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Chapter 2: Manipulation and
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| Chapter 2: Manipulation and Repression Inside Russia Many of the tactics that Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin has deployed abroad to undermine democracy were first used domestically, and their brazenness and brutality have grown overtime. To effectively understand and respond to the Russian government’s malign influence operations around the world, then, requires starting at the Kremlin’s own gates. Within Russia, Putin’s regime has harassed and killed whistleblowers and human rights activists crafted laws to hamstring democratic institutions honed and amplified anti- Western propaganda curbed media that deviate from a pro-govern- ment line beefed up internal security agencies to surveil and harass human rights activists and journalists directed judicial prosecutions and verdicts cultivated the loyalties of oligarchs through corrupt handouts and ordered violent crackdowns against protesters and purported enemies. This laundry list reflects not just governance tactics in the abstract, but tangible, regrettable impacts on lives and prosperity. Some cases in point an estimated $24 billion dollars has been amassed by Putin’s inner circle through the pilfering of state resources. 49 At least 28 journalists have been killed for their reporting inside Russia since Putin took office in December The pro-Putin United Russia party’s hold on seats in the Russian Duma grew to 76 percent in the 2016 elections, and the number of seats currently held by liberal opposition has been reduced to zero. 51 This chapter illustrates in more detail the Kremlin’s manipulation and repression within its own borders, later deployed or mimicked abroad, in three areas ideological, political, and cultural influence controlling the public narrative and corrupting economic activity. In October 2014, Putin’s then-first deputy chief of staff, Vyacheslav Volodin, famously quipped that there is no Russia today if there is no Putin.’’ 52 The statement encapsulated a consolidation of power in Russia over nearly 15 years into a highly centralized, authoritarian political system dominated by President Vladimir Putin.’’ 53 By equating Putin with the Russian state, VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 16 Michael Birnbaum, How to Understand Putin’s Jaw-droppingly High Approval Ratings The Washington Post, Mar. 6, 2016. 55 Masha Lipman, ‘‘Putin’s Sovereign Democracy ’’ The Washington Post, July 15, 2006. Shaun Walker, Kremlin Puppet Master’s Leaked Emails Are Price of Return to Political Frontline,’’ The Guardian, Oct. 26, 2016. David Clark, Putin Is Exporting Sovereign Democracy To New EM Allies The Financial Times, Dec. 20, 2016. Volodin’s assertion—just months after Russia’s invasion of Crimea that brought on international sanctions—linked the fate of the Russian people with Putin’s own. For Putin and his advisors, the move to co-opt the identity of an entire nation was no doubt fueled by his soaring popularity among Russians—from a slumping 61 percent prior to the Sochi Winter Olympics in February 2014 to above 80 percent in the months after. 54 Yet Volodin’s statement also marked a break from the Kremlin’s attempts to maintain a semblance of democratic institutions and processes—it revealed that these institutions and processes, which became increasingly subordinated to the needs and interests of Putin’s ruling clique, now existed only to prop it up. Volodin’s predecessor as first deputy chief of staff, Vladislav Surkov, had been credited with developing a policy of sovereign democracy an oxymoronic term explained by writer Masha Lipman as a Kremlin coinage that conveys two messages first, that Russia’s regime is democratic and, second, that this claim must be accepted, period. Any attempt at verification will be regarded as unfriendly and as meddling in Russia’s domestic af- fairs.’’ 55 As described in a 2016 profile, Surkov maneuvered through a complex Russian political system to implement this vision, cultivating fake opposition parties and funding pro-Kremlin youth groups. He personally curated what was allowed onto Russia s television screens, and was seen as the architect of ‘post-truth politics where facts are relative, aversion of which some have suggested has now taken hold in the west.’’ 56 The Kremlin’s concept of a sovereign democracy was intended to serve not just as a mechanism for domestic governance in Russia, but also as a model to other countries. The more that Russia’s sovereign democratic model could appeal to and be replicated elsewhere as a style of government that corresponds with the needs and interests of the power elites the more Russia would be able to extend its diplomatic reach and provide a counterpoint to the democratic principles that the United States has long cham- pioned. 57 The trajectory of Russia’s sovereign democracy experiment has unfolded along a spectrum ranging from deft manipulation to outright oppression of the media, civil society, elections, political parties, and cultural activities. All the while, the Kremlin’s sustained and global effort to undermine human rights and the governments, alliances, and multilateral institutions that champion them has sought to reduce outside scrutiny of the antidemocratic abuses that are core to its sovereign democratic system. And similar to Putin’s capitalizing on the 1999 apartment bombings to galvanize his own standing (see Chapter 1 and Appendix A, he has used other hardships befalling the Russian people as justification for tightening his grip on power. Such punctuating moments include the Kursk submarine disaster in 2000, which prefaced a crackdown VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 17 The Russian navy submarine Kursk sank in the Barents Sea on August 12, 2000 after multiple explosions onboard, resulting in the deaths of 118 Russian seamen. In the aftermath of the disaster, reports revealed that 23 crewmen had survived the initial explosion, but likely died several hours later in an escape compartment that filled with water, raising questions of whether the individuals could have been rescued in the interim. Government officials first claimed that the sinking was caused by a collision with a Western submarine, disputing assertions that faulty onboard equipment led to the disaster, and initially rejected foreign offers of assistance with the rescue effort. See ‘‘What Really Happened to Russia’s Unsinkable Sub The Guardian, Aug. 4, 2001. Ina group of Chechen rebels besieged a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, taking more than 1,000 individuals hostage, many of whom were children. Russian security services stormed the facility in an operation to end the standoff, during which approximately 330 individuals were killed. The European Court of Human Rights recently ruled in a complaint case brought by 409 Russian nationals that their government failed to prevent, and then overreacted in responding to, the attack, leading to inordinate loss of life. See European Court of Human Rights, Serious Failings in the Response of the Russian Authorities to the Beslan Attack Apr. 13, 2017. 59 Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, Is Chechnya Taking Over Russia The New York Times, Aug. 17, 2017. Oliver Bullough, ‘‘Putin’s Closest Ally—And His Biggest Liability The Guardian, Sept. 23, 2015. In December 2017, Kadyrov was sanctioned by the US. government for gross violations of human rights under the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act. US. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Publication of Magnitsky Act Sanctions Regulations Magnitsky Act-Related Designations Dec. 20, 2017. Anna Arutunyan, Why Putin Won’t Get Tough on Kadyrov,’’ European Council on Foreign Download 0.63 Mb. 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