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Figuig

Figuig presents itself as an important example of how a system of governance that emerged relative to the evolution of the community and its environment that was sustainable for centuries was compromised by the series of national political change and short-sighted policy. The social pressures of emigration and political change and economic change imposed from a strong central government precipitated greater change that eventually threatened the survival of the Oasis. The system of shared understanding concerning fairness, leadership, right and duties was challenged by constitutional changes that eroded its foundations and consequently constrained operational processes.(Ostrom, 1992, 52)

Pillars of the governance system that supported social, political, legal, and technological traditions (i.e. Water Councils of each Ksar) were dissolved and replaced by central government appointed political representatives supporting newly introduced policy initiative.(Figuig Interviews, 2005) Whether the objective of such a dramatic change was to gain greater control, develop efficiency, or support local institutions the resulting destruction of this long-standing institution, among others has been accompanied by apathy, frustration, and the imminent destruction of a system built on tradition and social values that evolved over time in response to local needs and the environment.(Figuig Interviews 2005) This system that maintained a careful balance of resources management and development, and a society that maintained a level of trust in its institutions, with a deep rooted sense of value, has surrendered to disorder and inefficiency as foundations of its governance were uprooted

Effective governance is supported by coordinated institutional development by both the state and society. But we must be careful to acknowledge the importance of restoring and maintaining effective institutions that were established prior to the introduction of outside negative influences to revive a sense of value and an appreciation of history to inform the next course of development, not simply change systems as reform often suggests. These provide a valuable starting point from which to develop more appropriate institutions or perhaps partner institutions that more effectively address the needs of society and inform and coordinate government policy and civil society’s mandate.

There is a growing perception that the governance of water resources and water services functions more effectively with an open social structure which enables broader participation by civil society, private enterprises and the media, all networking to support and influence government.”(Rogers, Hall, 2003:26-7)” These support local- social, cultural, and political institutional development that necessarily incorporates a sense of value, thus motivates greater involvement.

Social capital, “the aspects of the structure of relationships between individuals that enables them to facilitate action” can not be undervalued.”(Ostrom, 1992, 11) A system of good governance incorporates “social capital” or imbedded institutional design that has evolved in response to a problem, i.e. water scarcity, and the development of a community.(Coleman, in Ostrom, 1992, 13)

An effective governance systems, supports the needs of a community relative to an established value system and incorporates history and tradition that evolved over time (See Chap 5). National policy and legal regimes must provide active support but not interfere by imposing central control elements (e.g. ministries or agencies) that rely on centralized, inorganic, bureaucratic regimes that can not effectively appreciate the nuances of local systems and thwart progress built on a foundation of history, local knowledge, and social values relative to time and place. Ministries and agencies, thus, must offer implicit and explicit support to encourage communities to form water user associations that are able to effectively represent their stakeholders by transferring a sense of ownership to local users.

For generations Figuig had a successful water resources management system, measured by sustainability and adequate supply, to meet the needs of society that allowed it to maintain a distant, but relatively respected independence from state intervention. The centrality of water and the need to manage it effectively for the survival of the Oasis, as a whole brought about the development of a comprehensive legal code and corresponding institutions along with social mores and institutions.

Figuig had water resources management right for hundreds of years, but following Morocco’s independence from France in 1956, the system faltered as the Water Councils were dissolved by the central government as it usurped administrative power successfully for the first time in history. At the same time, the Algerian boarder was secured due to ongoing hostilities between the two nations causing greater isolation.

The dissolution of important institutions undermined the community’s governance structure, and subsequently its ability to effectively perpetuate the success of the water resources management system. Two important pillars of effective governance were destroyed; trust and a strong community. The system was offset by concentrated power in the hands of a government regime unfamiliar with the balance of influences. As discussed earlier, good governance is a function of community, supported by a sense of value, and its relationship with other systems. These interactions are critical for governing institutions to establish trust which, in turn, fosters respect for the law and the spirit with which it was established within the context of community.

Local community interdependencies were severed when the Algerian border was closed. Subsequently, the government of Morocco established redistricting legislation that aligned Figuig with cities it had previously had no relations, like Oujda to the North. Figuig’s historical relationship were strongest with other oases of the Ziz and Drâa valleys that were similarly established relative to a prolific water source. Their similar environment and position, on the caravan route of Timbuktu-Tlemcen created historical ties.

