Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill - Efforts to protect the coastline and marine environments

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill - Efforts to protect the coastline and marine environments

Bulk carrier spilled 200 tons of heavy bunker fuel oil

Aerial Area Map - Short Video shows booms + surface skimmer
Norway Oslo Fjord “Godafoss” - 17 Feb 2011

Ambient temp -20C (-4F) – Seawater temp -2C (28F) - Ice thickness to 25 cm (10”)

Container vessel spilled 112 tonnes of heavy fuel oil IFO 380 type

Boom deployment hindered by ice, ice/oil chunks inside booms, excavator removal of oiled ice slabs

Aerial Photo – Area Map – Slides

USA Gulf of Mexico - Deepwater Horizon - 20 April 2010

SLIDES – barges – Big Gulp, Little Gulp, A-Whale, MV Arca.

Aerial photos show limitations of booms – only really effective in calm conditions, modest winds,

Not inexpensive ($400/metre), take time to deploy, manual deployment is physically hard, mechanized deployment requires specialized gear, never mind storage space, plus on-site inspection, cleaning and maintenance.

1ppm, vs Marpol 15ppm, and EPA 29-42 ppm

eg EVTN's Voraxial tube separator <5ppm

Enviro Voraxial Technology, Inc - http://evtn.com/

An example are SpillGreen compounds and spray machinery

Spill Green Inc. Newmarket, ON Canada - http://www.spillgreen.com/
Skimmer vessels and barges with gravity tower separators

An example is EST Halifax Extreme Spill Technology Inc - http://www.spilltechnology.com/

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/07/oil-innovation-subsea-idUSL4N0A92VL20130107

The implications for spill response with “Platform-Free Technology” should not be overlooked. If the industry can operate without drill ships and much reduced personnel then they will have a much harder time if things go wrong, since there will be fewer resources in ships and people to deal with incidents. It appears that this is a real possibility for the Arctic.

The NCA is still in the process of working with the Godafoss accident. As a result,

evaluation of the overall operation is yet to be done. The list presented here does

not, therefore, provide the overall picture. Nonetheless, it likely gives the most

important findings.
Positive experiences
• Night capacity on oil recovery ships, use of drift buoys, 24 hours/day, made it

possible to follow and collect the oil for almost 4 continuous days.

• Advisors were sent from NCA to local municipalities at the start of the

accident. This helped the get the work on the right track and ensured good

documentation of strategic choices, efforts and costs.

• Sea operations with Norwegian-Swedish cooperation worked well. The use of

different ships’ sizes and equipment gave the necessary flexibility to work in

open sea, in shallow waters and in ice.

• Airplanes, helicopters and drift buoys provided updated and important

information about oil drift.

• Use of large double boom systems with a small opening, followed with a ship

with sweeping arms that collected oil worked well.

• Heating systems in Swedish ships enabled efficient and continued use of the

ships in extreme cold

• Hard working crews in all positions

• No accidents in spite of cold water and iced seashore

• Not enough knowledge in NCA about the capacity/equipment on Swedish

Coast Guard boats in the initial phase of the operation

• Unloading of oil and containers (explosives) on Godafoss went according to

plan, but the ship drifted before oil recovery systems were on site and ready

(no spill occurred).

• Limitations of booms, pumps etc., in cold weather and collection of heavy fuel

with extreme viscosity.

• Before towing, the outside of the hull should have been inspected and cleaned

(diving dangerous in ice and river current).

