Chapter IX power, Wealth and Interdependence in an Era of Advanced Globalization
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The Chinese National Bureau of Statistics measured the size of China’s GDP at PPP in 2014 at $10.6 trillion. This is the basis for our estimate of a $10 trillion economy in 2013. http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/ There is considerable variance in these estimates. Both the IMF and the World Bank estimate China’s 2013 GDP PPP at above $16 trillion. The CIA estimates this figure at $13 trillion. 63 Jack Levy, “Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China,” in Robert Ross and Zhu Feng, (eds.) China’s Ascent, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008, 18. 64 Ronald Tammen, et al. (eds.) Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century, New York: Seven Bridges, 2000; A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, New York: Knopf, 1958; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981; Ronald Tammen and Jacek Kugler, “Power Transition and China-US Conflicts,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 1 (2006) 35-55; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, New York: Vintage, 1987; Jonathan DiCicco and Jack Levy, “Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of Power Transition Research Program,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43,6 (December 1999) 675-704; Steve Chan, China, The U.S. and the Power-Transition Theory: A Critique, New York: Routledge, 2008. 65 The expectation of conflict is seconded by neorealist theories, though without the qualification regarding the satisfaction of the rising power. Aaron Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security, 30.2 (Fall 2005) 7-45. 66 Michael Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987. 67 Keir Lieber, “The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory,” International Security. 32.2 (Fall 2007) 155-191. 68 The effects of the security dilemma on national choices – in which efforts to engage in a purely defensive military expansion threaten other nations and lead to counterveiling efforts by opponents and an escalation to war – is not integrated into power transition theory. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, 30.2 (January 1978) 167-214. Charles Glasser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics, 50.1 (October 1997) 171-201. 69 Aaron Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, New York: Norton, 2011; Aaron Friedberg, “Hegemony With Chinese Characteristics,” The National Interest (July/August 2011) 18-27. 70 John Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3 (2010) 382. 71 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. 72 Elbridge Colby, et al. Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations, CSIS, 2013, http://csis.org/files/publication/130307_Colby_USChinaNuclear_Web.pdf 74 A review of these ideas is Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins, “Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction,” In Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins (eds.) Economic Interdependence and International Conflict, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003, 10-37. Further, there are other scholars, mostly realists, who assert that economic relationships bear little influence on the choices that result in war, which are related instead to the distribution of power in the international system. 75 Paul Schroeder, “Economic Integration and the European International System in the Era of World War I,” American Historical Review, 98.4 (October 1993) 1130-1137, provides a discussion of the intersection of elite assumptions in pre World War I Europe about international competition as a zero sum game linking both military and economic struggles. 76 The first date, 1813, is not precisely accurate, as the system we will discuss did not come into place until about 1818. But, for purposes of symmetry with the other dates, 1913 and 2013, we choose 1813. 77 A detailed discussion and debate about the changes in global systems from the 18th to the 21st centuries is: Peter Kruger and Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848: Episode or Model in Modern History? Munster: LIT, 2002. 78 T.C.W. Blanning, “Paul W. Schroeder’s Concert of Europe,” International History Review, 16.4 (1994) 701-714; Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994; G. John Ikenberry, After Victory, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001; Jennifer Mitzen, Power in Concert, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013. 79 Schroeder, “Economic Integration…,” 1133. 80 Carl Strikwerda, “The Troubled Origins of European Economic Integration: International Iron and Steel and Labor Migration in the Era of World War I,” American Historical Review, 98.4 October 1993) 1106-1129. 81 Chrisof Dejung and Niels Petersson (eds.) The Foundations of Worldwide Economic Integration: Power, Institutions and Global Markets, 1850-1930, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 82 Except for the outbreak of systemic war among the most powerful states. Such evidence would certainly cast large doubt on the conflict reducing effects of interdependence. 83 Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, 76.6 (November/December 1997) 22-43. 84 For an analysis of the adjustments made by China resulting from joining the system of global capitalist interdependence, see Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012, especially chapter 10. 