The new governing institutions merged communities with few historical links or synergies. The central government political establishment failed to incorporate the importance of water in desert communities, e.g. the Oujda region was characterized by fertile lands and abundant water from the river Melouia.

Figure 16 shows the new districts as well as the oases corridor of Ziz and Drâa valleys.

Figure 16: New redistricting

The new governing institutions were born out of national policy that severed important synergies and failed to incorporate the need to balance society, economies, politics, and value, hence were devoid of trust and respect from the local community. Importantly, the issue of water scarcity, the most valuable resource for the people of Figuig, could not be balanced into the regional agenda dominated by areas with fertile soil, prolific water sources, and a dependence on trade to support local economies. The lack of respect and mistrust of the community, in addition to institutional incompetence resulted in a state of governance paralysis.

As its social and political resources were being drained along with the erosion of governance supports resulted in a lack of effective mechanisms that could overcome crisis throughout its long history. Today’s crisis was precipitated by a dramatic increase in demand due to external influences brought by a changing social system precipitated by the returning immigrants, and the hastily, unchecked introduction of water technologies. While the new system maintained property rights and gave precedence to local law, it was disconnected from the community, unappreciative of the history, culture and traditions that evolved over time to support the community’s sustainability and effectiveness.

. While people were using water legally relative to established property rights the system could no longer provide strong functional supports. Legal, as well as social forces deteriorated. The established legal framework effectively perpetuated a well-defined property rights code. The absence of social and institutional controls made it difficult to prevent abuse, as the law was grounded in tradition and knowledge of the natural resource balance and goals of the broader community. The traditional systems of social rights and responsibilities remained consistent with national legal code. Its strength, however, is eroding along with the local institutional base. Importantly, while the traditional law remains undocumented and manifested in cultural expectations rather than written rules, the system in the past remained uniquely strong while the changes within the community have challenged its foundations. It is often thought that these systems are, in many cases, more responsive and effective in perpetuating the spirit of the law, as they are survived by institutions rooted in society, history, and traditions that are alive and animated. Dissolution of these institutions and an attempt to codify law that was not meant to be written often results in confusion and conflict.

Ahmed Bouakka, the current community judge of Figuig continues to perform judicial functions in keeping with Moroccan law and the common law of Figuig. Bouakka explains, his role is to bridge local legal tradition and the modern, national legal code. While the Moroccan judicial system continues to support common law, Figuig is, according to Mr. Bouakka, facing legal crisis. First, he further laments; local legal traditions were clear, sanctioned, and accepted. Much of the law, particularly as it was applied to water and property rights, was administered and developed by the strong, legitimized, and clearly mandated local institutions( the Water Councils). However, the Common Law code was not documented. The dissolution of the Jmaa created a legal void. Legal precedent and tradition is becoming more difficult to apply as a generation of elders involved in the Council are aging or passing. Additionally, contradictions between tradition and an evolving national system are becoming increasingly difficult to ameliorate. Finally, a changing social system is further confounding the problem of incorporating established rules.(Figuig Interviews, 2005)

Elders, such as Ahmed Benbrahim, an Asraïfi or water broker and farmer, describes the historical system as one in which the representative Jmaâ administered Figuig much like an independent nation. The locally elected officials would represent an electorate in a councilor governing body. The most prominent of these were the Water Councils. These maintained their authority and legitimacy for centuries, according to Benbrahim, and throughout the years of French occupation. It was soon after independence that the governance system began to erode. The Jmaâ was dissolved by the central government and replaced by administrative appointments from Rabat.

While the governance structure was radically altered, as local controls were intercepted by outside officials, the water resources management system remained, but in an alternate form. The network of assraifis assumed the role previously held by the water council supporting institutional structures that supported the community’s needs for the long-term. The system, however, has steadily eroded as the social fabric of the community changes and the value of water and subsequent knowledge of its administration is lost.

