Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs



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Controlling law: These three complex, major cases upset longstanding precedents in labor law and union activity, so if you practice in this area of employment law, it is essential to read the full opinions and the many articles and commentaries related to them:

  • Lamons Gasket - time limits for “unwinding” the results of previous organizing activity.

  • UGL-UNICCO - challenging union status after a merger or sale of a company.

  • Specialty Healthcare and Rehabilitation of Mobile, - smaller size allowed for the bargaining unit that could be organized.

NLRB URL link: https://www.nlrb.gov/cases-decisions/case-decisions/board-decisions and left-click on the site’s Resources box on the right hand side, then on Case Search to locate and access the full opinion. To locate articles and commentaries, Google the case names.
Title VII: discrimination against other employees of same race or national origin, “token” defense favoring a minority employee rejected; McDonnell Douglas clarified
Illustrative; not controlling law. A supervisor allegedly discriminated against five Hispanic employees. His defense was that he had not subjected another Hispanic employee to discrimination. The appellate court rejected that contention and explained where the district court had misused the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary test.
Diaz v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., No. 10-3073 (7th Cir. 8, 2011); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16325; http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/AR0P7B28.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Four former employees and one current employee of Kraft Foods Global, Inc., all Hispanic, alleged discriminatory treatment on the basis of their national origin. Their supervisor, Peter Michalec is not Hispanic. Their primary allegations were that:

  • he would assign them the most undesirable tasks, such as scrubbing parking lots and cleaning sewers during the winter months, but did not require non-Hispanic employees to perform these duties, and

  • he made anti-Hispanic comments and slurs.

In 2008 Kraft informed its employees it was outsourcing many positions at its Tech Center, including the positions that the five plaintiffs held. They alleged that Michalec thwarted their efforts to apply for other positions within the company. One result was that three of the plaintiffs ultimately ran out of time to find employment within Kraft or the new organization to which their former positions had been outsourced. Some examples of what they alleged Michalec did were:



  • Two of the five plaintiffs signed up to be considered one open position within Kraft; the sign-up sheet for that had been altered by crossing off their names, and they believed he had done it (those positions would have been supervised by him), and they were never considered for it.

  • Three of the plaintiffs applied for open sanitation positions within Kraft (which also would have reported to Michalec). Of the plaintiffs selected for one of those sanitation positions, she was given the least desirable shift, the night shift. This plaintiff alleged that no woman had ever been selected to work the night shift in a sanitation position, and when she asked him why she was assigned the night shift, Michalec allegedly replied that he placed another new-hire into the day shift position because he was “white like me [Michalec]”, plus “he had a family to take care of.”

of the appellate court on the discrimination claim: Citing the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Connecticut v. Teal, 451 U.S. 440 (1982), it ruled that “there is no token exception to anti-discrimination law” . . . “Title VII would have little force if an employer could defeat a claim of discrimination by treating a single member of the protected class in accordance with the law” . . . and “the principal focus of [Title VII] is the protection of the individual employee, rather than the protection of the minority group as a whole.”
McDonnell Douglas clarified: The appellate court noted that the district court may have inverted the burden-shifting factor under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The trial court allowed a sort of “similarly situated employee” analysis for the employer to use to rebut the discrimination claims. The appellate court rejected the use of that theory by the trial court. It clarified the correct approach by holding that . . . One thing is clear under [the McDonnell Douglas] framework: the employer cannot satisfy its burden by identifying a person within the protected class who was not similarly discriminated against.”
FMLA: pattern of abuse or misuse of leave, adequate investigation and documentation, employment properly terminated
Illustrative; not controlling law. Here is an example of alertness, thorough investigation and documentation by the employer. One of its employees validly on FMLA appeared to develop a pattern of either misusing or abusing that leave for extending holidays, weekends and leave on other occasions. Once having detected that pattern, it held an internal hearing pursuant to the union collective bargaining agreement (CBA). His employment was terminated for that reason, and the federal trial court held his termination was not discriminatory and granted summary judgment in favor of the employer.
Rydalch v. Southwest Airlines, No. 1:09CV00178CW (U.S.D., D.UT, 8/3/110; http://www.fmlainsights.com/Rydalch%20v.%20Southwest%20Airlines.pdf; http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=In%20FDCO%2020110803A35.xml&docbase=CSLWAR3-2007-CURR [enhanced lexis.com version].
The evidence: Douglas Rydalch, a reservation sales agent for Southwest (SWA) was transferred from Salt Lake City when that reservation center was closed, and it transferred him to Houston. His family remained in Utah. Rydalch injured his back in 2004 and that condition continued through 2007. What caught his employer’s attention was that his back problems tended to flare up on the days just before or after his previously scheduled time off, which SWA counted as having occurred 35 times. SWA also noted he often used FMLA leave on important dates and holidays:

  • In 2007 he used FMLA leave coinciding with July 4, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, New Years Eve and birthday.

  • SWA’s monitoring showed that he tended to take round trip flights Utah on the days he requested FMLA leave.

  • On Christmas Eve 2007 his supervisor learned that he again had taken FMLA leave and later learned that Rydalch had been out of town when he called in his absence.

  • Further investigation by his supervisor showed that Rydalch booked a trip to Utah from December 22 to 27.

  • A call from Rydalch reporting back trouble for December 26 and 27, his next two scheduled work days.

ERISA: 401(k), no breach of fiduciary duties, large and broad selection of funds, some funds allegedly with excessive fees


Illustrative; not controlling law. The claims for breach of fiduciary duty were that in the large group of funds were some funds that had excessive fees. That claim was dismissed because the broad range of funds involved in the group provided the participants with many options, and information on the risk profiles, investment strategies, and associated fees. Those factors were highly relevant and readily ascertainable facts for the potential investors. The 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that was how the plausibility of the claims challenging the overall composition of a plan's mix and range of investment options should be measured, and it dismissed the claims of breach of fiduciary duty. Renfro v. Unisys Corp., No. 10-2447 (3rd Cir. 8/19/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17208; https://www.judicialview.com/Court-Cases/Torts/Renfro-v-Unisys-Corp./44/38405 [enhanced lexis.com version]. Read the case for helpful case citations and reasoning of other federal appellate courts that the 3rd Circuit found persuasive.
Title VII: “morally offensive” sexual conduct, office affair, sexual affiliations, gender delineations

ADA/Rehabilitation Act: failure to sufficiently identify major life activities limited, failure to relate 2007 diagnosis to 2009 alleged conditions


Parker v. Salazar, No. 10-8091 (10th Cir., 7/18/11); 2011 U.S.App, LEXIS 14654; http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/10/10-8091.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Controlling law. There were two parts to this case: (1) sexual behavior and (2) alleged disability. Bruce Parker’s employment had been terminated after he received a negative performance evaluation. He sued for (1) alleged retaliation for reporting sex discrimination and (2) disability discrimination for multiple health problems in violation of the Rehabilitation Act [very similar to the ADA]. He lost on both claims.
Sexual behavior (or misbehavior): Bruce Parker and a coworker sent an email to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) equal employment opportunity representative complaining that two coworkers were have a sexual affair and “flaunting it, which Parker and his coworker found to be “morally offensive”. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals said that “Title VII’s reference to ‘sex’ means class delineated by gender, rather than sexual affiliations.” It pointed out that “Title VII [was] intended to eliminate disparate treatment of men and women.” Parker did not allege how the affair of those coworkers related to how BLM may have treated men and women differently. Parker was notified by BLM when he first filed his complaint about the affair that it was not prohibited discriminatory activity, which Parker understood.
Disability: The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act [which covers government employees and programs receiving federal funding] are very similar. When filing under the Rehabilitation Act, the “employee must articulate with precision both his physical or mental impairment and the major life activity the impairment substantially limits.” Parker failed to do that, and further, he failed to show why his 2007 diagnosis related to his resignation in 2009.
Public sector: constitutional rights, due process; First Amendment, free speech association, hiring an attorney
Controlling law. This public sector employee (1) was not denied due process of the law in his termination process, nor (2) was he entitled to First Amendment protection – freedom of association – for hiring an attorney – which was the basis of his retaliation claim.
Merrifield v. Bd. of County Comm’rs for Santa Fe, Nos. 10-2175, 10-2179 (10th Cir., 7/25/11); 2011 U.S. App LEXIS 15363; http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/10/10-2175.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Billy A. Merrifield, a youth services counselor at the Santa Fe County youth correctional facility, sent a sexually graphic image by cell phone to one of his subordinates, who then passed it around the office. In response to a complaint by an employee, Merrifield was placed on administrative leave and the director of corrections recommended termination of his employment for the cell phone incident and for other participation in a “sexually inappropriate environment”.
The next step was a predetermination hearing on March 8 with the county’s human resources director. The director agreed with the termination recommendation, which Merrifield appealed to the county manager, who denied the appeal and fired Merrifield on March 21. Next, a hearing officer heard the matter in a hearing lasting nine days, and his decision was to affirm the termination of Merrifield’s employment.
Merrifield filed a civil action in federal district court, alleging, among other things, two constitutional violations:

  1. due process rights in the predetermination hearing, and

  2. First amendment freedom of association by retaliating against him for hiring an attorney.

Public employees have a “”constitutionally protected property interest” in their employment. Law developed over the years holds that the government cannot terminate government employees without first providing them with due process of law consisting of a hearing before an adverse employment action can taken against the employee. Further, the employer must provide:



  1. notice of the charges made,

  2. an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and

  3. a reasonable opportunity to adequately respond.

The hearing need not be a full evidentiary process, but rather only inform the employee of the charges and afford an opportunity to respond to them.
Due Process: In his litigation he argued only that the initial letter of the director recommending termination failed to provide sufficient notice of the charges. No other challenges were made to the sufficiency of any other steps of the county’s process. In rejecting his argument, the 10th Circuit of Appeals emphasized that it is irrelevant that the notice given in a recommendation letter because the “necessary notice may come at the hearing itself”. Previous case law cited by the appellate court has held there is no requirement for a delay between the “notice” and the “opportunity to respond”. Notably, Merrifield did not challenge the adequacy of the notice at the hearing, and thus the appellate court had no reason to rule that the county hadn’t provided him proper notice at the hearing
Association: Both free speech and free association are protected by the First Amendment. In an employment situation, the government has more flexibility than in a situation involving the person as a citizen: The First Amendment generally protects a citizen’s freedom of speech, but “when . . . the relationship of the government to the person is that of employer, those First Amendment rights are limited” – but not unlimited. Of the many factors in the test a court would use to decide if an employer has violated an employee’s rights of free speech, the primary one is whether the speech in question was “on a matter of public concern”.
Merrifield made two arguments for his association claim:

  1. The public interest concern in the matter doesn’t apply in an association claim.

  2. Even if it did apply, hiring an attorney necessarily involved public concern because attorney-client relationships are “of concern to the community, our social way of life, [and] at the core of the core of our system of justice.”

Both of those arguments were rejected because:

  1. The public interest concern requirement applies to both speech and association - it is not a right to transform everyday employment disputes into matters of constitutional litigation.

  2. Merrifield was also found to not have provided any evidence that association with his attorney was ”anything more than an everyday employment dispute.”

ADEA: older worker replaced by computer program, replacement not a similarly situated younger worker, no age discrimination; McDonnell Douglas circumstantial proof test


Illustrative and very interesting case, but not controlling law. Thomas Gortemoller was replaced by a computer that replaced the "top-down process” with a decentralized interactive computerized process. The only issue on appeal is whether he was replaced by or otherwise lost his position to a younger individual. The trial and appellate courts ruled he was not.
Gortemoller v. International Furniture Marketing, Inc., No. 10-15689, (8th Cir., 7/20/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14976; 112 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1563 [enhanced lexis.com version]:
Thomas Gortemoller’s duties had been to be an intermediary between salespeople, customers, and designers. After terminating his employment the companies streamlined their product design process with a web-based computer program called Design Net that allowed salespeople and designers to communicate directly with each other. It also allowed customers to provide feedback directly to the salespeople and designers.
His primary responsibilities had consisted of:

  • conducting research to identify new products;

  • creating specifications and working with designers on products;

  • selecting designs produced by designers;

  • developing and merchandising products;

  • traveling overseas to inspect products; and

  • traveling to markets to sell products and evaluate the competition.

