Gulf War Air Power Survey
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| Eight Months of Desert Shield/Storm, (Scott AFB, IL: Hq MAC Command Analysis Group, Jun 1991), p 44.
9 All but one squadron of the active C-130 force were in the theater. The other two‑thirds of the fleet were in the Reserves. 10 In addition, however, the peak maintenance manpower requirements in the theater never exceeded sixteen percent of total active duty Air Force Maintenance manning, and a full callup of reserve maintenance personnel was not exercised. 11 Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp 202-211. van Creveld further states that a clear connection between amount of prior preparation and success or failure does not appear to exist. 12 AFM 1-1, Combat Support Doctrine, 1 Apr 1987, p 1-2. 13 For examples see Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Apr 1992, p 399; Michael M. Self, “Air Force Logistics Command Operations in Desert Storm,” (AFMC/XPOX: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, Jul 1991). 14 There are various ways of measuring reliability. Type 1 maintenance actions are by definition caused by some failure in hardware; they do not include can-not-duplicates (type 1) or induced failures (type 6). Because they exclude can-not-duplicates and induced failures, the type 1 maintenance actions are a reasonable indicator of design reliability. Sources of data: Air Force Maintenance and Operational Data Access System data for Sep 90-Aug 92 (for type 1 maintenance actions); Jane's All the World's Aircraft 84-85, 86-87, 89-90, 92-93 (for years of introduction). 15 Lt Col David C. Rutenberg, USAF, and Jane S. Allen, eds., The Logistics of Waging War (Gunter AFS, AL: Air Force Logistics Management Center, circa 1984), p 170. 16 Hq Air Force Aircraft and Missile Support Division (AF/LGSW). 17 Intvw, Mr. James A. Forbes with Col (Ret) Frank C. Cartwright, 6 Jan 1992. Col Cartwright was the Chief of the Air Forces Logistics Resources Integration Office (AF/LEXI) from 1983 to 1985. 18 The various types of spares are described in chapter 7. 19 The calculated R2 (explanatory power) of a linear relationship between the mission capability curve and the exchangeables funding curve with a three-year offset is 0.87. That is, 87% of the change over time in mission capability is “explained” by a previous change in exchangeables funding. 20 AFM 1-1, p 1-2. 21 Ibid. 22 Col William Rider, CENTAF/LG After Action Report, ca Mar 1990, p 19. 23 1991 Air Force Almanac, Air Force Magazine, May 1991, Vol. 74, No. 5. 24 “Defense Exports in the Post Desert Storm Environment,” DISAM Journal, Summer 1991, Vol. 13, No. 4, p 12. 25 Maj Jim Dart, USAF, “USMTM: Point Guard on the Arabian Peninsula,” DISAM Journal, Winter 1991/1992, p 2. 26 U.S. Army Engineers had a long-standing relationship with Saudi Arabia, and participated in numerous projects and facilities within and external to security assistance programs. Lt Gen Henry J. Hatch and Janet A. McDonnell, “Corps of Engineers: Laying the Groundwork for Theater Operations,” Military Review, Vol. LXXII Mar 1992, No. 3, p 3. 27 Ibid, p 3. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 (S/NF/WN) William T. Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, Center for Air Force History, United States Air Force, Washington, DC, 1992, p 7. 31 (S) Ibid, p 7. 32 AFM 1-1, p 1-3. This particular view of support bases unfortunately introduces terminological confusion because the work performed at a depot (one kind of support base) is generally thought of as industrial maintenance. Further, other support bases might only provide intermediate-level maintenancethat is, intermediate between depot/industrial-level and unit/organization-level. We will use the three-fold distinction: operational, intermediate level support, and industrial-level support when discussing maintenance and as otherwise necessary to minimize the confusion. 33 MAC's global missions were accomplished through an airlift system which had 78,000 people and 800 aircraft at 300 locations in 25 countries. MAC operated 13 bases in the United States and controlled facilities at Lajes and Rhein Main Air Base, GE. AF Almanac 1991. 34 Michael Self and Edward Kozlowski, AFLC White Paper: “Operations in Desert Storm,” Jul 1991, p 11. 35 Self and Kozlowski, p 4. 36 Maj Jim Dart, USAF, “USMTM: Point Guard on the Arabian Peninsula,” DISAM Journal, Winter 1991/1992, p 4. 