Cp solves the whole aff and gets China onto the fmct key to counter prolif
Text: The United States federal Government (USFG) should
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- That exploits a loophole in Wolf to facilitate broader cooperation without the political ramifications
- China leverages relationships and technologies fostered by the plan to challenge American space leadership
- Russia lash-out causes extinction
2Text: The United States federal Government (USFG) should:not repeal or reform the Wolf Amendmentrequest that the European Space Agency (ESA) increase space colonization cooperation, to act as an intermediary for PRC cooperation with the USFGThat exploits a loophole in Wolf to facilitate broader cooperation without the political ramificationsDavid 15 [Leonard David, Space.com's Space Insider Columnist, “US-China Cooperation in Space: Is It Possible, and What's in Store?,” June 16, 2015, http://www.space.com/29671-china-nasa-space-station-cooperation.html#sthash.xuOfRk7T.dpuf] Europe and China The European Space Agency (ESA) and China have blueprinted a work plan, said Karl Bergquist, who's in charge of relations with China within the ESA international relations department in Paris. [How China's First Space Station Will Work (Infographic)] ESA and the China Manned Space Agency (CMSA) signed a framework agreement in December 2014, Bergquist said. Since then, the two agencies have established three working groups: space experiments and utilization; astronaut selection, training and flight; and space infrastructure to analyze and propose concrete cooperation areas of mutual interest, Bergquist told Space.com. Outgoing ESA Director Jean-Jacques Dordain and CMSA Director Yu Tongjie met May 27 to continue strategic cooperation on long-term objectives and implementation steps. "As you can see, we are still in the early phases of the cooperation between ESA and CMSA," Bergquist said, "but the idea is to identify a concrete cooperation plan which then could be submitted for approval to the ESA member states." Escape route Logsdon said ESA, or even the Russian space agency, could serve as somewhat of a "middleman" sic to facilitate Chinese access to the International Space Station. "If China were to fly its Shenzhou spacecraft to the space station, it would dock to the Russian port … and Putin's Russia has been making friendly noises towards China," Logsdon said. Dordain has been a strong advocate for incorporating China into mainstream spaceflight activities, Logsdon said. Dordain's term of office ends June 30. The incoming leader of ESA is Johann-Dietrich Wörner, who is currently chairman of the German Aerospace Center's executive board. "It is not clear either how much leverage Europe would have on this issue or whether Dordain's successor will share this view, but with U.S. backing, Europe could serve as an American surrogate," Logsdon said. Logsdon said it is worth remembering that the U.S. congressional prohibition regarding China is on bilateral U.S.-Chinese cooperation. "Starting the cooperation on the multilateral International Space Station may offer an escape route from current limitations," Logsdon said. 3China leverages relationships and technologies fostered by the plan to challenge American space leadershipSterner 15 [Eric, fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute and held senior staff positions with the House Armed Services and Science committees, in addition to serving in the Department of Defense and NASA, “Op-ed | China, Talk and Cooperation in Space”, Space News, August 6, 2015, http://spacenews.com/op-ed-china-talk-and-cooperation-in-space] It is clear what the Chinese might seek from institutionalizing and deepening a cooperative civil space relationship with the United States. Accelerating Beijing’s learning curve when it comes to space technologies and operations, intelligence collection, technology transfer and political prestige all flow from working with the world’s most advanced space power. Most space technology is dual-use, meaning hardware, applications and systems developed for civil or commercial purposes have military uses. China recognizes this and often pursues bilateral cooperation in order to enhance its own economic and defense capabilities, not for mutual benefit. The Defense Department notes that “China’s advanced technology acquisition strategy continues to center on its civil-military integration policy as a means to leverage dual-use technologies to improve its defense industries. Despite improvements to its own indigenous technology development and industrial capacity, China continues to rely on the acquisition of critical advanced and Western dual-use technology, components, equipment, and know-how. These acquisitions manifest in the form of joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, and close business partnerships with, and technology imports from, highly developed countries, primarily of the West, that offer access to critical advanced technology sectors.” Consequently, the administration appears poised to put the U.S.