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| Lessons Learned • Hybrid War is Hereto Stay The Georgia war was the first instance in which cyberattacks occurred alongside a military strike. These tools would be replicated and refined six years later in Ukraine. The Georgia case has and should continue to be very instructive for other states, like the Baltics, that are vulnerable to similar attacks by the Russian government. • The Asymmetric Arsenal is Flexible After using military aggression in Georgia, the Russian government maintained pressure and influence by using disinformation, support for NGOs, and interference in political affairs. While difficult to measure, the Russian government is able to exert considerable influence in Georgia using these different avenues. • Western Commitment is Key The United States and the EU have provided significant assistance and political support to VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 76 Georgia in the years since the 2008 war in order to bolster democratic institutions and protect against Russian government aggression. This support has been essential in helping to prevent renewed Russian military aggression, but has not been sufficient in helping Georgia to confront the full range of Russian interference techniques. VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 77 Kremlin Rejects Claims Russia Had Role in Montenegro Coup Plot The Guardian, Feb. 20, 2017; Ben Farmer, Reconstruction The Full Incredible Story Behind Russia’s Deadly Plot to Stop Montenegro Embracing the West The Telegraph, Feb. 18, 2017. Testimony by Damon Wilson, Vice President of the Atlantic Council, Attempted Coup in Montenegro and Malign Russian Influence in Europe, Hearing before the US. Senate Committee on Armed Services, July 13, 2017, at 1. Ben Farmer, Reconstruction The Full Incredible Story behind Russia’s Deadly Plot to Stop Montenegro Embracing the West The Telegraph, Feb. 18, 2017. 439 Ibid. 440 Julian Borger et al., Serbia Deports Russians Suspected of Plotting Montenegro Coup The Guardian, Nov. 11, 2016. MONTENEGRO Russian malign influence in Montenegro has long been present and intensified in 2016 in an effort to derail the country’s NATO bid. This renewed focus included propaganda, support for NGOs and political parties, and culminated in an alleged Russian effort to overthrow the government following the 2016 parliamentary election. While Russia was strongly opposed to Montenegro’s desire to join NATO, it did not resort to the conventional military tactics used in Ukraine and Georgia, but instead relied on a hybrid mix of disinformation and threat of force to send the same message that integration with the West was unacceptable. That threat of force came in the form of an alleged coup plot, which was hatched sometime in mid when former Russian intelligence officers Eduard Shishmakov (who also used the alias Shirakov) and Vladimir Popov went to Serbia and met with anti- western Serbian nationalist Aleksandar Sindjelic, where they reportedly discussed a plan to overthrow the Montenegrin government following parliamentary elections that October. 436 According to Senate testimony by Damon Wilson of the Atlantic Council, Sindjelic was the leader of a Serbian paramilitary group called the Serbian Wolves which sent fighters to support separatists in Eastern Ukraine—where Sindjelic reportedly first met Shishmakov and Popov. 437 The plot was simple, and, if successful, would have been devastating. First, Montenegro’s pro-Russian Democratic Front (DF) political party would stage a rally in front of the Montenegrin parliament on Election Day. Then a broader group of coup plotters, dressed as policemen but with blue ribbons on their shoulders to differentiate them from actual officers, would open fire on the crowd, storm the parliament, and capture or kill Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic. 438 Following the meeting, Sindjelic reportedly paid ÷130,000 to Mirko Velimirovic, a Montenegrin, to organize logistics and buy 50 rifles and three boxes of ammunition. 439 But the plot would not come to pass. Days before the election, Velimirovic turned himself into police and exposed the conspiracy. Montenegrin security forces swept up the plotters, but reports have suggested that Shishmakov and Popov escaped and were among a group of individuals detained by the Serbian authorities shortly after the October election. 440 But after a visit to Serbia by the head of Russia’s Security Council (and former FSB director, Nikolai Patrushev, Shishmakov and Popov were reportedly released and al- VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER |