From the secretary to the government op india, foreign department to the resident in kashmir

28. But Afzal-ul-Mulk seems to have been ordained for destruction. Not content with the executions he had already ordered, he was mad enough to openly announce that there were twenty-four other individuals he intended to kill. As the names of the doomed were not mentioned, every man of any importance in the country trembled for his life. Finally, he not only excluded the Lutkho headmen from all participation in his country, but dismissed them to their homes with gross abuse, calling them "Kalash" and otherwise jeering at their Moghli religion. They went away muttering those vows of vengeance they were so quickly to fulfil.

29. It was at this moment, that Sher Afzal was despatched to the Badakhshan frontier by the Amir of Kabul, who provided the Katur prince with money and firms, also with presents for distribution amongst the Chitralheadmen, but fare him no soldiers, lie was, however, allowed to collect together the refugee Chitralis in the Amir territories men sold into slavery, or fugitives from jus­tice. Arming these people and supplying them with horses, Sher Afzal found himself at the head of one hundred and twenty well-equipped followers. He first of all sent men over the Dorah into the Lutkho valley. The messengers were received with open arms by all the inhabitants of that district, and were then followed by Sher Afzal, his son, and the remainder of the force. Sher Afzal was looked upon as the saviour of his country, the people crowded delightedly to his cause, and kept the secret of the expedition so closely, that Mehtar Jan Murid Dastgir was killed, several doubtful people made prisoners, and the whole band of adventurers reached Shoghot, an easy march of Chitral, without the doomed. Mehtar's suspicions being at all excited.

30. Resting for the day at Shoghot, as soon as night fell Sher Afzal and his party advanced warily to the Chitral fort; its gate was quietly opened for them by "Aksokkal" Fateh Ali Shah, an official whom the Mehtar had announced he would shortly put to death. They then rushed in and climbed on to the corner towers, whence they roused the inmates by firing their rifles and by loud shouts. They all wore fur caps, instead of the national headdress while they uttered their war cries in Persian, so that those of the garrison not in the secret imagined an Afghan army was upon them, and that resistance would be useless. Afzal-ul-Mulk was no craven. The women of his family begged him to put on the disguise of a female and seek safety in flight, but scorning this advice, he ran out to meet his danger, and ordered a fire to be .... to shew him its extent. By the light of the fire he was recognised hot down and was then hacked to pieces by the Lutkho men. The entire episode well illustrates certain phases of Chitral character, and indicates how this country a storm may be brewing, may accumulate almost irrestible force, and at length burst with fatal fury, yet without giving any premonitory signs of its approach.

31. Sher Afzal's character remains something of an enigma. His enterprise in invading Chitral with the force at his disposal was certainly very great. Even allowing for the fact that there was an extensive conspiracy afoot, which made his success possible and even probable, still it must be conceded that his s adventure was remarkably bold, admirably planned, and manfully carried through. Yet the country he had won so gallantly he abandoned almost without striking a blow, terrified for his personal safety.

32. He must be a man of considerable ability. He is said to possess a princely bearing, combined with polished manners, and to be a clever and convincing speaker. But, if lie knew how to captivate people by his hurried sen­tences and impossible promises, he shewed himself no less credulous of foe falsehood of others than he was free and crafty with his own mendacities. It must, moreover, be remembered that his rapid seizure of the Mehtarship must have been well nigh impossible if the people, generally had not believed him a kind of "Imam-i-Mahdi " sent by Heaven to deliver them from the "Dejal " Afzal.

33. During his brief occupation of Chitral He posed as the devoted servant of Abdur Rahman Khan, and the enemy of the Government of India, which strangely enough he and his hearers considered to be synonymous expressions. He told how lie bad been helped with money, arms, and in many other ways by his kind friend the Amir of Kabul. In return he had the " Khutba" read in the name of hrs patron, and fervidly declared himself the sincere friend and ever faithful servant of that prince.

34. Every one was delighted with the new Mehtar. The Adamzadas al­ready saw the old times reviving, and with the Syads, Mullas, and Moghli Pirs rejoiced in the thought that no longer would the surplus grain of villages be collected by the Mehtar's officials on the excuse that it would be shortly re­quired for English travellers. This impost involved a curtailment of the total amount claimed from ancient times as the perquisite or right of the upper classes which they were naturally extremely loath to abandon, especially with­out compensation of any kind: Another cause of offence against the English was the interest they were supposed to feel for the sufferings of the poor and miserable, and the dislike they were known to have for slavery, murders, and other abominations in the land. 'The lower orders chiefly exulted in the down­fall of Afzal the pitiless Might God send all their oppressors down the same path ! Besides, had not the new king promised what practically amounted to a total remission of all duties; had he not declared against slavery and volunta­rily agreed to give up the forced labour for the Kaka Kheyl timbering trade ! A Katur prince who ever made reference to the grievances of the poor most be a wonderfully good man, only inferior as a ruler and protector to the English, officers themselves.

35. Thus it happened that all ranks of the people were pleased at change of Government in their country. Only a few of the older men recognised the folly of relying upon the soft speeches and smooth promises of a Katur trained at the Court of the Amir of Kabul, but their voices were too low and timid to make themselves heard amidst the general joy and self-congratulations of the populace.

36. The news that Sher Afzal had fled to Asmar and that a son of Amir-ul-Mulk reigned in his stead, was received with genuine sorrow, relieved only by the confident assurance, repeated on every hand, that Nizam-ul-Mulk would speedily be put to death and the popular idol be brought back in triumph by an Afghan army.

37. Subsequently the announcement was made that an English mission was on its way to Chitral from Gilgit. A first no one believed this. I was looked upon as a wild, an incredible rumour. People asked how an English mission could be going to Chitral while an Afghan army was advancing on the same place. When the arrival of the English became an indisputable fact the Adamzadas with the religious leaders of the people became both angry and frightened, while the rest of the community prepared to receive the mission with something little short of enthusiasm. They were quite ready to abandon the cause of Sher Afzal, or any one else, for the benefits their exaggerated ideas convinced them they would receive under British protection.

38. The whole of Chitral from Nizam-ul-Mulk downwards seems to have assumed that the presence of English officers, accompanied by an armed escort, meant nothing less than the actual annexation of the country by the Government of India.

39. As the mission advanced into the country it found a smiling welcome from villagers everywhere. They cheerfully applied its transports, and were particularly delighted at the system of payment, whereby each man as he arrived in camp received his wages from the hand of a British officer before the loads were deposited on the ground. Instead as in former times, of being sullenly resentful at having to carry hardens, the villagers now competed for the privilege, even quarrelling amongst themselves as to who should be em­ployed. The rates of payment had been fixed at a very high figure on account of the time of year, the badness of the roads, the severity of the labour, and with the idea of keeping the people cheerful, contented, and friendly. This plan succeeded beyond my most sanguine expectations, but was not without an element of embarrassment also for the villagers delighted and surprised at receiving themselves the money they had earned, and astonished at the kind­ness and consideration with which they were treated, declared that in future they would have no other master than the Government of India, and much,-tact and care had to be exercised to prevent the people coming to me in large bodies to proclaim their loyalty to my Government and to repudiate the claims of their own ruler.