-Chinese civil space relationship on a path that could eventually benefit the Chinese defense industry as soon as the congressional restrictions expire. The plan’s policy of restraint encourages aggression and collapses US credibility encourages Russian aggressionKazianis, Senior Fellow Defense Policy @ Center for the National Interest, 2016 (Harry, “To Avoid a War With China, Should America Abandon Asia?,” 1-4, http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/avoid-war-china-should-america-abandon-asia-14792?page=4) Rule number one if you are trying to win a debate: never admit your own thesis is a “fantasy.” And yet, this is the grim position that John Glaser finds himself in, stating that “there is something fantastical about my policy preferences.” Fictional foreign policy ‘fantasy’s’ like Glaser’s, alluding to an America that can hide behind “vast oceans to its east and west and a superior nuclear deterrent” that is supposedly “remarkably insulated from external threats” creates a false narrative. Such ideas should be exposed for what they are: at their worst a shameful mischaracterization of what many are dubbing a policy of “restraint” and at worst a foreshadowing of a dangerous neo-isolationism that should be thrown onto the ash heap of history once and for all. But let’s not get ahead of ourselves just yet. Before we continue on with our debate on American foreign policy towards Asia (you can find Mr. Glaser’s original essay here, my response here, his rebuttal here as well as a supportive post to Glaser’s position by CATO Vice President Christopher Preble here), let us recap a polished up version of Glaser’s argument: “In order to avoid a clash with a rising China the United States should abandon its strategy of primacy in the Asia Pacific. Containment of China is a costly and risky strategy, I claimed, and one that is not necessary to secure America’s vital national interests. Crucially though, the core of my argument came down to this: the prospect for such apparently belligerent policies to successfully dampen China’s regional ambitions is very dim. That Beijing will grow more assertive in response seems more likely.” So now that we have his arguments reestablished, I would like to focus my final effort in this debate by unpacking Mr. Glaser’s thesis points, arguing not only why they are wrong, but also why they run completely counter to furthering America’s national security interest, something Glaser argues he is advancing in his half-baked foreign policy fantasy. I along with many others in these pages have argued Washington is following a classic hedging strategy when it comes to Beijing. On the one hand, America wants to continue a nearly $600 billion bilateral trade relationship that has clear benefits for both sides. At the same time, Washington has undertaken a careful—and what I would argue far too careful when one analyzes Beijing’s actions—reassessment of China policy. This has resulted in the “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia. Doing the bare minimum in order to not invite China’s wrath, America, along with its allies, is attempting to restrain Beijing’s aggressive and coercive actions, actions that at this point, can only be seen as China’s attempt to dominate a space at least out to the first island chain—and cast aside the status quo. America’s reaction was simply the least risky course of action, and merely a reaction to Chinese actions from 2008 to the present, actions that are growing more aggressive and coercive with each passing day. But we shouldn’t just consider America’s reaction when it comes to China. Such events are now forcing America’s allies throughout the region to reconsider their own security when it comes to China, creating some interesting reactions across the board. Consider just a short list: 1) Vietnam, a former Cold War enemy, is seeking a much stronger partnership with America—all thanks to Chinese actions in the South China Sea. Hanoi is also working to modernize its military, such as purchasing from Russia advanced conventionally-powered attack submarines armed with state of the art anti-ship weapons. 2) India, once a proud member of the non-aligned club, is working with the United States closely on many strategic and economic issues of mutual concern. Such a relationship is a direct result of a shared concern over Chinese actions. Washington has sold billions of dollars of defense equipment to New Delhi with talk of additional purchases already in the works. Both nations, fearing China’s aggressive actions, are being pushed closer by the day. 3) Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is working toward a stronger Japanese military, with record defense budgets and the crafting of plans to develop an anti-access/area-denial strategy in the East China Sea. In fact, Japan might end up selling Australia some its most advanced attack submarines, an idea unthinkable just a few years ago, but now very possible thanks to actions taken by China. 4) Speaking of Australia, there is now an active debate whether Canberra should acquire nuclear weapons. While most experts don’t believe Australia will acquire nukes anytime soon, when one factors in the fierce debate over ideas such as a “Larger Australia” then such chatter suggests a change in Asia’s security environment, one that China can only be credited in creating. 5) The Philippines has taken China to court over its claims in the South China Sea. While Beijing has been steadfast in its position that it will not accept any type of court decision over its claims of “indisputable sovereignty,” losing such a case would weaken China’s hand in the global court of public opinion—something it surely does not take lightly. Considering Manila can’t hope to counter China’s military might, “lawfare” was its only option after Beijing seized Scarborough Shoal. 