• Early warnings to other nations before a ship enters their territorial waters, so

that they could implement necessary to precautions

• Not enough hot water or steam for disconnecting hoses, equipment etc. Many

boats had problems with ice/slush in the cooling system

7. 
   Discussion and Recommendations (based on this presentation and that of Chris Ives described above)
   

• 
  Only demonstrated technologies should be considered and approved for Arctic oil spill response plans and operations and claims by industry as to the effectiveness of particular cleanup methods should be validated by demonstrated experiments in the field
  
• 
  Field experiments with actual oil and fuels must be part of the program to validate oil spill response methods and this is especially true in the case of oil in ice covered marine waters and offshore
  
• 
  Review of Arctic field testing and actual accidental spill records over the past 40 years indicates that some approaches currently being recommended and adopted by the oil industry and regulators either will not be effective or would have serious and negative consequences on the Arctic environment e.g. in-situ burning, use of dispersants, enhanced bioremediation
  
• 
  Field experiments with oil spills should be conducted on a regular basis in order to maintain spill response capability and training levels and to assess new approaches
  
• 
  Risk associated with offshore drilling must be minimized by reducing the frequency of major oil spills or blowouts to that of nuclear power reactor accidents i.e. the industry must meet the same standards as the nuclear industry with regard to safety culture
  
• 
  Study of the long term impacts of oil exposure including potential chemical dispersants on marine ecosystems should be part of all oil spill field tests (out at least 5 years)
  
• 
  Due to the very high cost of Arctic field work, it should be undertaken by international cooperative efforts and funded by a mix of government and industry as in the examples of the Canadian oil spill field projects described in this presentation (the Arctic Council could offer a mechanism for such collaborative work)
  
• 
  The use of unmanned underwater vehicles for tracking oil under ice as well as offering an additional method for studying the impacts of oil spills on under ice ecology should be a priority
  
• 
  Prior to approving drilling in the offshore regions in the Arctic which are subject to the moving polar pack often containing multiyear ice rather than shorefast ice regime, additional research is required to ensure that methods are found to deal with oil spills in this region of the Arctic marine environment
  
• 
  Little consideration has been given to the fact that much of the Arctic basin provides gas and condensates rather than crude oil and as such blowouts and accidents will likely involve these products so preparations for accidents and response methods should target this situation
  
• 
  Gas release in the Arctic will result in the formation of gas hydrates causing severe difficulties in working with equipment associated with uncontrolled events during drilling which suggests that additional and on-going research on such blowouts especially with gas and oil releases under ice should be a priority
  
• 
  Consider the consequences of a major spill when authorizing drilling permits and include a requirement to model the movement of oil from such sites should a major spill occur since even if the site is acceptable oil released from the site could move hundreds of miles should the spill be uncontrolled for a long period due to Arctic conditions
  

The majority of oil released is more likely to be caused by shipping accidents, or multiple small spills, than by infrequent major blowouts or shipping accidents. The following recommendations are offered based on a review of some actual Arctic oil spills.

A primary goal should be to avoid/minimise pollution of the Arctic and marine environments
- to give “Mother Nature” a helping hand when and where necessary.

• Respond VERY QUICKLY with resources on hand, to recover any oil / fuels spilt.

Consider the use of non-oil industry resources to broaden the approaches to oil spill response in light of the financial consequences of making decisions based only on insider considerations. e.g.the banking industry that did not see the recent crises coming

• Avoid the use of burning (severe air pollution) and dispersants (toxic to humans and marine life).

• Use non-toxic coagulants for smaller spills to LOCKUP harmful vapours & toxic components.

* Strengthen/enhance local SAR capability (SAR = Search and Rescue) that can also contribute to oil spill response requirements

* Clear the decks for fast action - some regulations can hinder the incident commander = Chief Fire Marshall.
Remember the Jones Act? - US could not accept Dutch OSV's for GoM cleanup (labour act precluded non-US bottoms)
Emissions regulation levels effectively require OSV fleet vessels to be stationed 25 miles from the drillship which is not satisfactory for a fast response especially in when ice is present.

• Introduce less polluting energy sources for Arctic shipping eg - low sulfur fuels (follow the lead of the Port Authority of Hong Kong)

1. 
   The National Energy Board (NEB) of Canada Arctic Offshore Drilling Review (2011) see site below for information collected by the NEB for the review https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-eng/livelink.exe?func=ll&objId=649241&objAction=browse&sort=name&redirect=3
   
2. 
   “Oil in Sea Ice”, Lyn Lewis, Pacific Marine Science Report 76-12, Technical Report from the Beaufort Sea Project, June, 1976.
   
