Conflicts of Law Outline
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- Franchise Tax Board of CA v. Hyatt
- Reasoning
- Constitutional Limitations On Recognition Enforcement of Judgments
- Thompson v. Washington Gas
- Domestic
- (1) Procedure: Can refuse to enforce if F1 lacked PJ or SMJ Durfee v. Duke
- (2) Collateral Attacks
- RST of Conflicts §97
- Land Taboo
- Fall v. Eastin
- Non-Final Support Decrees
- Elkind
- Dissent
- State v. Menard ) Workers Comp
- Holding
- Thomas
- Yarborough v. Yarorough
- Prevention of Gambling
- Issue
- Matsushita Electric ) If congress is silent about an exception to FFC, then no exception is presumed Matsushita Electric v. Epstein
- Need irreconcilable conflict between the federal statutes
- 28 USC § 1738
- The Defense of Marriage Act
Facts: DE company with PPB in OK, royalty owners in all 50 states, land in 11 Phillips didn’t pay lessors interest on the increase in royalty payments owed Holding: KS’ lack of interest in the out of state claims makes application of its substantive law to the non-forum state claims arbitrary and unfair – unconstitutional Reiterates Allstate – no sufficient contacts with most parties and subjects in the case. No “common fund” located in KS would require or allow the application of KS law to all claims (but doesn’t say which law applies) Reasoning: KS cannot revoke the rights of parties beyond its borders having no relation to anything done or to be done within them. The forum’s interest alone is an insufficient contact because it only became relevant because of a post-occurrence decision to bring the suit in Kansas (just like Home Insurance) Just because forum law is a presumption doesn’t mean that if it has no other contacts the presumption stands. Can’t “bootstrap” use of forum law as a reason not to look at other states. Parties didn’t expect KS law to be applied Stevens (dissent): No conflict between KS law and other state law – false conflict Franchise Tax Board of CA v. Hyatt: - FULL FAITH & CREDIT Facts: Hyatt filed a “part” tax return in CA, CA tax board thought it was suspicious The Tax Board audit said he was a CA resident until April 3, 1992 and imposed civil fraud penalties, Hyatt sued for intentional torts in Nevada NV state agencies had no immunity from intentional torts committed during employment, but CA had given this immunity Holding: Nevada law applies. Nevada does not violate the FF&CC by ignoring the CA immunity statute and hearing the intentional tort claims against CA tax agency Applying CA sovereign immunity law would violate Nevada’s own legitimate public policy – Nevada was competent to legislate in that area Reasoning: No threat to cooperative federalism from applying Nevada law in place of CA law – balancing test of Alaska Packers didn’t survive, replaced with balancing test of Pacific Employers Didn’t want to balance sovereign interests – can’t compare educational and tort and sovereign immunity interests (too difficult and no valid difference) Yates: Post-occurrence change of resident is insufficient standing alone, but maybe can be supplemented with other facts to form sufficient “aggregates” Constitutional Limitations On Recognition & Enforcement of Judgments Res Judicata The FF&CC is interpreted to require another court to apply the res judicata law of the rendering state, meaning that a second forum has to give effects to the final judgments considered in the first forum. The FF&CC attempts to prevent the re-hearing of claims once a forum has decided certain matters, thus minimizing the judicial energy devoted to each case, establishing certainty and respect for court judgments and protecting the policy relying on the previous judgment against continuous litigation Federal courts have to give FF&C to state judgments, and states have to give effect to federal courts too, but this is under 28 USC §1738, not the constitution What is the Same Cause of Action? (1) Substantive and procedural law are applicable to both actions, (2) the same right is alleged to be infringed by the same wrong in both actions, (3) the judgment sought in the second action would infringe rights established in the first, and (4) the same evidence would support both actions, or (5) the operative facts are the same in both actions Administrative orders are treated the same as judgments if the agency is empowered to adjudicate rights BUT FF&C and preclusive effect is NOT given to an un-appealed arbitration proceeding – arbitration without a court review isn’t a “judicial proceeding” under the meaning of the FF&CC (Thompson v. Washington Gas) Direct Attack: An appeal of the case within the same jurisdiction, or new trial, or setting aside a judgment for newly discovered evidence (res judicata) Claim preclusion- Prevents further suits upon same cause of action after final judgment (can’t litigate issues actually decided – first decision is just as likely to be correct as a second, desire to hear all issues in one case, not piecemeal) Collateral Attack: A case challenging the previous litigation using different cause of action but same set of issues (collateral estoppel) Issue preclusion- Prevents rehearing of issues that were litigated by the parties, determined by the tribunal and necessarily so determined (but can bring the case if the