37 John T. Correll and Colleen A. Nash, “Declining, Diversifying, and Disappearing,” Air Force Magazine, Vol. 74, No. 10, Oct 1991, pp 36-40, p 38. 38 Since then, as is well understood, the U.S. defense-related industrial base has been in decline. The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated in 1991 that two to four years would be required to regain levels of production achieved in 1990. John T. Correll, and Colleen A. Nash, “Declining, Diversifying, and Disappearing,” Air Force Magazine, Vol. 74, No. 10, Oct 1991, pp 36-40, p 36. 39 John T. Correll and Colleen A. Nash, “Lifelines Abroad,” Air Force Magazine, Vol. 74, No. 10, Oct 1991, pp 42-47, p 44. 40 To reemphasize, communication in this sense meant the pipelines or conduits through which resources were transmitted rather than electronic communication. 41 AFM 1-1, p 1-3. 42 Capt Robert N. Kestlefoot, USN, “Force Projection by Sea: Cornerstone of Contingency,” from Defense 85, Aug 1985, pp 16-23. Published monthly by AFIS, Arlington, VA, in Air War College Associate Programs, Vol I, 2nd Ed, Lsn 19, p 474. 43 This investment included 96 Ready Reserve Force ships (RRF), 25 Maritime prepositioned ships (MPS) for the Marine Corps, Afloat Prepositioned Ships (APS) for the Army and Air Force, eight fast sealift ships, (FSS), two 1,000-bed hospital ships, and two aviation logistics ships. The United States Navy in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC, 15 May 1991. 44 Sealift planning factors assumed little or no port facilities because ships were able to offload through the use of self-sustaining barges discharged from the ships, lighterage (which were sets of self-powered ferries configured for landing), and other such arrangements. Capt Robert N. Kestlefoot, USN, “Force Projection by Sea: Cornerstone of Contingency,” from Defense 85, Aug 1985, pp 16-23. Published by AFIS, Arlington, VA, in Air War College Associate Programs, Vol I, 2nd Ed, Lsn 19, p 475. Also, see the CINCCENT's assessment of lift later on in this chapter. 45 Kestlefoot, p 474, in Air War College Associate Programs. 46 Kestlefoot, p 475. 47 Kestlefoot, p 474. 48 That is, reach the port of debarkation. 49 Lt Col Robert Kaufman, USAF, “The Airlift Strategy: A Credible Deterrent and Our Most Effective Mobility Option,” in Air War College Associate Materials, Vol I, 2nd Ed, Lsn. 16. p 232. 50 Lt Col Kaufman, p 233. 51 Kaufman, p 231. 52 J.A. Forbes, Memo for the Record, subj: Airlift Capability on the Eve of Desert Shield, 5 Nov 1992. The memo summarizes results of discussions with Mr. Lowell Jones, ANSER Area Leader for Special Operations Forces, Airlift, and Training. Original source of these figures is AF/XOFM. 53 Rpt, MAC DCS Comptroller/ACIB, “MAC Airlift Services Management Report, FY 90,” nd, p 15. 54 Airlift Services Management Report, pp 15-16. 55 Airlift Services Management Report, p 15. 56 Rpt, MAC DCS Comptroller/ACIB, “MAC Airlift Services Management Report, FY 90,” nd, p 15. 57 Intvw, J. W. Leland, MAC History, with Mr. J. M. Ledden, MAC DCS Operations and Transportation/AXO‑S, 28 Jan 1991. 58 Memo, MAC DCS Plans and Programs/XPXO, “Air Carrier Volunteers Prior To CRAF Stage I Activation,” nd. 59 Intvw, with Ledden. 60 Intvw, J. W. Leland, MAC History, with Mr. W. J. Bush, MAC Command Section/CSB, 8 Oct 91; point paper, MAC DCS Plans and Programs/XPB/XPMRM, “Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve (AFR) Forces in MAC, FQ4/91,” 10 Jul 1991, Sup Doc 3‑28. 61 Ltr (S/Decl OADR), MAC DCS Plans and Programs/XPX to MAC History Office, “Review of Chapter III of 1990 MAC History, Operation DESERT SHIELD,” 6 Sep 1991, info used. 62 Although this table is dated as of FY 1992, information is similar to FY 1990-91, on the eve of the gulf war, JCS Mobility Requirements Study, 23 Jan 1992, page IV-8. 63 Air Force Regulation 400-24, War Reserve Materiel Policy, 31 Jul 1990, p 42. Harvest Falcon equipment was divided into 37 squadron-level sets, 14 independent (standalone) and 23 dependent sets, which were required to be paired with a dependent set. 64 Although this table is dated as of FY 1992, information is similar to FY 1990-91, on the eve of the Gulf War. JCS Mobility Requirements Study, 23 Jan 1992, p IV-8. 65 Annex D, COMUSCENTAF OPLAN 1002-88. 66 Annex D, p D-4, COMUSCENTAF OPLAN 1021-88. 67 Y'Blood, p 24. 68 HQ USMC Requirements and Programs Division, Concepts and Issues, Feb 1989, pp 1-1 to 1-16. 