Cyber defense
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| CIBERDEFENSA ORIENTACIONES PARA EL DISEÑO, PLANEAMIENTO, IMPLANTACIÓN Y DESARROLLO DE UNA CIBERDEFENSA MILITAR 89 long term, they cause serious effects, but specifically never exceed the threshold necessary to be recognized internationally as armed attacks, thus avoiding the response through legitimate retaliatory actions. In this case, the debate focuses on the search for legal actions that lead to sanctions for the aggressor State. 638. Collective response to aggression against an alliance member nation is a legally controversial matter, despite collective defense organizations such as NATO considering this possibility. The invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in the case of a cyber attack would be considered on a case-by-case basis. 639. It is accepted, by avast majority of countries, that a cyber operation that causes serious damage to national interests can be considered an armed attack, even in the absence of human casualties, and consequently the right to self-defense can be applied and legitimate and proportionate military retaliation can be unleashed from any domain, traditional or cyberspace. 640. Steps are currently being taken to promote nonbinding international standards for responsible behavior in cyberspace, although, at the moment with little success, since there are many views on what a responsible behavior model should be. 641. Despite the difficulty of the challenge, initiatives such as the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace of 2018 61 invites all cyberspace actors to work together and it encourage States to cooperate with private sector partners, the world of research and civil society. The supporters of the Paris Call commit to working together to adopt responsible behavior and implement the fundamental principles in cyberspace which apply in the physical world protect individuals and infrastructure, protect the Internet, defend electoral processes, defend intellectual property, nonproliferation, lifecycle security, cyber hygiene, no private hack back, and international norms. 642. Regarding the use of cyber offensive operations by the armed forces in armed conflicts or in peacekeeping operations, the legal debate continues on issues such as the limits on State sovereignty, the threshold of armed attack that provokes the right of self-defense, the application of the rules of international humanitarian law, the definition of legal mandates for cyber forces or the rules of engagement. 643. Offensive cyber operations remain a controversial issue in many countries, despite the fact that it is globally recognized that they are subject to the same rules and principles of international law as traditional military operations. 644. Offensive cyber operations are considered by NATO through the mechanism called SCEPVA 62 through which the commanders of NATO operations will be able to have cyber effects available, provided voluntarily by the NATO nations. 645. Renowned experts in international law warn that the law protects the commander that chooses to use offensive cyber operations instead of traditional ones in those cases where the use of cyber operations is considered to cause the same military effects as traditional operations, but with a lower risk of collateral damage (especially to civilians) and its own forces. Instead, the commander who chooses traditional operations despite the greater risk of collateral damage and to its own forces could suddenly be in a legally difficult justification situation. 646. The applicability of international humanitarian law in cyber operations is supported by most countries however, there is a small group of countries that question it as they consider that this could imply a militarization of cyberspace. 647. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 is currently the world reference in the application of international law to cyber operations however, it is reminded that it is a recommendation and not a binding norm. |