The traditional system, for example, according to Bouakka, would require a farmer to allow water to pass through his property via a canal that he must maintain. Most canals were established hundreds of years ago, but the growth of new developments is creating new demands on established farmers who must incorporate more systems to accommodate a growing number of farms outside of the established boundaries of the community. Moreover, traditional canals were built using clay. Thus a farmer who granted passage would also benefit from the canal as water would seep into the adjacent land to support the farmer’s irrigation needs. Today, however, new farmers are building more durable canals with concrete even where they pass through another’s property. Those required to allow for the installation of these canals, generally, do not benefit from water seepage, and are rather, inconvenienced or obstructed. As palm trees can be planted freely but legally protected from being compromised in any way, many farmers have planted them along water ways to obstruct flow from an intruder’s canal.

Accordingly, one of the most common disputes now is between farmer and canal owner. The farmer, in the past, benefited from traditional law as it allowed him to tap into a new water source. Today, the canal owner is generally considered the beneficiary of the modern legal code that often is heavily weighted toward individual rights narrowly extracted from the traditional code. While many of these disputes continue to be resolved through mediation with the community judge or elders within the community, many disputes linger as conflicts of law are increasingly common without institutional mechanisms to perpetuate effective application of the spirit of traditional codes. While the Moroccan judicial system gives deference to traditional legal code supported by precedent, the institutions that effectively administered the law no longer exist. Morover, much of the national legal institutions are ill equipped to address local water management issues. As “operational rules directly affect the day-to-day decisions made by users and suppliers concerning when, where, and how to withdraw water; who should monitor the actions of others and how; what information must be exchanged or withheld; and what rewards or sanctions will be assigned to different combinations of actions and outcomes,” a lack of rules has left the community and its corresponding water resources management system without a functional base to operate effectively.(Ostrom, 1992, 45)

According to Amar Abbou, the assistant to the mayor of Figuig and water specialist, Figuig is on the verge of a crisis unparalleled in history. Accordingly, he posits, along with numerous others in the community that, despite the relatively stable population numbers, the next twenty years will bring the community to the brink of extinction due to scarcity.(Figuig Interviews, 2005) It is with this that I posed the question to him and the other interview subjects, “What happened. If Figuig was able to sustain itself for centuries weathering fratricide, droughts, and locusts, what changed?”

The absence of the Water Councils and changes in government policy resulted in centralized political control that disenfranchised the community and the undermined a system of supports that encouraged conservative behavior. Today, to facilitate individual needs many farmers have by-passed permitting or other legal requirements necessary to install new wells or other technologies to extract water as oversight is weak and sanctions are rare. Cultural inhibitions or social forces no longer support environmental protection. This has contributed to increased water usage rates, a trend that seems to continue.

The current administration is, consequently, faced with an increased intensity of water problems, along with social and political issues and legal discord. As usage patterns continue to change, the social and economic fabric of the community has changed as well. The legitimacy of the current administration remains tentative as it has been unsuccessful in aligning itself with institutional networks and society.(Figuig Interviews, 2005)

As the central government follows through with its new water policy in combination with its decentralization policy, it has committed greater resources to the community to develop its water resources system. However, it is “too little, too late,” according to Mr. Abbou. The community, in its desperation to find immediate solutions to its water problem continues to lobby for greater support for the excavation of costly wells to reach deeper aquifers or build a new dam to collect rain water some distance from Figuig.

Mohammed Kemmou, a recently retired Parliament member, suggests that given the current economic, political, and social posture of Figuig its survival is questionable.(Figuig Interviews, 2005) The social customs and traditions began to erode as institutions were dissolved as working age men emigrated to urban centers and the political pressures of the central government and its appointment of local administrators brought about the dissolution during the same period. At the same time the economic isolation of the community as its border with Algeria closed, and its reliance on income from abroad diluted local industry that was no longer considered relevant to the Oasis’ survival or prosperity.(Figuig Interviews, 2005)

While the decentralization policy brought about greater autonomy to individual communities, the lagging economy and the subsequent redistricting law further diluted the power society. As the Moroccan government subdivided the country into newly defined manageable units each was organized around a port to encourage export trade. The cities within the region of Figuig, e.g. Oujda and Berkane, were economies that depended on export/import revenues from agricultural production. Direct port access benefited these and other cities in the region as trade efficiencies were important to their corresponding economies. Figuig, however, traditionally dependent on local trade was eclipsed politically and economically by redistricting.

