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| Ibid. 742 FireEye iSight Intelligence, APT28: At the Center of The Storm, Russia Strategically Evolves Its Cyber Operations, at 4 (Jan. 2017). Michael Schwirtz, German Election Mystery Why No Russian Meddling The New York Times, Sept. 21, 2017. Jefferson Chase, Experts Say Laws Not Enough as Germany Fights Bots and Fake News Deutsche Welle, Nov. 25, 2016. undermined by Europe and the United States, as well as the countries mutual hardships during the Second World War. 739 Germany’s domestic intelligence agency also alleged that Krem- lin-linked hackers were behind a 2015 hack of the lower house of the Bundestag that exfiltrated thousands of documents, and were responsible for subsequent hacks of Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union party and other political foundations and organizations affiliated with it. 740 The head of German domestic intelligence said in comments to reporters that the attacks were part of a campaign directed by Russia to generate information that can be used for disinformation or for influencing operations . . .. Whether they do it or not is apolitical decision . . . that I assume will be made in the Kremlin.’’ 741 German officials determined that the attacks had been likely carried out by APT, the hacker group also known as Fancy Bear that has been linked to the Russian government, and which was connected to several high-profile cyberattacks in the United States, France, Ukraine, and elsewhere. 742 Interestingly, by the September 24 election in Germany, a data dump of hacked information similar to those in the United States and France did not take place—perhaps out of concern for Merkel’s reaction in the event that she won the election. 743 In meetings with Committee staff in the months before the German election, most German interlocutors seemed sanguine that Russia would not interfere in a significant way, but political party representatives did express growing apprehension about their lack of preparation fora Russian attack. But time and the experience of other countries had afforded the German government, political parties, and the media the opportunity to build defenses against Russian meddling before election day. These defenses included a mix of government and non-government steps to boost resilience, from which the United States and others can draw important lessons. Lessons Learned • Disincentivizing the Sharing of Disinformation Must be Bal- anced with Freedom of Expression Concerns In late 2016, with the encouragement of the Interior Ministry, all German political parties except for the AfD agreed not to use bots or paid trolls in their campaigning, while Chancellor Merkel warned in a major address of the threat of fake news and disinformation tactics and signaled a willingness to explore increased government regulation of this space. 744 The Interior Ministry also proposed the creation of a Center of Defense Against Misinformation noting that Russian-Germans and people of Turkish origins are especially susceptible to disinformation and rec- VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00136 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 131 Germany Plans Creation of Center Of Defense Against Fake News, Report Says Deut- sche Welle, Dec. 23, 2016. Carla Bleiker & Kate Brady, Bundestag Passes Law to Fine Social Media Companies for not Deleting Hate Speech Deutsche Welle, June 30, 2017. 747 Thorsten Severin & Emma Thomasson,‘‘German Parliament Backs Plan to Fine Social Media Over Hate Speech Reuters, June 30, 2017. Richard Allan, Vice President for Public Policy EMEA, Facebook Ireland,‘‘Update on German Elections Facebook blog post, Sept. 27, 2017, https://de.newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/09/up- date-zu-den-wahlen (visited Dec. 30, 2017). 749 Lisa-Maria N. Neudert, Computational Propaganda in Germany A Cautionary Tale, Uni- versity of Oxford, at 23 (June 2017). German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Cyber Security Strategy for Germany, Nov. 2016. German Army Launches New Cyber Command Deutsche Welle, Apr. 1, 2017. ommending an intensification of political education work with those groups. 745 In June 2017, the German parliament passed legislation that enabled fines of up to ÷50 million for social media companies that failed to remove obviously illegal content within 24 hours, or that failed to assess likely false content and remove it within seven days. While the law increased incentives for social media companies like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter to police the content on their platforms, critics of the law called it a concerning legal model that possibly infringes on free speech and places too much power in the hands of companies to curb content simply to avoid fines. 746 The government also relied on Germany’s already relatively stringent laws on defamation and hate speech that promotes violence against minorities. 747 Facebook reported that it increased its efforts throughout the German parliamentary election campaign period, providing candidates with cybersecurity training, working directly with the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) national cybersecurity office, and removing tens of thousands of fake accounts. 748 While German government, business, and civil society actors have deployed vigorous action against the causes and effects of information manipulation and dissemination, some experts have noted difficulties enforcing strengthened legal regimes and the risk they pose to freedom of expression, and have urged that the German government couple its monitoring and oversight of online propaganda with increasing media literacy among the population Prioritize Cybersecurity Rapid-Response Capacity and Informa- Download 0.63 Mb. 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