Common Pool Resources Management

Common Pool Resources Management

Garret Hardin, in his 1968 landmark article describing the “Tragedy of the Commons” further supports the wisdom espoused by Olson through his description of common use resources. Hardin discusses the dynamic of open grazing in a defined pasture whereby herdsmen have unlimited grazing rights. According to Hardin, however, while the arrangement may have been sustainable for centuries as natural disasters, disease, and conflict keep it from being overpopulated, once social stability is reached tragedy is realized as the system no longer could regulate itself in the absence of established norms. As each individual pursues his own interests using the commons, Hardin asserts, “freedom in a common brings ruin to all.”(Hardin, 1966)

Following Hardin’s reasoning we assume that unless there are coercive devices in place, even if they are unjust, universal freedoms will bring about universal ruin. The tendency of local and national governments, regional planners and others, however, to address the problem of supply has created a problem of a different scale. They implemented centralized systems that relied on excessive regulation. Water resources management became the charge of infrastructure planners looking to technology to solve problems of water scarcity. Dams, pumps, and extraction mechanisms were constructed. While the monetary cost of these was great, few recognized the immense social and ecological, as well as economic costs of these projects in the long-run.

More examples of the devastating consequences of centralized control of common pool resources exist. The case of India following British colonization is often cited. With a lack of understanding of the dependence on local common-pool resources institutions, particularly by the poor British Colonists, shortly after taking control of India, declared many rural areas with limited revenue generating capabilities “wastelands” as they did not see them as “biologically productive.” Consequently, systems of social control of valuable resources gave way to “modernization and development” goals contributing to the degradation of commons in most regions.(Shiva, et at., 2005) Accordingly, the policy resulted in the government having created an ecological category of “waste lands” for areas that had, in fact, become unproductive as a result of social and government action or inaction. The impact on local communities’ abilities to be self-sufficient has had a dramatic, long-term impact on the ecosystem that they depended on for subsistence. Society and the economy were also changed in the long run in these communities and greater India

Production for one’s own consumption is the predominant motive for subsistence economies, thus the general logic underlying Garrett Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ does not operate under such conditions. Under conditions where common resources cannot even support the needs of the basic population,” argues Shiva, et al., “a tragedy is to be expected even in the absence of competition.”(Shiva et al., 2005)

As in the case of rural societies in India and other third world countries competition has not always been the driving force in human societies, rather, the principle of cooperation, not competition among individuals is considered vital.(Shiva et al, 2005) Competition is generally assumed to create hierarchy and monopolization of resources. Whereby resources in a centralized system tend to be concentrated in populated areas rural cultures have often had to rely on principles of cooperation. Community inputs are seen as essential to developing effective resource allocation systems. Interdependencies suggest that local cooperation is essential for the long-term survival of institutions and the community as a whole.

Hardin’s principles of commons management gained prominence by supporting the notion “that the solutions to environmental degradation lies in such institutional reforms as would compel private users of environmental resources to account for the social costs of their action.”(Hardin, 1968) Many reforms that narrowly incorporated this thinking however, brought about environmental devastation around the globe as governments took control of water resources and devised centralized water management system. Typically macro-technology and management institutions were applied universally with an eye toward economic development. The result is environmental deterioration, social fragmentation, economic destabilization and increased natural resource scarcity.

In his 1990 publication, “Water Community: An empirical analysis of Cooperation on Irrigation in South India,” Bardhan Pranab discussed his findings, after an examination of 48 irrigation systems in India, and found that the maintenance quality of canals was significantly lower when farmers perceived that the rules were made by the local elite.(Pranab, 1990) Additionally, where government agencies were responsible for determining water allocation and distribution processes there was little support on the part of farmers in terms of funding and participation, and rule violations were typical. Ray Ishar and Jeffrey Williams, in their study of government-owned irrigation systems in the Maharahtra State, in India, found that farmers upstream were responsible for a nearly one-fourth loss of expected revenues obtained through efficient water allocation and pricing schemes to theft.(Ishar, Williams, 1999:928-941).

Chris Sneddon, cites another example, in his article “The River Basin as Common Pool Resource: Opportunities for Co-Management and ‘Scaling Up’ in Northeast Thailand.”(Sneddon, 1998) He discusses the results of three decades of centralized planning and dam construction water projects with an eye on improved standards of living and economic development. As a result macro-level planning has, rather, led to the destruction of the river ecosystem along with water shortages, pollution and social conflict related to water.

Centralized dam projects have brought about the “concomitant transfer of ecological disruption and social conflicts.” (Shiva, 2005). As Marc Reisner argues, with respect to post-colonial period in history when the US Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers were in competition with each other, ‘what began as an emergency program to put the country back to work, to restore its sense of self-worth, to settle the refugees of the Dust Bowl, grew into a nature wrecking, money-eating monster that our leaders lacked the courage or ability to stop.” (Reisner, 1993) Consequently, interest groups are in conflict with indigenous populations and ecologists.

