Yourself and your co-workers
The station and apparatus
Utilities: gas, water, electricity, and phone lines
Move apparatus out of the station to the primary safe area. If the primary area is unusable, move to the secondary safe area.
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Complete a roll call (Redmond Fire Department, 1998, p. 1)
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Myrtle Beach Fire Department uses the designation of “Snapshot Assessment,” a term commonly found in the review of several fire department plans, to describe the same type of activity. (See Appendix F).
Preliminary Assessment-Disaster Assessment Snapshot. This tool is designed to report preliminary conditions following a disaster. It includes reports of personnel, equipment, and facilities as well as a rapid “snapshot” of conditions and damage in the immediate area of the location where the assessment is performed. This is not a detailed assessment of the situation and needs. It is designed to permit all initial reports to be made using a common measurement device (Myrtle Beach Fire Department, 1999, unnumbered page).
Palm Beach County Fire Rescue (1999) categorizes similar initial activity as an Impact Assessment. The first phase of the Impact Assessment is the Primary Survey.
The primary survey should be conducted first to determine: (1) the status of personnel (no injuries, minor injuries, serious injuries); (2) status of equipment and apparatus (in service, in service but needs repair, out of service); (3) status of structural damage to station (none, low, moderate, high, extensive) (Palm Beach County Fire Rescue, 1999, p. 13).
South Trail Fire Protection and Rescue Service District (1999) requires each station to conduct a similar initial assessment of their immediate area using similar criteria and procedures.
FEMA (1994) describes the secondary assessment as size-up. A fire department’s initial responsibility in a disaster is virtually the same as for routine daily emergencies.
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“They must assess the situation and perform a size-up and triage. Regardless of how you refer to these tasks, they must be done, and the information transferred to command” (FEMA, 1994, p. 3-42). The emphasis in a disaster, however, needs to be on completing the assessment prior to resources actively engaging in service delivery. Without a systematic assessment of the event’s impact on the community at large the Incident Commander does not know the scope and magnitude of the incident. The mechanism for this assessment is the “windshield survey.” The “windshield survey” consists of pre-identifying a route and target occupancies within a primary response area and traveling that route after a disaster” (FEMA, 1994, p. 3-45).
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Each company will conduct a windshield survey of their preassigned area. Companies will report via radio to operations in the Central Station the conditions of their areas. These reports are to include the status of utilities, roadways, and pending emergency calls. NO COMPANY WILL COMMIT TO A SITUATION UNTIL THEY HAVE COMPLETED THEIR SURVEY (South Trail Fire Protection and Rescue Service District, 1999, p 11).
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Palm Beach County Fire Rescue Department (1999) uses the terminology of “jurisdictional survey” to describe their assessment of the impact on the community. That department’s priorities are the status of target hazards, major response routes, and housing developments in the county. Redmon Fire Department’s Earthquake Emergency Plan calls for their personnel to survey the community and categorize hazards using a color-coded designation: red for significant damage, yellow for moderate damage, and green for little or no damage. (See Appendix G).
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Using the attached check sheets, and using the designated route, do a drive-by assessment of the commercial, multi-family residential, major arterials, shelters (schools and churches), and high hazard occupancies in your area. You are expected to stick to the route as much as possible (Redmon Fire Department, 1998, unnumbered page).
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Main (1995) wrote about the strategic benefits of a well-coordinated structural triage system following a tornado that struck the Evansville, IN area. In that paper the author recommended that the City of Evansville and surrounding townships adopt and use the structural triage procedures used by FEMA’s Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams to allow better coordination between local resources and USAR teams during disaster response. Myrtle Beach Fire Department (1999) and Palm Beach Fire Rescue (1999) include the USAR system for building triage as part of their response plans. Using the system ensures that structures are checked only once, thus scarce emergency response resources do not get involved in redundant work.
