Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs



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Controlling law. New law is declared by this case that protects concerted activities by contract employees and declares where such access may occur – so what happens in Vegas doesn’t necessarily stay in Vegas. Reading this case for all of the factual and legal details is essential if an employer might be confronted with union activities similar to those in this case, as is consulting with legal counsel experienced in labor law.
New York New York, LLC, d/b/a New York New York Hotel & Casino, 356 NLRB No. 119; go to https://www.nlrb.gov/cases-decisions/case-decisions/board-decisions to locate and download the decision; cases are listed alphabetically [enhanced lexis.com version].
Briefly, the issues decided by the NLRB arose from activities by off-duty employees of an onsite food service contractor seeking access to the hotel and casino property where they worked in order to pass out handbills in connection with their union organizing activity. The site was the New York New York Hotel & Casino and the activity occurred at three sit-down restaurants, a food court, banquet catering, hotel room services, and the dining room used by casino and other contractor employees.
The NLRB stated in this opinion that: "we seek to establish an access standard that reflects the specific status of the [contractor] employees as protected employees who are not employees of the property owner, but who are regularly employed on the property." Using that new access standard, the Board ruled that the property owner did not have sufficient property or managerial interests to prohibit its contractor's employees' off-duty access to its property and consequently violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act.
FMLA: interference with leave; refusal to reinstate; type of claim – discrimination or interference; evidence, employer’s intent is irrelevant; factors at play - air quality, using “low quality” paper, unclear cause of medical problems
Illustrative; not controlling law. This 9th circuit panel opinion relied on similar cases decided by the 6th and 7th circuits in this claim for interference with FMLA leave. Basically, the ruling in this case means an employer must prove its reasons for not reinstating an employee released to return to work after FMLA leave and that the employee need not show that her employer lacked a reasonable basis for its refusal.
[Comment: This case catches my attention because it essentially puts the burden of proof on the employer. Typically, the burden of proof in litigation seldom shifts from the plaintiff to the defendant. It is important to note that there is a difference between the burden of proof and the burden of going forward with evidence. In the prominent McDonnell Douglas case the analysis of evidence is that:



  • the employee has the initial burden to come forward with a prima facie case proving discrimination (i.e., essentially a burden of proof), then

  • the employer must show a legitimate business reason for its actions (i.e., the burden of coming forward with evidence that it did not discriminate); and finally

  • the ultimate burden is on the employee to prove that the employer's reason is a pretext for discriminatory motive (i.e., the plaintiff bears to burden of proof – not merely showing – a right to recover).



Now, I may be mistaken about this, but it appears that this Sanders case and those in the 6th and 7th circuits in effect shift the burden of proof to the employer.
A further interesting factor is that the cause of the employee’s health problems is unknown, a matter that might not be discovered even with an interactive exploration by both the employer and the employee.
Hearing from colleagues with their analysis of this situation is welcomed.]
Diane Sanders was released to return to work from FMLA leave with a letter from her physician advising that her employer, the City of Newport, OR, should stop using "low grade" paper, which it apparently agreed to do. However, it refused to reinstate her employment because it contended it could not provide her with a safe workplace because it was not clear what caused her medical problems.
Erroneous jury instruction:

In the trial court the judge instructed the jury that the plaintiff must prove she was denied reinstatement "without reasonable cause". The appellate court ruled this was the wrong legal standard, and it set forth the following applicable law and procedure:




  • Plaintiff’s required proof: On appeal, the court relied on this reasoning of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits of proof that . . .

. . . have ably summarized the elements of an employee’s prima facie case where the employer fails to reinstate the employee: “the employee must establish that: (1) he was eligible for the FMLA’s protections, (2) his employer was covered by the FMLA, (3) he was entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) he provided sufficient notice of his intent to take leave, and (5) his employer denied him FMLA benefits to which he was entitled.” [citations] We agree with this approach. In interference claims, the employer’s intent is irrelevant to a determination of liability.. . .




  • Defendant’s required proof: If the employee establishes a prima facie case, then the employer bears the burden of establishing that the employee was not entitled to reinstatement, i.e., the employer must prove that the employee was denied reinstatement for one of the reasons stated by the FMLA, for example, that the employee would not have remained employed if she had not taken leave. [Note: This approach is strict statutory interpretation and construction.]

Consequently, the appellate court vacated the judgment in the city's favor and remanded the case to lower court for a new trial using the proper elements of proof, as stated above, and procedure of presenting each party’s case.


