Controlling law: This is an important, complex case primarily of interest to litigators, who will probably prefer to read the official opinion itself for complete information because the facts are numerous and detailed, as are the points of law discussed and decided. The reason this case is complicated is because it consists of a mixture of claims based on federal anti-discrimination statutes and claims based on common law [i.e., non-statutory] legal theories, and this mixture has different various requirements for EEOC screening before court action is allowed and various filing deadlines, all of which is important to litigators, but less so for we who are not.
Lynn McDonald-Cuba v. Santa Fe Protective Services, Inc., No. 10-2151, 644 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir., 5/9/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9488; 112 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 327; 94 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P44,169; http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/10/10-2151.pdf; or https://www.judicialview.com/Court-Cases/Constitutional-Law/McDonald-Cuba-v-Santa-Fe-Protective-Services-Inc.//17/29783 [enhanced lexis.com version].
Now then, for the rest of us, here is an outline of terms and issues involved:
from the appellate court opinion:
Lynn McDonald-Cuba brought this action against her former employer, Santa Fe Protective Services, Inc. (SFPS), seeking damages for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and New Mexico state law. SFPS responded with counterclaims for breach of contract, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and breach of the duty of loyalty. SFPS later voluntarily dismissed these counterclaims. The district court then granted * * * summary judgment in favor of SFPS on McDonald-Cuba's discrimination and retaliation claims. She appeals, we have jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in part and remand in part with instructions to dismiss in part for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Brief outline of terms and issues.
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Of major interest is the matter of post-termination claims.
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The EEOC is the first step for claims of violations of federal anti-discrimination statutes, even if they occur after termination or once formal court litigation has begun because federal courts lack jurisdiction to review Title VII claims that are not part of an EEOC charge timely filed with EEOC.
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Timely filing, “discrete actions” defined. This is a legal term essential to analyzing cases that involve the cumulative effect of a pattern of repeated conduct, such as in a hostile work environment claim, when allegations involve acts occurring more than 300 days before a charge is filed. Each “discrete act” may constitute its own unlawful employment practice, which means a discrete act cannot be referred to in an existing claim or subsequent claim, and the federal court would not have jurisdiction over it, and thus ought to be dismissed.
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Retaliation was alleged by the plaintiff to have been based on her filing of an unemployment compensation claim. Retaliation claims in statutory discrimination context require that the employee must have at the time been engaged in activity protected by such a statute, or have participated in or supported a protected person in a claim. There are exceptions to this, such as having filed a timely EEOC charge, etc. Also, retaliation claims can be based on action(s) outside of the workplace that might be regarded by a reasonable person as against him or her and harmful to that person.
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If there is no direct evidence of discrimination, then the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary test may apply [Note: See the description of that test in numerous briefs in this collection, as well as in the formal opinion].
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The appellate court did not accept the plaintiff’s theory that a promotion plus a raise would be evidence of discriminatory bias because the (female) employer didn’t fully embrace the merits of the employee’s skills and abilities.
[Comment: I hope that this outline will be of some assistance in reading and understanding this case. Another helpful resource for you may be the article discussing this case in the October 2011 issue of New Mexico Employment Law Letter published at www.HRHero.com. And if it seems to you that I struggled with this case, you’re right! ]
Title VII: hostile work environment and retaliation, employee failed to cooperate, claim dismissed; Ellerth/Faragher
Controlling law. Summary judgment granted in favor of the employer by the trial court was affirmed on appeal because the employee failed to cooperate with the employer’s investigation, and this demonstrates the importance of writing, publishing, training about and enforcing adequate anti-harassment policies and prevention policies. Essentially, the employee failed to provide detailed information about her allegations of harassment, and failed to respond to a reminder to follow up on that. Employers have duty to provide a workplace free of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, etc., and human resources proceeded to investigate and interview the alleged perpetrator and witnesses. Results of the investigation were inconclusive, but the alleged offender was nonetheless counseled about workplace conduct and warned not to retaliate against the complaining employee. Several weeks later the complainant sent a detailed account to human resources, which contained new allegations of inappropriate conduct and touching, all of which had occurred before the time of her initial complaint. Human resources replied that the new information did not change its previous decision and actions. The complainant resigned and then later returned to work. At that time she complained that coworkers were upset with her complaint, and she alleged a hostile work environment.