Identifying Incident Objectives
Developing incident objectives is an important responsibility for any Incident Commander, but becomes even more critical in a disaster situation. “Every emergency incident, no matter how small, requires some form of planning to control the problem (Auf der Heide, 1989, p. 151). For the larger scale incident, such as those caused by severe weather, a more formalized process of identifying objectives and committing them to written form becomes critical to the success of operations. Auf der Heide (1989), FEMA (1994), and FEMA (1999) all recommend that the Incident Commander, as quickly as possible, begin that formal documentation of incident objectives using standard Incident Command System Forms 201-220. (See Appendix K).
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The experienced emergency responders who developed ICS spent over a year designing the forms that are used in the planning process. Their work focused on preparing documents that would: (1) follow the Management by Objectives concept; (2) answer the questions, “What do we need to know?” and “What do we need to do?” on complex incidents; (3) be relatively easy to complete; and (4) be of real assistance, not just an exercise in paperwork, for personnel working under crisis conditions (Auf der Heide, 1989, p.152).
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FEMA (1999) wrote that an Incident Action Plan documents the actions developed by the Incident Commander and Command and General Staffs during the Planning Meeting. A properly completed action plan specifies control objectives, tactics to meet the objectives, resources, organization, communications plan, medical plan, and other appropriate information to use in tactical operations. The use of ICS Forms 201-207, when properly completed, constitutes a thorough Incident Action Plan (FEMA, 1999, ICS Forms Catalog).
The written IAP is the cornerstone of good documentation of the emergency response. All emergency responses require some form of documentation, i.e., fire reports, patient care reports, a hazmat response report, etc. The emergency nature of a disaster does not lessen the need for, nor alleviate, requirements for complete documentation.
Documentation will be greater in both volume and in scope than during routine emergencies. Workloads will be proportional to the size of the disaster, or greater. This need is driven by: (1) more extensive damage; (2) more agencies involved; (3) greater cost; and (4) increased possibilities of something going wrong (FEMA, 1999, SM 5-3).
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Developing an Organization to Manage the Incident
A severe storm can quickly create a level of devastation in a community that rapidly creates demands for service that exceeds the abilities of emergency responders.
The tornado struck in mid-afternoon, tearing along a path 200 meters wide and seven kilometers long and causing an estimated $10 million in damage. With winds reaching approximately 270 km/h, it was categorized as a force 3 tornado, falling into the middle of a scale of 0 to 5 established by Environment Canada. Hundreds of homes suffered serious damage. Thirty out of approximately 260 families had their homes completely demolished (Drapeauu, 1994, p.2).
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Such situations require the rapid development of a management organization that enables an emergency response organization to safely, effectively, and efficiently deploy and manage resources. This is especially true since the operations needed will vary dramatically from those employed on a daily basis to routine emergencies. The conditions that responders will have to operate in will be unlike anything they may have seen in their career. Eichelberger (1991) wrote about emergency response operations in the town of Plainfield, IL following a destructive tornado. Responders were faced with entire blocks of homes that were destroyed, no street signs or landmarks for navigation, downed communications systems, and a lack of information about the scope and magnitude of the event until very late in the operation.
FEMA (1993) wrote that the Incident Command System is designed to be use in response to emergencies caused by fires, flood, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornados, and any number of other natural and man-made incidents.
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Many emergency response organizations in the U.S. now use the ICS to manage their daily response to emergencies. However, when a community is faced with an event that generates numerous small incidents, or several large incidents in the same geographical area, simultaneously the full expansion of the ICS organization may not be adequate. “The Incident Complex and Area Command are two tools that were developed as a result of experience with such disasters. The definition of Incident Complex is two or more individual incidents located in the same general proximity which are assigned to a single incident management team or unified command to facilitate management (FEMA, 1994, p. 3-17).
FEMA (1994) wrote that the following factors should be considered when using an Incident Complex:
A complex may be managed under a single or unified command.
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The incidents are close enough to be managed by the same incident management team.