85 Quddus Snyder, “Integrating Rising Powers: Liberal Systemic Theory and the Mechanism of Competition,” Review of International Studies, 39 (2013) 209-231. 86 Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” International Organization, 41.3 (Summer 1987) 491-517. 87 Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization and the End of the Cold War,” International Security, 25.3 (Winter 2000) 5-53. There is a large and important literature relating changes in ideas by Soviet and other leaders as a key source of the end of the Cold War. However, the analysis of economic constraints and ideas are not necessarily a competing hypotheses. Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, (eds.) International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 88 Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, “ Economic Constraints and the Turn Towards Superpower Cooperation in the 1980s,” in Olav Njolstad, (ed.) The Last Decade of the Cold War, New York: Cass, 2004, 69-117; Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, “ Economic Constraints and the End of the Cold War, in William Wohlforth (ed.) Cold War Endgame, Penn State University Press, 2003, 273-309. 89 Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011, 664-690. 90 Especially significant was the decisions to integrate by communist Vietnam between 1992 and 1995. 91 The new system of interdependence calls for new forms of understanding. Previously, interdependence has been conceptualized as a bilateral relationship. This is inadequate, for interdependence today must be understood in multilateral terms, as a relationship between individual states and a global system and as a system of relationships among a multitude of states and non-state actors. For a conception based on bilateral thinking, see John Kroll, “The Complexity of Interdependence,” International Studies Quarterly, 37.3 (September 1993) 321-347. 92 Stephen Brooks, Producing Security, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. Thomas D. Lairson, “Deep Interdependence and the Political Economy of Power Relations in Asia,” paper presented at the June 2013 Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast Conference, Monterey. 93 Erik Gartzke, “The Capitalist Peace,” American Journal of Political Science, 51.1 (January 2007) 166-191. The major outsider states were North Korea and Cuba; the major non-state actor ready to attack the system was Al Qaeda and affiliates. 94 See Chapter Six for discussion of global financial crises in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Also see, Mark Copelovitch, The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 95 G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China: Power, Institutions and Western Order,” in Robert Ross and Zhu Feng, (eds.) China’s Ascent, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008, 89-114. A similar analysis can be made for the World Bank. Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006. 96 Malaysia did chose to reinstitute capital controls during the financial crisis but remained otherwise deeply integrated into the global economy. 97 Even Greece, which has recently suffered a massive economic depression from its relationship to the Euro, has not moved to withdraw from this system, much less withdraw from the global economy. 98 Daniel Rosen and Thilo Hanemann, An American Open Door? Maximizing the Benefits of Chinee Foreign Direct Investment, Washington: Asia Society, 2011, http://asiasociety.org/policy/center-us-china-relations/american-open-door 99 This was clearly true for the Soviets two decades ago and is even more true today. 100 One group of scholars, focusing only on U.S.-China dimensions of economic interdependence, describes a situation of “mutual assured economic destruction” that prevails from any significant military engagement between these nations. James Dobbins, et al. “Conflict With China,” RAND, Occasional Paper, 2011. 101 Michael Mastanduno, “System Maker and Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and the International Political Economy,” 61.1 (January 2009) 121-154. Carla Norrlof, America’s Global Advantage, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 102 Eswar Prasad and Lei Ye, The Renminbi’s Role in the Global Monetary System, Washington: Brookings, 2012; Economist Intelligence Unit, “China: Towards a Redback World,” September 24, 2013, http://www.eiu.com/industry/article/1550992339/china-towards-a-redback-world/2013-09-24 ; Arvind Subramanian and Martin Kessler, “The Renminbi Bloc is Here: Asia Down, Rest of the World to Go?” Petersen Institute for International Economics, Working Paper 12-19, October 2012. 103 See the discussion of Chinese rebalancing above in chapter 7. 104 In China’s case, a vital issue for consideration is the relationship between external conflict, including efforts to overturn the existing international system, and regime survival. Can the Chinese Communist Party maintain its level of domestic control in an external environment defined by great instability? This question may provide a sobering effect on Chinese decision-making. M. Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes,” International Security, 30.2 (Fall 2005) 46–83. Directory: tlairson -> ipe tlairson -> Nyt amid Tension, China Blocks Crucial Exports to Japan By keith bradsher published: September 22, 2010 tlairson -> China Alters Its Strategy in Diplomatic Crisis With Japan By jane perlez tlairson -> The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 11, Issue 21, No. 3, May 27, 2013. 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