Christian v. AHS Tulsa Regional Medical Center, LLC., No. 10-5010 (10th Cir., 7/15/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14514; http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/10/10-5010.pdf; http://www6.lexisnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action=UserDisplayFullDocument&orgId=102083&topicId=115390011&docId=l:1493281219&Em=7&start=16 [enhanced lexis.com version].
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer and the appellate court affirmed based on the Ellerth/Faragher defense:
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an employer can show it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct harassing behavior and
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the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive and/or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.
The hospital had an appropriate, adequately detailed sexual harassment policy, and the employee had received it been trained about it, and at the training session employees had been encouraged to report violations. The hospital took prompt remedial action. The employee failed to carry out her responsibilities and obligations under company policy.
[Note: Case law over the years has extended harassment prevention requirements to many types of harassment in additional to the sexual type. Many policies I see do not extend harassment prevention to misbehavior other than sexual, which needs to be corrected by employers in order to be eligible for the Ellerth/Faragher defense for harassment other than sexual.]
Title VII: race, hostile work environment, failure to promote, remedial measures, prompt remedial action; retaliation; summary for employer
Illustrative; not controlling law. Because we see so few cases involving prompt remedial action, this case from Delaware is included for your consideration. However, be sure to read the full opinion carefully for what the federal appellate court found important and persuasive. Briefly, it affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the employer because the manager’s supervisors made no overt racial statements, and the employer promptly addressed all of the employee’s allegations in a manner it found was reasonably calculated to prevent further harassment. Further, evidence in this case of diversity and anti-harassment training by the employer was found to be persuasive proof of its efforts to prevent future discriminatory behavior in the workplace.
Peace-Wickham v. Walls, No. 09-4690 (3rd Cir., 12/21/10); 409 Fed. Appx. 512; 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26004; 111 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 769; http://federal-circuits.vlex.com/vid/janeka-peace-wickham-v-james-walls-233395070; http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/094690np.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Janeka Peace-Wickham, an African American, began working for the Delaware River and Bay Authority (DRBA) as a manager at the Delaware Memorial Bridge Facility Café. That position was described as a "working supervisor," and as such she was expected to fill in as needed with cooking, cashiering, and serving.
Discrimination allegations:
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Not long after starting her employment there, she and a Caucasian coworker got into a heated argument, after which they both filed internal company complaints of racial harassment against each other. Peace-Wickham was dissatisfied with the length of time it took DRBA to complete its investigation, even though it immediately reassigned the other worker after receiving the complaints.
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Peace-Wickham also claimed that some of the café customers (mostly DRBA employees) made racially inappropriate remarks:
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Overheard a customer who was unhappy with the way her meal was prepared remarked to another customer, "Back in the day, down South, blacks would have been hung for things like this."
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Another customer remarked to Peace-Wickham that the café had "changed" since her arrival, which Peace-Wickham interpreted as racially motivated because the previous supervisor was Caucasian.
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After a previous café supervisor left, also African American, someone posted a sign that read "free at last, free at last, thank god we are free at last." Peace-Wickham assumed the message was directed at her because she was the only remaining African American employed at the café.
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She alleged that a customer had balled up receipts and thrown them at her;
Retaliation allegations:
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About three months into her employment, Peace-Wickham complained of harassment by a Caucasian coworker, and things only got worse from then on.
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She regularly complained that the café was understaffed and about how she was treated by customers and fellow employees.
Failure to promote:
She alleged she was denied a promotion because of her race and because she had previously filed charges.
Litigation:
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The district court dismissed the case before trial by granting the employer’s motion for summary judgment.
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The 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the employer.
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It was persuaded that the court record contained evidence of any overtly discriminatory statements or conduct by her supervisors. [Note that though overtly discriminatory statements or conduct isn't required to show intentional discrimination, the presence or absence of such conduct is helpful in determining the motive of the decisionmakers.] In this case, the court said the fact that Peace-Wickham couldn't point to any overtly discriminatory conduct on the part of her supervisors lent further support to the conclusion that they could not be held directly responsible for any hostile environment that may have existed.
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On the important point of prompt remedial action, the court found that the DRBA took appropriate remedial steps to respond to her allegations of discrimination when it became aware of them.
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Concerning her complaints that DRBA took too long to investigate and conclude her initial harassment claim, the court found it significant that DRBA revised its investigation procedures. Though DRBA did take longer to investigate her complaint than her coworker's, it addressed the issue immediately by separating the two employees.