judgment wasn’t on the merits, dismissed procedurally) Domestic Limits of Legislative Jurisdiction: Exceptions to FF&C Preclusion: There is no public policy exception to the recognition and enforcement of judgments under the FF&CC. However, the general preclusive rule of the FF&CC is subject to limited exceptions. In certain situations, F2 may refuse to enforce a judgment of F1. These pockets of exceptions have arisen to balance the harshness of its application in certain circumstances. (1) Procedure: Can refuse to enforce if F1 lacked PJ or SMJ Durfee v. Duke: Land near Missouri river, Nebraska court decided, enforced in Missouri Holding: The issue of F1’s jurisdiction over the case cannot be re-litigated in F2 There is no reason to collaterally attack the issue of SMJ because that gives parties two chances to have their day in court, and a second court’s decision is no more likely to be correct than the first one. A judgment is entitled to FF&C even to a question of jurisdiction when: F2’s inquiry shows that F1 fairly and fully litigated and decided those issues Includes: Full and fair trial where you voluntarily appear and contest issues Fair here because parties had opportunity to litigate issues in F1 Doesn’t Include: Default judgment, or first judgment was fraudulent, then Thompson: BUT if the case has not been fully litigated, F2 has an interest in not recognizing judgments where there was no SMJ in F1. F2 is entitled to inquire into the jurisdictional issues, and if they’re insufficient, F2 doesn’t have to give F1 judgment FF&C Jurisdiction of the court by which is judgment is rendered in any state may be questioned in a collateral proceeding in another standing Chicot- Judgment in F1 is binding on F2 despite the fact that the issue of constitutionality hadn’t been raised or litigated in the first case (2) Collateral Attacks: A state may have valid collateral attack grounds For cases of fraud, duress, or coercion First RST §451: A collateral attack is allowed in F2 against F1 if: (1) the lack of SMJ was clear, (2) the determination of jurisdiction depended upon a question of law not fact, (3) the court was of limited and not general jurisdiction, (4) the question of jurisdiction was not actually litigated, (5) and policy against the court’s acting beyond its jurisdiction is strong If these elements don’t show up, then parties cannot collaterally attack the judgment on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter RST of Conflicts §97: Balancing test to decide when a collateral attack on SMJ is allowed: Look at due process limitations in limiting a sister state’s jurisdiction, and state policy reasons (territory in F2’s state?), whether lack or jurisdiction/competence is clear, whether issue was on law or fact, whether court has general or limited jurisdiction, whether jurisdiction question was actually litigated, strength of policy denying jurisdiction to the second court (3) Public Policy: Normally the federal policy of FF&C outweighs any state interests in not enforcing a sister state’s judgment BUT there are rare occasions where recognition of a sister state’s judgment requires too large a sacrifice by a sate of its interests in a matter with which it’s primarily concerned. Supported by RST §103, Justice Stone’s dissent position in Yarborough Can use this limited exception if a state interest is profound, legitimate and implicated in these facts. However, this exception must be limited, and cannot be allowed to swallow the rule. Public Policy is Enough (Considered Fundamental State Policy): Land Taboo: F2 has interest in land within its own boundaries, and in keeping land records clear (Clarke) Historically looked to the land’s state to effectuate its policies, but doesn’t relate with the modern federal system. Property doesn’t care who owns it, but people who live around certain property benefit from property laws Prof. Currie: Either a judgment is rendered without jurisdiction, in which case due process of law is denied by finding it conclusive, or it is rendered with jurisdiction, in which case it is entitled to full faith and credit After Fall, little left of the Clark case – just a pleading requirement Good Practice: Don’t claim that F1 judgment directly affects title to land, but instead get remedial powers in F1 to do indirectly what can’t do directly Don’t bring an action for ejectment or possessory action Clarke: Wife died (dom in SC) leaving property (CT) to her husband and surviving daughters, but one died (CT law land to sister, SC passes to dad) Holding: Courts of decedent’s domicile could construe her will as to property within that court’s state, but the land in CT was beyond the SC court’s jurisdiction Law of the state where land is controls its transmission by will or by intestacy, but here there is no FF&C violation for ignoring F1’s decision when F1 didn’t have SMJ over the land in question Notes: A bad argument because have to approach taboo culturally, so the rule is about more attenuated interests (neighbors) Fall v. Eastin: Married in IN, moved to NB, bought land Facts: Husband filed for divorce in Washington, wife claimed that they had already divorced in another state where she got the land, and husband fraudulently recorded a deed which clouded her title (want to create a