Federal emergency management agency fema rep-2, rev. 2 / June 1990

1INTRODUCTION

Brand name instruments referred to in this document are included only as examples. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, trademark, or manufacturer does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement or recommendation of its use. Civil Defense instruments, e.g., CDV-700, CDV-715, etc., are referenced because of their availability for use in the offsite radiological emergency preparedness program in each State.

The purpose of this report is to provide guidance on emergency radiological instrumentation to State and local agencies responsible for measuring radioactive airborne releases in the event of a nuclear accident at a light water nuclear power plant. The guidance presented in this document covers the selection and use of radiation measurement systems based on the protective action guidance as presented in the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) "Manual of Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents" (January 1990).ⁱ The guidance is also based on the planning provided in NUREG-0396, EPA520/1-78-016 "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants" (December 1978).ⁱⁱ

This "Phase 1 - Airborne Release" document addresses the radiation instrumentation and data collection systems that:

1. 
   Acquire gaseous and particulate radiation data for use in con­firming the need to implement protective action against direct exposure to an airborne release,
   
2. 
   Are located off the site of light water nuclear power reactor facilities,
   
3. 
   Are operated by State and/or local organizations, and
   
4. 
   Provide radiological data and/or information to an Emergency Operations Center (EOC),ⁱⁱⁱ or its equivalent as stated in State Plans, for protective action decision-making.
   

The function of the measurement systems addressed in this document is to acquire sufficient radiation data for use in verifying protective action decisions in time to ensure that radiation exposure to the public will be as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). By the same token, it is necessary to consider keeping the cost of the systems within reasonable limits, without compromising AIARA exposure, by utilizing existing instrumentation and resources whenever possible. Therefore, planning for the design and implementation of the system must be thorough to assure a rapid and proper response in the event of a nuclear accident.

Since the first publication of this document, FEMA-REP-2,^iv new regulations have been published, other regulations have been revised, and additional evaluations have been made on offsite emergency response instrumentation and measurement systems. This revision of FEMA-REP-2 is updated based on existing regulations and recent evaluations of air sampling and instrumentation systems. Also, a section has been included on particulate monitoring to complete the guidance on emergency monitoring of an airborne release.

During 1975 a Federal Interagency Task Force on Emergency Instrumentation for Nuclear Incidents at Fixed Facilities was established by the Federal Interagency Central Coordinating Committee for Radiological Emergency Preparedness. This Task Force coordinated the interagency responsibilities described in the Federal Register notice of December 24, 1975.^v The Task Force recommended emergency instrumentation systems, that are maintained and operated by the Federal, State and/or local organizations for radiation measurements in an emergency at commercial nuclear power reactor sites beyond the site boundary and not with those emergency instrumentation systems maintained and operated by the reactor licensee.

In 1980, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) published its regulation, 44 CFR 351 (45 FR 69904, 10/22/80),^vi which established Federal agency roles and assigned tasks regarding Federal assistance to State and local governments in their radiological emergency planning and preparedness activities. As a part of these regulations (44 CFR 351.10), the FRPCC was established to assist FEMA in providing policy direction for the program of Federal assistance to State and local governments in their radiological emergency planning and preparedness activities. As a result of this new regulation, the Federal Interagency Task Force on Emergency Instrumentation for Nuclear Incidents at Fixed Facilities was renamed the FRPCC Subcommittee on Offsite Emergency Instrumentation for Nuclear Incidents, hereafter referred to in this document as the Subcommittee.

Emergency response to a nuclear reactor accident is expected to be coordinated between the licensee, State and/or local organizations, and Federal agencies. The primary role of State and local governments is to mitigate the risks to the health and safety of their constituent populations through the implementation of protective actions in their jurisdictions. In order to implement these actions, the State and/or local governments will require radiological information based on emergency radiation measurements for verification of protective actions already implemented, and initiation, control, and cessation of additional protective actions. This radiological information can initially be derived from projections based on onsite measurements and from offsite measurements made by the facility, but later primarily by measurements made by State and/or local organizations, and/or by Federal agencies. While initial actions will be based on information from the facility, later offsite measurements will play a necessary role in determining if further actions are needed to protect the public.

Nuclear facility licensees are required to monitor the plant environs for radioactivity that may be released from normal operation and from accidents (10 CFR 50 - Appendix A).^vii They are also required to develop an emergency plan that includes monitoring the facility itself and the onsite and offsite environs for prompt detection and continued assessment of an accident (10 CFR 50 - Appendix E).^viii The radiological information from the onsite emergency radiation measurement systems will be of prime importance for the implementation of immediate protective actions by the State and/or local governments in accordance with their formalized emergency response plans.^ix The State and/or local governments also need an emergency radiation measurement system for offsite emergency monitoring to supplement the radiological information derived from the facility’s measurement systems in order to implement necessary protective actions and subsequent recovery efforts. The offsite emergency response capability requires thorough coordination of all aspects of the response plan with the nuclear facility management to assure close cooperation and a rapid and positive response in the event of a nuclear accident.

In an effort to consolidate the Federal response to a wide range of potential radiological emergencies, FEMA has coordinated the Federal interagency development of a Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP).^x Included in the scope of FRERP are all types of civil radiological emergencies that might require a significant Federal response in support of State and local governments. Under FRERP, if a serious radiological accident were to occur, the Department of Energy’s (DOE's) Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) and the Federal Radiological Monitoring Assessment Plan (FRMAP) can provide comprehensive emergency radiological monitoring capabilities for supplementing the State's and/or local organization's emergency radiation measurement systems (see Appendix A). However, these Federal capabilities may not be available at the scene for 12 to 18 hours after receiving a request for assistance. Consequently, the most acute need by State and/or local organizations for their own offsite emergency radiation measurement systems will be during the first 18 hours or so after the start of the accident.

The most workable design for the offsite emergency radiation measurement system involves a compromise between the ability to describe the time history of the extent and magnitude of contamination from the radioactive release, and the information that is necessary to implement timely protective actions that achieve the greatest health benefit. For example, the number and locations of measurements, the times at which they must be made, the types of measurements, accuracy, bias, and other system characteristics represents a balancing between the desire to describe the radiation accident and the fact that protective actions, if they are to be effective, must be complete within specific time constraints. The recommendations of this report present guidance on use of offsite emergency radiation measurement systems to provide data as a technical basis for the verification of protective actions implemented during and following an airborne release. These recommendations are consistent with the planning basis for the development of State and local government radiological emergency response plans in support of light water nuclear power plants, planning basis document NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016.^xi