6) Taiwan, after Washington has dropped the ball time and time again after agreeing to help Taipei acquire new conventional submarines, will now work to engineer their own domestically. This was an obvious response to China’s massive military buildup and fears that America might not be able to make it to the island democracy in time to stop a possible future Chinese military action such as an invasion—an option Beijing has not renounced despite good relations and a recent meeting between “Mr. Xi and Mr. Ma” late last year. As we can see, it is not just America that is working to constrain China’s aggressive actions, but a region-wide effort—and Beijing only has itself to blame. Idea #1: In order to avoid a clash with a rising China, the United States should abandon its strategy of primacy in the Asia-Pacific This is really the crux of Glaser’s argument and really what makes his ideas truly unique—but also uniquely dangerous. Let us suppose next year, when a new U.S. president takes office, that he or she decides America should ‘abandon’ primacy in Asia—an argument no presidential candidate dares make, by the way. What next? At the very least, Washington would have to dissolve treaties and other obligations to allies in the region such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Australia—as well as dissolve budding strategic partnerships with nations such as Vietnam and India. The above scenario should set off a number of frightening questions. For starters, has any nation throughout history decided to simply just dissolve so many different alliances and partnerships at once over a short amount of time? How would our allies in Europe or in the Middle East respond? Would they trust our leadership to confront the Islamic State? What about the challenge of Putin’s aggressive moves in Ukraine or Syria? Our allies would correctly assume America might just walk away from these relationships as well someday—as according to Glaser’s worldview, better to withdraw than confront a challenge to the status quo that might create conflict. Sketch this out a little further and one would not be remiss in making the assumption that Glaser is not only advocating dropping so-called primacy in Asia, but by default, walking away from many other alliances around the world. If this is the case, Glaser owes it to the reader to explain what happens when America walks away from an international system not just in Asia but around the world. What replaces it? Would nations like Russia, China and Iran that have very different interests than the United States quickly rush in and fill the void? Any college freshman taking International Relations 101 or even the most cursory reading of history would tell you that this is the likely outcome. Idea #2: Containment of China is a costly and risky strategy. . . and one that is not necessary to secure America’s vital national interests Is the Obama Administration today really trying to contain China? If this is what containment looks like—when we can’t even get the messaging right when the U.S. Navy conducts freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS), as we are so worried we are going to offend China as it builds and militarizes new islands in the South China Sea—then we have a much bigger problem on our hands. For the purposes of this essay, let us put aside the debate if Obama is trying to contain China. Idea #3: The prospect for such apparently belligerent policies to successfully dampen China’s regional ambitions is very dim Despite Mr. Glaser’s assertion above, I would argue that Washington and its allies must confront Chinese actions head on and that we can change Beijing’s strategy of altering the status quo. No one is calling for conflict, but Beijing must be made to understand that its challenge of the international system will be met with significant costs. Simply walking away from Asia, out of fear that war will be the result of a more active policy, is not a solution based on reality or history, but rather is a failure to understand the tools America and its allies have to change Beijing’s calculus. In the past, I have offered a specific five-point plan to tackle China’s challenge of the status quo when it comes to the South China Sea. While for purposes of time and length a complete review is beyond the scope of this essay, I would offer two points from this previous work that could also be applied when it comes to Chinese actions throughout Asia. First, “If Beijing wants to raise the stakes in the South China Sea [and for that matter, Asia], it should know its actions will have repercussions across the region - even in the areas it holds most dear. “. . . If China is hell-bent on changing the international order in Asia to accommodate its own wants and aspirations, why should America respects its core interests anymore? “For example, if Taiwan wishes to enhance its own military with progress toward new conventional submarines, or by purchasing updated F-16 or even F-35 aircraft, Washington should help. “America could even float the possibility of large arms sales agreements with Vietnam and the Philippines as a way to level the playing field. Washington could also speak out to a much greater extent on human rights abuses in China - specifically in Tibet and Xinjiang. Regular invitations to the White House for the Dali Lama and Chinese human rights activists would certainly get Beijing's attention.” And Second: “China's growing power has always been rooted in its economic rise. Bearing in mind Beijing's actions over the last several years, it is long past time for Washington to consider whether its deep trade and economic relationship with China now runs counter to its own national interests. Should America's economic success be so intertwined with a rising China that routinely challenges the international order? “The mere threat to reverse decades of U.S. economic policy would be enough to give Beijing pause. U.S.