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Some staff and/or logistical support economies could be achieved through a combined management approach.
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Planning, Logistics, and Finance activities can be adequately provided to the Incident Complex from a single management team.
In an Incident Complex where numerous incidents are handled quickly and with only a few resources, the incidents are not named, but handled as tasks within a division or branch (See Figure 3 on next page).
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Figure 3. Incident Complex Organization (FEMA, 1994, p.3-22)
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FEMA (1994) wrote that some incidents occurring in the same general area and drawing from the same resources may even exceed the capabilities of the Incident Complex. Experience with these situations, such a multiple wildfires in the same area, led to the concept of Area Command. This system inserts a level of management between the agency or EOC and multiple incidents. The incidents themselves many be managed by single or unified command. The Incident Commanders, after appropriate notification, report to the Area Commander (See Figure 4 below).
Figure 4. Area Command Organization (FEMA, 1994, p. 3-22).
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Incident Commanders are a part of the Area Command structure. Area Command does not replace the incident level ICS organization. The primary responsibilities of the Area Commander are to:
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Provide effective agency or jurisdictional oversight for assigned incidents.
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Ensure that Incident Commanders have a clear understanding of agency expectations, intentions, and constraints related to the incidents.
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Establish priorities between various incidents based on incident needs and agency policy and direction. (Probably the most important responsibility.) This will include three priorities: (1) priorities among incidents; (2) priorities related to allocating critically needed scare resources; (3) priorities related to demobilization.
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Ensure that Incident Management Team (IMT) personnel assignments and organizations are appropriate for the kind and complexity of the incidents involved.
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Maintain liaison with officials in charge, assisting and cooperating agencies, and other interested groups.
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Coordinate the demobilization of assigned incidents (FEMA, 1994, p. 3-20).
Palm Beach County Fire Rescue (1999) has adapted these two concepts into their disaster response management system package. That department uses the terminology of Battalion Command in place of Incident Complex; a Battalion Command Team (BCT) manages the multiple incidents that occur in the same battalion (geographical area). (See Figure 5 on next page).
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Figure 5. Battalion Command Team. (Palm Beach Fire Rescue, 1999).
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That department uses the terminology of Department Command Team (DCT) in place of the Area Command described by FEMA (1994). The DCT responsibilities are essentially the same as those of the Area Command team. (See Figure 6 below).
Figure 6. Department Command Team. (Palm Beach County Fire Rescue, 1999).
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FEMA (1994) wrote that adding these additional tools to the ICS was not sufficient to effectively manage disaster situations. They identified a shortcoming in the management of major incidents: the inexperience of officers filling Command and General Staff positions.
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If it logical that a well trained and experienced first responder will function better at a single family dwelling fire, then it is illogical for a high ranking executive fire officer to anticipate success in the management of a major disaster with little or no time in preparation (FEMA, p. 3-30).
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One of their recommendations for improving this situation is for fire departments to develop predesignated Incident Management Teams (IMT). “An IMT can generally be defined as a group of highly qualified personnel functioning as a well trained, disciplined, pre-identified team who responds to and manages incidents involving complicated environmental, life, property, and political influences” (FEMA, 1994, p. 3-30).
Develop a System of Resource Management
Quarantelli (1983) wrote that emergency planners are frequently guided by the assumption that one of the primary problems in disaster response is lack of resources. Many disaster response sources use some variation of the definition that disasters are emergencies that overwhelm available resources. Quarantelli wrote that is not always the case. “The problem of too many resources is coming to be recognized as a pattern which is found, at some time or another, in many disasters” (Quarantelli, 1983, p. 104).
Eichelberger (1990) and Mann (1993) both wrote of the need to effectively manage resources following severe weather. Eichelberger, in analyzing the response to the tornado that struck Plainfield, IL, wrote that not having a good handle on what resources were available, where resources were deployed, and when resources were available hindered response efforts. Mann made similar observations of the response to Hurricane Andrew.
