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| Ibid. 764 Ibid. 765 Ibid. 766 Ibid. 767 Ibid. 768 Sebastian Rotella, A Gangster Place in the Sun How Spain’s Fight Against the Mob revealed Russian Power Networks ProPublica, Nov. 10, 2017. 769 Ibid. fore he could testify at trial. Jose Grinda Gonzalez, Spain’s leading law enforcement expert on Russian organized crime, told reporters, We had accepted the idea that the world of the Russian mafia was like that. But it’s true that the case made other people think this gentleman had told the truth, because now he was dead.’’ 761 Through their investigations of Petrov’s gang, Spanish law enforcement authorities found enough evidence linking the criminal organization to Russian government officials that they named over a dozen of them in the indictments, including the former defense minister. 762 Petrov was arrested in 2008 in a massive crackdown on Russian organized crime that eventually resulted in pretrial indictments against 27 suspects on charges of criminal association and money laundering. 763 Vladislav Reznik, a senior Duma member and leader of Putin’s United Russia party, is among the accused, and the indictment alleges that he operated at the highest levels of power in Russia on behalf of Mr. Petrov and his organiza- tion.’’ 764 Petrov’s trial is set to begin in February 2018, though he is unlikely to attend he disappeared to Russia on bond in 2012 and the Russian government has not taken any action to return him to Spain. 765 But the Petrov case has led to more progress in Spain’s fight against Russian organized crime in 2009, while pursuing a lead from the case, Spanish police entered the office of a lawyer suspected of money laundering, only to see him grab a document from his desk, crumple it up, and begin to eat it. 766 The document, after being forcibly spat out, led investigators to anew group of alleged money launderers in Barcelona who have suspected ties to Kremlin-linked organized crime. 767 The suspected money laundering ring in Barcelona is indicative of long-running efforts by Russian organized crime groups to setup shop in Catalonia. Russian mobsters have reportedly been active in Catalonia for years, building influence among politicians and businesspeople and seeking to exploit the rivalry between regional and national law-enforcement agencies. 768 According to ProPublica, Suspected underworld figures also surfaced as representatives of a major Russian oil company, Lukoil, that was proposing to join with a Spanish firm to open 150 gasoline stations in Barcelona. The deal ultimately fell through, but information from Spanish and Russian law enforcement cited in court documents suggested that organized crime figures with ties to both Lukoil and the Russian spy agencies planned to use the deal to launder illicit funds. 769 And in 2013, the Catalan regional government appointed Xavier Crespo, a former mayor belonging to the Convergence and Union (CiU) party, to the post of security secretary, which controls the VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00140 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 135 Martin Arostegui, Officials Russia Seeking to Exploit Catalonia Secessionist Movement VOA News, Nov. 24, 2017. 771 Ibid. 772 Ibid. 773 U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on Efforts by the Russian Federation to Undermine Elections in Europe and Eurasia Pursuant to the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act of 2017 (PL. 115-44), Nov. 7, 2017. 774 Itxu Diaz, Venezuela and Russia Teamed Up to Push Pro-Catalan Fake News The Daily Beast, Nov. 28, 2017. David Alandete, ‘‘Pro-Russian Networks See 2,000% Increase in Activity in Favor of Catalan Referendum El Pais, Oct. 1, 2017. Catalan police. 770 However, the appointment was rescinded when intelligence services based in Madrid presented evidence that Crespo was involved in money laundering, and in 2014 he was indicted for accepting bribes from Petrov. 771 The CiU also allegedly received funds laundered by Russian crime syndicates through Catalonian banks and shell companies. 772 A faction of the CiU joined with two leftist parties to form the coalition that held the referendum on October 1, 2017 for Catalonia’s independence from Spain. The referendum was driven by decades-long domestic political, cultural, and economic issues, but it also presented Moscow with an opportunity to promote an outcome that would weaken a major EU state. And there is now an increasingly large body of evidence showing that the Kremlin, at least through its state-run media outlets, directed a significant disinformation campaign targeting the referendum. The US. State Department reported that Russian state news outlets, such as Sputnik, published a number of articles in the run up to the poll that highlighted alleged corruption within the Spanish government and driving an overarching anti-EU narrative in support of the secessionist movement. These Russian newsagencies, as well as Russian users on Twitter, also repeatedly promoted the views of Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, who has taken to social media to call for Spanish authorities to respect the upcoming vote in Catalonia. Spanish newspapers have also reported that Russian bots attempted to flood social media with controversial posts in support of Catalonian independence prior to the ref- erendum. 773 One analysis looked at more than five million social media messages on Catalonia posted between September 29 and October 5, and found that 30 percent of the messages came from anonymous accounts that exclusively post content from RT and Sputnik, while 25 percent came from bots and 10 percent from the official accounts of the two propaganda platforms. 774 Another analysis found that, just before the referendum took place, pro-Kremlin Twitter accounts increased their mentions of the Catalan crisis by 2,000 per- cent. 775 The Kremlin’s interests in Catalonia’s referendum were likely varied. First, Moscow has recently favored independence and secessionist movements that occur beyond Russia’s borders and weaken the EU. For example, before Brexit, Kremlin-linked disinformation campaigns were pro-Scottish independence. But after the UK decided not to be in the EU, and many voters in Scotland indicated VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00141 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 136 Chris Green, Russia Set to U-turn on Support for Scottish Independence The Scotsman, May 11, 2017. William Booth & Michael Birnbaum, British and Spanish Leaders Say Russian Trolls Meddled in Their Elections The Washington Post, Nov. 14, 2017. Martin Arostegui, Officials Russia Seeking to Exploit Catalonia Secessionist Movement Download 0.63 Mb. Share with your friends:
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