69 A Marine Expeditionary Brigade has 8,000-18,000 Marines and sailors, is commanded by a General Officer, and carries 30 days sustainment. It is normally built around a reinforced infantry regiment and a composite aircraft group. Ibid. 70 Maj Thomas C Linn, USMC,” MAGTF Capabilities in an Uncertain World,” Extract Marine Corps Gazette, May 1990, pp 33-37. Copyright 1990 by the Marine Corps Association. 71 Ibid. 72 The United States Navy in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC, 15 May 1991. 73 The material on wing organization is excerpted from AFP 400-77, USAF Wartime Logistics Organization and Decision making, 2 Jan 1990. 74 There were actually two basic wing structures. The first was the trideputy, as described. The second was the dual deputy wing. The dual deputy wing had deputy commanders for operations and logistics plus a combat support group commander. The chief of maintenance and the chief of supply were subordinate to the deputy commander for logistics. Transportation, contracting, and the comptroller came under the combat support group. AFP 400-77, USAF Wartime Logistics Organization and Decision making, 2 Jan 1990. p 9-B-1. 75 The fighter squadron was the archetype. 76 HQ USAF/LGXX (LRC) MEFPAK Summary Report, 3 Sep 1992. 77 AFP 400-77, USAF Wartime Logistics Organization and Decision Making, 2 Jan 1990. 78 Ibid. 79 Ltr, Col B. G. Hawley, MAC Staff Judge Advocate, to MAC DCS Plans and Programs/XPMO, “Organization of Airlift forces for Operation Desert Shield,” 5 Oct 1990, Sup Doc 3‑52; staff summary, MAC DCS Plans and Programs/XPPD, “Operation Desert Shield Command Relationships and Legal Issues,” 2 Oct 1990, w/Atch, Sup Doc 3‑53. 80 They were authorized base-level self-sufficiency spares (BLSS) kits, which were composed of different items than the WRSK kits. (S/NF) Intvw, Dr. Theodore R. Jamison, with Maj Gen Charles J. Searock Jr., SAC's Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Subject “Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Aug 1990 to Mar 1991,” 4 Mar 1991, p 11. 81 Primary authorized aircraft are primary in the sense that backup aircraft are not included. Deployments were universally sized in terms of PAA. 82 (S/NF) Intvw, Dr. Theodore R. Jamison, 4 Mar 1991, p 2. 83 Because of the amount of detail, both deliberate and crisis planning were computer intensive. The volume of data was large enough that during deliberate planning, only the deployment phase was considered. AFSC Pub 1, pp 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-12. 84 Ibid, p 6-12. 85 Ibid, p 6-14. 86 Ibid, p 6-28. 87 Ibid, p 6-15. 88 Ibid, pp 6-14, 15. 89 Ibid, p 6-10. 90 Ibid, p 6-60. 91 Ibid, p 6-29. 92 Ibid, p 6-75. 93 Ibid, p 6-29. 94 Ibid, p 6-10. 95 The JDS is a real-time, transaction-oriented database, which can be updated by a customer. The update can be transmitted over the WWMCCs Intercomputer Network, or WIN. The WIN can also be used for teleconferencing. 96 Ibid, p 8-7. 97 Ibid, p 8-8. 98 Ibid, p 8-8. 99 White, Lt Col Gerald L., USAF, “US Central Command,” from Air War College Associate Programs, Vol. II, lsns 3132, introduction to lessons, p 1. 100 Ibid. 101 Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication Joint Pub 40, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, para e, p IV6. 102 Current Joint Doctrine is ambiguous on a concept of theater logistics. On one hand, the draft JCS publication 4-0, “Joint Logistics Doctrine,” states that logistics is a function of command and should be under a single command authority. Yet, elsewhere in the same directive, it allows the services to train, equip, and sustain respective forces in the theater and otherwise provide for its forces. 103 Support therefore, remained the purview of the military service while the CENTCOM staff “monitored” logistics to a large extent. The CINC, if he chose, could combine certain common support requirements with a single service as executive agent, at his discretion. During all phases of combat, Joint and Air Force logistics agencies and staffs “monitored” and “assisted.” No office or function was charged with (and staffed for) command or orchestration of CENTCOM logistics at the overall theater level. 104 (S) Directory: sgp -> library sgp -> Sgp country Programme Strategy for op6 sgp -> Itu-d study groups sgp -> Internship with Congressional Campaign Exploratory Committee — Only 4 spots left! sgp -> Using Well Logs in the Petroleum Industry sgp -> Telecommunication development bureau itu-d study groups Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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