valid recording system) Holding: FF&CC requires a Nebraska court to recognize a Washington court’s decree in a divorce action in Washington F2 not obliged to enforce the decree of F1 –F1 judgment can be recognized without being enforced F1 doesn’t transfer title, but recognized because precludes re-litigation of merits of the F1 judgment about ownership Rule: When a court uses its equity powers (contempt) to force a result, it’s allowed to indirectly do what it otherwise cant do directly F1 can’t make a decree to operate as such conveyance Reasoning: A state cannot directly effect title to land in another state as only situs state has jurisdiction over its own property (land taboo), BUT F2 can indirectly effect title to the land by forcing a conveyance by parties under its jurisdiction Exception to the land jurisdiction rule – because W never executed the deed to H, WA court’s requirement for H to convey the property to the wife was binding in Nebraska Decree can’t be of legal title, but it can compel obedience through contempt or attachment – if it’s to impact a person holding legal title to property not in the forum’s jurisdiction Holmes (concurring): Personal obligation goes with the person – WA decree for specific performance would be entitled to FF&C between the parties in NB Livingston v. Jefferson: Action for trespass to Louisiana land was “local” so it couldn’t be maintained outside Louisiana – rejected by court of appeals People can look up other laws, flexibility for a transitory action RST §87: Allows actions for harm done to land in another state Non-Final Support Decrees: Divorce, custody and support decrees SCOTUS hasn’t explicitly required enforcement of sister-state judgments that remain subject to modification in the state of rendition Judgment lacks finality if further judicial action by the court rendering the judgment is required to resolve the matter litigated Local law of rendering state determines whether judgment is “final” UIFSA: Spousal Support: Issuing state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the order, so can’t be modified in any other state Child Support: F1 loses exclusive jurisdiction if all parties move out of state where order was issued (Elkind), but waivable Worthley v. Worthley: Divorced in NJ, wife got $ judgment, then he moved to CA Holding: F2 does not need to give FF&C to a modifiable judgment. Since NJ decree is prospectively and retroactively modifiable, they’re not constitutionally bound to enforce D’s obligations under it because it wasn’t a final judgment But they can enforce it if they want – enforcing state has as much power to change the decree as the original state Rule: A decree does NOT have to be modified exclusively in the courts of the state where the support decree was originally rendered – CA can change just as well as a NJ court- no need require parties to litigate issues in NJ Actions to enforce retroactively modifiable decrees have to be litigated in a forum that has personal jurisdiction over both parties Dissent: Too much confusion because multiple courts could modify Lynde v. Lynde: If unpaid installments for an alimony order are considered un-modifiable, that judgment must be enforced by sister states Equitable F1 judgments not enforceable in F2 – doesn’t deserve FF&C, but a modifiable order (as determined by local law where issued), then other states can modify it if there is no clear language manifesting a limitation Penal and Tax Judgments: State conviction characterization Characterization of conviction was a matter of F2 law, and that elements of the F1 crime would be analogized to F2 crimes to decide (State v. Menard) Workers Comp: Thomas v. Washington Gas: DC resident injured in VA working for DC company, got workers comp agreement with VA Agency, later tried under DC Workers Comp Act too Holding: F2 can reopen an F1 judgment in the area of workers compensation All agreed that “the proceeding” before the VA Commission was a “judicial proceeding” within the meaning of the FF&CC Stevens – plurality (4): F2 award is not barred – overrules Magnolia, recasts McCartin from a statutory interpretation case into an interest analysis case (DC’s interest in the injured worker Thomas is sufficient) DC court not bound by a VA workers’ compensation award because the VA agency had no authority to decide rights under DC’s law, so no constitutional objection to hearing those rights in a new proceeding Different than Magnolia’s unmistakable language so McCartin applies Magnolia is rarely followed, so there is little danger that there has been any significant reliance on it White – concurrence (3): F2 award is not barred, follows McCartin’s original “unmistakable language” test and rejects the interest analysis Shouldn’t be a difference between judgments coming out of agencies and coming out of courts, and there was no unmistakable language in Virginia statute, so DC can reopen the judgment Doesn’t like the thought of allowing a litigant a second bite at the apple if they could choose between two forums at the beginning Rehnquist – dissent (2): F2 is barred, applies Magnolia and would abandon McCartin and not recast it as endorsing an interest analysis approach McCartin is unwarranted delegation to states to determine FF&C issues McCartin: F1’s