An employee who had worked for the companies for eight years, Todd Evans, was assigned to oversee the new streamlined process.


The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer, and the appellate court affirmed the judgment. In a circumstantial evidence case the requirements of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), are:

  1. The plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which he may do by showing that he was

    1. a member of the protected age group,

    2. subjected to adverse employment action,

    3. qualified to do the job, and

    4. replaced by or otherwise lost a position to a younger individual.

  2. If the plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, then the defendant must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action.

  3. At that point, the plaintiff must proffer evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the employer's reasons are a pretext for discrimination.

The only disputed issue was whether he was replaced by a younger employee.
The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals found that the companies replaced their "top-down process," (Gortemoller as an intermediary between salespeople, customers and designers), with a decentralized online interactive computer process in which those parties communicated with each other directly, i.e., the new system allowed salespeople, customers and designers to make decisions together about what and how products were made. As to the employee involved in the process after Gortemoller left, he merely oversees this process but does not perform Gortemoller's former duties - no one does that under the new system. As to travel, Evans performed this duty before Gortemoller was fired and it was "not a duty for which Evans became responsible after Gortemoller was terminated."
NLRB: disciplinary action, overly broad company rule
Controlling law. Here is another complex and detailed case that needs to be read in its entirety for all of the twists and turns, requirements and exceptions. The issue was the extent to which an employer violates the National Labor Relations Act if it disciplines an employee who violates a work rule that is unlawfully overbroad, where the conduct resulting in the discipline is wholly outside the protections of Section 7 of the Act.
Continental Group, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 39 (8/11/11), search for it at: https://www.nlrb.gov/cases-decisions/case-decisions/board-decisions and left-click on the site’s Resources box on the right hand side, Case Search, third one down [enhanced lexis.com version]. 2011 NLRB LEXIS 426
Briefly stated:

  • The Board discussed applicable precedents and held that discipline imposed pursuant to an unlawfully overbroad rule is unlawful in situations in which an employee violated the rule by engaging in protected conduct or conduct that otherwise involves concerns and protections covered by Section 7, e.g., activities such as employees' rights to organize, collectively bargain, engage in other concerted activities, and to refrain from such actions.

  • On the other hand, the Board also held that an employer can lawfully discipline an employee pursuant to an overbroad rule if the employee's conduct is not protected by Section 7, nor is similar conduct protected by the Act.

NLRB: social media guidelines memorandum: http://www.employmentandlaborinsider.com/OM%2011_74%20Report%20of%20the%20Acting%20General%20Counsel%20Concerning%20Social%20Media%20Cases.doc.pdf.


Title VII: discrimination, complaint, retaliation; “cat’s paw theory, Staub v. Proctor Hospital
Illustrative; not controlling, but reasoning was based on Staub v. Proctor Hospital, (2011) 2011 U.S. LEXIS 1900,*;131 S. Ct. 1186; 179 L. Ed. 2d 144;111 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 993131, so this case is of more than passing interest. It involved a third-party complaint and an adverse employment action by an allegedly independent board.
McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, No. 09-3567, No. 10-3430 (3rd Cir., 8/17/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17199; http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/093567p.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
McKenna, a Caucasian police officer was fired, which he claimed was retaliation because he complained to his supervisor about what he considered to be racially discriminatory treatment of minority officers. The City claimed that it was not liable, arguing that even if the supervisor’s conduct was retaliatory, the City was insulated from liability because the termination decision was made after a hearing by the independent Police Board of Inquiry (“PBI”). The verdict in favor of McKenna was affirmed by the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals.

  • It cited the recent “cat’s-paw” decision, Staub v. Proctor Hospital, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that if an action by a biased supervisor is the proximate cause of a worker's termination, an employer can be held liable even if the supervisor did not make the ultimate decision.

  • Because McKenna’s supervisor had testified at the PBI hearing, the appellate court concluded that the jury could reasonably have decided that the supervisor’s retaliatory animus bore a direct and substantial relation to the termination, and the PBI’s decision was not independent and it was foreseeable.