Sanders v. City of Newport, No. 08-35996, No. 09-35119 and No. 09-35196 (9th Cir., 3/17/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5263; http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2011/03/17/08-35996.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
USERRA: no basis for hostile work environment claim
Illustrative: not controlling law. The 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the language of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) does not create a cause of action for “hostile work environment” against military service members. Carder v. Continental Airlines, No. 10-20105 (5th Cir., 3/22/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5847; http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions%5Cpub%5C10/10-20105-CV0.wpd.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
As you will recall, the Act was passed to prohibit civilian employers from discriminating against employees engaged in military service. It states that employees who perform military service “shall not be denied initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment” on the basis of that service. Courts may broadly or narrowly interpret statutory language. In this case the trial court interpreted broadly, and the appellate court interpreted narrowly, focusing on the language of the statute itself, stating that the definition of the term “benefits of employment” under the USERRA includes any “advantage, profit, privilege, gain, status, account or interest (including wages or salary. . .)” associated with employment. As a matter of strict statutory construction and interpretation, it ruled that the plain language of the term “benefits of employment” does not include the prohibition of harassment, hostility, insults or other similar words or comments. In other words, it would not read into USERRA rights and prohibitions that are not expressly stated. Whether our 10th Circuit Court of Appeals would also rule that way is uncertain, so proceed carefully in situations of possible harassment/hostile work environment involving employees covered by USERRA.
Here is what occurred in the workplace and the courts:

  • A group of Continental airline pilots alleged various violations of USERRA, including allegations that they had experienced a hostile work environment on the basis of their military service.

  • The trial court recognized that USERRA “expressly prevents the denial of benefits of employment to members of the uniformed service by their employers.”

  • Disagreeing with the trial court, the appellate court construed USERRA narrowly and strictly and denied the hostile work environment claims of the pilots.

FLSA: complaint defined, “filed any complaint”; judicial interpretation of wording, statute, regulation, rule, handbook or an email; anti-retaliation provision, protected activity


Controlling law. An ”oral complaint” has been interpreted by the Unites States Supreme Court to be an activity protected by the FLSA against retaliation. As with so many recent cases, this one points out the need for employers to train everyone in the company or agency in the latest developments in the law. Good training can be good prevention, and good prevention is far better than the expense after a possible violation of having a good defense in court.
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., No.09-834, 563 U.S. ____ (USSC, 3/22/11); 179 L. Ed. 2d 379; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 2417; 17 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 577; 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 874; http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-834.pdf; Fisher & Phillips LLP article: http://www.laborlawyers.com/files/28163_SC%20Kasten_Saint-Gobain.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]
Kevin Kasten had four documented tardiness events for which his employer had warned, counseled and documented. Kasten alleged the location of the time clocks was illegal and that he had complained to several superiors and a human resources employee during the approximate period of October 2006 until he was fired in December 2006. After his employment was terminated he sued the employer alleging retaliation under the FSLA’s anti-retaliation provision making it unlawful for an employer:
to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee . . . .
Both the federal trial court in Wisconsin and the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals refused to interpret the meaning of the word “file” to mean an oral complaint.
In the 6-2 decision (Justice Kagan abstaining), Justice Breyer wrote that the phrase "filed any complaint" is to be interpreted broadly so that oral, intra-company complaints constitute protected activity under the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA. Two bases were stated for that:

  1. Concerning the plain language of the statute, what about the term "filed" as used in the FLSA anti-retaliation provision. It cited a wide range of sources, including dictionaries, judicial opinions, statutes and regulations. Justice Breyer wrote "[t]he word filed has different relevant meanings in different contexts" leading to the conclusion that even oral complaints can be "filed." He also noted that several federal administrative agencies (including the Department of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) allow the filing of oral complaints and further noted that due to "Congress' delegation of enforcement powers to federal administrative agencies" the Supreme Court could give deference to these administrative agencies' views of the use of the term.

  2. Next, Justice Breyer discussed Congress' intent in originally enacting the FLSA in 1938 within the context of the employees the act was designed to protect, and he noted that President Roosevelt, in 1937, called for the passage of a law to "help the poorest of ‘those who toil in factory'" and cited to the high rate of illiteracy among those workers. Coupling those facts with the fact that Congress relies on "information and complaints received from employees" to enforce this anti-retaliation provision led the Supreme Court to conclude that Congress must have intended the term "filed any complaint" to encompass both oral and written complaints, and he further noted, many of the employees' which the act was designed to protect would have great trouble reducing their complaints to writing.