40. The headmen sent by Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk to accompany the mission, as well as those who, taking, advantage of the troubled state of the country, had appointed themselves to positions of authority, tried on several occasions in the usual Chitrali way, to keep back the prices paid for provisions and to appropriate the money for their own use, but the villagers each time broke out into open mutiny, and always succeeded in resisting the attempted injustice a most remarkable sign of the times.

41. On its march the mission found the administration of the country in a distracted condition. Nizam-ul-Mulk had no authority of any kind in Yasin, which was held by Mahomed Wali Khan, a son of the infamous Mir Wali, the murderer of poor Hay ward. But he ruled with a divided allegiance; he was constantly at issue with the people he governed, principally on the strength, of his assertion that the district had been given to him by the mission, yet at the same time he was actively intriguing to get possession of the Warshagam territory on the Chitral side of the Shandur Pass. The people of the Laspur division coquetted with his emissaries while they, absolutely refused the Governor the Mehtar had sent them. They nominated a Governor of their own choice whose irregular appointment was subsequently confirmed by Nizam-ul-Mulk, although he greatly distrusted the individual selected. From all valleys reports were brought of a similar state of confusion and insecurity The Mehtar's authority seemed to be openly derided, while he took no measures to establish and enforce it.

42. At many of the villages near Chitral the Moghli, Pirs and other no tables were obviously constrained in their manner on meeting the mission and were unable to conceal their chagrin at its presence amongst them. Little courtesies and attentions, such as invitations to take tea and smoke cigarettes, with appreciative mention of services they had rendered on former occasions backed by a judicious distribution of presents, served for the time at least to raised the cloud from their brains, and in several instances induced them to open their hearts and give their opinions on the state of affairs.

43. In spite of the unsettled state of the country, the dislocation of all civil arrangements and the semi rebellious humour of the villages the mission may be said to have experienced no real difficulties of any kind a Result in no small measure due to the tact and temper displayed by Captain Younghusband, Mr. Bruce, and Mr. Gordon, each in his respective duties, in dealing with the people

44. When Chitral itself was at length reached, we found ourselves in the midst of civil turmoil. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that Nizam-ul-Mulk owed his very existence to our opportune arrival. His anxious face and disturbed manner revealed the perturbation of his mind how thoroughly con­scious he was of the insecurity of his position, yet for a time he continued the distrustful, jealous policy of his father. He set spies about the mission house and allowed no headmen to visit me unaccompanied by one of his own confidential advisers. Swayed by conflicting counsels fearful that the mission might leave Chitral yet suspicious of it ultimate intentions in remaining he continued in a pitiable state of confusion and indecision for several days until he became quite thin and ill from his fears and perplexities.

45. Now all is changed. The Mehtar has obtained some measure of peace and a feeling of security besides being convinced of the sincerity of our desire to help him without our having any designs of our own on the country inimi­cal to his dignity as Mehtar. That lie still believes we have taken his terri­tories into our own keeping, there is unfortunately little doubt, but he now glories in .the idea, and daily when he holds Durbar he proclaims his indebted­ness to the Government of India and his personal devotion to it. He is indeed most ostentatious in his professions of his loyalty, and when receiving travelers or merchants or messengers from the Governor of Dir and from Umra Khan, he appears to preface all his remarks with a declaration of his sentiments on this point he leaves no doubt in the minds of any of his hearers that he has placed all his hopes for the future on the help and countenance lie may receive from the British power.

46. He is trying hard to collect the rifles and ammunition scattered about the country by Sher Afzal, and is making an honest endeavour to establish order amongst his people. Governors are being or have already been appoint­ed to all the districts, and the work of civil administration is being started. Finding the benefit which has accrued to himself from discontented and almost avowedly hostile Adamzadas having been influenced by me at private inter­views he sends every one of any importance to pay a visit to the mission the spies have been all withdrawn and all our dealings are our a cordially friendly footing.

47. A Mehtar of Chitral roughly speaking rules in one of two ways, either he makes himself feared or he conciliates his opponents by giving them pre­sents. The Mehtar who is in a position to use both methods is practically secure the man who can use neither method is almost beyond hope. At the present moment the Chitral treasury is empty and it has been necessary to lend Nizam-ul-Mulk the sum of Rs. 5,000. This sum was at once exaggerated in the popular idea to five times its actual amount. I believe the Mehtar himself started the rumour. It has in any case been most useful. Nizam-ul-Mulk is by nature much more inclined to hide his treasure in the ground than to buy the good will of his headmen, by its judicious distribution. It may be taken as a sign of his returning confidence in his power to remain in Chitral that begun giving "khilluts" with a fairly generous hand, to those entitled to receive them.

48. It is the consistent policy of the mission to attempt to strengthen Nizam-ul-Mulk position not only by the great respect with which it always treats him, but by the deference to his supposed wishes it always display in all dealing with his friends or his enemies; most of all by the entire abstention from even the semblance of interference in the internal affairs of the country. To avoid being drawn into matters of local administration and local policy is more difficult than it may appear. The Mehtar and his chief advisers, under the guise of seeking advice themselves unconsciously conspire to defeat our intentions on this point although probably they would be amongst the first to resent the inevitable results of any infringement of this salutary rule. But by keeping the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs steady before the mind's eye it has always been possible to avoid being caught in their innocently laid traps. Our reward has been that we are not only on the warmest terms of friendship with the Mehtar, and still maintain our popularity with the poorer classes, but that, if we may place any reliance on their personal asseverations we have also disarmed the hostility of a considerable number of the Adamzadas and Moghli Pirs, while not a few of them go about loudly praising the generosity and kindness of the English officers.

49. Nizam-ul-Mulk has quite lately transmitted to me his opinion that even with Sher Afzal on the Badakhshan frontier there will be no fear of trouble so long as the mission remains in the country, and that the position of affairs has undergone such a wonderful change during the last month that, if Sher Afzal were certainly interned. Some distance from the frontier, there would be no cause for apprehension of any kind, under any circumstances. He, however, is just as impressionable as the people he rules, and his opinions have to be accepted with a certain reservation, although they no doubt embody the ideas of his chief advisers as well as his own private sentiments.

50. Something of the history of the past as well as the present state of affairs have now been laid before you. It still remains for me to speak of the future. In doing this all opinions and suggestions have to be advanced with the utmost caution, Chitral being prominently a land where unexpected events come to pass.

51. It is the deliberate opinion of Khan Sahib Rab Nawaz Khan Bahadur

52. Until within a fortnight ago all peaceable Chitralis looked forward to the spring and the opening of the passes with dread. No one knew exactly what he feared, but all felt certain that tragic events were impending. That the more important of those would he a second invasion by Sher Afzal or his son, the murder, or attempted murder, of Nizam-ul-Mulk and a possible attack on the British mission, was the subject of current talk.

53. The news that Sher Afzal was in disfavour, and had been imprisoned by the Amir, helped to calm men's thoughts, though very many declared* the tidings were untrue; but the chief factor in giving an increased feeling of security to the people has been the change in the attitude of many of the Adamzada class towards the mission. Instead of being regarded with avowed disfavour and open hostility, instead of being shunned by Sher Afzal's most influential supporters, it being now, clear to all that no me meddling the internal affairs of the "sweet country" is contemplated, and no dreaded innovation are to be attempted, the mission is cheerfully accepted and openly praised. Even allowing for the extreme impressionability of the Chitralis, their natural fickleness and changeful dispositions, some portion of this favourable feeling ought to be retained permanently.

