Chicago Debate League 2013/14 Core Files
NC Frontline: Solvency [3/3] 45
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- 2NC Extension Solvency - 1 “Immigration from Everywhere” 46
- 2NC Extension Solvency - 2 “Mexico Won’t Reform” 47
1NC Frontline: Solvency [3/3] 454) Mexico uses its position as a critical geographic link to Latin America to deny U.S. policy requirements. They will not reform because of U.S. assistance. STARR, 11 [Pamela, Director, U.S.-Mexico Network, and Associate Professor (NTT) University Fellow, Center on Public Diplomacy at University of Southern California; “U.S.-Mexico Relations and Mexican Domestic Politics,” college.usc.edu/usmexnet/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Camp-Oxford-paper-final.doc] The oft-quoted aphorism attributed to former Mexican President Porfirio Diaz, “Poor Mexico, so far from God and close to the United States,” conveys these real historic limits to Mexico’s sovereign autonomy created by a border shared with a great power. Yet geography has also constrained the freedom of U.S. policy action. Mexico’s position on the U.S. southern border means that the overriding U.S. interest in Mexico is ultimately to have a stable ally on its frontier. The importance of this fact was evident during the early nineteenth century and was forcefully underlined during World War I when Mexican political instability and flirtation with U.S. adversaries created the threat of a possible attack on the United States through Mexican territory. In the aftermath of that war, concerns about foreign adversaries attacking the United States through Mexico declined, but the approach of a second world war rekindled U.S. strategic concerns about Mexico. In this circumstance the United States acquiesced to the 1938 nationalization of the Mexican petroleum industry, a clear violation of the sanctity of private property rights for which the United States had intervened in the past. Put simply, having an ally in such a strategically important country trumped the rights of U.S. property owners. During the Cold War when the United States feared that developing nations might fall like dominos to communist influence, Mexico was the “last domino” in Latin America. This strategic reality motivated a U.S. willingness to accept Mexico’s authoritarian politics and closed economy for forty years, practices that had previously motivated U.S. involvement in Mexican affairs, in exchange for a stable, anti-communist ally to the south. Mexico repeatedly exploited this consequence of geography to carve out an autonomous policy-making space. Throughout the Cold War, this enabled an independent foreign policy that was regularly at odds with U.S. preferences. For a revolutionary regime following increasingly conservative economic and social policies at home, a foreign policy motivated by the revolutionary principles of anti-imperialism, social welfare, and non-intervention was an effective tool for legitimating the regime. This inspired a series of international positions in direct opposition to United States policy. Most notably, Mexico sustained diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union when that was frowned upon in Washington; it recognized the Castro regime in Cuba and persistently opposed its political and economic isolation; it vocally opposed U.S.-sponsored coups and other forms of intervention in Latin America; and it actively supported the 1970s socialist government in Chile. The United States tolerated this opposition with an eye to strengthening a stable, essentially pro-U.S. regime on the U.S. frontier, but only as long as Mexican action did not pose a real obstacle to the U.S. capacity to protect its strategic interests. The lone exception to this Cold War rule occurred during the 1980s in Central America when the United States concluded that Mexican involvement directly impeded the promotion of U.S. strategic aims in the region. This circumstance provoked two years of very tense bilateral relations, but the United States ultimately concluded that a strategy designed to outmaneuver Mexico was more likely to produce a positive outcome than further pressure on Mexico to abandon its independent and domestically popular policy stance. 2NC Extension Solvency - #1 “Immigration from Everywhere” 461) Illegal immigration comes from everywhere in Latin America. The plan can only secure the border with Mexico, but terrorists will be able to get in through other weak points and their impacts are inevitable. Extend our 1NC WALSER, MCNEILL AND ZUCKERMAN evidence. 2) Not all immigration goes by land; thousands of immigrants travel through the Caribbean by sea. WALSER, MCNEILL AND ZUCKERMAN, 11 [Ray, PhD., Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America at Heritage Foundation; Jena Baker, Senior Policy Analyst for Homeland Security in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at Heritage Foundation; Jessica, Research Assistant in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, at The Heritage Foundation; “The Human Tragedy of Illegal Immigration: Greater Efforts Needed to Combat Smuggling and Violence,” 6/22, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/the-human-tragedy-of-illegal-immigration-greater-efforts-needed-to-combat-smuggling-and-violence] Illegal immigrants also travel by sea. Last year, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted 2,088 illegal aliens off the coasts of the United States. While the number of interceptions has consistently declined over the past six years, previous estimates indicate that thousands of people still attempt to make the maritime journey from the Caribbean each year. The majority of these immigrants set sail from Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, each journey filled with it its own set of challenges. 2NC Extension Solvency - #2 “Mexico Won’t Reform” 471) Mexico’s politicians do not have the political will to reform or challenge business leaders and criminal cartels in Mexico. They will take the Plan’s assistance as profit and not implement changes. Extend our 1NC ROBERTS AND ORTEGA evidence. 2) Even if Calderon has proposed reforms, special interests and domestic politics will prevent any serious economic growth. ROBERTS AND ORTEGA, 08 [James, Research Fellow for Economic Freedom and Growth in the Center for International Trade and Economics; Israel, Senior Media Services Associate in the Media Services Department, at The Heritage Foundation; “How Reforms in Mexico Could Make the U.S. More Secure,” 5/13, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/05/how-reforms-in-mexico-could-make-the-us-more-secure] President Calderón faces an uphill fight to win reforms from the divided Mexican Congress to permit greater private investment in the energy sector. The opposition, including entrenched special interests in the PRI and anti-globalization activists in the PRD, will try to "forestall reaching the two-thirds majority needed to change Mexico's constitution and allow for participation of private companies in oil exploration and production."[24] Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2011 2011 -> Voices of the Old Sea Norman Lewis 2011 -> Malevil Robert Merle 2011 -> The Elephant Keeper’s Children Peter Hoeg 2011 -> Jv packet •Mars Colonization Affirmative •Mars Colonization Negative 2011 -> Registration Form (Rev. 8-86) omb no. 1024-0018 2011 -> All America Looks Up to Virginia;” Virginia and the Declaration of Independence 2011 -> Rao bulletin 2011 -> Christopher Columbus was born between 25 August and 31 October 1451 in 2011 -> The Battle of Frenchtown (1855), Washington Territory: the Political and Demographic Context rev 9/4/11 2011 -> Seti aff •seti neg •Asteroids Aff Download 3.16 Mb. Share with your friends:
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