3. 
   Does chemically dispersing crude oil increase PAH uptake by fish? An article in COOGER UPDATE March 2004 Vol. 1 Issue 1, p. 3. Also see K. Lee, “Oil dispersants: Exploring options for oil spill clean up” and other similar accounts in Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada publications at www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca
   
4. 
   “Acute Oil Spills in Arctic Waters – Oil combating in Ice” by Saara Hanninen and Jukka Sassi, Research Council of Norway, Report 188913/I49 (2010). A good review of Nordic oil response technology for Arctic waters.
   
5. 
   “Beaufort Sea Oil Spills State of Knowledge Review and identification of Key Issues”, Environmental Research Studies Funds Report No. 177, by S L Ross Environmental Research Ltd., D F Dickens Associates LLC, Envision Planning Solutions Inc., Nov (2010)
   
6. 
   M. F. Fingas and B. P. Hollebone, “Review of behaviour of oil in freezing environments”, Marine Pollution Bulletin 47, 333-340 (2003).
   
7. 
   “Deepwater Horizon Dispersant Use Meeting Report”, Coastal Response Research Center, University of New Hampshire, June 4, 2010. Rev. 3 (108 p. report)
   
8. 
   “Black Wave: The Legacy of the Exxon Valdez”, a documentary film on the impact of the Exxon Valdez spill over the past 25 years – a teaching guide. Bullfrog Films, Oley, PA 19547, 99 or 52 minute versions available.
   
9. 
   “Arctic oil: 1970 study holds surprises for how to clean up oil spill in ice”, Alex DeMarban July , 2012. See http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/arctic-oil-1970-study-holds-surprises-how-clean-oil-spill-ice?page=full
   
10. 
    “Contamination, regulation, and remediation: an introduction to bioremediation of petroleum hydrocarbons in cold regions”, Chapter 1 in Bioremediation of Petroleum Hydrocarbons in Cold Regions Eds. D. M, Filler, I. Snape and D.L, Barnes, Cambridge University Press, (2008).
    
11. 
    “British Columbia Marine Oil Spill Response Plan, Ministry of Environment, January 2007. 103 pages See http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/eemp/
    
12. 
    “Advancing Oil Spill Response in Ice Covered Waters”, by DF Dickens Assoc. Ltd., March 2004. A comprehensive review of approaches with some excellent recommendations for programs in this field.
    
13. 
    Letter signed by 500 scientists to President Obama and Secretary Salazar regarding resource extraction on the outer continental shelf related to the USGS Circular 1370: “An Evaluation of the Science Needs to Inform, Decisions on Outer Continental Shelf Energy Development in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, Alaska”, January 23, 2012.
    
14. 
    UK House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, Protecting the Arctic, 181 pages of written evidence submitted including material provided by RESTCO and can be viewed at
    http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmenvaud/writev/1739/1739.pdf
    
15. 
    “Platform-free oil in the Arctic” see http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/07/oil-innovation-subsea-idUSL4N0A92VL20130107?feedType=RSS&feedName=rbssEnergyNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+reuters%2FUSenergyNews+%28News+%2F+US+%2F+Energy%29&utm_content=Google+Reader
    
16. 
    “How Would Chemical Dispersants Work on an Arctic Oil Spill?” posted July 2012 by John Whitney, Office of Response and Restoration, NOAA, see http://usresponserestoration.wordpress.com/2012/07/09/how-would-chemical-dispersants-work-on-an-arctic-oil-spill/
    
17. 
    “Usefulness of high resolution coastal models for operational oil spill forecast: the Full City accident”, G. Brostrom et al , Ocean Sci. Discuss., 8, 1467 (2011).
    