54. But there is no disguising the unpleasant truth that the Mehtar is not generally liked, and at present enjoys merely a reflected share of the popularity of the English officers. He will have to steadily continue his policy of clemency for some time before he gains the hearts of even a fair proportion of his subjects. Everything he does which pleases his people is put down to foreign influence, which those acts which they do not approve he is given entire credit for.

55. I have already referred to the possibility of Nizam-ul-Mulk being murdered. The exact amount of danger in which he lives cannot be estimated, but the probability is that it is lessening day by day such a catastrophe occurring must be conceded.

56. Many people, including Rab Nawaz Khan, think that the best plan for removing this fear altogether would be for the Government of India to guarantee the throne to Nizam-ul-Mulk, and, failing his issue, to his young half-brothers Amir-ul-Mulk and Shuja-ul-Mulk, the sons of the late Aman-ul-Mulk by his Asmari "Khunza," so that people might know that, even if Nizam-ul-Mulk were killed, Sher Afzal would still have no chance of succeeding him. I do not, however, believe in the advisability of adopting this plan, or in its efficacy, if adopted.

The half-brothers mentioned are very young, the elder is not more than fifteen, and both are unfortunately below the average standard of boyish intelli­gence. To put either of these princes on the throne in the event of Nizam-ul-Mulk's death would be, I imagine, almost impossible, unless we were prepared to sustain our nominee by force and administer the country ourselves in his name an arrangement, in my opinion, as impolitic as it would be burdensome and expensive. If the present Mehtar were to be murdered, or to die naturally, his successor might probably be ultimately found in the family of Mehtar Jan Aman-ul-Mulk of Kala-i-Naghr. This consists of three brothers of legitimate "birth and royal rank. The brothers are grown men, and although they have lived all their lives in the cold shade of neglect, they are believed to be fit for the duties of Mehtarship. Their father was Mehtar Jan Humayun, who, with all his family, except these three sons, was slaughtered by his brother-in-law, Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk, on the suspicion that he was privy to the murder of Mehtar Muhtaram Shah, the "Cannibal," whose savage reign of one year's dura­tion was ended by a bullet from his cousin Said Ali Khan, whose, father had been one of the "Cannibals" many victims. In the general massacre of Humayun's family the three little boys, the offspring of Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk's own sister, were alone spared.

The policy which, in my opinion, should be adopted on this point will be is cussed below, when the whole question of our future relations with Chitral is being considered.

57. No reference has been made to there being any possibility of our influencing Sher Afzal into entering into friendly relations with the Government of India in the event of his ever regaining the throne of Chitral.

I know nothing personally of this prince. One or two of his admirers under the influence of presents and kindly treatment have hinted that in his heart Sher Afzal is not really hostile to the Government of India, nor desirous of excluding British officers from Chitral, but their opinions are tainted by their obvious desire to remain loyal to Sher Afzal, and at the same time he friends with those who have treated them well. It must not be forgotten that all the acts of Sher Afzal and all his outspoken declarations point to his extreme dislike and consistent enmity to the English and their Government. I am fore compelled to the inference that Sher Afzal being Mehtar means the rigid exclusion of British officers, as well as British news writers and other native officials from Chitral, with a complete severance of all bonds of friendship and even neighbourly tolerance between this country and Kashmir.

58. It is necessary, therefore, to consider what could be the probable effect on our frontier policy of Sher Afzal being Mehtar of Chitral. In the first place, we could never be certain that an attempt would not be made to revive the old unhappy days before the Chitrali rulers were regularly subsidized when impecunious princes looked to Gilgit as a land to be plundered or terrified into paying black-mail. A thoroughly hostile Government at Chitral it ........................... enough to attempt raiding Gilgit single handed, would certainly become the centre and relying place for all the discontented and fanatical tribes of the Indus Valley, and might at any time cause serious, or at least vexations, trouble on our Kashmir border, for whose protection the Gilgit; frontier force would have to be both strong and vigilant.

59. A much more serious point, however, is this, that all the evidence I have been able to obtain and carefully examine, points to the fact Afzal had remained, Mehtar of the country, Chitral would have become practically a province of Kabur avowedly hostile to the Government of India, while the Amir himself would always have been in a position to disclaim all responsibility for its misdeeds.

60. It seems almost certain that a serious collision between the Afghanis and the Russians cannot be long postponed. The Amir would expect and would undoubtedly receive, all the help his subsidized ally, the Mehtar of Chitral, could give him. The Russians must assuredly triumph in the end, and would then have an excellent pretext for attacking and invading Chitral, even if the Mehtar had only indirectly supported the cause of the Afghans.

61. In the case supposed, the British authorities at Gilgit would probably be entirely ignorant of what was passing, in Chitral. The first news they would get might be an intimation that an avenging force of Russians had crossed the Dorah and occupied the country. With the Amir's army defeated, the whole of Badakhshan rapturously throwing itself into the arms of a deliverer from the hated Afghan yoke, the Russians would meet with absolutely no resistance. If boundaries had already been fixed and agreed upon by a Commission, the Russians might still plead the absolute necessity of their punitive expedition. It would be hard to refute such arguments. I apprehend it might be harder still to induce the invaders to go back, their task being completed. The im­portance of Chitral, its facility of entrance from .the north, its easy roads to Peshawar by the Kunar Valley and Jelalabad or by the Lowari Pass, Dir and Swat, both running through fertile districts thronged with large villages, is so great, that it can hardly be exaggerated even by a writer like myself, who may be held to be incapable of viewing the complete perspective because he is too close to his object.

62. The extreme importance of our retaining a firm hold on this country is not universally understood, and if Russians were once within its borders, it is quite possible that public opinion influencing Parliament would refuse its sanc­tion to the adoption of any extreme measure necessary to enforce our legiti­mate demand that they should return to the other side of the Hindu Kush.

63. With Russian influence strong in the country or Russian troops actual­ly within its boundaries, a most serious embarrassment to Indian finances may be confidently predicted. A large increase in the army will be required to protect our frontiers, and its great cost, the outlay required for defences, roads and railways, will not be the only trouble which will have to he faced resolute­ly and expensively.

64. If the Amir of Kabul can be relied upon to permanently restrain Sher Afzal from making another attempt oh Chitral, the 'situation will be to a certain extent cleared of its present difficulty; but I cannot rid myself of a suspicion that very much trust cannot be placed on any such^; promise. All reports go to show that the Amir is indeed highly incensed against Sher Afzal at the present moment, and that, after reproaching him for pusillanimity and folly a most as bad as cowardice, he has put him under some kind of restraint. This no doubt is all true enough, and Abdur Rahman is very likely extremely annoyed at Sher Afzal's failure; but the Amir is a man of great tenacity of purpose, and must know the value of keeping such a court card as the fugitive prince for future use in his games of diplomatic skill with the Government of India.