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DRBA also posted anti-harassment signs and instituted diversity and harassment training for all of its employees.
The court held that those measures fell "comfortably within the realm of legally adequate legal measures." It further stated that it was "unwilling to step into the shoes of DRBA management, as suggested by Peace-Wickham, and make highly particularized judgments as to whether the DRBA should have docked pay, demoted, or withdrawn certain fringe benefits instead of following the course of action chosen."
Title VII: gender; more than one reason for termination, layoff; evidence, potential disparate treatment Title VII claim for discrimination
Illustrative; not controlling law. How many reasons need to be given for termination or layoff? This case demonstrates the problem of possibly having too many reasons, and not using the best reason and of possibly not having adequate evidence of warning, counseling and documenting to support the best reason. Here, there was possibly a very good reason to have taken adverse action against the employee, but the evidence might show similar deficiencies by other employees against whom no action has been taken. The point is that the employee may have a valid Title VII disparate treatment discrimination claim, and that is how trial preparation will likely proceed as a result of this appellate decision.
Smizer v. Community Mennonite Early Learning Ctr., No. 10 C 4304 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 2011)., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102212; http://bowtielaw.wordpress.com/category/social-networking/ [enhanced lexis.com version].
The reason the employer gave to the employee for terminating his employment was a Facebook posting he’d made. However, the employee was unconvinced, and he claimed that actually he was fired because of “tardiness and lack of cleanliness in his classroom.” Further, he claimed that similarly situated female employees, who also were tardy and who kept equally messy classrooms, but they had not been fired or subjected to adverse employment action. If that could be shown to be true, then it would support the plaintiff’s Title VII claim. Accordingly, he moved in the trail court for an order to compel his former employer to produce documents he claimed would show these similar failings of his female counterparts. [Note: That is an example of “good lawyering” by his attorney and of bad judgment on the part of the employer in deciding how to terminate a problem employee, and on what basis. The employer should have dealt with the real problems in the workplace.]
ADEA: age 60, deficient performance, violations of company policy, Development Improvement Plan (DIP), Performance Improvement Plan (PIP); disparate treatment, inconsistency, sufficiently similarly situated younger employee; summary judgment reversed
Illustrative; not controlling law. Inconsistent, disparate treatment frequently leads to unfavorable results for employers. In this case the trial courts’ award of summary judgment in favor of the employer was reversed, which means the expense of a trial, and based on the facts, probably a jury verdict of liability and damages in favor of the employee, plus court costs and attorney fees – or an expensive settlement. The company’s defense was “at-will” employment, and we know from many years of following employment discrimination cases, that defense is essentially worthless – and that was the perspective of the appellate court.
Lesson: CONSISTENCY, CONSISTENCY CONSISTENCY, and if you do take differing actions in similar situations, it will be essential to have a solid, rational justification based on valid business necessity and most likely warning, counseling and documenting – and good luck.
Earl v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., No. 09-17477 (9th Cir., 9/26/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19616; http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/opinions/; or possibly http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2011/09/26/09-17477.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Christine Earl, age 60, was terminated for violating company policies over a span of time. The company used both a DIP and a PIP (a more serious warning process) approach to performance problems. In this case she was placed on a DIP, was not provided a PIP, and subsequently fired. A younger similarly situated employee with the same kinds of policy violations was put on both a DIP and then a PIP for corrective action before adverse employment action, and that was the evidence of possible age discrimination that convinced the appellate court to reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer and remand the case for trial by jury.
FMLA: failure to return employee’s telephone calls; hearing loss, tinnitus, vertigo, retaliation; leave as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA
Illustrative; not controlling law. A federal trial court ruled that the employer's failure to return the employee's telephone calls while she was on FMLA leave is evidence of retaliation. And remember, as has recently been noted in other case briefs, the FMLA and the ADA are now very closely related. In this case, an ADA accommodation might have been necessary if she had to extend leave beyond her FMLA leave period.
Hofferica v. St. Mary's Medical Center, No. 10-6026 (U.S.D.C. E.D.PA); check the article at http://www.fmlainsights.com/retaliation/failing-to-return-employees-phone-calls-may-be-fmla-retaliation/ if following link doesn’t work – left-click on the case name in the article; here are possible URL links to the actual opinion: http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/11D1055P.pdf. http://www.fmlainsights.com/Hofferica%20v.%20St.%20Mary%20Medical%20Center.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Numerous links are provided because if one doesn’t work for your computer, perhaps another one will.