-Chinese bilateral trade is worth more than $550 billion. Even the slightest hint of a change would have powerful ramifications - and would likely be opposed by many in the American business community who have made their fortunes in China. Yet, with $1.2 trillion-worth of U.S. seaborne trade passing through the South China Sea, and with a global commons that has stood the test of time now under threat, Washington has a powerful reason to hint at reconsidering its economic relationship with Beijing (and an even more important reason to ensure the Trans-Pacific Partnership becomes reality).” Would China get even more aggressive as a reaction to the above, as Glaser seems to suggest? Beijing, I would argue, would have very few options to respond in kind—unless it wants to up the ante dramatically and at the same time the costs of its actions. An even more aggressive China would only align the Asia-Pacific and wider Indo-Pacific against its ambitions—and by default contain itself. While I doubt China will completely back down, Beijing would be creating tremendous risk by pushing even harder, as the costs would simply be too high for what they would get in return. While I tip my hat to Mr. Glaser for a spirited debate and I respect his position, and to a certain extent his idealism, an America that would simply withdraw from Asia—and by default, as the predominant power globally considering the damage to its reputation—is a nothing short of a recipe for disaster. How would Washington be perceived in global capitals as abandoning its allies to China at a time when Beijing continues to alter the status quo throughout the region? Would anyone ever trust America’s word again? At the end of the day, I admire Mr. Glaser’s fantasy, but it should remain where it belongs, for debate in a classroom or in an International Relations theory textbook. Russia lash-out causes extinctionFarmer, Telegraph Defence correspondent, 2015 (Ben, “Russian tensions could escalate into all-out war, says Nato general”, 2-20, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11425393/Russian-tensions-could-escalate-into-all-out-war-says-Gen-Adrian-Bradshaw.html) Tensions with Russia could blow up into all-out conflict, posing “an existential threat to our whole being”, Britain’s top general in Nato has warned. Gen Sir Adrian Bradshaw, deputy commander of Nato forces in Europe, said there was a danger Vladimir Putin could try to use his armies to invade and seize Nato territory, after calculating the alliance would be too afraid of escalating violence to respond. His comments follow a clash between London and Moscow after the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, said there was a "real and present danger" Mr Putin could try to destabilise the Baltic states with a campaign of subversion and irregular warfare. The Kremlin called those comments “absolutely unacceptable". Sir Adrian told the Royal United Services’ Institute there was a danger such a campaign of undercover attacks could paralyse Nato decision making, as members disagreed over how much Russia was responsible, and how to respond. Nato commanders fear a campaign of skilfully disguised, irregular military action by Russia, which is carefully designed not to trigger the alliance's mutual defence pact. He said the "resulting ambiguity" would make "collective decisions relating to the appropriate responses more difficult". But Sir Adrian, one of the most senior generals in the British Army and a former director of special forces, went further and said there was also danger that Russia could use conventional forces and Soviet-era brinkmanship to seize Nato territory. He said Russia had shown last year it could generate large conventional forces at short notice for snap exercises along its borders. There was a danger these could be used “not only for intimidation and coercion but potentially to seize Nato territory, after which the threat of escalation might be used to prevent re-establishment of territorial integrity. This use of so called escalation dominance was of course a classic Soviet technique.” He went on to say that “the threat from Russia, together with the risk it brings of a miscalculation resulting in a strategic conflict, however unlikely we see it as being right now, represents an existential threat to our whole being.” Directory: rest -> wikis -> hspolicy16 -> spaces spaces -> Their conception of death as a biological end to life denies the value of death as a reversible and subjective transformation Download 273.08 Kb. Share with your friends:
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