Vandana Shiva, et al. present the associated ecological and social conflicts with dam building in the Indian case.(Shiva, et al., 2005) The impact on the environment and society is not dissimilar to many other projects around the world. As its river valleys are highly populated and provide the life-blood of civilization in the region large dams, intensive irrigation and large diversions have brought about 3 types of conflicts including 1. large scale displacement leading to ecological refugees, 2. displaced people are in direct conflict with those that benefit from large scale dam projects. 3. changes in water flows upstream as well as downstream create conflicts between people and the state as well as between different communities and different states resulting in regional conflicts over water rights.(Shiva, et al, 2005) The Krishna river basin based on its scale and usage is cited as an example of the numerous types and sources of conflict that emerge from a single interconnected system.( Shiva, et al., 2005).

Arthur Maass and Raymond Anderson, in 1978, presented what is often considered one of the most detailed criticisms of centralized water governance based on their findings of their investigation of traditional Spanish water systems. Through a longitudinal study of areas of Spain that had been irrigated for some time (often centuries) Maass and Anderson were able to illustrate the importance of local control embedded in a broader value system. A comparative analysis of water management systems developed independently of the central government demonstrated how “different communities of irrigators will prioritize the same set of objectives such as equality, distribution characteristics, and technological or economic efficiency differently even if they appear similar.” Accordingly, each requires a different set of institutional supports. Maass and Anderson argue that different contingent variables,”-hydrological, technological, social, and political-must be identified as the cause of institutional variation.”(Maass, Anderson, 1978) In turn, legal institutions must be developed relative to local physical, social, and technological features.

Throughout history “the availability of fresh water has determined the geographic location of where human beings settle and the evolution of societies.”(Postel, 2004) In turn, institutions have been developed over time to sustain a social, economic and ecological balance. The importance of the historical institutions that governed water systems, sometimes for centuries or even a millennium are, however, often overlooked and large scale, technologically superior modern system are imposed on local communities.

While often simple and crude traditional water management systems sustained societies for hundreds, and even thousands of years, traditional technologies are often overlooked with a view toward technological superiority. To support economic development many developing countries, including India and China, have followed the examples of the United States, “where big dams like the Hoover and Grand Coulee have transformed deserts into fields.” (Iyer, Ramaswamy, in Levin, 1995) Large infrastructure projects continue despite the “strong body of evidence [that] says they may not be a good idea, but official policy is to continue with big projects,” according to India’s former Minister of Water Resources, Ramaswamy Iyer.(Iyer, in Levin, 1995) Accordingly, dams tend to be the first-choice answer to water problems, but should be last, according to Iyer.(Iyer, in Levin, 1995)

Rupa Desai and Bharati Mehta have argued, after surveying successful bottom-up water management systems in India, “[w]hether it is education, culture or natural resources management, a society which tries to move ahead without keeping itself firmly rooted in is own tradition is bound to fall.”(Desai, Mehta, 2000) They cite fifty years of water infrastructure development that resulted in huge dams and canals. The result is a water crisis throughout India.(Desai, Mehta, 2000)

Emily Levin, and others have argued that valuable ancient methods of water harvesting that have been abandoned in the recent past may prove invaluable to securing water for both today and tomorrow. The devastating impact of the water crisis on local populations has incited communities to find solutions themselves, to tackle the problem with “a series of interventions” including, for instance local water harvesting or other “traditional technologies steeped in local knowledge and geography.” (Levin, 2004)

In search of a solution to the problems of water as common pool resources Elinor Ostrom published her landmark study of common pool resource management building on Maass’ and Anderson’s assertion that to develop effective irrigation institutions it is important to identify local irrigator objectives.(Ostrom, 1992; Maass, Anderson, 1978) Central to Ostrom’s discussion is the importance of stakeholder involvement in a decentralized system in order to craft effective water resources management institutions.(Ostrom, 1992)

In her book “Governing the Commons” (Ostrom, 1990) Ostrom presents a paradigm shift from the previous era of centralized water resource management to espouse the value of community empowerment in crafting new institutions for self-governance. Through her discussion of water as a common pool resource Ostrom posits that to develop responsive institutions it is important to directly involve users and suppliers of an irrigation system throughout the design process. The imposition of a centralized system is illustrative of the pervasive lack of understanding of how institutions are crafted over time. According to Ostrom, irrigation technologies must be paired appropriately with local institutions and organizations for effective organizational development.(Ostrom, 1992)