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Both wrote that the problems were exacerbated by: communications problems (systems being out of service, radio frequency differences between agencies, etc.); a lack of rapid development of an effective organizational structure; and resources coming into the disaster area from surrounding areas.
Tallahassee (1999) identified a resource management tool for use during response to severe weather in that city. The purpose of a “Road Clearing Task Force” is to disburse equipment and provide road clearing and emergency response after a storm.
Each task force is composed of at least: (1) a Public Works unit capable of clearing a road of debris; (2) a police unit for traffic control and other assistance; (3) a fire unit for rescue and fire suppression; (4) an Electric Utility crew (Tallahassee, 1999, www.state.fl.us/citytlh/emergency/hurrican.html).
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Auf der Heide (1989) wrote that resource management problems are often the result of inadequate situation analysis. “Procedures for ongoing needs assessment is a prerequisite to efficient resource management in disasters” (Auf der Heide, p. 115). Enhanced resource management is one of the key elements of the ICS. “ICS resource management procedures are designed to overcome the typical problems of too few, too many, lost, or mismanaged response forces” (Irwin, 1989, p. 141).
The most important response resource is people. One of the most common problems in a severe weather incident is assessing the welfare of off-duty response personnel and recalling those additional personnel to aid in the response effort. Mann (1993) wrote of the impact that Hurricane Andrew had on the response personnel in agencies affected by the storm.
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Many had homes of their own destroyed, or had significant family situations that hampered their ability to report for duty. Eichelberger (1991) reported similar circumstances that were exacerbated by no procedures in the department directing personnel how to report their status and availability for recall.
Palm Beach County Fire Rescue (1999) and Myrtle Beach Fire Department (1999) both have specific procedures in place to account for the welfare of their personnel and recall them to duty if necessary. Palm Beach County Fire Rescue designates the month of May as Hurricane Preparation Month. One of the tasks assigned to each supervisor during that month is to ensure that the personnel information (home address and phone numbers) for each of their subordinates is accurate in the department’s Record Management System. “When a hurricane watch is issued for the County, all off-duty personnel are required to call into their respective Battalion Headquarters to report their name and phone number for future call back” (Palm Beach County Fire Rescue, 1999, p.6).
Myrtle Beach Fire Department has a procedure whereby off-duty personnel, who would be required to report for duty following a storm, are directed to report in at their assigned work station. If unable to do so, they report to the nearest available fire station. The Fire Department establishes an Employee Accountability Desk (designated telephone) in their Emergency Operations Center and the Officer-in-Charge of each station is responsible for providing hourly personnel accountability reports to the Accountability Desk. Any employee who cannot get to a fire station may report their status directly to the Accountability Desk.
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The names of those personnel not accounted for in some manner within 12 hours following the end of the storm will be presumed to be in need of assistance and efforts will be made to reach them at their home or last know location (Myrtle Beach Fire Department, 1999, p.11).
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Salt Lake City Fire Department (1999) experienced many problems with personnel accountability and recall of off-duty personnel when a tornado struck that city on August 11, 1999. Those problems included a lack of a procedure to recall off-duty personnel to increase available personnel resources, and a lack of a procedure to communicate information on the welfare of emergency personnel to concerned family members.
Bradford (1999) wrote of a new computerized scheduling and callback system being used in the Long Beach (CA) Fire Department. That computerized system, developed by a software company in Orange County, CA, is used on a daily basis for the staffing of fire stations, management of leave from duty, filling of daily positions with overtime employees, etc. The system enables each employee to take responsibility for maintaining their personal information in the system.
The system is so intelligent that it can be used to find someone before a person can do it because each staff member has a personal calendar and contact list that they keep updated in the system. The system can tell us if the person is at home, working a callback (overtime shift), doing an exchange (trading a shift with someone from another station, or on vacation or sick leave. All we have to do is punch in the name, and the computer gives us a telephone number where the person can be reached (Bradford, 1999, p.58).