Briefly, these are the pertinent facts, but read the trial court’s memorandum for the exact details:
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Kathleen Hofferica, a registered nurse was approved for intermittent FMLA leave for her medical conditions of tinnitus, hearing loss and vertigo.
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She took extended FMLA leave starting in September 2008 for treatment for those medical problems, and she expected to return by November 6, 2008.
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She alleged that during her leave she and her husband regularly provided her direct supervisor with leave updates, but for some reason her supervisor often failed to return the calls.
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In early November, she provided a return to work certification clearing her return for November 13, and she contacted her supervisor to ask for a "modest" extension through November 13, but the supervisor again did not return her call.
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Rather, the Medical Center sent her a letter informing her that her employment had been terminated because she failed to return to work on November 6 when her FMLA leave allotment had been exhausted.
Hofferica alleged discrimination and retaliation for taking FMLA leave. Before trial, her employer moved for summary judgment (i.e., a claim that there were no facts about which a reasonable jury could disagree). In rejecting that contention, the trial judge ruled that the case should be heard by a jury and denied the employer’s motion. You can read the full memorandum at the URL links cited for this case. There, the trial court found that the supervisor's failure to return phone calls was evidence of "an antagonistic attitude toward the employee, particularly where such behavior started after she began her FMLA leave, and continued “despite regular communications from the employee", ruled that testimony and evidence of that misbehavior could be used at trial as evidence of retaliation.
EPLI: Employment Practices Law Insurance, what is covered, and what is not
Illustrative; not controlling law, but definitely something to check on. What is a covered claim? You may want to read this and check on the wording of your policy. Article URL link: http://employerslawyer.blogspot.com/2011/09/suit-by-eeoc-not-covered-under-epli.html.
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 3:07-cv-00303 (M.D. TN 8/11/11) [enhanced lexis.com version].
ADA: not qualified, unable to achieve reasonable company requirements related to position, no reasonable accommodation; evidence, direct, indirect, McDonnell Douglas test, documentation of warning and counseling
Illustrative; not controlling law. To be covered by the ADA an individual must be qualified to perform the essential functions of the position, with or without reasonable accommodation.
Job descriptions of essential functions must be accurate and related to business necessity [Note: You’d be surprised at how many of the companies I train or consult with do not have accurate job descriptions]. To prevail in an ADA claim, the claimant must be able to prove that he/she was qualified to perform that job in a satisfactory manner, with or without accommodation.
Dickerson v. Bd. of Trustees of Comm. College District 522, No. 10-3381, (7th Cir., 9/16/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19051; http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=In%20FCO%2020110916118.xml&docbase=CSLWAR3-2007-CURR; http://www.employmentlawmatters.net/uploads/file/9-16-11%207thCir-must%20meet%20employer%27s%20expectations%281%29.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Robert Dickerson, a mentally impaired (Full Scale IQ of 67) part time custodian claimed ADA discrimination for his disability or perceived disability [regarded]. However, he had a history of deficient performance. His employer had diligently warned, counseled its efforts to help him to help himself and diligently documented those efforts. Some of his major deficiencies included problems beginning in 2005, such as wandering off the job, not completing assignments, leaving work for others to do, etc., all of which was covered by warning, counseling and documenting.
To some extent the case was complicated when he asked what he could do to gain promotion, and the response was “you should not be suing your employer”, which he claimed was direct evidence of discrimination. However, the indirect evidence under McDonnell Douglas convinced both the trial and appellate courts determined there were was no ADA discrimination.
FLSA: "learned professional exemption requires much more than a general college degree
Illustrative; not controlling law. The requirement is whether the job requires a college degree in a particular skill that is directly related to the job, not whether a job requires a college degree generally.
The case is Solis v. State DSHS, No. 10-35590 (9th Cir., 9/9/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18668; http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2011/09/09/10-35590.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
DSHS requirements for the social worker position in question were:
. . . at least a “[b]achelor’s degree or higher in social services, human services, behavioral sciences, or an allied field,” as well as eighteen months as a Social Worker 1 or two years’ experience in an equivalent position. Candidates for Social Worker 3 must meet the same educational requirements and have additional work experience. Within one year of their appointment, new employees in these positions must complete a formal training program that includes four weeks of classroom instruction and two weeks of field instruction.
