Global Sport in the Global South

In most cases, athletes in developing nations do not find themselves contending for world dominance in international sport. Instead these nations have their own sports system, embrace and observe televised international sport from afar, or find themselves making mismatched attempts to compete with developed countries’ sports incentives, culture, resources, and facilities. However, certain sports find take root in developing countries due to exceptional innate talent possessed by their inhabitants. This is obviously the case with Kenyan long-distance ability but also occurs with (1) the finesse of baseball players in the Dominican Republic and (2) the strength and speed of football players in Western (and sometimes Northern) Africa*. Kenyan running is not the first time where developed and developing countries have competed in international sport.

Kenya, the Dominican Republic, and West Africa all have colonial legacies, but the latter two had sport introduced through brushes with recreation of that colonial regime (as opposed to Kenya, which did so with soccer but developed running after independence from Great Britain). Countries like the DR and Panama had baseball introduced or even forced upon them during military occupation by the United States⁶⁵. Now Major League Baseball recruits hundreds of Dominican players every year into their minor leagues. Western African countries were colonized by England, France, Italy, and Spain—coincidentally these nations are the biggest recruiters of African football players into European Premiere Leagues.

Major League Baseball compares and contrasts to international track and field/athletics, but here is not the place for a full juxtaposition. It is useful to know a little about Dominican baseball players, however. Baseball, of all American sports, rewards the highest number of athletes with the highest overall salary—due to the absence of salary caps and the inception of free agency, a concept that is very conventional for modern Kenyan running as well⁶⁶. Even so, Alan Klein tracks facts and figures about the difference in treatment between American and Dominican players in the MLB. Most high-level players usually earn the same amount, regardless of race or nationality, but Klein shows that in 1991 Dominicans were initially hired for salaries averaging $4,000, whereas Americans entering minor league play out of college signed for a base $150,000⁶⁷. Scholars point at this situation as one of dependency—domination of the Third World by the First World, including a deterioration in the terms of their trade⁶⁸. Although a holistic and comprehensive look would take many pages, it is clear in literature that many think “this view of sport lends itself nicely to the role of emissary to the less powerful, helping Third World societies better themselves while convincing the First World of its preeminence⁶⁹”—only some of which is true.

American-Dominican collaboration started with “working relationships” where North Americans were given access to players with promises to assist in ground-level development of Dominican facilities and athletes⁷⁰—little of which has happened. There is a system of recruitment camps on the ground in the Dominican, with 30-day tryout sessions that players periodically switch between (reminiscent to behaviors in Kenyan athletics). Opinions are mixed in the Dominican Republic about Dominican versus American baseball but have worsened since the international players have started to choose extended seasons and higher salaries over competing in winter ball in the DR. Other ideological problems exist when Dominican players are subject to the same quotas and work permits (in the US) as would take place in the agricultural sector. Put another way, the development of baseball academies is “reminiscent of the ways in which nearby sugar refineries operate in that raw materials are obtained cheaply, locally refined (at a reduced cost), and shipped abroad, except that in the case of academies it is young men who are procured and processed rather than sugarcane”⁷¹. Although not fully explained here, there are systemic issues in Dominican baseball that make the sport deleterious as well as advantageous.

As far as Western African football goes, Paul Darby and others also show forms of dependency: “European football clubs can be interpreted as a form of neocolonial exploitation in that it involves the sourcing, refinement, and export of raw materials, in this case African football talent, for consumption and wealth generation in the European core and that this process results in the impoverishment of the African periphery”⁷². Academies exist for African football in four varieties, according to Darby: African, Afro-European, private/corporate, or nonaffiliated “improvised” academies set up on an ad-hoc basis. Just like with Kenyan athletics, the both official and less-than-official mechanisms of recruitment stand vulnerable to less-than-healthy practices. Formal recruitment mechanisms find ways to get athletes to Europe, try them out, and actually abandon those athletes in a foreign continent⁷³. Some smaller clubs actually break the rules, recruiting underage athletes, or even act within rough, poorly written rules that allow an athlete to leave with only a tourist visa, an informal agreement to repay parents, and no letter from their national federation.

