Chesterfield fire department response to severe storm emergencies executive analysis of fire department operations in emergency management



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  1. How vulnerable is Chesterfield County to severe weather, i.e., thunderstorms, hurricanes, tornados, etc.?

Chesterfield County is extremely vulnerable to the effects of severe weather. In the literature it described the United States as a whole as very vulnerable to the formation of severe weather systems, particularly thunderstorms, because of the absence of any significant mountain ranges running in an east-west direction. The lack of such physical barriers allows warm, moisture-laden air from the Gulf of Mexico to flow northward where it readily collides with cold, dry air coming down from Canada. The resultant collision spawns some of the most violent weather on earth, in the form of supercell thunderstorms and tornados, and the battleground is the Midwestern United States, particularly the Great Plains.



Chesterfield County is a microcosm of that larger national weather development scenario. Lying in the central Piedmont region of Virginia, the Blue Ridge Mountains (part of the Appalachian Mountain Range) run north-south approximately ninety miles west of the county. The Atlantic Ocean lies approximately one hundred miles to the east of the county. Warm, moist air from the Gulf of Mexico frequently flows northward through Georgia and the Carolinas up through Virginia, and Chesterfield County. In the spring and summer this moisture frequently fuels late afternoon thunderstorms; in the winter it can bring significant snowfall. Hurricanes and their remnants also follow that path to Chesterfield County. Since 1972, the County’s Emergency Operations Plan lists twelve significant incidents that required county response for emergency services above normal operations levels. All twelve were caused by severe weather: supercell thunderstorms and tornados; hurricanes and their remnants; and flooding either from the previously mentioned storm types, or non-tropical, slow-moving moisture-laden low-pressure systems. The Hazard Analysis contained in the county’s Emergency Operations Plan ranks the windstorm/tornado/severe thunderstorm category as the second most likely vehicle for a disaster in Chesterfield County, exceeded only by a hazardous material accident. The hurricane/tropical storm category was rated a close third.

Flooding is a major concern because the county is part of the drainage basin for two rivers, the James and the Appomattox. This has been dramatically illustrated in 1999 as the remnants of Hurricane Dennis and Hurricane Floyd both passed through Chesterfield County. Hurricane Floyd, which dropped more than seven inches of rain on the county over a period of several hours, created some of the most extensive small streams flooding that the county had ever experienced.



The literature contained information that localized flooding, particularly flash floods, becomes more of a hazard as land becomes developed and concrete and asphalt covers more and more ground preventing rain from soaking into the ground. Chesterfield continues to experience rapid growth and development that started in the early 1970's and that scenario is taking place today.

  1. How does severe weather affect the number of calls for service received by the department?

Severe weather creates a significant increase in the overall number of calls for service, and for three particular calls types: hazardous conditions; public service calls; and alarm activations.

For three selected storms a six-day average was calculated for fire calls, EMS calls, hazardous conditions, public service calls, and alarm activations received for the same time period as the storms. (Hazardous Conditions, Public Service, and Alarm Activations are included in the total fire call figures). Figure 7 below compares the calls for service received during a tornado/thunderstorm that moved through the southern part of the County’s Matoaca District on August 6, 1993 between 1330 hours and 1730 hours to the same time period for three days before the storm and three days after the storm.





Figure 7. Tornado of August 6, 1993. Comparison of calls for service vs. 6-day average for time period 1330 hours to 1730 hours.


The total number of calls for service (fire and EMS) during that incident (45) represents a 200% increase over the six-day average of August 3-5, and August 7-9, 1993 for the same time period. (The six-day average was fifteen calls for service during the same 1330-1730 hours period). Calls for service for hazardous conditions, i.e., downed power lines, transformer fires, lightning strikes with no fire, hazard control for situations not involving a motor vehicle accident, etc., which are practically none existent during the six-day average account for thirteen (28.8%) of that total number. Public Service calls which include response for water shut offs, tree removal from roadways, trees into structures with no other hazards, etc., made up six (13.3%) of the total increase in call activity.

Figures 8 below shows the same comparison for a microburst that struck the Clover Hill District on March 8, 1995.





Figure 8. Micro-burst of March 8, 1995. Comparison of calls for service vs. 6-day average for time period 1730 hours to 2330 hours.

The 90 calls for service during that incident is a 529% increase over the six-day average of 17 calls for service (March 5-7, and March 9-11 for the same time period). The Hazardous Conditions calls and Public Service calls show an increase consistent with that shown in Figure 7 above.



Figure 9 below shows the comparison for Tropical Storm Fran, a storm that affected the entire county on September 6, 1996 from 0100 hours to 1900 hours.



Figure 9. Tropical Storm Fran, September 6, 1996. Comparison of calls for service vs. 6-day average, 0100 hours to 1900 hours.

During that prolonged storm (17 hours) the department responded to 355 total fire calls. That represents a 602% increase over the six-day average of 59 calls for service during the same time period. The Hazardous Conditions calls, 116 (32.7%) and Public Service calls 127 (35.7%) accounted for 68.4% of that increase.

