385History of the Strategic Air Command, 1 Jan - 31 Dec 90, Volume I Narrative, p 335.
386History, p 323.
387DS/DS Tanker Assessments, p 4-11.
388Ibid, p 5-2.
389History, p 332.
390DS/DS Tanker Assessments, p 5-2.
391Ibid, p 5-2.
392Ibid, p 4-3.
393History, p 333.
394DS/DS Tanker Assessments, p 4-4.
395Ibid, p 4-5.
396History, p 338.
397DS/DS Tanker Assessments, p 4-6.
398Ibid, p 4-7.
399Ibid, p 4-8.
400Ibid, p 4-6.
401Ibid, p 4-8.
402History, p 344.
403DS/DS Tanker Assessment, p 4-9.
404Ibid, p 5-8.
405Ibid.
406History, p 365.
407Ibid.
408Headquarters Strategic Air Command/DOOT.
409Ibid.
410GWAPS Analysis of ATO Data.
411DS/DS Tanker Assessment, p 5-5.
412Ibid, p 5-6.
413DS/DS Tanker Assessments, p 5-7.
414Ibid, p 8-2.
415Ibid, p 8-1.
416The “see and avoid” concept requires pilots to scan the sky constantly for other aircraft and to take evasive action if a potential mid-air collision is detected. The primary problem with this concept is that it is very difficult to detect a developing mid-air collision in bad weather, at night, or head-on. The “big sky” theory is that one doesn't need to worry about avoiding a mid-air collision because the sky is big enough to prevent one.
417Air Force Inspection and Safety Center.
418(S/NF) Tanker Tactics in Southeast Asia, 17AD(P) Pamphlet 3/1, 10 Nov 1990.
419DS/DS Tanker Assessment, p 8-3.
420Ibid, p 6-5.
421Ibid, p 6-6.
422DS/DS Tanker Assessment, p 6-7.
423Ibid, p 8-3.
424Ibid, p 8-6.
425Ibid, p 8-7.
426Lt Gen Charles A. Horner USAF, Commander CENTAF, Article: Desert Shield and Desert Storm: An Overview. Air Power History, Published by Air Force Historical Foundation, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA 24450, Fall 1991, p 6.
427Intvw, Col J. A. Cyr, AF/DPXC, 20 Apr 1992.
428(S) Intvw, Ms. Bev Hooper, AF/LGSP, 25 Mar 1992.
429(S/NF/WN) Rpt, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, Vol III, p D43-45, Jan 1992.
430(S) Rpt, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, Vol III, p D11-15, Jan 1992; and (S) Ltr, Review of TACHistory Draft, 12 Jul 1991.
431(S) Intvw, Ms Bev Hooper, AF/LGSP, 2 Apr 1992.
432(S) Briefing, Lt Col Brad Christy, Ammunition Control Point (ACP), subj: “USAF Global Asset Prepositioning,” undated.
433(S) HQ TAC History (Munitions Support Annex) Draft, 12 Jul 1991, p 2.
434(S) Intvw, CENTAF/LGW, 15 Apr 1992.
435CENTAF Master Storage Plan 1-89, CENTAF/LGW; confirmed by MSgt Reed, CENTAFLGW for Oman figures. (S) AF/ACPMSG 110235Z Aug 1990, subj; Saudi Deployment Ammunition Availability on Prepo Ships, source for Afloat numbers.
436(S) Intvw, CENTAF/LGW, 15 Apr 1992.
437Ibid.
438(S) Rpt, AF/ACP Report to GAO on Munitions Ops, Jan 1992, p 8.
439(S) Intvw, Maj Keller, Cmdr, 2701 Muns Maint and Test Sqdn, Hill AFB, UT, 12 Mar 1992.
440(S/NF/RD) HQ SAC History, 1 Jan thru 31 Dec 1990, p 182.
441Ibid, p 200.
442(S) Msg 4300BW(P), 150330Z Aug 1990, subj: EARFLAP to HQ AF/LRC, SAC/BS, and AF/ACP.
443Ibid, p 197.
444(S) Rpt, SAC History for 1990, pp 462-463.
445Ibid, p 205.
446Ibid.
447(S) Brfg Slide, CENTAF Critical Munitions Status, to Chief of Staff, 10 Aug 1990.
448(S) Rpt, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, Vol III, p D10-11.
449Rpt, “Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,” Final Report to Congress, Apr 1992, p 43, file NS252.
450USAF/ACP report to the GAO.
451Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict Vol III, p 39.
452(S) Rpt, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, Vol III, p App F-32.
453Intvw, Dakan with LC B. Swezey, CENTAF/LGW, 15 Apr 1992.
454(S) Msg, CENTAFREAR to AF/ACP, et al, “Seven Day Munitions Requirements,” 160105Z Aug 1990. This is also the source of the “on-hand” figures in column 2.
455(S) Msg, USCENTAFFWD/LG, “projected Munitions Requirements,” USCENTAFFWD/LG to AF/ACP, et al, 211356Z Aug 1992.