65. Chitral means very much to the Amir, Besides considerations another spot from whence he could indicate his power of annoyance against ....... great ally, whenever he desired to add point to an arguments or ................... ................ it is a country admirably adapted to help his ambitions protects ......................... and Dir. It might be used as a cat's paw in obtaining those district, which he cannot openly capture himself, now the Government of India has stopped his advance at Asmar. He is accredited with a burning desire to distress of destroy his inveterate enemy Umra Khan and to seize the Bash gal and Veran Valleys of Kafristan. Both these objects he might hopefully pursue if he had a thorough control of Chitral.

66. If subsequent rumours are true that the Amir in his mortification at the failure of Sher Afzal has not only, as might have been anticipated, showed some signs of disfavour to that prince, but has actually imprisoned him in a particularly vile dungeon, and has also in other ways despitefully used him and his followers, they merely indicate that Abdur Rah man has allowed a gouty temper to triumph over the dictates of prudent policy, land has already inclined Sher Afzal to listen to wise counsels and make friendly overtures to the Gov­ernment of India, if ever he succeeds in escaping from his present bonds and is able to make another attempt on Chitral. But it seems impossible that Abdur Rahman has really proceeded to these extremes; while it is much more likely that he has spread abroad a false statement of his seventies in order to blind people to the fact that he was himself the instigator and strong helper of Sher Afzal in capturing Chitral.

67. Even if sufficient guarantee can be obtained that neither Sher Afzal nor any of his family, while they remain hostile to British interests, can ever obtain the Mehtarship of Chitral, there are still other reasons why we ought always to maintain such an effective control over the affairs of the country that our influence could never be endangered either by the fickleness of the Mehtar for Cue time being or by the political ambition of Russia. At present our prestige is great, and our position can be easily rendered perfectly secure; but I believe we could not make any backward movement without imperiling the one and making the other difficult to recover. The probabilities are that if we now reverted to our old policy with the Mehtars of Chitral, which served us well enough while the strong Aman-ul-Mulk ruled the land, and withdrawing British officers from Chitral left no obvious palpable sign of our dominant autho­rity in the country, we should find ourselves involved in unceasing frontier troubles.

68. Nizam-ul-Mulk would probably be either killed or driven from the country Anarchy, from which we have lately rescued the people, would at once reappear. Umra Khan would actively and openly support a nominee, while the Amir and his Sipah Salar from Asmar would secretly support their own candidate. The country would be split into factions, and many, other claimants also might assert their pretentious to the throne. Yasin would be distract­ed by the rivalry of Mohammad Wali Khan, Mokaddas Aman, as well as by Katur pretenders in addition. Whoever was successful for the moment, would at once try to get possession of Mastuj and the Chitral Kohistan. The Punial rajas would start intriguing actively and earnestly. The continued triumph of violence and disorder would make Hunza, Nagar and the Shin States restless and eager to join in the fray, either to support the claim of relations, or from the hope of plunder. We should be in almost as bad a position as if Sher Afzal were ruling the whole of Chitral as our avowed enemy. The end would probably be that we should have to step in and restore order with the sword and at the cost of much bloodshed.

69. It, on the other hand, Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk were able by any chance to retain the throne and assert his authority, he would at once make overtures to the Russians. He is by nature a ruler of the same stamp as Safdar Ali Khan, the late Thum of Hunza. Relieved from the restraining influence of British officers, he could not be trusted for a moment. His idea of successful statesmanship is to get subsidies from whoever will pay them in return for a nominal allegiance and secret agreements. This is the ............................... ............... traditional policy of the rulers of these petty Khanates and is ........................ by argument nor altered by evidence of its invariable failure. They never ascribe such failure to its true cause but merely consider it the result of bad luck or fate, against which no man can protect himself.

70. Russia would certainly seize any opportunity of pushing her influence across the Hindu Kush, either by taking advantage of a general de bacle or by intriguing with a shifty, unscrupulous Mehtar.

71. On all grounds, therefore, I think we ought to uphold our present authoritative position in Chitral by establishing an Agency in the country and placing it in charge of a British officer. In this way we shall be protected against any more under-hand schemes of the Amir of Kabul, and also against. Russian intrigue, further fighting and, bloodshed will be prevented, and we shall be able to ensure the peace and security of our Gilgit-Yasin frontier.

72. To enable us to safely maintain an Agency at Chitral, and also retain an efficient control over the whole country, it is necessary, in my opinion, not only to provide a guard of 100 or 120 trained British Indian sepoys for the Political Officer at Chitral, but also for Yasin to be occupied effectively. These measures cannot, however, be prudently adopted unless the present Gilgit garrison is strengthened. This will involve a moderate increase of expenditure in the present, but will be the saving of large sums in the future.

73. Concerning the actual number of troops required to reinforce the Gilgit garrison I have little to say. It is a point to be decided by Colonel Durand and the military authorities. But I am sure the number asked for will be very much smaller than officers unacquainted with the country would, at first, be inclined to consider necessary. The reinforcement should, I believe, be British Indian troops, so that there should always be on the frontier a force well officered and of approved discipline. To avoid wounding Kashmir susceptibilities, the addition to the Gilgit garrison should be all included under the desig­nation of a Guard for the British Agent.

74. That there are many objections to sending up British Indian troops to Gilgit cannot be denied; the transport and supply of such a force bristles with difficulties; the shutting up of a number of men in more or less isolated positions is most undesirable; the impossibility of recalling them to India in case of necessity during several months of the year has to be admitted; yet, with all these objections clearly before my mind, I have no hesitation in strongly advising that it should be done.

75. If the alternative road to Gilgit through Kaghan and Chilas were employed, the difficulties both of marching up troops and of supplying them would be greatly diminished. This road, besides many other advantages, has this great superiority over the Bandipur-Bunji Road, that it does not appear liable to those landslips and other freaks of nature, which, in the latter route, cause so much anxiety to the Gilgit authorities. The military importance of having two lines of communication with India, instead of one, is too obvious to require more than the merest mention here.

76. Concerning the proposed occupation of Yasin, it is obvious that to enable it to be done effectively Gilgit must be reinforced. To attempt to properly garrison Yasin from the troops now at Gilgit would be too severe a strain on the resources of that Agency.

77. I estimate that for Yasin a total of 600 rank and file is required. Well

78. I have good reasons for believing that such a force of 600 men in the Yasin district could be supplied with food in average years from the surplus grain of Yasin, Ghizr, and Chashi, at moderate rates and without hardship to the inhabitants.

19. There need he no anxiety concerning the safety of the proposed; Yasin garrison even under a combination of adverse circumstances, provided the men are well equipped, well supplied, and fairly officered.

80. In the improbable, I believe almost impossible, event of a general rising of the whole of the Yasin district, aided by all the Shin tribes and many of the Nimchas and distant Pathans, there would still be no danger of the troops being overwhelmed.

81. A hostile force, no matter how strong in numbers, would, partly from its own constitution and mostly from the peculiarities of the situation, be always at a great disadvantage in attacking disciplined troops in strong positions in Yasin. Its only hope would be in establishing a blockade for a long period, while, as a matter of fact, it could not remain in the district more than a limited number of days. Poorly armed, without artillery, and having no leaders correctly speaking, it would be also deficient in those arrangements for transport and commis­sariat which would alone enable it to keep the field.

82. Without outside help on a very large scale, Yasin would be powerless for mischief.

83. All roads leading into Yasin, except that from Gilgit, are most difficult, merely consisting of rough tracks leading over high passes. It is doubtless the severity of the marching which disables men from carrying more than five days rations in amount rarely or never exceeded according to my experience and information.