West African football bears resemblance to the situation in Dominican baseball in many ways. Of course there is the ongoing debate on whether “academies” are helpful or inimical to {African} development, and indeed African football development. In both games there is “unscrupulous behavior” by academy managers, but also noticeable “dependent development that at worst is residual of First World influence⁷⁴. In addition, famous Dominican baseball players and West African soccer players have a chance to represent their nation globally in a sport that most citizens at home already hold dear. Star players like designated hitter David Ortiz (DR) and attacking forward Didier Drogba (Ivory Coast) give back to their communities on a regular basis and could hardly be considered examples of failure. However, baseball has been indoctrinated in the Caribbean Islands, with camps originally set up by foreigners, whereas football has been embraced and in many opinions “stripped” from Africans. European clubs have bought out majority shares in African clubs and in general operate as they please. In fact, the situation has gotten so bad that it featured a report by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 1999⁷⁵.

So do these two examples hold sway in properly discerning the situation on the ground in western Kenya? As I said earlier, Kenyan running is not a complete remnant of former colonial roots, as is the case with baseball and football mentioned above. In addition, running probably has less following than football in Europe and definitely less following than baseball in North America, so the rewards might not be as big across the board for athletes in athletics. With that said, Kenyans monopolize their sport much more so than either of the others, in some sense evening out income-generating activities and prospects for significantly benefiting home communities. Most specifics above about exploitation and dependency find counterparts in Kenyan athletics, especially instances directly related to or resulting from under-supervised free agency or migration habits of poor athletes. Future comparisons between these three cases would be beneficial to elucidate the mechanisms of dependency in global sport.

When I arrived in Kapsabet, it took me a full three weeks to even begin assessing the level of poverty in this area approximately forty kilometers southwest of Eldoret. I wanted to know what I was “working with", so to speak. It was my belief, after having read Robert Chambers⁷⁶, that understanding poverty in Eldoret would help me understand the runners—especially their economic calculus in Kenya and abroad. In light of the 2009 drought in Kenya, it was reasonable to ask questions like: “How has the lack of rain affected your township and your training?” This is a relevant question, as Kenya runs on mostly hydroelectric power, is home to key lakes and rivers that supply the entirety of East Africa, and sees 75% of its populous dependent on its world-renowned agricultural sector. But whereas this query works to distinguish between recent hardships and lucky breaks (from the drought), it gives little data on (1) a community’s predisposition towards deprivation and (2) towards its ability to buffer against this same deprivation.

In fact I received many different answers to the drought question while in Kapsabet; even though the region (European Highlands area past the escarpment bordering the Rift Valley) as a whole lucked out and met a mild drought, some households were unphased, but many saw a ¾ drop in their fall maize harvest (specific number from farms in Kitale). Eventually I realized that quality of land was the crux of this discrepancy—that in Kenya, its main crops see yields drop exponentially both with less rainfall and with unfertile soil. So two men with seemingly identical plots might survive until they meet extenuating climatic circumstances such as drought; at this point, the farmer with fertile soil might see a 10% drop in harvest while the farmer with rocky soil will lose his entire year’s crop. To explicate further, a plot with ideal soil and climate in Kitale might only require one-tenth of the land necessary to yield the same crop amount in the hot, arid, and destitute Turkana region. This is a perfect example of poor buffering capability. In his book Rural Development⁷⁷, Robert Chambers draws a figure that cites five factors—poverty itself, physical weakness, vulnerability, powerlessness, and isolation—which together define the trap that is deprivation.

As is evidenced above, individual problems are caused by widespread structural issues, nuanced personal problems, or a combination of both. Chambers’ five points can be instrumental in tracing these problems back to their roots. In the next chapter I will use these five disadvantages frequently to identify barriers to development and prosperity for both projects in the agricultural economy and in the sport of athletics in Kenya. To be quite clear, I consider it necessary to research the agricultural roots of young Kalenjin men, as this comprises my entire study sample of male Kenyan runners (baring a few select outliers). We can make a connection between the poverty/dependency of farmers in Kenya and the poverty/dependency for the vast supermajority of aspiring athletes. Runners, as I will demonstrate, possess similar capabilities and agency with respect to their professional network as farmers do.

