Federal Communications Commission fcc 13-158 Before the Federal Communications Commission

A.Entities Subject to Rules

XL.The definition of “Covered 911 Service Provider” that we adopt reflects the fact that, while most current 911 networks rely on the infrastructure of an incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC), no single type of entity will always provide 911 service in every community. In addition, the transition to an Internet protocol (IP) architecture for NG911 services will allow an expanded range of entities beyond ILECs to route and deliver 911 calls, as well as location and callback information, to local PSAPs or consolidated call centers. Consistent with the goals of the Next Generation 911 Advancement Act of 2012,⁴⁴ the Commission seeks to promote NG911 adoption and account for changing technologies that support these functions while ensuring that legacy 911 infrastructure remains reliable as long as it is in use. We also recognize that overbroad rules could inadvertently impose obligations on entities that provide peripheral support for NG911 but may not play a central role in ensuring 911 reliability or benefit as much as a typical circuit-switched ILEC from the best practices discussed below. To minimize the risk of unintended effects, we describe covered entities in terms of the core 911 capabilities they provide rather than the technology they employ or how they are currently classified under our rules.

XLI.Commenters generally agree with the 911 Reliability NPRM’s focus on entities that route 911 calls and number or location information to PSAPs, rather than the broader class of entities that allow customers to originate 911 calls.⁴⁵ The American Cable Association, for example, states that “the Commission should make sure to define the term ‘911 service provider’ to include only entities providing communications services directly to PSAPs under tariff, contract or other direct arrangement and exclude providers who only provide 911 service to their customers.”⁴⁶

XLII.Some commenters, however, suggest that the proposed rules should extend further, to backhaul providers that transport 911 calls,⁴⁷ data centers that provide NG911 capabilities,⁴⁸ and even to PSAPs and consumers.⁴⁹ We decline to expand our definition as far as these commenters suggest. Under current network configurations, while many service providers may play some role in the origination and delivery of individual 911 calls, only a limited number of entities provide 911 connectivity directly to PSAPs. Thus, we do not intend today’s rules to apply to wireless providers, VoIP providers, backhaul providers, Internet service providers (ISPs), or commercial data centers based on the functions they currently provide in 911 networks, assuming they do not provide the functions of a Covered 911 Service Provider under our definition.

XLIII.While some commenters, particularly rural local exchange carriers (RLECs), advocate explicit exemptions from 911 reliability rules for certain parties,⁵⁰ we intend the certification requirement adopted here to apply to all “Covered 911 Service Providers,” as defined above, without exception. We also decline to create a specific waiver procedure for entities to seek exemption from the rules. While we acknowledge that small or rural service providers may have limited resources or operate in remote areas, we decline to establish two tiers of 911 reliability based on economics or geography. Moreover, the rules we adopt allow flexibility for small or rural providers to comply with our rules in the manner most appropriate for their networks, and certain requirements will, by their nature, only apply to larger providers. For example, some small service providers monitor their networks directly from a central office and may not have separate NOCs; in such cases, the provider could certify that, while it does not have diverse aggregation points supplying telemetry data to diverse NOCs, it has taken reasonable alternative measures to ensure that the monitoring network in its central office is diverse.

XLIV.Although one commenter suggests that the rules should extend further to PSAPs,⁵¹ that question is beyond the scope of the NPRM in this proceeding. In any event, the record in this proceeding and our experience as set forth in the Derecho Report does not reflect avoidable failures on the part of PSAPs, but rather on the part of their service providers. We therefore disagree that Commission action should primarily “touch[] on the benefits to PSAPs of working with network providers to purchase diverse and redundant services where available.”⁵² Moreover, there are significant questions of federalism involved in regulation of local government entities, and a strong consensus among commenters that the Commission should not interfere with the internal operations of PSAPs.⁵³ While we agree that each of these groups plays a role in 911 reliability and encourage PSAPs to contract for the highest level of service available, we conclude that a regulatory focus on entities that provide 911 capabilities to PSAPs is most consistent with the Commission’s objectives in this proceeding, based on the findings of the Derecho Report, our prior experience, and the comments in the record as set forth above. Moreover, in light of the limited focus of this proceeding, we do not believe it is necessary to determine whether to classify all entities or networks directly or indirectly involved with 911 calls to a PSAP as “telecommunications,” as the Pennsylvania PUC suggests.⁵⁴ Because the term “telecommunications” has a specific meaning under the Communications Act,⁵⁵ we seek to avoid unintended consequences of classifying a broad range of entities that provide 911 capabilities as “telecommunications.”

XLV.As multiple commenters observe, the Commission’s approach to 911 reliability must support and encourage the development of new technologies while ensuring that legacy infrastructure remains reliable as long as it is in use.⁵⁶ We must not inadvertently discourage innovation by assuming that future 911 capabilities will require the same level of oversight as those in place today. ⁵⁷ Therefore, while we strongly support the transition to NG911,⁵⁸ we are not persuaded that NG911 technologies have evolved to the point that reliability certification rules should apply to entities beyond those that offer core services functionally equivalent to current 911 and E911 capabilities.⁵⁹ We may, however, revisit this distinction in the future as technology evolves, as discussed below with regard to review and sunset of the rules.

XLVI.Similarly, we decline at this time to cover all operators of emergency services Internet protocol networks (ESInets), as proposed in the NPRM.⁶⁰ Some ESInets may provide capabilities other than those at issue here, and other ESInets may be operated directly by PSAPs and 911 authorities. Under the rules we adopt today, ESInet operators will be required to certify reliability only to the extent they qualify as Covered 911 Service Providers under our rules.