84. Unless almost at once successful, the combination must break up and disperse in search of food, yet it could never face rifle fire during the daylight. The communications between the different posts could almost invariably be maintained; they could only be exceptionally closed by day, and then only for short periods.

85. It must be remembered that the Shin and kindred tribes have not the dash and enterprise of Pathans; their fanaticism, also, is at present of a very mild and theoretical kind. It is this poor fighting Shin element, which would largely predominate, in any attacking force. All the battles in this country are practi­cally bloodless; the killing being done after the so-called fight is over.

86. The only possible danger I can conceive for well-supplied, property equipped Gilgit troops, is from young or inexperienced British officers recognizing the weakness, of the enemy, but forgetting the source of their own strength, becoming impatient at the mild character of the fighting, and being temped to leave their strong places, to attack at a disadvantage a, numerous, enemy well posted in positions the capture of which would be both expensive and useless patience and coolness of temperament arenas much the cardinal military virtues in the country as brilliant leading and dashing onslaught on more favoured battle fields.

87. I have written as if it were conceivable that the whole country should be in a blaze round all the various posts, but such a condition of affairs ought not to be possible. If we maintain a strong but kindly administration deriving our authority directly from the Mehtar, or exercising it in the name of some nominee of his, but in either case taking care that while we are responsible to the Mehtar for the maintenance of order and for the payment of the revenue (a small matter of a few thousand rupees), we are equally determined that our good name shall not be tarnished by being associated with tyrannical or unjust government: then we may confidently expect that the Yasin is will not merely be well disposed to us, but will quickly become energetically loyal and faithful in our service.

88. The most important factor in attaining this end is to place in Yasin a sympathetic political officer, a man tolerant of the changefulness of mind of a half-wild people, and hot too rigid in requiring absolute punctuality and other ideal difficult or impossible to attain even in civilised countries. Carelessness in carrying out elaborate instructions does not necessarily imply disrespect to authority or dislike to reasonable control, but is more the result seen of that forgetfulness or failure in continuity of thought which is constantly seen in children, whom the lower classes in Yasin, in many other respects, strongly resemble. A carefully selected officer of the temperament I have indicated would rapidly range the whole population on his side.

89. The Ghizar men share with the Laspuris the credit of being the flower of the fighting element in Chitral. Gradually and cautiously, effective local levies might be raised. Their management would have to be placed entirely in the hands of the political that is to say the civil officials. Experience confirms me in the idea that purely military officers of any standing usually become too crystallised in the routine of disciplined troops to be en-trusted with the care of our strange but useful levies, to whom anything like drill is irksome, but who nevertheless, by the heredity of centuries and by their peculiar knowledge of every yard of their own country, display an apti­tude for mountain warfare which is extraordinary. The average military officer is apt to either make service unpopular by insisting on rules admirable indeed when applied in appropriate cases, but inapplicable to first beginnings amongst lively inconsequential Chitralis, or else he holds them in such half-amused contempt that he can hardly be at the pains to seriously teach them to shoot.

90. It will be a long time before such levies could be of much use against regular soldiers; hut against the neighbouring tribesmen they would be invincible. The knowledge that they had good troops behind them, and, most of all, that there were stores of food and other supplies to fall back upon, would fill them with confidence. It is the "band-o-bast," the power to choose its own time and season for fighting, even more than its superiority in arms, which makes a civilized power unconquerable by wild tribes.

91. I have dwelt at some lengthen: the question of the arrangements for holding Yasin because, even if Chitral were merely occupied for a limited period, until it has a strong trustworthy government, and until after the meeting of a boundary commission, even then I think Yasin should never he allowed to slip from our grasp. Its possession would always act as a re­straining influence on the Shin tribes of the Indus valley, and keep the Gilgit border quiet and it would always give us a masterful position in relation Chitral affairs, since Drasan could be occupied by levies from Ghizr in three days, while regular troops could reach the same place three days later.

92. Besides acting as a present support to be the British officers and their escort at Chitral, ensuring their safety the possession of Yasin is doubly important to us in the future, because the Russians are now actually on its northern frontier. If we do not declare ourselves masters of the country, they will certainly begin pushing exploring parties into it again. Last year a party ventured as far as the summit of the Khora Bohrt pass. It is impossible to say how far east in Wakhan the Amir will declare to be the limit of his territories, but with Yasin in our secure possession His Highness's ultimate decisions on this point will be of minor importance.

93. In his present grateful humour and avowed willingness to do anything whatever to meet he wishes of the Government of India, it should not be hard to get Nizam-ul-Mulk to agree to the proposed arrangement in Yasin which would be as convenient and profitable for him as it would he convenient and profitable for us.

94. Turning now to the establishment of apolitical agency in Chitral Unless Yasin is occupied as I have suggested by Gilgit troops, I do not think it would be prudent or even safe to have British officers isolated at such a distance from help, and so liable to be cut off from all communication with India but if Ghizr is properly held, all danger from such causes is greatly minimised.

95. The Chitral Agency staff might consist of a political officer with a military officer to command the guard. If a commissioned medical officer could be also appointed it would be well, otherwise the best man of the best subordinate class available should be placed in medical charge of the British officers, the escort, the civil dispensary, &c., &c.

96. To ensure an uniform policy being maintained all along this frontier, all British officers, including any political officer in Yasin, must be under' the orders of the British Agent at Gilgit and act strictly on his instructions:

97. The escort at Chitral ought to consist of at least one hundred trained sepoys; for a year or two at any rate this number should be maintained. To provide against all possible contingencies, it ought to be cantoned with the British officers in a well-built defensible structure in a carefully selected position, and always have six months supplies in hand. Strict discipline must be maintained and careful watch and ward kept, not only to ensure safety from stray Mussulman fanatics or hired Kafir assassins, but also against sudden secret invasions, of which Sher Afzal's descent on Chitral may be considered a possible type.

98. The possible dangers to be anticipated are-

1. 
   A general rising of the people against Nizam-ul-Mulk and the English and in favour of Sher Afzal's family and the Afghans;
   
2. 
   An attack or invasion from Umra Khan's Dir territories;
   
3. 
   Risks from Afghans and other fanatics visiting Chitral.
   
4. 
   Frontier troubles from the Kafir and other "Yaghistan" borders.
   

99. Concerning the possibility of an emeute in Chitral itself, I have already indicated that all our secret information and all the signs of the times, if I read them aright, go to show that the danger of a general rising against the present Mehtar is very much less than it was. It is, however, possible that, the adherents of Sher Afzal may make another effort to regain Chitral after the opening of the passes an attempt, which would probably be coincident with the murder, or attempted murder, of the present Mehtar. The best way to guard; against this double contingency is to have troops at Ghizr in Yasin, and in this way Overawe the more turbulent spirits amongst the disaffected Chitralis. If this were done, and unremitting efforts were made to win over to out interests the Adamzadas, the natural aristocracy of the country outbreak will be very small indeed.