worker’s comp law should NOT be interpreted to preclude subsequent laws unless it contained UNMISTAKABLE LANGUAGE. Practitioners rely on McCartin in its original form at their peril Six justices in Thomas think McCartin is wrong, they want to reopen the case Magnolia: Worker’s comp laws PRECLUDE judgments in other states Simple rule of Magnolia is endorsed by only 2 dissenting members in Thomas Policy is NOT Enough: Child Support: The interests of children to get payment from deadbeat dads isn’t enough to refuse to recognize a holding in F1 Yarborough v. Yarorough: Divorce decree in GA for daughter's maintenance (F1), then daughter moved to SC (F2) and sued there for more money Holding: The 5th Circuit must give FF&C to GA decree, and can’t enter an additional amount for father to pay because his rights have been pre-established GA's decree was intended to absolve father of future liability, and was final and non-modifiable - fulfilled the duty he owes his daughter under GA law, so SC can’t re-litigate his duties Stone (dissent): Daughter lives in SC so that state now has a special interest in her welfare, enough to overcome FF&C – courts should be able to re-evaluate alimony based on changed conditions Prevention of Gambling: Policy preventing gambling in futures isn’t enough Fauntleroy: Two Miss citizens had gambling contract, one brought dispute to arbitration, enforced in Missouri courts, over D’s argument that K was illegal in Mississippi – tried to have Missouri judgment enforced against defendant in Mississippi (where K made, but where K illegal) Issue: Does Mississippi have to enforce a judgment made by Missouri courts about a contract invalid under Mississippi law? Holding: Yes. Although Missouri was in error upholding the K, Mississippi has to give FF&C to the Missouri judgment F1’s error on the merits (even if it’s a misapplication of F2’s law) is not a ground for refusing FF&C to F1 in F2. Reasoning: More important to ensure inter-state accord in normal cases than to prevent the weird case seen here Judgment of a state court should have the same credit and effect in every other court of the US as in the state where it was pronounced Dissent: This permits a state to "overthrow" another's public policy Congressional Limitations: Congress can make laws prescribing the manner in which acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved and the effect thereof but Congress hasn’t taken advantage of it, so courts are often without guidance as to what the national policy is Presumption of FF&C – federal courts have to give FF&C to state court judgments If Congress passes law preventing FF&C, need the statute to explicitly say that there is no FF&C given to certain judgments (clear statement rule, Matsushita Electric) If congress is silent about an exception to FF&C, then no exception is presumed Matsushita Electric v. Epstein: Shareholder suit for fiduciary breach, settled in state court Holding: Absent a partial repeal of the FF&CC, 28 USC §1738, by another federal statute a federal court must give the judgment the same effect that it would have in the courts of the state in which it was rendered – even for exclusively federal claims State court didn’t adjudicate the federal law claims, the parties really did A judgment entered in a class action, like any other judgment entered in a state proceeding, is presumptively entitled to FF&C under the terms of the Act Step 1: Federal court should first look to the law of the rendering state to decide the effect of the judgment – is it final? Would it be barred from litigation in a court of that state? Is it entitled to res judicata in F1? (F1 law measures FF&C in F2) DE court would have found that judgment bars subsequent pursuit of claim Step 2: If final, then is there an exception to §1738 that allows the federal court to refuse to give preclusive effect to the state courts? Need irreconcilable conflict between the federal statutes Nothing in the statute shows explicit congressional intent to contradict the requirements of §1738 (hard to imply in intent to repeal) DE court never trespassed upon the exclusive territory of the federal courts – it just approved a settlement – it never purported to resolve the merits of the federal claim 28 USC § 1738: Does it preempt federal courts to fashion federal C/L rules of preclusion? U. Tenn. v. Elliott: Un-reviewed determinations by state agencies aren’t entitled to FF&C under §1738 because it predates development of administrative agencies The Defense of Marriage Act Directory: outlines -> Conflicts%20of%20Laws outlines -> Adil Khan Contracts Midterm outline- waldron outlines -> Remedies for breach of promise (1) The Interests Protected outlines -> Basic Process for Assessing Damages: 97 Select interest that deserves vindication 97 a. Restitution 97 outlines -> Chapter Five: Written Documents 1 Unsigned Documents 1 outlines -> Cases and Materials on Contracts outlines -> College of Science and Health outlines -> Evidence outline outlines -> 2. Act, Omission, Status or Circumstances 4 Consequences and Causation 8 Introduction to Mens Rea and Intent 10 Levels of Fault 11 Conflicts%20of%20Laws -> Choice of law: the basic model Download 381.41 Kb. Share with your friends:
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