However, be aware that the opinion went on to observe that in order to provide fair notice under the FLSA:


"[t]o fall within the scope of the anti-retaliation provision, a complaint must be sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for their protection."
[Still unanswered is this question: Whether the FLSA’s “filed any complaint” language includes complaints, oral or written, made by employee to his or her employer internally and not involving notice to at that time, or action by, a governmental agency.]
Constitutional law: First Amendment, blog post, matters of public concern, no extraordinary circumstances, “employee covenants and non-disclosure agreement”, “client names, addresses, and credit card numbers”, injunction denied
Illustrative; not controlling law. This case involved disclosure of information about persons listed in Cambridge Publishing’s Who’s Who publication. Harsharan Sethi was its Director of Management Information Systems. He was the suspected author of the blog at www.cambridgeregistrscam.com, which:

  • indicated that subscribers to Who’s Who might be entitled to a full refund of their membership fees,

  • suggested members file complaints with the District Attorney and Attorney General, and

  • offered to provide information on management personnel, including “their backgrounds,” “their life styles,” and “their prior run ins with [the] IRS.”

Cambridge petitioned for an injunction to protect personal information, and after much activity in the state district court, the state appellate court ruled that the disclosures were protected by the First Amendment because they would be a matter of public concern. This is a complex case involving sensitive personal information and data, so reading the entire case is very important and also requires involvement of experienced, competent legal counsel in such a situation. Cambridge Who’s Who Publishing, Inc. v. Sethi, 009175/10, NYLJ 1201482619238, at *1 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty., 1/25/11); http://decisions.courts.state.ny.us/10JD/Nassau/decisions/INDEX/INDEX_new/BUCARIA/2011FEB/009175-10.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Privacy: union request for employee contact information denied
Illustrative; not controlling law. Privacy was paramount in this situation: a union had requested that a California employer disclose an employee’s home telephone number and address without first advising the employee of the disclosure and having the employee’s permission. This decision is based on California law, but it illustrates an important point about privacy and disclosure concerns, so employers in other jurisdictions ought to seriously concern seeking legal advice before responding to such a request. County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Committee, No. B217668 (CA. Ct.App.2nd Dist., Div 3, 2/24/11); 192 Cal. App. 4th 1409; 2011 Cal. App. LEXIS 209; http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11953095384640043249&q=County+of+Los+Angeles+v.+Los+Angeles+County+Employee+Relations+Committee,&hl=en&as_sdt=2,32&as_vis=1 [enhanced lexis.com version].
Title IX: intercollegiate athletics, equal athletic opportunity, sex discrimination, disparate impact, elimination of some university teams to comply with law, proportionality criteria, alternative methods considered, three-part test, statistical evidence
Illustrative; not controlling law. Though Title IX applies to educational institutions, some of the reasoning might be persuasive authority for other types of discrimination cases involving proportionality, disparate impact, etc. Because of its limited applicability outside of academic institutions and questionable persuasive authority, it is noted but not briefed here. Interested parties are referred to the case by these citations: Equity in Athletics Inc. v. Department of Educ., No. 10-1259 (4th Cir., 3/8/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 4493; http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/101259.P.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Class Action: arbitration, waiver, Stolt-Nielsen interpreted
Illustrative law and controlling law. For litigators, read the American Express case for illustrative law and Stolt-Nielsen for controlling law:

  • In re American Express Merchants' Litigation, No. 06-1871-cv (2nd Cir., 3/8/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 4507; http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/1e97f0d4-ce60-4145-9e85-3925af5613c9/1/doc/06-1871_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/1e97f0d4-ce60-4145-9e85-3925af5613c9/1/hilite/ [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., No. 08-1198, ____ U.S. ____; 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) ; 176 L. Ed. 2d 605; 2010 U.S. LEXIS 3672; 2010-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P76,982; 2010 AMC 913; 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 269; http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1198.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].

Trade secrets: publicly available ingredients, secret status of source code not invalidated; pilfering, “Dynamic Expected Utility Model”, Goldman Sachs and Société Générale


Illustrative; not controlling law. For litigators, read Decision Insights, Inc. v. Sentia Group, Inc., No. 09-2300 (4th Cir., 3/15/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5151; http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/092300.U.pdf; http://www.noncompetenews.com/file.axd?file=2011%2f3%2fDecision+Insights+v.+Sentia.pdf; [enhanced lexis.com version],

It’s the recipe, not the ingredients, that is protected.


NLRB: pre-discharge or post-discharge disparaging remarks – United States Supreme Court Jefferson Standard case, statements made after discharge, return to work issue, protected concerted activity, negative blog postings, disparate and discriminatory treatment, security access policy
Controlling law. Disparaging blog remarks made post-discharge were ruled to be illegal grounds under the National Labor Relations Act for his former employer to refuse to return him to work. It makes a difference if the comments were made before or after discharge in determining whether taking an adverse employment action may or may not be ruled discriminatory.
Stephens Media, LLC d/b/a Hawaii Tribune-Herald and Hawaii Newspaper Guild Local 39117, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 356 NLRB No 63, confirming order issued February 14, 2011; http://www.hawaii247.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/356_NLRB_63-Hawaii-Tribune-Herald.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Two cases were involved, a 1953 U. S. Supreme court case and this recent one, which differ in when the derogatory statements were made.
Background:

The Supreme Court case of Labor Board v. Electrical Workers, No. 15, 346 U.S. 464 (1953), involved the administrative law decision of the National Labor Relations Board v. Local Union No. 1229:


Upon the facts of this case, the discharge of certain employees by their employer did not constitute an unfair labor practice within the meaning of §§ 8(a)(1) and 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act; their discharge was "for cause" within the meaning of § 10(c) of that Act, and the action of the Labor Board in not requiring their reinstatement is here sustained. Pp. 346 U. S. 465-478.
(a) In the circumstances of this case, in which the employer was an operator of a radio and television station, the distribution by the employees in question of handbills which made public a disparaging attack upon the quality of the employer's television broadcasts, but which had no discernible relation to a pending labor controversy, was adequate cause for the discharge of these employees. Pp. 346 U. S. 467-477.
(b) The fortuity of the coexistence of a labor dispute affords these employees no substantial defense. Pp. 346 U. S. 476-477.
(c) There is no occasion to remand this cause to the Board for further specificity of findings, for even if the employees' attack were treated as a concerted activity within § 7 of the Act, the means used by them in conducting the attack deprived them of the protection of that section when read in the light and context of the purpose of the Act. Pp. 346 U. S. 477-478.
Current case reasoning and ruling:

The difference for the NLRB between the two cases was that the disparaging remarks made by the employee in the recent case were made after he was fired, not before, i.e., not during his employment, as in the Jefferson Standard case. In Stephens Media, the critical issue for the NLRB was whether the employee’s post-discharge remarks could form the basis of a denial of reinstatement or could cut-off a claim for back pay. In deciding those remarks could not, the NLRB stated that, “[s]imply put, employees who are unlawfully fired . . . often say unkind things about their former employers [after the fact]”, and therefore, the NLRB ruled, employers who violate the law should not be permitted to escape a full remedy for the effects of their unlawful actions based on the fired employees’ “natural human reactions” to those adverse employment actions.


Protecting Trade Secrets Through Employee Surveillance: Risky Business: Computer Fraud & Abuse Act (CFAA); trade secrets; Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA); Stored Communications Act 9SCA); Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA)
Interesting and informative article of March 14, 2011 by Michael R. Greco, a partner in the Employee Defection & Trade Secrets Practice Group at Fisher & Phillips LLP. http://www.noncompetenews.com/post/2011/03/14/Trade-Secret-Protection-Through-Employee-Surveillance-Risky-Business.aspx
FMLA: Free DoL agency forms to help you avoid mistakes
Resources from the Department of Labor:

  • Return to work ideas: http://www.dol.gov/odep/return-to-work/

  • DoL official forms: http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/

Retaliation: “continuing violation” doctrine, timely filing, sexual harassment, hostile work environment, threats, humiliation, constructive discharge, emotional distress, jury verdict, proper instructions, verdict upheld


Controlling law. Two major points were made by this case: (1) the doctrine of “continuing violation” was extended from its application in hostile work environment cases to retaliation cases, and (2) the doctrine of “constructive” discharge was not only reaffirmed, the appellate court said it would not second guess the jury.
Continuing violation:

When deciding if a discrimination claim has been timely filed, NM courts distinguish between two types of discrimination:



  1. A “discrete act” would be termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, etc., that “take[s] place at an identifiable time.”

  2. A hostile work environment claim “involve[s] repeated conduct over days or years”. Under the “continuing violation” doctrine, if a claimant files within 300 days of any instance of the alleged misconduct, then NM courts may allow evidence and consideration of all instances, even if they occurred over the course of several years.

Retaliation claims have differed from discrimination claims, and are a separate claim for relief.

Instead of having to prove discrimination, the claimant must prove:


  1. he or she engaged in a protected activity, such as complaining of discrimination,

  2. he or she suffered an adverse employment action, and

  3. there is a causal connection between the two events.

The appellate court ruled the district court correctly applied the continuing violation doctrine and correctly instructed the jury on that theory of liability.
Constructive discharge verdict:

The constructive discharge theory of liability was reaffirmed, and the appellate court ruled that the jury had been fully and properly instructed on the applicable law, heard and weighed the evidence, and that there was substantial evidence to support its verdict of $94,653.93 for lost wages and $30,000 for emotional distress, and therefore it said it would not second guessing the decision of the jurors. Charles v. Regents of N.M. State Univ., (11/4/11); 2010-NMCA-133; 2010 N.M. App. LEXIS 133; 110 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1252; http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4510195608191118953&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr [enhanced lexis.com version].


FLSA: overtime calculation, “regular rate” concept
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