100. With reference to danger from Umra Khan's territories or from the Shinaki tribes, it must be remembered that Chitral is so situated that bodies of swift-footed mountaineers from any, direction can reach its vicinity before any tiding of their hostile intention can arrive. At Dir there is a hotbed of fanaticism kept at a red heat by the teachings of the priest known as the Baba Sahib, one of the Murids of the late Akhoond of Swat. This fervid preacher is universally respected for his piety liberality, and or hodoxy. He is said also to be a man of great learning and ability. He frequently has with him at Dir as many as two or three hundred disciples amongst whom are several Kafirs. The enthusiasm and devotion of those men give their leader a power which ....... not be despised especially when it is remembered that the distance for Dir to Chitral can be covered by natures of those countries in two days.

101. While Umra Khan finds it politic to keep on friendly terms with the Government of India, and while he keeps, a firm hold on Dir, this danger may not be great; but if he were to become estranged from the British or to lose Dir, it would not be wise to disregard the possibility of some kind of hostile attempt from that quarter.

102. It may be taken as certain that the presence of an English Agency at Chitral will be looked upon with disfavour by all the surrounding peoples, except by the Kafirs. Umra Khan is said to dislike it particularly, on the ground that it brings the English on to a frontier from which he is assailable. He lately sent a message to Nizam-ul-Mulk urging him to send away the British officers as soon as possible, and offering to send five hundred men to supply their place. He is known to cast a longing eye on the rifles the Mehtar possesses. 103. The Shin tribes of the Indus valley are avowedly hostile. Their power is not formidable although their numbers are numerous.

104. The Kafirs arc a people who will require to be treated with some caution. They arc apt to be incited to violence by clever intriguers, by the sayings of certain men held to be inspired during religious sacrifices, by bribes and from accidental causes, such for instance as one of their number being shot during an attempt at thieving, and so on. They, however, know their own weakness in weapons, and several of their headmen are clear sighted enough. It would probably only be in times of confusion and trouble that they would have to be considered as a possible danger. Their natural inclination is certainly to be friendly with Englishmen. Very great reliance cannot be placed on this tendency, however, because Kafirs, when suffering from a defeat or from some injury at the hands of an enemy, in their first burst of indignation or rage are inclined to assume that all except their active sympathizers arc secretly hostile to them; they require a little time before cool reflection enables them to see things in a proper light.

105. They tell me that when Umra Khan raided them, after I left Kauristan in 1891, he taunted them about me and said his attack was to punish them for entertaining an Englishman. They would like me to accept the responsi­bility for all their late troubles; they also pretend to think I have the power to compel Umra Khan to conclude a humiliating treaty of peace with them. But in this matter they are merely pursuing their customary national tactics.

106. It seems that Slier Afzal has some hold on the Kam Kafirs. He had either been liberal with money or with promises. He has also betrothed his son to the daughter of one of the chief men and paid the price of the girl. They have likewise a common bitter enmity against Umra Khan to make their interests appear identical. When the roads are open I shall send for a deputation of the headmen to come to me, and shall then find out the true state of their feelings. The Katir Kafirs, those in the upper part of the Bashgal valley, have had no dealings with Slier Afzal, as far as I can discover.

I think, in short, the Kafirs are not so much a danger in the future as a element of possible disquiet which may require to be carefully considered tactfully dealt with.

107. I believe no fear need be entertained concerning the safety of the Agency if the oblivious precautions. I have already mentioned are strictly adhered to, and if its officers decline to allow the lapse of many uneventful, perhaps monotonous, date to lull them into a feeling of absolute security. For the peculiar circumstances arising from a general frontier war or a war with Afghanistan, &c., special arrangements would be necessary to provide for the absolute security of the Agency, but short of such a war on a large scale the officers and their escort will incur no unreasonable risks by remaining in Chitral.

108. Our policy in Chitral might, I think, be defined as follows. The Agency escort will never be used a bodyguard for the Mehtar, nor under any circumstances be permitted to begin hostilities with the Chitralis.

109. The arrangements under which we remain in different from those we acknowledge as our guide for action in latter place we accept all responsibility for the good government or the district for the reasons I have mentioned in paragraph 87, but in Chitral we abstain; her from interference with the internal Affairs of the Stated altogether

110. To guarantee the Mehtarship to Nizam-ul-Mulk or any other family would he impolitic and inexpedient. If the present Mehtar were to' become tyrannous and Oppressive, it should be at his own risk. He must learn to place reliance for hiss personal safety, not n the bayonets of British troops but on the justice and mercy of his system of government. The principle to be strictly adhered to is, I think, the one we have always proclaimed as actuating us in our relations with Chitral absolute non-interference between the Mehtar and his subjects.

We ought, I believe, to accept the de-facto Mehtar, whoever he may be, provided only that he acknowledges the suzerainty of His Highness the Maha­raja of Kashmir, and agrees to be guided by the advice of the Political Officer at Chitral in all matters relating to the foreign relations of the State.

111. In this way we may reasonably hope to obtain the good-will of the Adamzadas, who will see in time that we have no desire to introduce any new system of law or administration repugnant to their customs or religion, while the mere presence of British officers in the land will be sufficient to put a stop to many of those iniquities for which Chitral is unhappily so notorious-. Domestic slavery will gradually disappear, the trade in slaves, including the traffic with Peshawar in female children, will end at once. Murders will greatly diminish in number.

The simple fact that the British officers are known to look upon such cus­toms and crimes with grave disapproval, and are also disgusted when they hear, of mutilations and other barbarous forms of punishment, is a powerful factor in improving the morals and civilizing the customs of the people.

It is one of the chief reasons why the poorest classes are already so friendly disposed towards us. A slight but undoubted improvement in their condition has already resulted from the casual visits of English travellers in the past, and they consequently look forward hopefully to the benefits they will obtain from the residence of British officers in their country.

112. To me it seems also most desirable that Mehtars of Chitral be form­ally installed on the throne by, an English officer acting as the representative of His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir and of the Government of India, and that until this has been done, no agreement for the payment of subsidies, &c., be entered into. The delay which will necessarily always ensue between the actual succession to the Mehtarship and the formal installation by a British officer may be valuable as showing the hold the new prince has on the affec­tions of his subjects. The ceremony can be hastened or delayed as may seem expedient; but the Political Assistant in charge of the Agency will continued to control the foreign relations of the country under all circumstances and at all

113. I therefore suggest that Nizam-ul-Mulk be regularly installed by an officer deputed for the purpose. This would clearly show to all the neighbouring States that the agreement of 1877 between the Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk and the Kashmir Durbar is not to be considered as either dead or lapsed, but is an actual living reality and that the suzerainty of the Maharaja of Kashmir over the whole of Chitral can never in future be called in question. All the great Adamzadas, Syads, Moghli Pirs, &c., should be summoned to attend the Installation Durbar, their participation in the ceremony being very desirable.

114. In the event of civil war or anarchy in Chitral, we might have to occupy Drasan and actually rule the country ourselves; but I consider that if my suggestions are accepted we need have very little fear of such any unfortunate and improbable state of things occurring. On the other hand, if the country rapidly grew settled and peaceable and a satisfactory arrangement were come to with Russia concerning her "boundaries and spheres of influence, the plan of keeping British officer and a considerable escort at Chitral itself might perhaps be reconsidered. This point I have not been able to decide to my own satisfaction.