My first empirical chapter draws from qualitative research carried out in the Fall of 2009. This study was done with the objective of analyzing Kenyan athletics in the following ways: (1) investigating how rural agricultural crop cycles compared to the normal business cycle taken on by international sport, (2) discerning what it actually takes to produce a world-record performance from humble beginnings, and (3) discovering how resources garnered from the profession are reallocated. My results in effect make a well-informed guess as to the health of the running business—specifically on the ground in Kenya. At the initial time of research (2009), these are my explicit objectives:

1. 
   Appropriately characterize a professional Kenyan runner’s role within his indigenous rural family and the greater community.
   
2. 
   Identify core obstacles that a long-distance runner sees on his quest for athletics stardom and the ensuing financial rewards. This recognition will indicate whether or not this Kenyan comparative advantage in running talent is being effectively “mined”.
   
3. 
   Analyze the different approaches successful Kenyan runners take towards using their cash winnings and miscellaneous rewards. Also evaluate which parties benefit from the athletes’ spending decisions and whether these decisions in turn optimize potential benefits—a subjective quandary, to say the least.
   
4. 
   Explore opportunities for steady improvement on the Kenyan method for tapping its potential in athletics. How can performances be boosted; how can more runners achieve breakthrough performances in time, place, prestige, or exposure; and how can financial benefit from these performances be ensured. How can I help?
   
5. 
   Make a careful value judgment on the viability of Kenyan athletics, as a sport and as an income-generating profession.
   

After ten unstructured interviews, a survey, and a variety of informal focus groups, I am not able to point at running as an unviable profession. I never intended to do such a thing, as the few successful athletes have an unarguably lucrative profession. I also cannot say that the Kenyan supply-side of the international labor market (for athletes) is unviable as a holistic entity—in general, markets continue to exist if there exists supply and demand⁷⁸. As shown at the end of this chapter (and especially in the documentary), It is a stretch to say that poor Kenyan runners stray too from having rational choice, semi-realistic expectations, and sufficient information to become a runner. Thus my findings point towards the dependency of runners, especially on their managers and other agents (coaches, event managers, and sponsors) that make their training and racing possible.

Thus it has been necessary to look at these issues from the perspective of the Kenyan athlete himself. While is the documentary and remainder of my findings I take many perspectives, this empirical chapter speaks for and on behalf of runners, the realities they face every day, and their aspirations for future fame and financial well-being.

Note on Character Anecdotes:

I am producing a documentary on my subject matter. Throughout the feature I include the in-depth stories of individual runners, stories that exhibit and fall victim to structural forces emphasized in the entire project. In two sections below, I set paragraphs apart from the thesis body with short anecdotes about runners with whom I formed a personal connection. Although these stories together neither prove dependency nor challenge established theory, they serve the crucial function: they illustrate the raw date from which I formed my research question and established my findings. I have chosen to let them stand by themselves as illustrations of the issues at hand as well as the nuanced and singular way in which success or failure occurs for an athlete.

1. 
   Eldoret – A Rural Agricultural Setting
   

However, the impressive development of Eldoret has in some ways precluded similar development from nearby areas—especially Kapsabet. Even though a forty kilometer matatu ride is expensive for any farming family from this area, there is no sensible reason for the government to either relocate or duplicate some key industries and service headquarters away from Eldoret. Also, foreign direct investment (FDI) always appreciates centrality and stability, both for which El-D fits the mold. As Chambers emphasizes time and time again, rural areas on the periphery do not see progress at the same rate as those in the center; in fact, those athletes that become wealthy enough often migrate to Eldoret for this exact reason—any of their investments would see less traffic in Kapsabet or Iten, so a profit-seeking entrepreneur bets on where the consumer will be. As a result, Kapsabet is home to only one business in the prototypical western sense.

On this note, the local KTL Tea Factory is the only completely mono-dimensional business among many other assorted dukas, although a few electronics stores seem to be scaling up to some degree (even though they will never become “chain stores”). In general, any specific projects in Kapsabet are by nature “self-help projects” in the majimbo sense—they will use the community’s resources, not those of the Kenyan Government or the Eldoret municipality. This is why effective devolution⁸¹* inherent in Kenya’s new Harmonized Draft Constitution would best help the farmers that have always been the heart and soul of the Kenyan economy. In the last twenty years, percent investment in agriculture has decreased from over 30% to well under 5% in the industry that easily employs the most Kenyan people, and that trend needs to be reversed. In addition, Agricultural Society of Kenya (ASK) shows* tend to avoid addressing the most pressing agricultural issues in Kapsabet; I have recorded frequent complaints about the minimal relevance of agricultural research from Nairobi. From my participant observation, this research plays little role in the every-day lives of small farmers. Around the world today there is, in fact, very little examination into the science of raising goats or of growing invaluable crops like kasava or maharagwe or non-cash-crop mboga. There is seemingly little or no science for the poor, and only unnecessary research for the rich (genetically-cloned sheep come to mind)—a perfect indication of Chambers’ “isolation”.

