From the Director U. S. Army Capabilities Integration Center
-4. Intent for Future CCP Application
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1-4. Intent for Future CCP Applicationa. Although a CCP is generally narrowly focused, TRADOC Pam 525-7-19 attempts to capture thinking across the very broad, but inseparably interconnected mission areas of the NMSCWMD. The intent is for this document to serve as a common reference point from which future Army staff officers can draw input to various current and future CBAs. b. Other documents. There are numerous authoritative documents listing many CWMD required capabilities. However, these capabilities are not integrated into a holistic conceptual framework enabling analysis to assess whether they represent a comprehensive list of those capabilities required to successfully conduct CWMD in the future JOE. Below, in an abbreviated form, are some of the features corresponding to the key ideas and critical enablers underpinning the TRADOC Pam 525-7-19 CCP concept gleaned during the CCP needs analysis. Chapter 4 presents the Army CWMD conceptual framework in more detail. (1) Key idea: Be proactive. The future Army must engage the WMD threat early in the spectrum of CWMD military mission areas. Historically, the Army has focused attention on passive defense and, to a lesser degree, CM. These two mission areas, designed to deny an enemy the benefit of a WMD attack, are reactive in nature. Emphasized proactive engagement in the security cooperation, threat reduction, WMD interdiction, weapons of WMD offensive operations, WMD elimination, and active defense mission areas represents a paradigm shift. Rules of engagement (ROE) changes may be required to accommodate these actions. (2) Key idea: Layer the approach. The Army, in support of the joint force, must combat WMD through layered application of military capability in time, space, and function in coordination with other elements of national power. This layered approach directs actions at key nodes and links of a threat WMD network to produce a system shock that causes the targeted network, node, or link to fail catastrophically, rendering it incapable or unwilling to perform its WMD enabling function. This layered approach also relies on layering of Army CBRN assets such as sensors and protective equipment that respond to the actual threat. (3) Critical enabler: Network-enabled battle command (NEBC). The future Army CWMD concept must integrate CWMD missions and operations into the commander’s planning and decision cycle. The common operational picture (COP) must be attack resistant, fed by intelligence from the highest National assets down to tactical level sensor and individual Soldier reports. Army CWMD information must be fully integrated into the commander’s decision cycle and be supported by Soldiers that have a broad CBRN knowledge base at all echelons to produce situational understanding (SU). (4) Critical enabler: Leverage technology. The Army must better leverage new technologies such as nanotechnology, micro-encapsulation, unmanned systems, and sensor fusion, and must be more flexible in its procurement process to capitalize on new technologies sooner. Technology advances may not be fully available in during the 2015-2024 timeframe to achieve an end state answer for every challenge facing the Army; however, efforts should focus on such things as producing real time hazard awareness versus over-reliance on hazard prediction modeling tools and personal protective equipment (PPE) that is adaptive and scalable to actual hazards while accommodating faster, safer unmasking. In addition to these related areas of study, the Army should invest in effective decontamination that is less labor and resource intensive. (5) Critical enabler: Improve training and leader development. CWMD training must produce Soldiers and leaders able to react to and solve complex technical problems. The Army, within the joint community must develop a strategy to maintain and retrain highly perishable CBRN skills. Unit training is currently more flexible and quickly adaptive than institutional training, but often lacks valuable consistency and standardization. Institutional training content updates, approval, and resourcing are tied to processes too slow to remain current. c. Future required capabilities. Historically, CBRN operations have been of a responsive and reactive nature. The Army’s mission has emphasized passive defense, for example, looking for and responding to CBRN use via the sense, shape, shield, and sustain roles. The CCP needs analysis highlighted several current CWMD capability shortcomings with implications for future required capabilities. A full, more detailed listing of future required capabilities appears in table 5-1. The following are representative examples. (1) CBRN sensors have point and limited standoff detection capability and are either not networked or poorly networked to the COP. (2) Tactical and operational units performing CBRN operations do not have an assured, rapid interactive information linkage with pertinent entities up to and including joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) assets. (3) Improved data fusion and knowledge management tools are required to enable more rapid and accurate SU. (4) ROE that are sufficiently detailed, tailored, and rapidly amendable to take advantage of fleeting opportunities to conduct counter-CWMD actions, especially WMD interdiction and WMD offensive operations, are required. (5) Soldier PPE is cumbersome and can severely degrade Soldier performance. (6) Soldiers often must use PPE longer than necessary because of conservative hazard area predictions and time consuming procedures to make the all-clear determination required before unmasking. (7) Decontamination processes are characterized by a significant logistics burden and low throughputs, and are ineffective for certain classes of equipment. d. Chapter 5 presents the results of an analysis to identify a great majority of the future required CWMD capabilities, within the scope of TRADOC Pam 525-7-19, that enable TRADOC Pam 525-7-19. Directory: tpubs -> pams pams -> Training development in support of the operational domain pams -> List of approved recurring information requirements pams -> Budgeting and resourcing pams -> Headquarters department of the army pams -> Headquarters department of the army pams -> Army training and education proponents pams -> From the Director U. S. Army Capabilities Integration Center pams -> The tradoc model safety program and self-assessment guide pams -> 19 December 2012 Foreword From the Commanding General U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command pams -> From the Director U. S. Army Capabilities Integration Center Download 0.5 Mb. 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