Severe weather not only increases the total number of calls for service received, but also increases the rate at which those calls are received. Table 10 on the next page illustrates the increase in the calls per hour experienced during the selected storms as compared to the six-day average.



Storm

Calls/Hour (During Storm)

Calls/Hour (Six-Day Average)

% of Increase



Tornado, 8/6/93

11.25

3.75

300%



Micro-burst, 3/8/95

15.0

2.83

530%



Tropical Storm, 9/6/96

20.9

3.5

597%


Table 10. Comparison of calls for service per hour received. Selected storms vs. 6 day-average for same time period.

Such rapid increases in the number of calls for service can quickly tax the available resources of the department as it attempts to provide service to its citizens. This is particularly true if the event encompasses the entire county as Tropical Storm Fran did in 1996. Emergency resources can be shifted from unaffected areas to the hazard area for smaller events, such as the tornado/thunderstorm and microburst.



  1. What policies and procedures does Chesterfield Fire Department currently have in place for response and emergency operations during severe weather?

The Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) for emergency 9-1-1 calls for service in Chesterfield County is the Emergency Communications Center (ECC). The ECC is a consolidated emergency communications center, separate from the police or fire department, that handles all E-9-1-1 calls from the public and dispatches those calls for service to the police, fire, and EMS agencies in Chesterfield County.

Fire and EMS calls are prioritized as Priority 1, 2, or 3 calls for service. For EMS calls, priority 1 calls are those with immediate life-threatening potential, i.e., cardiac arrest, uncontrolled bleeding, altered mental status, difficulty breathing, etc.



Priority 2 calls are those calls that could be life-threatening, but the threat is not immediate, i.e., stroke patients with no difficulty breathing, a seizure patient who has stopped actively seizing, etc. Priority 3 calls are those where no threat to life exists, i.e., a fractured leg, back injury, sick case, etc. Emergency resources respond with red lights and siren on priority 1 and 2 calls; priority 3 calls are handled without red lights and siren. These priorities are established by the Operational Medical Director, who serves in that capacity for both the ECC and the fire department.

Fire calls for service are categorized as either priority 1 or 3 (See Appendix A). Resources respond with red lights and siren on priority 1 calls only. Presently 30 of the 35 (85.7%) fire call types that can be entered into the ECC’s Computer Aided Dispatch System (CADS) are categorized as priority 1. The fire department’s present storm policy advises that during inclement weather the Senior Battalion Chief should direct the ECC to dispatch no more than three priority 3 fire calls, and three priority 3 EMS calls at any one time. The small number of call types currently categorized as priority 3 does not significantly lessen the number of calls that the ECC needs to dispatch, and to which the fire department needs to respond. This is especially true when one of the call types that increases dramatically during severe weather, the Hazardous Condition call type, is presently categorized as a priority 1 though it includes those calls, i.e., downed power lines, transformer fires, lightning strikes with no fire, etc., that should be considered as a lower priority during severe weather events that stress the emergency response system.




The number of priority 1 call types becomes a driving force that quickly depletes available resources in a response district. The following scenario is quite typical in Chesterfield County. Emergency units are quickly dispatched as single-unit resources to a variety of calls such as wires down, trees into homes, transformer fires, etc. Engine and truck companies are dispersed throughout their response districts, and in many cases may be responding to calls in their second due area. At the same time, fire units are continuing to be dispatched with medic units (ambulances) on EMS calls as dictated by the Emergency Medical Dispatch (EMD) protocols that are part of the CADS. Next, a true emergency is reported, i.e., a structure fire caused by a lightning strike, and the closest resources may be coming from a third or fourth due engine company. (Given the large geographical area of the county, 446 square miles, such fire companies may routinely be responding from a distance of 8-10 miles or more.) (J.E. Graham, personal communications, September 16, 1999).

The department’s present adverse weather policy primarily addresses flooding that can occur on the James and Appomattox Rivers, and Swift Creek (a local waterway in the county). Addendum D to that policy addresses some tactical and task level operations during inclement weather, but focuses mainly on winter weather situations as it was developed in response to lessons learned from emergency response during severe winter snows in January, 1995. Neither the policy nor the addendum provide strategic direction to the department’s middle and upper managers to aid them in conducting fire department operations during severe weather events.




The department’s Incident Command System policy has not been updated to include components such as Incident Complex and Area Command as outlined in the National Fire Academy’s Command and Control of Natural and Man-made Disasters. Battalion Chiefs do not act in the capacity of resource managers for their battalions during severe weather events causing a rapid increase in calls for service received, and multiple working events in their battalion. Rather, they continue in their normal operations response mode of attempting to respond to significant events, i.e., structure fires, where they function as the Incident Commander for that event. When plans are developed, they tend to be ad hoc plans developed for the incident based on the knowledge and skill levels of the officers involved. There is no consistency from incident to incident and we continually re-manage similar incidents (J.E. Graham, personal communication, September 16, 1999).