18. 
    “Group V Fuel Oils and the Environment”, US Coast Guard Oil Spill Response document with description of types and recommendations. See www.nrt.org and http://www.crrt.nrt.org/production/NRT/RRTHome.nsf/resources/Caribbean-Pamphlets/$File/15_CRRT_Group_V_Oil_Pamphlet.pdf
    
19. 
    “Lessons learned the Godafoss accident in Feb. 2011. Oil spill recovery at -20^oC”, Rune Bergstrom, see http://www.interspill.com/previous-events/2012/13-March/pdfs/Lessons%20Learned%20the%20Godafoss%20Acccident%20in%20Feb%202011.pdf
    
20. 
    “The future of Dispersant Use in Oil Spill Response Initiative”, a 252 page report by the Coastal Response Research Center and NOAA, March 22, 2012. Dr Ken Lee was one of the contributors to this report. Report does not deal with use of dispersants in the Arctic although many issues would be common to both temperate and Arctic waters.
    
21. 
    “Do we know enough to ensure safe Arctic drilling?”, Henry Huntington – New Scientist 2864, May 15, 2012.
    
22. 
    C. Ives at IPY Montreal – Action Forum – Creating the Conditions for Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Development, April 25, 2012 with reference to the Lloyd’s of London report- a statement.
    
23. 
    Video narrated by Dr Ken Lee on Arctic oil spill research, Centre for Offshore Oil, Gas and energy Research, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=by0MhP4bW0k
    
24. 
    “Arctic opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North”, Lloyd’s and Chatham House, a comprehensive report comparing approaches of circumpolar nations that includes 114 references see http://www.lloyds.com/~/media/Files/News%20and%20Insight/360%20Risk%20Insight/Arctic_Risk_Report_20120412.pdf
    
25. 
    “Oil and Ice: The Risks of Drilling in Alaska’s Arctic Ocean”, a 6 minute YouTube Video by the Centre of American Progress, August 2012. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=JwCbWPR7VK8
    
26. 
    “Coast Guard plans first-ever Arctic Ocean patrols off Alaska, with oil-spill test”, Alex DeMarban, Alaska Dispatch Feb 28, 2012. See http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/coast-guard-plans-first-ever-arctic-ocean-patrols-alaska-oil-spill-test?page=full
    
27. 
    “Five Most Disastrous Oil Spills in History”, see http://www.travelgrove.com/blog/news/5-most-disastrous-oil-spills-in-history/
    
28. 
    “Murmansk Region oil-spill cleanup plan: just empty words on paper?”, a summary of reports by Bellona see http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2006/42017
    
29. 
    “Prirazlomnaya oil spill would threaten Russian Arctic with irreparable disaster”, a study estimating potential oil pollution from a Russian drilling platform in the Pechora Sea, Russian Greenpeace August 2012. See http://www.greenpeace.org/russia/en/news/Prirazlomnaya-oil-spill-would-threaten-Russian-Arctic-with-irreparable-disaster-study-/
    
30. 
    “Bioavailable contaminants come from the Exxon Valdez oil catastrophe”, Aug 2009 press release Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research, see https://www.ufz.de/index.php?en=18580
    
31. 
    “NV Gains Arctic Oil Spill Response Expertise with Latest Acquisition”, article in gCaptain Staff , April 2012. See http://gcaptain.com/gains-arctic-spill-response-expertise/
    
32. 
    “Deepwater Horizon oil spill”, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepwater_Horizon_oil_spill
    
33. 
    Imperial Oil Resources Ventures Limited, Beaufort Sea Exploration Joint Venture: Preliminary Information Package (Dec 2012 see http://www.imperialoil.com/Canada-English/Files/PIP_Beaufort_Sea_Explor_JV_with_Cover.pdf An 88 page document that attempts to comply with the NEB Filing requirements for offshore drilling in the Canadian Arctic discussed in this report section 1.
    
34. 
    “Meeting the Challenge of Oil Spill Mitigation in the Arctic”, David Prior in the Canadian Naval Review Vol.7, No. 4 (winter 2012) pp10-15.
    
35. 
    “The Challenges of Oil Spill Response in the Arctic”, Staff Working Paper No. 5, from the National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, update January 2011.
    
36. 
    Extreme Spill Technology see www.spilltechnology.com
    
37. 
    SpillGreen oil spill remediation see www.spillgreen.com