The state also had guidance regarding when equivalent work experience could substitute for specialized degrees.
Title VII, PDA, ADA: short-term pregnancy complication
Illustrative; not controlling law. As summarized by the author of the opinion for the appellate court [a district court judge sitting by designation with appellate judges]:
YOUNG, District Judge. Beverly Healthcare, LLC ("Beverly"), employed Victoria Serednyj as an Activity Director in Beverly's Golden Living nursing home in Valparaiso, Indiana, from August 2006 to March 2007. In early January 2007, Serednyj learned she was pregnant, and, at the end of February 2007, she began to experience pregnancy-related complications. Her doctor placed her on bed rest for two weeks, and, at the end of this two-week period, her doctor placed her on light duty restrictions. Serednyj asked to be accommodated, and Beverly denied [*2] her request under its modified work policy. Because Serednyj also did not qualify for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), Beverly terminated her employment. Serednyj then filed suit against Beverly, alleging gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), pregnancy discrimination under Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"), disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and retaliation. Beverly moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Serednyj now appeals. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Because of the important significant details in the opinion, reading the entire case is strongly recommended because these kinds of cases are decided on specific patterns of facts, which means a slight change in fact(s) could produce a different result. Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, No. 10-2201 (7th Cir., 8/26/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17810; http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/BG0LBZDK.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Title VII: gender, female neurosurgeon, hostile work environment, sexual innuendos and demeaning comments, emotional distress; credentialing committee, alleged harasser providing, input injunction; back pay, front pay and compensatory damages, $1.6M verdict affirmed
Illustrative; not controlling law. Hostile work environment plus allegations of unfavorable treatment of her credentials status.
Tuli v. Brigham & Women’s Hospital, No. 09-1731 [also 08-2026, 09-1597, 09-1603], (1st Cir., 8/29/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18003; http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=08-2026P.01A; [enhanced lexis.com version].
Facts: Sagun Tuli, M.D., a female neurosurgeon, claimed discrimination by her employer, Brigham & Women’s Hospital and her supervisor, Dr. Arthur Day, after a yearly review of her medical staff credentials resulted in a conditional reappointment.
Tuli was hired into the hospital’s Department of Neurosurgery in 2002, and was as the department’s professionalism officer and representative to the hospital’s Quality Assurance and Risk Management (QARM) Committee, that required her to investigate and report on complications in other physicians’ cases. As QUARM representative she investigated three of Day’s cases, all three of which ultimately were reported to the state’s Board of Registration of Medicine. In addition, Tuli raised concerns to the hospital’s chief medical officer that Day was inappropriate and demeaning to women, including Tuli.
Her medical staff credentials were due for review in 2007 by the hospital’s credentialing committee, which would determine whether she would continue to have medical practicing privileges at the hospital. Peculiarly, Dr. Day presented her case to the committee in unflattering terms, including a suggestion that she would benefit from anger management training. As a result, the committee decided to condition her reappointment on obtaining an evaluation by an outside agency (“Physician Health Services”) and on agreeing to comply with that agency’s recommendations.
The litigation: Tuli then sued for a preliminary injunction to prevent the loss of her privileges and also alleged gender discrimination based on both disparate treatment and hostile work environment created by Dr. Day’s behavior toward her:
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early in the litigation process the preliminary injunction was granted, and
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at trial the jury decided in her favor and award:
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$1,000,000 in compensatory damages against the hospital on her hostile environment claim,
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$600,000 against the hospital in compensatory damages on her retaliation claim, and
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$20,000 against Day personally for economic harm on a “tortuous interference with business” claim.
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Following this verdict, the trial judge entered a permanent injunction, keeping the hospital from withdrawing her privileges at the hospital.
The hospital appealed on all counts, and the First Circuit upheld the jury’s verdict, as well as the permanent injunction:
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It found that the evidence showed Day had frequently questioned her authority by:
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calling her a “little girl”, and
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asking whether she really could do a “big operation.”
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It upheld allowing evidence at trial that included incidents outside of the applicable 300day statute of limitations, i.e., it upheld the trial court admitting evidence to the jury of Day’s behavior over the course of her employment, and not simply behavior within the 300 days prior to her first formal claim. This is the “continuing violation” theory: if an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the alleged hostile environment can be considered by the jury for purposes of determining liability.
NLRB: unwinding organizing activity; challenging union status after merger or sale of a company; appropriate size of bargaining unit to be organized
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