115. Such is the general line of policy, which, in my opinion, we should adopt towards Chitral. It has, no doubt, certain obvious disadvantages, but I believe it is the best which can he devised under present circumstances we shall obtain all we need reasonably desire - a sufficient dominance of the country. A good road and a telegraph line to Gilgit will follow as a matter of course, for the Political Officer and the escort at Chitral will require these conveniences. The construction of roads and telegraphs should be undertaken as soon as possible, beginning with the Gilgit-Chitral road. This should be begun quietly, and as a work to which no exception could possibly be taken. It might be made popular by carefully selecting officers for the work, by liberal payments to labourers, and by presents to the Adamzadas and other headmen.

116. In bringing to a close this lengthy and I fear tedious report on Chitral matters, I hope that my carefully considered opinions have not become obscured in the numerous pages it has seemed necessary for me to write in order to explain to you fully the reasons on which those opinions are based.

117. I am aware that the Government of India has no desire to undertake the responsibilities which the acceptance of my advice will involve, and yet I am so sure of the correctness of my views that I am deeply anxious lest a faulty exposition of the situation, an inadequate description of the issues at stake, may cause an underestimate to be formed of their great and pressing importance.

118. The loss to our prestige, now so high that the mere presumption that he was actively supported by the Government of India placed Nizam-ul-Mulk on his father's throne, would be irremediable if we now withdraw from Chitral and are debarred from all influence in its frontier affairs; yet it is not mere loss of prestige from which we shall suffer, as I have attempted to show.

119. Prestige, however, in the Hindu Kush is itself as valuable as many bayonets, as useful as the expenditure of much money.

No. 1586, dated. Srinagar, the 20 April 1893.

From - Lieutenant-Colonel D. W. K. Barr, Offg. Resident in Kashmir,

To the - Government of India,

In continuation of my letter No. 15, dated the 18th April 1893, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a letter, in original, No. 1009, dated the 18th March 1893 with its enclosures, received from the British Agent, Gilgit, on the 25th instant, forwarding extracts from the Chitral Mission Diary, dated, respectively, the 8th, 9th and 10th February 1893.

________________

No. 1009, dated Gilgit, the 18th March 1893.

From - Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. A. Durand, C.B., British Agent at Gilgit,

To - The Resident in Kashmir.

I have the honour to forward copies of extracts from the Chitral Mission Diary.

2. The news is discounted by later information, but the deductions made by the Chitralis, as to the Amir's real attitude towards Sher Afzal as shown by the fact of his son being at liberty in Zebak, are worthy of notice.

________________

Extracts from Chitral Mission Diary forwarded by Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson, C.S.I., to Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. A. Disband, C.B., dated Chitral, the 8th February 1893.

About midday Ghulam and Bahadur Shah came to renew yesterday's conversation about Warshagam. Mr. Robertson said he thought, under the present circumstances, it would not be advisable for the Mehtar to send any force into Yasin; armed men entering the district might alarm the Ghizr arid, other folk, who would probably imagine war was intended, and so would either; desert their homes and run away, or stay and fight. The Jemadar was on "his way to Gilgit, and, in passing through the district, would be able to explain matters to the people. If he were successful there would be no fear of any disturbance arising, while, if he were convinced there was danger that the Warshagam men now in Chitral would be attacked or illused by Muhammad Wall on their returning to their homes, he would at once send back word to that effect. Until the Jemadar returned to Chitral it would be premature to suppose that an armed force was necessary to make the Mehtar's orders respected. At the present moment, when everything appeared to be progresses so satisfactorily, it would be unfortunate if there were anything like a distance or insurrection, in any part of the Mehtar's dominions. The Government of Indian would certainly be sorry to hear of such an occurrence, while, if the Mehtar's dominions. The Government of India would certainly be sorry to hear of such, an occurrence the Mehtar's mandate to Muhammad Wall were obeyed at, once, simply because it was a mandate from Chitral, the moral effect on all the people would be very much greater than if he had to support his distinct orders with an army. If the Jemadar reported that Muhammad Wali and the Yasinis refused to obey the orders of their ruler, it would then be time enough to think of punishing them for contumacy.

At first Ghulam and Bahadur Shah seemed depressed at this view of the subject, but subsequently, when the argument was fully explained to them they cheered up and declared the advice offered we sound and would certainly be acted upon. They then went away apparently satisfied. They said Abdur Rahman Khan was the Governor whom the Mehtar thought of putting the Yasinis.

Abdur Rahman Khan is a peculiar looting lad said to be clever. He cannot, however, be more than seventeen years of age, and has had as yet no opportunity of displaying any force of character. He is the fourth son of Aman-ul-Mulk by Syednan (Syedmothu), the eldest of whom, Shah-i-Mulk of Dras, was murdered with his two brothers Bahram and Wazir by Afzal-ul-Mulk, under circumstances of peculiar atrocity.

Mr. Robertson's impression is that the Mehtar and Bahadur Shah want to send in a large force to Yasin with the injection of creating a disturbance, and so obtaining an excuse for severe reprisals on those people who deserted-him for Afzal-ul-Mulk and Muhammad Wali, but that such a policy is extremely undesirable. The danger at present is from the Latku people Minawar and Nayab with their followers are said by the Badakhshi princes to have declared that the news about Sher Afzal and the other fugitives haying, been placed under close arrest by the Amir is false, as otherwise Sher Afzal's son would not be permitted to remain at large at Zebak. They assert pri­vately that the whole of the Latku population, numbering 1,000 families, intend in the spring to leave their country and join Sher Afzal's son at Zebak, from whence they, intend to wage war in Chitral. They have no quarrel with the mission provided they leave the country, but if they do not go away voluntarily, they intend to drive them out and pursue them as far as London. In any case the Mehtar will be better employed in consolidating his position than in, worrying the Yasin people and re-stirring up their enmity to himself.

The Jemadar in conversation said that, had Aman-ul-Mulk been allowed by Government to invade Dir last year, Umra Khan would have been ruined. There would have been a general insurrection, in face of which his cause would have been hopeless. The Baba Sahib is secretly bitterly hostile to him, for Umra Khan is no respecter of Mullas, but oppresses them greatly and takes their property to increase his revenues which probably amounts to a lakh of rupees a year. Another important man, inimical to Umra Khan, is Sardar Khan of Baraul, whose wife is own sister to Nizam's mother, the Khuza.

During the conversation with Ghulam about Yassin, he mentioned that Mr. Robertson had last night said that, when the Chitrali troops went there, the Gupis force would retire. Nothing at all on that point had even been referred to, and the remark occasioned some surprise. Ghulam was satisfied he had misunderstood what was said. The Jemadar thinks nothing was meant, and that Abdul Hakim's interpretation in Chitrali had been in fault, while, Abdul Hakim naturally thinks he spoke quite clearly, and that Ghulam's observation was intended to draw forth an expression of opinion about the probable stay of the troops at Gupis. It is most likely that in this matter the Jemadar is right, for, as far as we know, the Mehtar and. his friends are very pleased at our occupying that part of Yassin, but it is very inconvenient that Ghulam and Nizam-ul-Mulk also, who can both speak Persian very fairly, will persist in talking in their native tongue which Abdul Hakim understands well enough for ordinary purposes, but not sufficiently well to be certain of always translating absolutely correctly.