According to the Director of the Ministry of Agriculture, Dr. Mohamed Ait-Kadi, the water problems facing Figuig are a matter of national concern for two important reasons. First, Figuig is considered a national heritage site and uniquely beautiful and rich in history. As Morocco relies heavily on tourism revenues the deterioration of a culturally rich, environmentally unique and, historically wealthy community would be a national disgrace. Second, and considered equally important, is its role in sustaining border security. Though Figuig maintains no military capabilities its mere presence provides adequate border security. The price of a depleted frontier would be notable. To secure the boundaries, would most likely, require significant military investment and may potentially prove less effective than an established and viable community. Moreover, water resources systems developed or maintained by the military on their own to support border patrols may prove difficult and costly to sustain or develop without a local, knowledgeable water resources management team.(Figuig Interview, 2005)

Under the guise of national water policy the Moroccan government sanctioned and financed a project led by Dr. Kadi. After careful hydrological studies a deep aquifer, in the community of Berkouks on the outskirts of Figuig, was discovered. A new well was dug in a deep aquifer and land was reclaimed following soil desalinization. To manage the system and control for imprudent farming practices and excess water use a Water Council, modeled after traditional Councils in Figuig, to support this small community was established. The mandate of the new council was to oversee property and water rights and obligations, manage water use, and educate farmers about efficient farming and effective water conservation methods. By developing a microcosm of cooperation and institutional development the community continues to support small scale, non-commercial farming. While this project was designed to compliment the existing system, a traditional framework to support its success was applied. Nonetheless, it continues to encounter difficulties. Most importantly, the importance of conservation and appreciation of the limits of water resources has been overshadowed by social change. Many of the inhabitants of Berkouks are repatriated emigrants. Most have a limited appreciation for the need to conform to traditional farming methods. Most importantly, new attitudes have overshadowed conservative use and an appreciation for the value of the finite resource. A number of farmers have cited the use of a “new aquifer” distinctly separated from the aquifer contained within Figuig. The vast source, accordingly, appears to have supported notions that the source is plentiful and thus similar aquifers can be found throughout the desert without limit. Consequently, conservation is not a paramount concern.(See Figure Farm in Berkouks) Important traditions have failed to be transferred to the new community.

Figure 17: Water canals of Berkouks

Figure 17 shows 6 canals that are used for water distribution in the new project of Berkouks. Figure 18 shows a partial list of members of the association that benefit from the water.

Figure 18: Membership list

Nonetheless, the successful development of a new community of water users provides an important example of implementing a water resources management system with limited government interference. This could have significant implications for the current administrative regime in greater Figuig. Moreover, it has important implications for other administrative bodies whereby “IWRM demands a new framework within which there may be a need for significant changes in existing interactions between politics, laws, regulations, institutions, civil society, and the consumer-voter.”(Rogers and Hall, 2003)

While a cooperative system supports stakeholder involvement and local decision-making the erosion of important social values and environmental sensitivity that reflects the value of water undermines the need for conservation and a system of demand management. While there is “no one best way” to organize water systems.(Chambers, 1988; Levin, 2004; Uphoff, 1986; Ostrom 1990, 1992) This example supports the importance of “the informal authority of networks as constitutive of, supplementing or supplanting the authority of government, to governing with and through networks. It points to a more diverse view of state authority as being located at the boundary of state and civil society.(Bevir, 2004) Government has the potential to effectively guide the development of a governance system by leading or effectively supporting local institutional development that incorporates local needs, values and knowledge developed over time and perpetuated by history. The success and failures of the governance system to support an effective water resources management system in Figuig provides many lessons for policy makers and those involved with water.

The case illustrates how Integrated Water Resources Management is a product of a society that was established and developed relative to a unique history, successes, and dilemma. Each community has established itself relative to each other and its environment with a set of goals that together define a set of values that society internalizes and perpetuates through its institutions. It is with this that I argue that the success of IWRM is a product of society and the institutions that support its goals. The strength of community and the institutions that support its needs and values consequently support varying levels of good governance. As value motivates behavior, social value, particularly as it pertains to water, must be established and exploited to provide the foundations of good governance and an effective water resources management system.