NLRB: unauthorized workers, labor violation, no backpay


Controlling law. In Mezonos Maven Bakery Inc., https://www.nlrb.gov/cases-decisions/case-decisions/board-decisions [enhanced lexis.com version], the Board ruled it cannot order backpay for workers unauthorized to work in the United States, even if the employer (or employers) caused the violations of the immigration laws, because that would legitimize illegal conduct.. This is the broad interpretation and extension of Hoffman Plastics Compounds Inc. v. NLRB (2002); 535 U.S. 137; 122 S. Ct. 1275; 152 L. Ed. 2d 271; 2002 U.S. LEXIS 2147; 70 U.S.L.W. 4209; 145 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P11,230; 169 L.R.R.M. 2769; 2002 Cal. Daily Op. Service 2731; 2002 Daily Journal DAR 3304; 15 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 178; http://supreme.justia.com/us/535/137/ [enhanced lexis.com version].
ADEA, ERISA: benefits: cash balance plan, conversion to annuity, cash-in, “wearaway” provision allegedly violates ADEA; “anti-backloading” rules, notice requirements
Controlling law. This benefits case is very complex and it is strongly recommended that the full opinion be read for all of the details, citations and reasoning. [Note: When it looks to me as though the brief might be about as long as the opinion itself, briefing it seems like a duplication of effort, plus briefing it might leave out an important factor or factors.]
Tomlinson v. El Paso Corporation, No. 10-1385 (10th Cir.,8/11/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16525; http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/10/10-1385.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Title VII: sexual harassment, touching, slurs, profanity; character evidence of similarly harassing others (“me too”)
Illustrative; not controlling law. Character evidence generally is inadmissible, but there are exceptions, such as showing or proving intent, motivation, common plan, and other similar issues. This is a California state court case, so litigators are cautioned to review this decision in the light of the evidence rules and case law in their own jurisdiction.
Pantoja v. Anton, F058414 (CA.Ct.App. 5th A.D, 8/9/11); 2011 Cal. App. LEXIS 1036; ; http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/F058414.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version].
Thomas Anton, attorney, allegedly harassed Lorraine Pantoja, a staff member, by touching her inappropriately, using slurs and profanity, and engaging in other such misconduct. He objected to testimony to be offered from other female employees that he engaged in similar conduct towards them. At trial, Anton successfully had that conduct excluded as character evidence, even though Pantoja's lawyers argued that evidence was necessary to prove Anton's intent. A jury decided in favor of Anton. Pantoja appealed, and the appellate court reversed the defense verdict and judgment because "me too" evidence can be admissible to show Anton's intent to sexually harass. Further, it was also admissible to impeach Anton's denials of misconduct or inappropriate behavior. Accordingly, the case can be retried and the “me too” evidence may be presented.
FLSA: retaliation claim rejected, applicant not an employee
Illustrative; not controlling law. In order to prevail in a claim based on a statute, a plaintiff must be a person or entity defined in the statute. A job applicant claimed she was not hired because she had a pending FLSA lawsuit. The Fair Labor Standards Act governs only existing employer-employee relationships. Because the FLSA only prohibits retaliation "against any employee," and "employee" is defined as "any individual employed by an employer", the retaliation claim by an applicant not yet an employee was held to have been properly dismissed by the trial court.
Dellinger v. Science Applications International Corporation, No. 10-1499 (4th Cir., 8/12/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16635; http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/dellinger.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
ADEA: adverse employment action, deficient performance, Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) held not discriminatory
Illustrative; not controlling law. Typically, employers are allowed to take corrective action with employees whose performance is deficient. In this unpublished 3rd Circuit case the Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) was held not to be a discriminatory "adverse employment action" under federal anti-discrimination laws.
Reynolds v. Dept. of the Army, No. 10-3600 (3rd Cir., 7/22/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15146; http://courtlistener.com/ca3/28T8/raymond-reynolds-v-dept-army/ [enhanced lexis.com version].
Raymond Reynolds, an engineer with the Communications-Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Center of the United States Army was considered to be performing below standards. His supervisor, Norma Kornwebel, was of the opinion that he did not take his job seriously, that he improperly delegated responsibilities to others, and that he failed to comply with her directives. Reynolds denied those allegations of poor performance and claimed she treated him “dismissively” and had not provided him with clear performance objectives. Her performance assessment of him in August of 2004 stated he had failed to meet certain goals. At her meeting with him on November 3, she provided him with PIP that allowed 90 days within which to improve his performance or possibly be reassigned, demoted, or fired. The next day he applied for two early retirement incentive programs, and a month later he filed an age discrimination charge with the EEOC (Reynolds was 51 at the time).
A claim of age discrimination requires an employee to show that:

  1. he was at least 40 years old,

  2. he suffered an adverse employment action,

  3. he was qualified for his position, and

  4. he was replaced by a person sufficiently younger than himself.

The district court concluded that Reynolds could not show that he was the subject of an adverse employment action and granted summary judgment in favor of the Army, which the appellate court affirmed based on earlier similar decisions of Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit [our jurisdiction]. It stated that a PIP “differs significantly” from the types of actions typically viewed as adverse. Notably, rather than changing the status of an employee’s position, a PIP usually conveys to the employee ways in which that person can better perform the responsibilities that he or she already has. In this instance, the appellate court pointed out, viewing a PIP as an adverse action would simply create greater frustration for employers seeking to improve and employee’s performances by taking an action that effectively would result in a discrimination claim.


[Note: Warning, counseling and documenting are important methods of taking corrective action.

However, counseling and PIPs need to clearly state achievable goals within a reasonable time period, and additional counseling, training and feedback may be necessary within the period. An unreasonable PIP or counseling session may well result in a discrimination claim. Valid business necessity and fairness count.]


SOX: Sarbanes-Oxley, whistleblowing, retaliation, sufficiency of employee’s allegations, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6)
Illustrative: not controlling law. This is a case involving legal trial procedural rules, so it will primarily be of interest to litigators, and they ought to read this entire opinion for all of the important details.
How specific must an employee’s allegations be to survive a motion to dismiss by the employer? General allegations of wrongdoing are not enough in a SOX case. This federal district trial court case required that the employee’s allegations must state that his or her communications to the employer "definitively and specifically" related to one of the statutes or rules listed in SOX and conveyed "an objectively reasonable belief that the company intentionally misrepresented or omitted certain facts to investors, which were material and risked loss." Though this case was dismissed for insufficient allegations, the pleadings may be amended and the case may be allowed to proceed. As you can see from the brief outline in the following paragraph, quite a bit appears to be involved here.
This employee questioned and refused to process expenses claimed for company events in the Bahamas and Las Vegas. The employer’s tax department took over the matter and various bonus and other methods of compensation were explored. The employee’s formerly high performance evaluations, notably in "integrity" and "ethics and values” worsened. Human resources conducted an investigation into whether he had failed to report basketball tickets, had made sexually suggestive remarks to coworkers, and finally, if ten years earlier had an inappropriate relationship with another employee. Many more details are set forth in the court’s decision.
Wiest v. Lynch, Case No. 2:10-cv-03288-GP (July 21, 2011); http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/07/25/wiestopinion.pdf.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for trials in Rule 8 requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. 8(a)(2), in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” [citations omitted]. However, at least for this court, the judge required specific references to SOX statutory provisions and specific factual allegations of how those statutes were violated. Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, but these civil procedural rules also allow a plaintiff to amend the pleadings to be more specific if the judge deems that to be appropriate under the circumstances.
[Consider adding this case to your litigation checklist for FRCP Rule 9, Pleading Special Matters.]
FLSA: avoiding attorney fees, FLSA Section 216(b)
Illustrative; not controlling law. This 11th Circuit Court of Appeals case held that by paying all wages claimed and an equal amount of liquidated damages before judgment, an employer avoided paying attorney fees. This is similar to “offer of judgment” rules in some federal and state civil trial rules. Reasoning in the trial court and the appellate court was:

1) entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff is a necessary predicate to an award of attorneys' fees under the FLSA;

2) an FLSA case is rendered moot by payment of the full amount claimed by the plaintiff in back wages, plus liquidated damages;

3) dismissal based on mootness is not the equivalent of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff; and, therefore

4) a plaintiff in an FLSA case mooted by full payment of the claim is not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under Section 216(b).