Vulnerability

Let’s consider all of this by looking at a vulnerable (one of Chambers’ five indicators) farmer toiling away as he would have done in the 1960’s before independence, but operating within a greater system which is frantically developing, namely in Eldoret. After Kenyan independence in 1963, large plots of land were consolidated and given to rich Kenyans, many of which were Kikuyu. This consolidation has continued with the individualization of Kenyan land tenure (creating freehold titles) in the 1980’s. Now land prices have shot up so acquisition of new plots takes greater sacrifice, but farmers are so vulnerable that sometimes they must give up their own land in order to pay for bride wealth, fund a relative’s funeral, or settle a dispute. This is why holding a cluster of goats or sheep is so critical (for assets and debt settlement), and when a suffering family gives up this group, they see “the ratchet effect”—a procession towards deprivation that cannot be reversed once assets have been surrendered.

The same ratchet effect results from frantic urbanization: because of favorable job availability in cities like Eldoret or Nairobi, rural men decide to migrate to the nearest metropolis in search of salaried jobs. However, this influx cannot be absorbed by a steadily growing city, and widespread unemployment follows. Population and economic growth, as expected within the Western conception of development, will see urban prices slowly rise. Unfortunately, the residual rural income from sale of crops does not rise at a commensurate rate. Essentially, selling your farm’s surplus is not as profitable as it once was, those same plots are shrinking (due to shared inheritance between siblings—population growth in most African countries has not ebbed, even though development theory suggests this should happen with a rise in GDP as Kenya saw in the 70’s), and essential manufactured goods, medical care/drugs, secondary school fees, and especially western miscellaneous goods and electronics become unaffordable. This is the system through which the farmers in Kapsabet descend to the lowest rung of prosperity.

Powerlessness

Another functionality which helps to extract profit from the rural poor on the periphery is the global supply chain—from harvest by the farmers to final sale to the consumer. As of late, people in Kapsabet have occupied the most unfavorable end of this continuum. The following opposing examples illustrate these malicious forces using both a destructive economic scheme and an effectual one. First of all, in Kitale I learned that the maize-flour industry is distorted against the poor farmers. According to Philip Mbithi⁸², farm workers have periodic and seasonal changes in their time spent doing farm work. Consequently, during idle periods of the year planters must attend to other odd jobs, family responsibilities, and economic capital-building activities (to be explained in following paragraphs). However, when harvest time comes around, these families must quickly and powerfully mobilize in order to pick, de-husk, dry (sometimes), transport, and sell their maize. However, the Kenyan Government and the Kenya Cereals and Produce Board (KCPB) haphazardly buy up individuals’ maize in unspecified amounts.

Now if the government never shows, the farmers are forced to sell to the predatory prices of the milling companies who take advantage of the farmers at the very last minute before their harvest rots. In turn, they grind the maize at a streamlined, low cost and subsequently store it in their silos to artificially impose monopoly pricing—sometimes as informal cartels. This process creates food shortage through a failure to distribute the food surplus as well as by generating maize flower bags at well-inflated prices. The weak points of this system lie in the inability of both the KCPB and the Minister of Agriculture to secure maize preservation, in the opportunistic rent-seeking of the milling company, and in the powerless position of the farmers, who cannot afford “to wait”⁸³.

