Historical and Geographical Dimensions of India’s Interaction with Southeast Asia
Independent India’s outlook of Southeast Asia
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Irrigation S E Asian Agri-history 2005, Irrigation S E Asian Agri-history 2005, Hist. Geog Dimensions India’s Interaction S E Asia, Hist. Geog Dimensions India’s Interaction S E Asia
| Independent India’s outlook of Southeast Asia Independent India sustained the spirit of fostering closer relations and even assisted the juvenile independent states of Southeast Asia (Lakshmana Chetty 1981). India began to be looked upon to garner greater economic and political weight in Asia, in view of its physical connectivity to large parts of Asia, its wherewithal for enhancing economic cooperation in South Asia and its institutional synergies for deepening defence and security cooperation in Asia (Jain 2005). While explaining the Asian identity in a nutshell that we are of Asia and the people of Asia are nearer and closer to us than others, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru candidly observed at the Asian Relations Conference (March-April 1947) that we have many problems in common, especially in the Pacific and in the southeastern region of Asia, and we have to cooperate together to find solutions (Nehru 1948, p Gopal 1984, pp. Nehru’s vision of a resurgent Asia and India’s critical engagement in reshaping its destiny was based on India’s geo-strategic centrality to Asia, long and deep historical and cultural roots embedded in the evolution of Asia, and also on the premise that the decolonized and newly independent countries of Asia be inclined to to keep away from great power rivalries and conflicts. Nehru thus favoured India working on Asian solidarity and its expression through regionalism, 8 institutionalization of cooperation and mutual understanding, so that Asia could have a legitimate weight in world politics (Maitra 2005). However, India’s engagement in the past with much of Asia, including Southeast and East Asia, was built on an idealistic conception of Asian brotherhood, based on shared experiences of colonialism and cultural ties. The proven track of Indian national morale and character thoroughly convinced the newly independent Southeast Asian nations of India’s wherewithal for addressing the security concerns. Though Nehru favoured an organization for ameliorating the socioeconomic problems of the miserable-lot, he was vehemently opposed to regional security arrangements proposed by some of the newly independent Southeast Asian nations which were obsessed with the power vacuum situation in the region. Expectedly, the region was turned be a veritable political laboratory, when both the superpowers attempted to gain control over this part of the Spykman’s Rimland which was considered pivotal for shaping the destinies of the world. Nehru’s prophecy of neutrality did not evoke the much-expected response from its Southeast Asian neighbours and others who attended the Bandung (Afro-Asian) Conference April 1955). Thus, Bandung was considered as the climax and downfall of India’s popularity among the Southeast Asian nations. For all its deep "geographical footprint" in Asia-Pacific, India’s persistent commitment to the nonalignment movement (NAM) which was launched at Belgrade in absorbed most of India’s multilateral diplomatic attention and pushed it into the role of sermonizing and eventually to a state of aloofness. India lost much of its initiative in the affairs of Southeast Asia and, in fact, considered the latter as being in the moribund backwaters. In fact, from s onwards, India’s preoccupation with conflicts in the subcontinent was also at the base of India’s lackadaisical attitude that made it to miss the rare 9 opportunity of joining as a founder-member of Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN); and ASEAN members too gained the impression that India was inward-looking with no sense of concern for their security. India which twice turned down ASEAN’s offer of membership did not foresee the prospects of the ASEAN process in the context of Cold War. If India’s refusal to join a non-US sponsored defence arrangement (FPDA) was yet another missed opportunity, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 was a signal of India’s drift. The tumultuous developments in Southeast Asia particularly in the Indochina region in the latter half of shad pushed India into betwixt and between position. India’s recognition of Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea (1980) led to India’s estrangement with ASEAN which had henceforth entertained apprehensions over India’s blue water navy and nuclear capabilities. The drift and discard attitude between the time-tested neighbours persisted until the collapse of the Soviet Union. India thus fell short of the expectations of Southeast Asian countries and it missed the opportunities for fortifying its economic relations with immediate neighbourhood. Download 389.05 Kb. Share with your friends:
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