding disincentives to using these weapons,11 including possible alienation of supporters and the lack of certainty in the scope of consequences relative to conventional weapons such as high explosives. 2. Many terrorist organizations have considered CBRN use. There is sufficient evidence to conclude that a multiplicity of terrorist organizations and individuals representing different backgrounds and espousing different ideologies have either considered using CBRN weapons or have attempted to acquire a CBRN weapons capability. This includes, among others, terrorist organizations and individuals motivated by ethno-nationalist, Marxist, right-wing, animal rights, and religious causes. 3. Technical and knowledge-sharing innovations are making it easier for terrorist entities to achieve a CBRN capability, which could facilitate the decision to pursue these weapons. The prospects for acquiring a CBRN capability are increasing, both as a result of technological advances and the diffusion of knowledge. The Internet, access to technical schools and universities, and the spread of “dualuse” technologies into many countries are major contributors.12 These dynamics facilitate terrorists’ awareness of CBRN weapons and provide new opportunities to acquire them, which might shift their weapons selection calculus toward CBRN.


ANSWERS TO: No Impact to Bioterror

Bioterror spreads – defense fails


Metcalfe 13 (John Metcalfe, Staff Writer for Atlantic Cities, 7/24/2013, "Cities Might Not Be as Prepared as They Think for a Bioterrorism Attack", www.defenseone.com/threats/2013/07/cities-might-not-be-prepared-they-think-bioterrorism-attack/67352/)

Imagine that a small group of terrorists deliberately infect themselves with smallpox and then walk around London, spreading it to the populace. How much could the terrible disease proliferate before the world realized something was amiss? This unsettling question is at the heart of new computer model showing how a bioterrorism attack in one city could quickly become the world's problem. Scientists started off with the hypothetical release of smallpox in London, New York, Paris and other major cities, then simulated how travelers would carry the virus to a host of other countries. Their conclusion: In the best-case scenario, smallpox could spread to two to four nations before doctors managed to diagnose it. Still ahead would lie the monumental task of quarantining the infected, distributing vaccines and tracing the source of the outbreak. Previous research into bioterrorism have indicated that Western cities, with their protocols and vaccines, are pretty well prepared to handle a biological attack, says Alessandro Vespignani, a computer and health-sciences professor at Boston's Northeastern University. But in a paper in this month's Scientific Reports (don't worry, it was vetted for international-security issues), he and his fellow researchers argue that the assumption of local readiness is missing the big picture. "The problem is that most of those studies don't consider the global dimensions of the event," Vespignani says. "Before you even realize there is an outbreak, it might already be in other places. That changes the game." One major danger: From London, the smallpox might spread to countries that don't have the health infrastructure of the Western world. In these places it could become potent pandemics that might wash over into still more nations. And that's not only possible for attacks in cities near the less-developed corners of the world. No matter what metropolis a bioterrorist targets for harm, the dispersion of disease unfolds more or less the same way, at least according to the computer model. Vespignani says there are two big things that people should take away from these findings. The first is that governments and international health organizations, whether it be WHO, the CDC or whoever, need to develop contingency plans for a pandemic that originates from afar. "They need to think about sharing resources," he says. The second is that wanna-be terrorists playing with pathogenic agents ought to consider that a biological attack is a double-edged sword. "They think they're going to affect only the area that they target. But quickly and easily, it will spread all over the world," perhaps even right back to their own motherland. "Using these kinds of weapons, there is no winner, for sure."

Air travel means their quarantine defense doesn’t apply


OCC ’10 [Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, August 5, 2010, Global Security, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2009,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2010/c-rprt-terrorism_2009-04.htm, accessed 10/2/12, JTF]

Bioterrorism, another deadly threat, is the deliberate dispersal of pathogens through food, air, water, or living organisms to cause disease. The 2009 Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism concluded that it is more likely that terrorists would be able to acquire and use biological agents than nuclear weapons due to the difficulty in controlling the proliferation of biotechnologies and biological agent information. If properly produced and released, biological agents can kill on a massive scale and, if terrorists use a pathogen that can be transmitted from person to person, the disease could quickly spread through commercial air travel across oceans and continents before authorities realize their nations have been attacked.



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