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The system also has the capability to be used for the recall of personnel for emergency situations, i.e., recall to increase staffing in anticipation of severe weather, or for response to a severe weather event.
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The system can notify personnel by home phone, mobile phone, or pager. It can be programmed to leave recorded messages on a home answering machine or portable phone voice-mail system. . . . Service administrators can use the system to automatically notify personnel of . . . emergency situations” (Bradford, p. 58).
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The literature review also indicated a problem of having enough emergency apparatus available for recalled personnel to staff during severe storm response. Salt Lake City Fire Department (1999) and Eichelberger (1991) wrote that those departments could not staff reserve fleet apparatus because units were not sufficiently equipped to function as emergency response units. (Personnel transfer equipment from their primary apparatus to the reserve apparatus when their primary unit must go out of service). Palm Beach Fire Rescue (1999), Myrtle Beach Fire Department (1999), and South Trail Fire Protection and Rescue Service District (1999) ensure that reserve apparatus is properly equipped for approaching hurricanes as part of their operational policies.
Develop a Communications Plan
Auf der Heide (1989) wrote that one of the most consistent observations about disasters is that communication is inadequate. Brunacini (1985) wrote that what many perceive as a communication problem, may in fact be more of a coordination problem.
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The most crucial types of information that need to be shared are those related to:
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An ongoing assessment of what the disaster situation is and what disaster countermeasures need to undertaken
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An ongoing determination of what resources are needed to undertake the countermeasures, what resources are present, assigned, out-of-service, what resources are available, how they can be obtained, what is their capacity, and how long it will take for them to arrive
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A determination of the priority of needed disaster countermeasures (and therefore, resource allocation)
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A determination of what persons and organizations will be responsible for the various tasks necessary to accomplish the countermeasures (Sorenson, Mileti, and Copehaver, 1985, p. 32).
Auf der Heide (1989) wrote that disaster research done by many researchers, including Kilijanek, Quarantelli, and Worth, suggests that many communications problems are “people problems.” Communications equipment may be in short supply, but more often than not a physical means of communication is available. Examples of “people” problems in communication include the following:
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The “Robinson Crusoe syndrome,” or “we’re the only ones on this island.” Organizations are accustomed to operating autonomously and fail to change this approach where multiple agencies are involved and are dependent on one another. Each person gives priority to the information needs of his own organization rather than that of the overall response effort.
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Terminology and procedures used to exchange information vary among different organizations.
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There is a hesitancy to depend on other organizations, often due to lack of trust or familiarity, or due to political, jurisdictional, and personal disputes.
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There is no mutual agreement as to who has the responsibility for the collection and dissemination of various types of information, or to whom it should be distributed.
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Persons possessing information do not realize that another person who needs it doesn’t have it.
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The information needs of other organizations are not understood.
These are crucial aspects of communication that no amount of radio equipment is likely to correct (Rosow, 1977, p. 173).
FEMA (1994) wrote that communication is one of the most important commodities for routine emergency response; communication becomes critical during disaster response. “In particular, the importance of communications during the assessment of disaster situations cannot be overstated” (FEMA, p.3-42).
During Hurricane Andrew, the first reports from South Dade County, where the worst damage occurred, were words to the effect of “It’s the worst thing I’ve ever seen, there’s total destruction.” However, at the Metro-Dade County EOC, just ten miles north of where the reports were originating, the damage appeared to be, “a lot of trees down with some minor damage to homes.”
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This discrepance caused some delays in moving resources to the stricken area immediately following the storm. It wasn’t a lack of confidence in the person making the report, but rather the exact meaning of his/her words (Castillo, Montes, and Paulison, 1992, p.10).
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FEMA (1994) wrote that when normal communications are operational, i.e., radio systems and telephone systems, it is important for response personnel to accurately describe the situation at their location.
Specifically, the following will improve the effectiveness of your communications and the resulting operations that they produce.
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