______________

Mehtar Jao Bahadur Khan and Bahadur Shah called in the morning on Mr. Robertson, who said to see them, as he wished to speak to them on a subject which he had lately been turning over in his mind. He said that Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk had frequently impressed upon him the necessary to having a standing army in Chitral; and Mr. Robertson thought at would been an excellent thing it such an army could now be raised; he pointed out the Amir of Kabul and Umra Khan both had standing armies, and were become powerful in consequence and that it was high time, if Chitral wishes to preserve her influence, that she should have one too. Mr. Robertson said be could not say whether Government would agree to the plan, as it had not yet been laid before them for consideration; but he had lately been thinking over the late Mehtar's words, and intended, after he had consulted Nizam-ul-Mulk and the leading men of the country, to lay a definite scheme before Government. At present his idea was that a few hundred men should be enrolled, one or two hundred of whom should be collected for a month or two every year, and during the time they were actually serving; they would receive say Rs. 5 a month, while at other times when they were, at their homes, they would receive say one or two rupees as a retaining fee. This was a rough idea of the scheme which Mr. Robertson said the hoped the Mehtar Jao would lay before the Mehtar, so that he might be able to discuss it shortly with him.

The Mehtar Jao said they quite agreed with Mr. Robertson as to the necessity of the scheme, and thought that there should be no difficulty in carrying it out; they would, however, as requested, talk over the whole matter with the Mehtar, so that there might be a definite discussion of it later, on. They remarked that they thought it would be advisable if Martini-Henry rifles should be supplied instead of Sniders. But Mr. Robertson said that they must first prove themselves worthy of having Sniders before they could expect to receive Martinis. Recently a large number of Sniders had been given them, but they were scattered all over the country, and no account could be kept of them. These should all be collected together first.

* * * * * * * *

It is said (Ghulam Mohi-ud-din is the informant) that Minawar Nayab and other leaders of Sher Afzal's party refuse to believe that their leader has been imprisoned by the Amir. They say the whole story is false, otherwise why would Sher Afzal's son be allowed to remain at Zebak in his present threatening attitude.

_______________

Extracts from Chitral Mission Diary, dated Chitral, the 10th February 1893.

Another report is circulating that, if Sher Afzal is at present under arrest; he will only remain for a short time in disgrace, and then be set at liberty again to resume his plans for obtaining possession of Chitral. His followers are cheering themselves up by circulating and believing this and other reports about the prospects of their party. Mast Khan has secretly been to see Abdul Hakim to warn him to tell Mr. Robertson that all the Adamzadas are opposed to the mission remaining in Chitral, and also to warn him to beware of isolated attacks on some of the British officers by Afghan fanatics.

The Badakhshi princes, Muhammad Rahim Khan and Muhammad Azyam, had an interview with Mr. Robertson before starting for their homes. They, as on former occasions, iterated their loyalty and devotion to the Government of India and their willingness to do any service it might impose upon them, particularly military duty such as an attack on Badakhshan &c. They say they could at once assemble any number of Badakhshis, good fighting men, from a. hundred men to three complete regiments. Only the word was wanted and some rifles. The whole of Badakhshan would rise at their bidding, while the Afghans would have to fly for their lives.

Mr. Robertson commented on the fact, that the Amir of Kabul was a friend and ally of the Government of India. The princes, however, smiling, remarked that those living on the frontier known what actually occurred there. They enumerated the different kinds of help given by the Amir to Sher Afzal - the money advanced, the arms and horses supplied, &c., and asked it such were the acts of friendly neighbours. They pleaded their own poverty the abject distress they were in the actual hunger they were suffering from, Mr. Robertson sympathized with them greatly, bade them good bye for the present, and gave them Rs. 100 for their more pressing and immediate wants.

No. 1587 D.-O., dated Srinagar, the 26th April 1893.

From - Lieutenant-Colonel D.W.K. Barr, Offg. Resident in Kashmir

To—Sir H. Mortimer Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

In continuation of my demi-official letter No. 1208, dated the 29^th March 1893. I enclose, for information, the marginally detailed demi-official letters, in original, with their enclosures, for warding copies of demi-official letters from Robertson regarding the state of affairs in Chitral, and containing certain items of news relative to the movements of the Russians on the Pamirs.
No. 983, dated the 16^th March 1893.

No. 1023, 18^th - 20^th March 1893.

No. 1065, dated the 22^nd - 23^rd March 1893.

No. 1165 R., dated the 29^th March 1893.

____________________

No. 983 D.-O., dated Gilgit, the 16^th March 1893.

From - Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. A. Durand, C.B., British Agent at Gilgit,

To - Lieutenant-Colonel D. W. K. bare.

I forward herewith copy of Robertson's last. I have cut out some unimportant pieces about office establishment and rum for the Sikhs.

Robertson has evidently made up his mind that, the Jemadar must go, but I am not sure if he expects me to keep him here till orders come.

The change for the better in the feeling of the Adamzadas is most
satisfactory. Hay it continue

No news yet of Muhammad Wall having started; if I don't hear in a day or two, I must write and order him in.

____________________
Extract from demi-official letter from Surgeon-Major G. S. Robertson, C.S.I., to Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. duband, C.B., No. 23, dated Chitral, the 26th February 1893.

I do not think it advisable that Rab Nawaz Khan should remain here. We get on in every way very much better now he has gone. He is too much mixed up in local matters, was far too much of a partisan of Afzal-ul-Mulk, and consequently is neither liked by the people nor trusted by Nizam. I imagine he has lost all his former influence in Chitral except that which he gets reflected from us.

As Abdul Hakim could not be spared from Gilgit, I wish you could send up Agha-Muhammad soon, so that he might get initiated into the run of things and get the Mehtar and the principal men before Abdul Hakim goes back and the Jemadar is relieved.

Abdul Hakim is simply invaluable here. He goes on well with every body, and collects information tactfully and assiduously. If he only succeeds in imparting his ways and methods to Agha Muhammad, it will be avery great advantage to the officer who remains here.

We only have "extras" for the escort up to the end of March. We are trying to get everything except rum from Peshawar through one of the Kaka Khel traders.

* * * * * * * * * *

We are still getting on very well. The Latku men have bee in, have been kindly treated by the Mehtar, and interviewed and tipped by me. As far as we can see a very great change for the better has come over Chitral affairs. All reports and all our secret information go to show that many of the Adamzadas are not only reconciled to our being here, but even seem to like it. They now clearly see that our presence is not inimical to their dignity and position, and that we do not intend to meddle with the internal affairs of the "sweet country," nor introduce any dreaded innovations into its Government. The poor we seem to have ways with us, but we cannot run a country like this on their suffrages alone, and in defiance of the native aristocracy, without employing force or threatening to do so. If we can only show the majority of the Adamzadas that it is to their interest to support Nizam, loyally and faithfully, the greatest of all our difficulties will have so far obtained is at least encouraging.

There are all manners of rumours about the successes of Muhammad Sharif Khan, many of them are contradictory, some are obviously untrue. The only certain thing seems to be that there is some sort of movement against Umra Khan. I may, in a few days, send a man to get definite, news unless in the meantime certain information arrives from a trustworthy source. There is some suspicion of the loyalty of Muhammad Sharif Khan, Governor of Dir, to his brother, Umra Khan.