1) No Link: Their evidence is generic about foreign aid, not the specific economic assistance plan we advocate. You should prefer our specific solvency advocates over their hyper-generic evidence, and they should be forced to explain exactly how their disadvantage links to our plan action.
2) Alternate Causality: There are many structural causes of corruption. The plan does not make any of these worse. Even if we don’t solve all corruption, we make the situation better by solving the specific scenarios of our Harms.
LOMBORG AND ACKERMAN, 07
[Bjorn, adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School; Susan, Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale University ; “Latin America’s Corruption Challenge,” 10/26, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/latin-america-s-corruption-challenge]
The sources of public administration failure include lack of professionalism in the civil service; vague, complex, and confusing legal rules; weak management of government finances; poor distribution of tasks across levels of government; lack of transparency in government processes, and the difficulty of holding officials accountable for their actions. Weaknesses in any or all of these areas create incentives for corruption, laziness, and incompetence.
3) Case Outweighs: Our Harms scenarios have larger impacts than their Disadvantage. By solving for our Harms, we are stopping global war. Even if they win their impact, it is only a localized civil conflict that does not spill over to any other regions or connect to U.S. national security. This means our plan has a much bigger magnitude than their disadvantage.
4) Non-Unique: Our specific country is already very corrupt.
[Insert country-specific evidence for Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela]
2AC Frontline: Corruption Disadvantage 245
5) Turn: Aid decreases corruption by increasing rules and limits on government action while also solving revenue shortages that lead to bribes.
TAVARES, 03
[Jose, Department of Economics at Universidade Nova de Lisboa in Portugal; “Does foreign aid corrupt?” Economic Letters v. 79, http://www.dochas.ie/Shared/Files/4/DoesForeignAidCorruptFinal.pdf]
In this paper we ask whether foreign aid corrupts by using data on a cross-section of developing countries and instrumenting for total aid inflows. We find that foreign aid decreases corruption. Our results are statistically and economically significant and robust to the use of different controls. Why might aid decrease corruption? One can advance several possibilities. First, foreign aid may be associated with rules and conditions that limit the discretion of the recipient country’s officials, thus decreasing corruption—a conditionality effect. Second, if foreign aid alleviates public revenue shortages and facilitates increased salaries for public employees it may diminish the supply of 20 corruption by public officials—a liquidity effect. One important caveat is in order. Since most actual aid flows are driven by motives other than the economic and political performance of recipient countries, as pointed out in Alesina and Dollar (2002), one cannot infer from our results that when more aid is observed lower corruption will follow. Instead we should interpret our results as pointing to the potentially beneficial impact of aid inflows on corruption once current biases in aid allocation are weeded out.
6) No Link: Their evidence is not causal – countries receiving aid start with corruption and less development. They don’t become corrupt after the aid arrives.
CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, 11
[Casey Dunning; “U.S. Foreign Assistance and Corruption: It’s All Relative” 03/28, http://www.cgdev.org/blog/us-foreign-assistance-and-corruption-it%E2%80%99s-all-relative]
Development is risky business. By its very nature, it takes place in the least-developed countries with the least-developed institutions, infrastructure and economies. To think that there is a low income country with zero corruption to which the United States can provide aid is foolish; it doesn’t exist at the high end of the income scale either. (In addition to many others, Bermuda and Uruguay both score better than the United States on control of corruption this year.)
2AC Frontline: Corruption Disadvantage 246
7) Alternate Causality: Private businesses are causing corruption, which means the government will be corrupt regardless of the plan.
KLIKSBERG, 09
[Bernardo, special advisor to the UN, UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF; “Corruption in Latin America: getting past the myths,” 3/12, http://english.safe-democracy.org/2009/03/12/corruption-in-latin-america-getting-past-the-myths/]
The case of Siemens, and other similar ones, among them the bankruptcy some years ago of the largest private Dominican bank -which absorbed resources vital to the country-, as well as the confirmed bribery carried out by the executives of a transnational leader in Argentina in order to massively sell computerization to the principal public bank, have shown that corruption is not just public. Corporate corruption is an important part of the global problem. In practice, corruption schemes tend to entwine public and private executives. Up until 1999, the year in which the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development outlawed corruption, the German fiscal code, among others, allowed bribes to be written off as business expenses. The UN’s Global Pact stopped validating corruption as a private business issue in 2004, when it made the fight against it the tenth principle of its Code of Social Business Responsibility.
8) Turn: Our plan specifically solves for corruption.
[Insert Country-specific evidence for Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela]
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