Physical, social and human capital, according to Ostrom, must be carefully balanced and included in the process of crafting institutions. “Instead of designing a single blueprint for water-user organizations to be adopted on all irrigation systems within a jurisdiction, officials need to enhance the capability of suppliers and users to design their own institutions.”(Ostrom, 1992) Effective institutions for managing water resources are able to define acceptable rules that lead to desired outcomes. Carefully defined rules developed relative to a unique set of physical, economic, and cultural environments will result in a positive relationship between incentives and outcomes. An adaptive system is able to grow and change in response to an unstable environment by providing a stable set of expectations.(Ostrom, 1992)

The principle of Elinor Ostrom’s outcome-based management style has been adopted by policymakers throughout the globe precipitating movement away from centralized, generic water resources management to a decentralized system of outcome-oriented institutional development. Analysts, however, continue to attempt to classify water resources management systems, but according to Ostrom, “none have been successful in devising a blueprint that can effectively accommodate the unique cultural, social, economic, environmental, and technological elements of a specific system.” Local control, moreover, is a significant objective. Accordingly, Ostrom suggests, “long-term survival should not be equated with optimal performance, even though it demonstrates sustainability.”(Ostrom, 1992:81) Rather, an effective self-governing system is one that is more flexible, distributes water more equitably, and counteracts the pervasive incentives that often lead managers and consumers to abuse and neglect water resources system. To achieve its goals stakeholders are involved in the design, operation, and maintenance of water supply systems that meet their needs, but are not necessarily technologically or economically efficient.(Ostrom, 1992)

Robert Durant supports the move to Ostrom’s “result-based”, or “outcome-based” approach to dealing with environmental challenges in view of the shortcomings of conventional bureaucratic, command-and-control procedure-based, and adversarial approach to environmental resource protection.(Durant, in Durant, Robert F, et al, 2004, 2) Environmental policy-making is difficult in that implicit in the process of managing natural resources are risks that are multilevel, interactive, multiple pathway, and cumulative in nature. He argues citing Martin van Vliet’s theory that flexibility and adaptability to a myriad of local circumstances, diverse regulatory targets, interdependent actors, and evolving knowledge bases are necessary. (vanVliet, in Durant, et al., 2004)

Robert Durant states that first-generation approaches discouraged behaviors deemed critical for addressing environmental resource problems holistically and cost-effectively in the long run.(Durant, et al., 2004) The broad base support of this principle is demonstrated by the early adoption of Agenda 21-Global Programme of Action on Sustainable Development, 2000 from the Rio Earth Summit of June, 1992, incorporates this principle along with integrated sectoral water plans and programs within the framework of national economic and social policy with careful consideration of the importance of balanced coordination. Further, suggests Durant, a results-based agenda with a sense of common purpose among government, the private sector, and civil society will support effective environmental management system development.(Durant, in Durant, et al, 2004)

Much experimental research has shown that external rules and monitoring, in fact, tend to crowd out cooperative behavior. Private solutions to commons problems, however, tend to involve the evolution of norms or institutions that generate cooperative behavior. As a result these rules, generally, “have more staying power than externally imposed rules because they tend to have been developed within a particular community.”(EconPort Common Pool Resources Handbook, Introduction, 2004)

The International Development Research Center cites thirty years of the organizations research in developing countries to support the theory that the application of technology is not adequate in developing an effective and sustainable solution to the problem of water scarcity.(Hibler, 2004) “IDRC’s experience has clearly shown that social, economic, and political factors are as crucial to the successful application of research and management as is the choice of technology.”(Hibler, 2004) “Large-scale centralized water management has gone as far as it can…technology is only one piece of the puzzle.” …”[N]eeded are the timely application of research, enabling policies and inclusive governance structures.”(Brooks, 2004)

In the face of increasing water problems and, technologically advanced water management systems governments and societies have looked toward decentralization. “Formal authority has been dispersed from central states both up to supranational institutions and down to regional and local governments.” Accordingly, a survey illustrating this trend published in 2001 found that 63 of 75 developing countries have been undergoing some decentralization of authority.(Garman, et al, 2001)

Marks and Hooghe, while arguing that governance must operate at multiple scales in order to capture variation in the territorial reach of policy externalities, cite much recent literature that supports the theory that the dispersion of governance across multiple jurisdictions is both more efficient than, and normatively superior to, central state monopoly.(Hooghe, et al., 2003)

Gram Vikas Mandal, a village development group, is an often cited example of a micro-water shed project developed by local villagers in the face of a drinking water crisis that was not adequately addressed through ambitious centralized projects. Other noteworthy examples of people’s initiatives in the shadows of ineffective centralized dam projects in India are in the villages of Khopala and Jhunka in Bhavnagar district or Saurashtra.(Desai, Mehta, 2000)