  1. What training do Chesterfield Fire Department officers receive for response and emergency operations before, during, and after severe weather and how well prepared do they feel they are for such operations?

Chesterfield Fire Department has no specific training programs for its operational personnel to prepare them for response to the type and magnitude emergencies that severe weather can produce. All officers receive training on the department’s Incident Command System, but that training focuses on the use of ICS for fire, EMS, and hazardous materials incidents that would be within the scope of normal operations.


Senior Battalion Chiefs, Battalion Chiefs, and Senior Captains make up the Middle Manager population within the department. The advanced level ICS training that the Middle Managers have received addresses scenarios for those same categories of incidents were the amount of necessary resources to manage the incident will be larger than daily operations. There are no training programs that address the scale of resource management that a severe weather event could require, or that would prepare those Middle Managers to manage multiple incidents covering large geographic areas of the county.

Recently, the department completed development of its Officer Development Program Level II curriculum. That program is targeted toward those Lieutenants and Captains who have completed the Level I program. This new course, for which delivery starts in January, 2000, contains an eight-hour program covering Chesterfield County’s Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), the fire department’s role in that plan, and how the County’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is designed to function when activated. All fire department Middle Managers were required to attend the pilot delivery of that course. At the time this research project was completed that was the only formalized training that the Middle Managers had received on that topic and that was approximately two years ago. There has been no additional training, or scenario-based exercises directed at that group to develop and maintain their proficiency with the materials and concepts of the EOP and the EOC. Only those Middle Managers who have had to attend the yearly EOC operational drill, because they are a Division Head, or happened to be assigned to the EOC from the Emergency Operations Division on the day of the drill, have received exposure to the process.




Results of the Fire Officer Survey

Forty-four (67.6%) of the 65 first-line supervisors (Lieutenants and Captains) who received the survey completed it and returned it to the author. None of the respondents reported that they had completed any of the severe storm response training programs offered by the National Fire Academy and Emergency Management Institute. Table 11 below illustrates the survey results from those officers.



Question

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree



I feel the organization has a plan for safe effective and efficient response to severe storm emergencies.

0

6

7

29

3



I am trained and prepared to manage emergency response resources at my level in the organization.

0

3

1

32

8



I understand the hazards and special operations and resource management necessary for response to storm related emergencies.

1

5

6

31

1



I receive adequate training for response to storm related emergencies.

1

15

7

20

1


Table 11. First-Line Supervisor Responses to survey

Twenty-one Middle Managers received the survey with 17 (81.0%) completing the survey and returning it to the author.


Three Middle Managers reported that they had attended the NFA course, Command and Control of Natural and Man-made Disasters. Two different Middle Managers reported that they had attended the NFA course, Executive Analysis of Fire Service Operations in Emergency Management. The other 12 respondents reported that they had attended none of the NFA or EMI courses. Table 12 below shows the responses of Middle Managers to the survey questions.

Question

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree



I feel the organization has a plan for safe effective and efficient response to severe storm emergencies.

0

6

7

29

3



I am trained and prepared to manage emergency response resources at my level in the organization.

0

3

1

32

8



I understand the hazards and special operations and resource management necessary for response to storm related emergencies.

1

5

6

31

1



I receive adequate training for response to storm related emergencies.

1

15

7

20

1


Table 12. Middle Manager Responses to Survey




  1. What are benchmarks for response to severe storm emergencies exist that could enable Chesterfield Fire Department to make its operations more safe, effective, and efficient?


The review of the literature, including the operational policies of several fire departments, indicates that an emergency response to severe weather related incidents require strong policy and procedure in the following areas: (1) situation assessment and size-up; (2) developing and communicating incident objectives; (3) development of an effective incident management organization; (4) efficient and effective resource allocation; (5) addressing incident safety issues.

Situation Assessment and Size-up

Following a severe storm related event a department must be able to quickly assess the immediate impact of the storm on emergency resources and facilities. The operational plans reviewed all contain provisions for a “snapshot” or preliminary assessment by fire station personnel of their equipment, personnel, facilities, and what are the conditions in the immediate vicinity of their physical location. This initial assessment information is quickly relayed to the appropriate level of management for the event so that an initial assessment can be made as to the initial size and scope of the emergency.

Once that preliminary assessment has been completed, emergency resources are directed to systematically assess the condition of their first-due response area through the use of the “windshield survey.” Emergency apparatus and personnel physically drive predetermined routes through their response area and collecting information on storm impact based on what they can see through the windshield of their apparatus. Supervisors completing the windshield assessment should focus on assessing the status of transportation routes, target hazards, public utilities, etc., and recording significant findings for communication to department managers. Company Officers are directed to only stop and provide emergency service for obvious life-threatening situations.


The emphasis is on completing the survey as quickly as possible to provide more complete information as to the size and magnitude of the incident to the emergency incident managers, both in the field and in the EOC.

Developing and Communicating Incident Objectives



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