Powerlessness Deterred

The system through which tea is produced in the greater Kapsabet area presents a more effective approach at food preservation and effective, equitable distribution of profits. During my travels, I visited both the locally-oriented KTL Tea Factory and the British-owned Chimoni Tea Factory—a conglomerate aimed at wholesale export of pre-ground Kenyan tea. Not only is tea a wonderfully-profitable product of the Rift Valley (during high harvest season tea-pickers will round the same plot at least once a month), but there also systems in place to ensure its supply to tea-drinker abroad and in Kenya. While the Chimoni Factory serves India, Europe, and the United States at East African auctions in Mombasa, the KTL Tea Factory offers competitive prices to local farmers, buys up smaller units of tea, and produces tea grounds in individual one-kilogram sacks for the Kenyan people. This is dramatically different than the coffee and sugar industries, where the highest-quality product goes abroad for the highest prices, and then Kenyan government parastatals import lower-quality sugar(or coffee)—with substantial tariffs—to sell to the citizens at a higher price than would be asked if the original sugar or coffee was simply rerouted. This is simply preposterous.

As for the Chimoni Tea Factory, the company makes huge dollars by exporting five million kilograms of tea per year out of Mombasa. Although some might claim that citizens from Mombasa are servicing this industry without seeing their due benefit, I witnessed how Chimoni used its profits to equitably give back to the indigenous people. First of all, all blue-collar laborers and even some factory managers grew up near Kapsabet and received free training to work at the factory. The Chimoni facility is spotless and is cleaned regularly so that it appears immaculate. It is a two-row assembly line with the highest-level industrial equipment (supposedly imported from Eldoret and Great Britain), and both safety and quality standards (each tea order must have units of “two leafs and a bud”) are adhered to at all times.

In addition, this company has reached deals with respective tea farmers for fair deals, and at the end of each work-year, these original suppliers receive a sizeable bonus if the company makes profits. The Chimoni Factory has recently spent the effort to become certified with the Rain Forest Alliance (RFA, an NGO based in New York City), and now they are able to sell their product at a premium. To be a member a produce company must respect workers’ rights, avoid predatory-pricing strategies, and enact measures to prove corporate social and environmental responsibility. Accordingly, the Chimoni Tea Factory has agreed to recognize a tea-farmers’ guild, to power their boilers from four separate and rotating forests that the factory owns (moving the operation towards carbon-neutrality), and to deposit waste into a series of strategically-placed wetlands that naturally treat runoff from the production process. Although the factory (and the greater tea-growing and refining system) might not be flawless, I was overwhelmed at the degree to which tea growers, factories, and buyers aim “to first do no harm” (Easterly).

Maybe the most enlightening aspects about living in and around Kapsabet is the clever coping mechanisms that both the townspeople and the runners possess to protect themselves and survive in difficult times—which could be an all-year-round, unremitting necessity. Patrick Sang, a world-class 3000 meter steeplechaser and specialist in giving back to his sport, informed me about the unusually high dependency ratio among Africans, and especially among rural Kenyans. This is one of the toughest things about moving to the city to help support your family; just like immigration through Ellis Island in the United States, you unintentionally (but knowingly) renounce many of your vital ties with family, friends, and even informal patrons, in order to provide for those people.

For example, the janitor at the Hussein Camp is completely unemployed, for all intents and purposes. However, he survives doing odd jobs around the compound and by receiving the token of a few hundred shillings from Coach Said every week. I officially employed him for my final week at the camp, and he will live off the 1000 Ksh I paid him for maybe the next month; the importance of my faith in his capabilities showed in how meticulous an uneducated, unemployed man could see a job to its execution. My handouts, which I felt bad about, were well-placed with him because he will continuously hope for supplementary jobs in the future and not just make off with the money. The poor cannot wait for ideal jobs—they instantly pounce on any job and will suffer to hang onto it.

Other examples of this intricate system of interdependency show how the poor use “self-help” to create human safety nets which are otherwise under-furnished by the central government. The Kalenjin’s unwavering support for MP and Agricultural Minister William Ruto is the most well-known adjunct to politicians who hold a foothold in power, influence, and available funds (which spell prosperity); Ruto’s policies have administered a brutal sugar shortage and an incompetent KCPB, and yet siding with Ruto represents the most probable and timely opportunity for a changed life. Politicians in Nairobi repeatedly disappoint their constituents, but the poor cannot afford to wait.