456(S) Msg, USCENTAFFWD/LG, USCENTAF Munitions Rqts, USCENTAF/LG to USCENTAFREAR, AF/ACP, et al, 291509Z Dec 1990.
457(S) Msg, USCENTAF/LG/DO, “Projected 90-day and 120-day Muns, CENTAF/LG/DO to USCENTAFREAR, AF/ACP, et al, 240615Z Jan 1991.
458Based on EARFLAP reports completed by AF/LGMW and input from the Ammunition Control Point.
471(S) Intvw, Lt Col Brad Christy, AF/ACP, Munitions activities in the Gulf War, 13 Mar 1992; (S) Intvw, Maj Bob Lerner, CENTAF/LGW, 15 Apr 1992; (S) Intvw, Lt Col Bill Swezey, ASD/ALZ, 15 Apr 1992; (Lt Col Swezey was the senior munitions manager in CENTAF FWD during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm); Hq USAFE/LGW Lessons Learned, the Gulf War, undated.
472CENTAF/LGW Lessons Learned briefing, May 1991.
473(S) Msg, CENTAF/LGW 221016Z Feb 1991.
474(S) USCOMCENTAFSITREP 181800 Sep 1990.
475(S) Msg, USAF/ACP AMMO 1 Net 282000Z Nov 1990.
476(S) Msg, AFISC/SEW 221640Z Mar 1991.
477AFISC/SEW, Lessons Learned in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Jun 1991.
478(S) Intvw, CENTAF/LGW, 15 Apr 1992.
479(S) Rpt, AF/ACP, “Answers to GAO Questions on Desert Shield, Desert Storm,” p 16.
480(S) Intvw, CENTAF/LGW, 15 Apr 1992.
481Rpt, AF/ACP Answers to GAO, Jan 1992, p 16.
482(S) Intvw, Lt Col E. B. Christy, AF/ACP, 25 Apr 1992.
483(S) Msg, AF/ACP to CENTAF/LG and CENTAFREAR, subj: Proposed Munitions Support CENTAF, 121557Z Jan 1991.
484Ibid, p 17.
485Article, “War Planner: Civilians Didn't Change Target List,” Air Force Times, 8 Jul 1992, (SD 4-16); (S/DECLASS: OADR) Msg, HQ TAC/DR to USAFTFWC/CC, et al, subj: Seek Eagle Request (SER 41-91) Delivery Info for CBU-87/89 and MK 84/82/20 with wing tanks on the F-15E Desert Storm, 232321Z Jan 1991, (SD 4-17); (S/DECLASS: OADR) Msg, TAC/CV to SAF QA, et al, subj: Desert Storm Deep Hardened Target Penetration Test, 191803Z Feb 1991, (SD 4-18); (S/DECLASS: OADR) Msg, USAFTAWC/CC to HQ TAC/DO, et al, End-of-Test Report, GBU-28/B Quick Look, 272000Z Mar 1991, (SD 4-19).
486(FOUO) Videotape, GBU-28 Hard Target Penetrator Munition, various dates (Sup Video 2); Art, “GBU-28 Desert Storm Rapid Response,” TAC Attack, Jan 1992, p 4-7, (SD 4-20); Intvw, Donna Clark, Historian, with Maj Phillip J. Siebert, 422 TES PRO F-111, 9 Feb 1992; Art, “Pilot's Last War Mission the First for New Bomb,” Air Force Times, 23 Sep 1991, (SD 4-21); (C/DECLASS: OADR) Msg, Det 3 ESAA/CC to DIA, et al, subj: IIR 1218 0104 90/Description of Underground Bunker Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, 231615Z Aug 1990, (SD 4-22); Art, “Powerful GBU-28 Bomb used in Iraq Made of Old Gun Barrels,” Air Force Times, 3 Jun 1991 (SD 4-23).
487(S) Intvw, Maj Wright, ASD program Manager, Kathy Douglass, ASD deputy program manager, and Art Spencer, Wright Lab (HERD), 28 Jun 1991.
499Mission Capable (MC) is the term used to describe an aircraft or other type of equipment that is in a condition that would allow it to perform all of its assigned missions without restriction. The numerical values shown in the figure represent the average frequency over time of the aircraft conditions expressed as a percentage of the number of aircraft in the AOR. The Not Mission Capable Supply (NMCS) and Not Mission Capable Maintenance (NMCM) rates represent, respectively, the percentage of time that aircraft were not MC awaiting parts or maintenance actions to be completed.
500Most of the mobility spares packages that moved forward with the initial aircraft deployments were called war readiness spares kits (WRSK). WRSKs are predetermined and prepackaged spares designed to support deployed units operating at planned wartime activity rates until reliable resupply lines can be established. WRSKs are authorized to units that are designated for mobility tasking in the War and Mobilization Plan, Volume 3 (WMP-3). Other types of spares packages include mission support kits (MSK) which are generally tailored packages of spares designed to support activities not documented in the WMP.