See Wikipedia: “Mootness”, a legal concept that a case cannot be decided because a decision would no longer have real consequences.


The employer tendered payment less than two months after the filed his lawsuit. Dionne v. Floormasters Enters., No. 09-15405 (11th Cir., 7/28/11); 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 15560; http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200915405.pdf; and from MoreLaw: http://www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n=09-15405&s=FL&d=49399 [enhanced lexis.com version].
[Note: This leaves open the question of timing and fairness in the extent of litigating an issue. If an employer paid later than Floormasters did, maybe even after a jury verdict was rendered and then ordered in a judgment by the court, would the courts reason the same way? Offers of judgment rules usually have realistic time limits that solve that practical problem.]
ADA: association with disabled person, wife, distraction theory; three-part evidentiary test: (1) prima facie case of discrimination, (2) employer’s reason for adverse employment action, and (3) proof of possible pretext
Illustrative; not controlling law. Don’t overlook or forget about this important provision of the ADA:
. . . excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2006).
Though employees who are not disabled workers are not entitled to reasonable accommodation under this provision, it does cover the situation in which there is an association of the employee with a disabled person. This case clarifies the matter, at least in the 6th Circuit’s discussion of the distraction theory. Essentially, don’t assume that an employee will be distracted and unproductive or less productive because he or she is associated with a disabled person. In this case, the employee lost because there was evidence of deficient performance rather than sufficient proof of an ADA violation.
Stansberry v. Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp., No. 09-2499 (7/6/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13659; 2011 FED App. 0177P (6th Cir.); http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/11a0177p-06.pdf; http://www.judicialview.com/Court-Cases/Empalternativelyloyment/Stansberry-v-Air-Wisconsin-Airlines-Corporation/22/34497 [enhanced lexis.com version].
The appellate court's decision clarifies what a plaintiff must show to prove a "distraction" theory claim under the ADA. There are three theories:

  1. Expense,

  2. Disability by association, or

  3. Distraction.

This case sets forth the prima facie [basically legal initial]case for a distraction theory claim. A plaintiff must prove:



  1. is qualified for the position;

  2. was subjected to an adverse employment action;

  3. was known to be associated with a disabled individual; and

  4. the adverse action occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference that the disability of the relative was a determining factor in the decision.

This 6th Circuit Court of Appeals case affirmed summary judgment of the lower court ordering that a plaintiff was not entitled to trial on his ADA associational disability claim because he could not establish that he was terminated because of his association with his disabled wife.


Eugene Stansberry was manager of Air Wisconsin's operation at the Kalamazoo Airport from 1999 through July 2007. His employment then was terminated for a variety of reasons. He claimed ADA discrimination because of his association with a disabled person, his wife.
Though Stansberry met the requirements the first three elements of the four-part test, he was found to have failed to establish the fourth element, circumstances indicating his association with his disabled wife was the reason he was fired. He claimed her condition had worsened at the time of his discharge, but he failed to produce evidence refuting Air Wisconsin's valid business reasons of performance deficiencies, or alternatively, to present evidence of any pretext by his employer to cover up discriminatory bias or prejudice against him because of his wife’s condition.
FMLA: lying, no protection
Illustrative; not controlling law. FMLA regulations impose specific rights and responsibilities on both employers and employees. Truth is one of the requirements, which in this case had to be the whole truth. The employee claimed he was suffering from prostate cancer, but he was actually being treated for bipolar disorder. His medical certification was incomplete, and his employer terminated his employment for:

1) failure to provide the required documentation; and



2) the false reasons of the employee as the basis for the leave.

Prigge v. Sears Holding Corp., No. 10-3397 (3d Cir. June 23, 2011); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 1299; http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/103397np.pdf; http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=In%20FCO%2020110623159.xml&docbase=CSLWAR3-2007-CURR [enhanced lexis.com version].
ADEA: valid nondiscriminatory reason for termination, investigation, stated reasons held in good faith at the time of the discharge; “but-for” factor means age must the factor that made the difference; “cat’s paw” theory inapplicable
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