Furthermore, a study on socioeconomic capital would be best for further examination of this issue: we see mechanisms such as the local tea factories and the system of unregistered maize-grinding machines, each for which the aforementioned types of favors are necessary. Many well-off farmers in Kapsabet have bought miniature grinding machines in order to skip the expensive and inefficient maize profit-chain, and they now charge a small fee for farmers to feed themselves from their neighborhood and not from the supermarket. This system, which has also witnessed communally-purchased contraptions, saves at least 40 Ksh, “Kenyan money”, on each bag of maize-flour. Picking just a small number of examples that I have observed since arriving in Kenya: (1) loyalty between homegrown matatu business, where the driver of an Eldoret shuttle to Kisumu will recommend a particular driver towards Kitale, if that is indeed where you intend on going; (2) unofficial agreements between ladies at the Kapsabet market that they will share the combined profit from selling sukumawiki (kale), which at the bazaar tends to be identical across all merchant-stands; (3) granting of free medicine to a farmer by a duka ya dawa (“store for medicine”) chemist, in return for a week’s worth of viazi (potatoes) when harvest season comes around (a variety of “in-kind transfer); and (4) even families sponsoring the migration of kaka or dada (brother or sister) in the hope that eventually income from a newly-acquired farm or government job will boost the income-level of the entire extended-family (this also assumes a repayment from said beneficiary). In conclusion, this series of convoluted ties and trusts represents a “socially-good” externality, where the well-known tragedy of the commons would represent a “socially-bad” outcome. Shortly I will show how these same functionalities carry over into life as a runner at the Hussein Camp in Kapsabet.

Hedging, Diversifying, & Scrambling

The final thing I must add about the rural agricultural setting in which Kenyan runners are born and raised (over 90% of those surveyed had parents that are still farmers—the exceptions being a Somali with parents who are owners of the supermarket, one whose dad is in jail and whose mother is a “hustler”, and one whose father is an athletics coach) is that the socioeconomic make-up of the farming family is changing in response to development, greater education (and therefore opportunity), and diversification to meet a growing need for a rising monetary income—as described above. When visiting families across the escarpment (in Iten, Kitale, Eldoret, Kapsabet, Kakamega, and Kapkoi), I started to realize the emergent plurality in job-persuasion, nascent within the boundaries of a single family. Now, when I would aim to visit a “farming family”, I would find myself among adults with a mixed bag of income-generating activities. I would attribute some of this trend to the enactment of the Kazi kwa Kijana (“Work for Young Men”) bill by the central government, which has the goal of employing young men in a variety of new professions when they are in dire need of work; this usually is the case after adolescence and secondary school.

During my research, one family had a father who was a farmer-turned-teacher, who after earning enough money was revisiting becoming a successful farmer. Mary Nabuley’s* brother-in-law was a retired University graduate with a degree in Agriculture, who acquired a job at the Kenyan Seed Company, has since become a small-scale farmer with various supplementary professions such as pioneer restaurant/hoteli owner, investor, and unofficial advocate on the peoples’ behalf for the Kitale Chief and Kitale Counselor. This William Kundu advises the retired teacher with his deep agricultural knowledge, hosts officials at his restaurant (return favors to come in the future), and owns a small maize mill that he offers up for communal use—all perfect illustrations of the previously-mentioned socioeconomic safety nets. In addition, most families (even in Shirazi village on the Indian Ocean pwani) have one brother working in a far-off urban setting, maybe one attending school, and another watching over the family farm. One runner I met hailed from Kapkoi, bought a plot of land for his new house (using prize money), and was sending his youngest brother to university while the final brother worked as a teacher and main authority in the runner’s absence on the new family farm. Numerous other examples of merchants, ministry officials, and urban labor jobs abound, but the critical point is that the income-generating activity within the family is rapidly diversifying.

Bridging Question

What relevance does this hold to runners and their profession other than giving us a background? Is this not just the color-commentary that roles as an NBA player is about to take a free-throw? The inside line to a horse’s chances at the Kentucky Derby? The special feature that plays to make a Kenyan track victory at the Olympics more gripping or identifiable to a Western TV Audience? The answer is not at all. We can only imagine what it is like for a poor boy to be flown abroad to run in the Olympics, but when his readiness is compromised or when cross-cultural issues bear down on his chances for success—this all becomes very relevant to my research question. Why are runners dependent? In the next section I present structural, systemic issues affecting dependency in runners. Each and every instance is either defined by or exacerbated by cross-cultural juxtapositions or misunderstandings. Agricultural roots are the key—to runners’ behavior and to other actors’ misbehavior.

2. 
   Excavation of Running as a Resource
   

1. 
   
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